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RUSSIA

XX CENTURY

LUBYANKA

STALIN

And VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD

January 1922 - December 1936

DOCUMENTATION

RUSSIA.

XX CENTURY

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STALIN AND VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD

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COMPILERS:

V.N. Khaustov, V.P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnikova

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This volume is one of the collections of documents devoted to the role of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) and Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin) in the creation of Soviet punitive organs and their use as an instrument of state administration and strengthening the dictatorship.

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yyy 5-85646-087-1

#### INTRODUCTION

This collection is the first publication of documents from Stalin's archive. For many years, this archive was in closed storage as part of the so-called Kremlin archive of documents and materials of the Politburo—the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After 1991, Stalin's documents and his personal archive ended up in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. In 1998, after the appeal of the Chairman of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions A.N. Yakovleva, President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin decided to transfer Stalin's personal archive to the federal archival service of Russia.

The topic “Stalin and the Cheka-GPU-OGPU-NKVD” is extensive and complex due to the nature of the power that has been established in the country for decades, and due to the role that this person played in our history during his lifetime and even after his death. In numerous archives, a huge mass of documents and materials have been deposited, revealing the leading role of Stalin in the constant expansion of the activities of the security agencies, the use of their controlling and punishing functions in all areas of state administration. Thus, Stalin turned the punitive organs into the most reliable instrument for strengthening personal power. The collection publishes documents from Stalin's personal archive, that is, those that he himself considered necessary to preserve, or those that were sent to the archive by Stalin's assistants according to his routine.

Documents and materials on the activities of the security agencies of the Soviet state began to be deposited in Stalin's archives from 1922, when he took the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party and when, due to Lenin's illness, enormous power was concentrated in his hands, including and power over the Cheka.

The collection contains documents that give an idea of the main activities of the punitive organs and Stalin's personal participation in the formation, development of the nature and methods of their work from 1922 to 1953.

Since their inception, the security organs have been one of the most important instruments of power of the ruling communist party in the Soviet state. As noted in February 1919 in the appeal of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to the communists - employees of the emergency commissions, “The Cheka was created, exists and works only as direct organs of the party under its directives and under its control.” This principle was enshrined in the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of February 15, 1922.

However, the principle is the principle, and in the real political life of the country, a situation has developed when the party, for the sake of its own survival, divided

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power with an organization that gradually grew into a kind of "state within a state".

A wide range of tasks were entrusted to the bodies of the Cheka-GPU-OGPU-NKVD-KGB: combating the activities of foreign special services; conducting intelligence work in foreign countries; detection and suppression of any activity against the existing government and the state system. The entire system of places of detention was part of the security organs - prisons, camps, special settlements, places of exile. But in the end, the main task of the security agencies was to maintain the power of the only ruling party - the Communist Party, and hence their own power. The nature and the very essence of the political regime inevitably made the first person in the established system of power, that is, Stalin, the complete master of both the party and the security agencies. Stalin quite soon, even under the seriously ill Lenin, using his position, became, in essence, the sole head of the security organs.

The entire system of power established by the communist regime was based on violence - physical, political and moral. The most important instrument for the implementation of this policy was the bodies of the Cheka-GPU-OGPU-GUGB NKVD of the USSR. In order to justify the policy of violence, back in the 1920s, Stalin put forward the notorious thesis that the class struggle would intensify as socialist construction progressed. In a report at the 17th Party Congress in 1934, he proclaimed the thesis about the possibility of building a classless socialist society, but emphasized that the path to it goes through "strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat by deploying the class struggle, by destroying classes, by liquidating the remnants of the capitalist classes in battles with enemies, both internal and external. Thus, Stalin gave absolutely clear guidelines for inciting struggle in the country. During the 1930s, the state security organs, with the sanction of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, used a variety of violent measures to "stabilize" the internal political situation of the USSR.

The practical impact of Stalin on the activities of the state security organs increases sharply as V.I. Lenin and, accordingly, in the process of further strengthening the position of the Secretary General in the party apparatus, although at the same time it should not be forgotten that Lenin was the organizer and main guardian in the formation of Soviet punitive bodies.

The collection opens with the minutes of the meeting of the L.B. Kamenev - I.V. Stalin on the reorganization of the Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and the creation of the State Political Administration under the NKVD of the RSFSR. Stalin took an active part in the development of a new regulation on the GPU and its main departments. And in subsequent years, all changes in the structure of the GPU-OGPU-NKVD, the expansion of their rights and opportunities took place under the direct practical guidance of Stalin. Gradually, large subdivisions of the internal troops, all border units, and the police became part of the security agencies.

In 1931-1934, the OGPU turned into a powerful operational and military department, to which all operational security units were subordinate.

1 XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (6). January 26 - February 10, 1934 Verbatim record. M., 1934. S. 28.



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both central and local bodies of the OGPU, border and internal troops, VOKhR and the police.

The expansion and strengthening of the direct influence of the state security organs on all spheres of the life of Soviet society was associated with the processes of internal development of the party and the state. The strengthening of the dictatorship of Stalin's personal power, the course towards an accelerated pace of industrialization and collectivization had a decisive influence on the activities of the GPU-OGPU-GUGB NKVD. Difficulties and contradictions in the course of this construction intensified the desire of the ruling elite to increasingly actively use punitive bodies in the implementation of their plans.

As historical experience has shown, the political regime established by the Communist Party simply could not exist without repressions, without the widespread use of violent methods in governing the country.

One of the largest operations of the GPU in 1922, begun at the initiative of Lenin, and then held under the control of Stalin, was the expulsion from Soviet Russia of scientific and technical specialists, writers, philosophers and other representatives of various strata of intellectual Russia. , many of which were the pride of domestic and world technical and social thought.

During the years 1920-1930, at the direction of Stalin and his colleagues in the Politburo, the organs of the GPU-OGPU-GUGB NKVD were entrusted with the task of liquidating the Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary and other political parties of a socialist direction. As bodies of the political police, the Chekists actively contributed to the disintegration of various political parties, discrediting and persecuting their leaders. The documents testify that it was the state security organs that were entrusted with the task of preparing falsified trials, at which the activities of these parties were portrayed as subversive, carried out on instructions from the special services of foreign states. At trials in the case of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Menshevik and Labor Peasant Parties, their leaders were exposed to the whole world as enemies of the people, striving for the liquidation of the Soviet state and the restoration of the capitalist order. The documents show that Stalin personally controlled the course of the trials, determining in advance what kind of testimony should be obtained from the defendants. In the fact that in the political life of Soviet Russia there was no place left for other parties, except for one, the decisive role was played by the organs of state security.

Stalin himself identified specific "enemies". In order to deflect responsibility from himself and the Bolshevik leadership for major failures in the economy, in supplying the population with food, he pointed out that the "malicious sabotage of the top of the bourgeois intelligentsia in all branches of our industry, the brutal struggle of the kulaks against collective forms of economy" was to blame for everything. in the countryside, sabotage of the activities of the Soviet government by the bureaucratic elements of the apparatus, which is an agent of the class enemy. He referred to the "enemies of socialism", "agents of our class enemies" those people who advocated a reasonable reduction in the pace of industrialization, bringing them in line with the possibilities that the country had in those years 1 .

Any ideological and theoretical disputes about the ways of socialist construction, any "dissenting opinion" in the party, Stalin considered as anti-

1 Stalin I. Works. T. 7. S. 180-181.

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party actions, and then qualified them as attempts to create anti-proletarian, anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary groups: "Every and every deviation from the Leninist line that exists in our party is a reflection of the resistance of the moribund classes ... It is impossible to launch a real struggle against class enemies, having in the rear their reflection in the Party, leaving in the rear people who do not believe in our cause and who are trying in every possible way to slow down our progress" 1 .

The security organs were actively used personally by Stalin in the internal party struggle to crack down on his political opponents. Already during the lifetime of the first head of the state security agencies, Dzerzhinsky, the persecution of members of various opposition party groups began: Myasnikov, Shlyapnikov. After the Fifteenth Party Congress, by decisions of the Collegium of the OGPU and the Special Conference, the supporters of Trotsky were condemned. Stalin sharply reprimanded the leadership of the OGPU when it sent an appeal to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party of imprisoned Trotskyists from the Upper Ural political isolator.

During the 1920s and 1930s, some leading figures of the Soviet state seemed to be trying to limit the functions of state security agencies to certain legal norms. People's Commissar of Justice Krylenko, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, with whom Stalin consulted during this period, spoke about the desirability of softening punitive measures. Krylenko considered it quite sufficient to be guided in practice by the norms of the criminal and criminal procedure codes, constantly objecting to the expansion of extrajudicial powers of the GPU-OGPU. Litvinov was always worried about the reaction of political circles in Europe to certain actions of the GPU-OGPU. But this in no way meant that they sought to change the general course of the punitive policy, and after the conviction of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsy, no one made any attempts to weaken the role of state security in the country's domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, some of them proposed even more radical and cruel punishments for former members of the opposition.

Immediately after the assassination of Kirov, on the same day, December 1, 1934, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (urgently, by questioning its members) adopted a resolution "On the procedure for conducting cases on the preparation or commission of terrorist acts", which provided for the conduct of such cases " expedited procedure", cancellation of applications for pardon and immediate execution upon sentencing. The initiative to adopt such a resolution came from Stalin... But after all, the same People's Commissar of Justice Krylenko back in 1927 (after the assassination in Poland of Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR P.L. Voikov) in a special note to the Politburo proposed the same and even tougher measures: "extraordinary courts composed of 3 persons", "no accusation and no defense", "sentences are not subject to appeal", "immediate execution".

The accelerated construction of the "socialist" economy increasingly required non-economic and emergency measures, and Stalin began to use the state security organs as one of the most important tools for economic development, endowing them with the functions of monitoring and verifying the execution of decisions of the highest power, which is still known -

Stalin I. Works. T. 7. S. 51.

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significantly expanded the capabilities of the special services in inciting fear in the country and arbitrariness in the actions of the authorities.

Of course, the bodies of the GPU-OGPU-GU GB NKVD of the USSR performed the necessary functions in solving problems of strengthening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, in timely informing about real external threats, in protecting the defense potential, state secrets and secrets from foreign intelligence agencies. But during this period, this activity occupied a much smaller part of the huge amount of work entrusted to the state security agencies.

...

The published documents are taken from the archives of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia (CA FSB of Russia). Part of the documents was declassified for this collection.

The collection is compiled chronologically. It includes documents of party bodies, the highest bodies of state power and administration, and the highest judicial institutions. First of all, they contain information about the events with which Stalin was acquainted, took part in their discussion and often gave his opinion. The vast majority of documents reflect the diverse areas of activity of the organs of the GPU—OGPU—GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR. According to their type, these are special messages, orders, circulars, directives, information reports, protocols of interrogations.

Most of the documents are published for the first time. The republished documents are necessary for comprehensive coverage in this edition of Stalin's role in the organization and activities of the state security agencies. Although these problems are reflected in a number of fundamental collections of documents published in recent years\*.

Separate documents were not included in the main publication, but were used to the maximum extent in the comments.

Significant assistance in the selection of documents was provided to the compilers by the publication of the agendas of meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)-VKP(b).

In documents, some abbreviations are sometimes allowed due to the same type or repetitive information found in the text. The omitted text during publication is marked with a dot. Some appendices to documents are not published when the problem or question is sufficiently disclosed in the content of the main document. This is stipulated in the subscript

tossing.

Abbreviations in some documents have been restored in square brackets. Most of the remaining abbreviations are listed in the list of abbreviations.

Letters to I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936 Collection of documents. M.: Russia is young. 1995. Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents. Comp., O.V. Khlevniuk,

AB. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L A Horn. M.: AIRO XX, 1995. The tragedy of the Soviet village: Collectivization and dispossession. 1927-1939. Documents and materials: In 5 volumes / Edited by V. Danilov, R. Manning, L. Viola. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999-2002. T. 1-4 Stalin and Vaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 / Comp. O.V. Khlevnyuk, R.U. Davis, L.P. Kosheleva, EA. Rees, L A. Horny. M.: ROSSPEN, 2001.

„ 2 Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)—VKP(b). Meeting agendas. 1919-1952: Catalogue. M. : ROSSPEN, 2000-2001. T. 1-2

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Each document has an editorial title. Document headers are enclosed in quotation marks.

The texts of documents are printed with the preservation of their stylistic features that characterize the era and the authors of these documents. Gross spelling errors and obvious omissions in the documents have been corrected without reservation.

Saved and reproduced all the resolutions and marks on the documents, except for insignificant office work. Resolutions and notes are placed in footnotes after each document.

The collection is provided with a scientific reference apparatus, including an introduction, notes on the text and content of published documents, a nominal commentary and an index of names, which contains a list of surnames and initials of persons mentioned in the text, in alphabetical order.

The compilers express their gratitude to the staff of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for their assistance in preparing the collection.

V.N. Khaustov  
V.P. Naumov

No. 1

MINUTES OF THE COMMISSION MEETING L.B. KAMENEVA  
AND I.V. STALIN ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE VCHEKA

January 20-23, 1922

There are t.t. Kamenev, Stalin, Eiduk, Lezhava, Fomin, Borisov, Sokolnikov, Unshlikht

No. 1, item 4 - Questions from Comrade Unshlikht: a) about the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; b) about the Cheka

a) Instruct Comrade Unshlikht to take measures to ensure that the manuscript known to him is published abroad no later than in 2 weeks (1).

b) Instruct t.t. Kursky and Unshlikht to develop within a week, on the basis of the following directives, a draft regulation on behalf of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and submit it for approval to the Politburo.

In pursuance of the IX Congress of Soviets, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decides:

1) Abolish the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Crimes ex officio.

2) All cases of crimes directed against the Soviet system or representing a violation of Soviet laws are adjudicated by the Revolutionary Tribunals or People's Courts, as appropriate.

3) As part of the NKVD, create a State Political Directorate under the NKVD, acting on the basis of a special position under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and his deputy appointed by the Council of People's Commissars (2).

4) Local bodies of the State Political Administration are not part of the departments of the Administration, but are directly attached to the provincial executive committees, and in the autonomous republics - to the Central Executive Committees.

5) The State Political Directorate of the NKVD is instructed to:

a) a special fight against espionage, banditry and the suppression of open counter-revolutionary actions;

6) railway security and waterways and cargo following them;

c) political protection of the borders of the republic, the fight against smuggling.

b) In order to fulfill the tasks assigned to the State Political Directorate, GPU troops are at the disposal of the GPU. For the same purposes, the GPU is granted the right to search, seize and arrest on the basis of

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special instructions developed by the GPU and approved by the NKJUST, and the following rules must be observed during arrests:

a) filing charges no later than 2 weeks from the date of arrest

b) the right to be kept under arrest without referral to a court for no more than 2 months, after which the GPU must ask the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for the right to continue this period in case of special need, or to transfer the case to court, or to release.

7) In addition to the affairs of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee listed in this provision, special instructions may be given to the State Political Administration.

8) Adopt by a special resolution:

- a) the center of activity of the GPU should be concentrated on organizing information, inside information and studying all counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet acts in all areas;
- b) to preserve as much as possible the combat apparatus of the Cheka in such a way that, in the event of an aggravation of the civil war, it could be quickly and decisively deployed;
- c) the NKJUST retains the right to control the legality of the actions of the GPU;
- d) in view of the transfer of the punitive functions that were at the disposal of the Cheka to the courts, to strengthen the judicial apparatus in every possible way, among other things, by introducing persons specially nominated by the Cheka into the judges.

Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (hereinafter APRF). F. 3. Op. 57. D. 35. L. 63-64. Script. Typescript.

\* There is a typewritten note in the text: "Commission t.t. Kamenev and Stalin appointed to the Politburo 20/1-23/1 1922".

No. 2

DRAFT DECISION ON ABOLISHING THE VCHEK, SUBMITTED  
BY THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSION OF JUSTICE TO  
THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

January 30, 1922

In pursuance of the resolution of the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the reorganization of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Crimes ex officio and its local bodies, V.Ts.I.K. decides:

1. Abolish the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and its local bodies.
2. Assign to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, along with other tasks specified in § 1 of the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the fulfillment of the following tasks throughout the territory of the RSFSR:
  - a) suppression of open counter-revolutionary actions, including banditry;
  - b) taking measures to protect and combat espionage;
  - c) protection of railway and waterways of communication and cargo following them;
  - d) political protection of the borders of the RSFSR;
  - e) combating smuggling and crossing the borders of the Republic without appropriate permits;
  - f) fulfillment of special instructions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee or the Council of People's Commissars for the protection of the revolutionary order.

3. In order to carry out these tasks, to form a Political Administration under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR under the personal supervision of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs or his deputy appointed by the Council of People's Commissars, and in the localities Political Departments in

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autonomous republics and regions under the Central Executive Committees, and in the provinces under the Provincial Executive Committees.

4. Political Departments under the C.I.K. autonomous republics and regions remain directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs for Political Administration on the same basis as other united People's Commissariats and Administrations of the Republics and Regions.

5. The Political Departments of the Provincial Executive Committees act on the basis of a special regulation on them, approved by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

NOTE: Special Departments and Transportation Departments are fighting crimes in the army and railway. dor. on the basis of special provisions approved by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

6. Directly subordinate to the Political Directorate are special units of the troops, in the amount determined by the decision of the Council of Labor and Defense, controlled by the Special, which is part of the Institutions of the Political Directorate, the headquarters of the troops of the Political Directorate of the NKVD, as well as the railway police.

7. If it is necessary to take preventive measures against persons involved in counter-revolutionary actions, banditry, theft on railway transport and waterways, smuggling and crossing borders without the permission of the Political Directorates, Political Departments, as well as their representatives in the counties, the right to conduct searches, seizures and seizures is granted on the following grounds:

a) in relation to persons caught at the scene of a crime, arrests, searches and seizures by agents P.U. or P.O. may be produced without a special order from the P.U. or P.O. and a special order with the subsequent sanction of the chief P.U. or P.O. within 48 hours. preventive measures taken, in all other cases, arrest, as well as searches and seizures, are allowed only by a special decree of P.U. or P. O. signed by their chief on special warrants, the procedure for issuing which is determined by the instructions developed by the Political Administration and approved by the People's Commissariat of Justice;

b) no later than two weeks from the date of arrest, charges must be brought against the arrested person;

c) no later than two months from the date of arrest, the Political Directorate either releases the arrested person or asks the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for permission to further isolation, unless special circumstances of the case require it for a period determined by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee or sends the case to court, listing the arrested person for it.

8. All ordinary criminal cases on speculation, malfeasance and other crimes that are before the publication of this decision in the production of the Cheka and its bodies are subject to transfer within two weeks to the Revolutionary Tribunals and the People's Court according to their affiliation and henceforth all cases of crimes against

ruled against the Soviet system or representing a violation of the laws of the RSFSR are subject to resolution exclusively in court by the Revolutionary Tribunals or People's Courts, as appropriate.

9. General supervision of the implementation of art. Art. 6 and 7 of this resolution to assign to the People's Commissariat of Justice.

10. In accordance with this resolution, supplement the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

30.1.22 Kursk

Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereinafter RGASPI). f - 17. Op. 3. D. 259. L. 7-8. Script. Typescript.

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No. 3

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE VCHEK"

February 2, 1922

No. 93, p. 11 - Approval of the draft regulation on the reorganization of the Cheka (post. PB No. 91-a of 23.1.) (Present. Kursky and Unshlikht).

a) Approve the draft regulation on the abolition of the Cheka.

Ask the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to pass this provision no later than 5.II.

b) Instruct Comrade Unshlikht to submit the regulations on the State Political Administration with the conclusion of the People's Commissariat of Justice for the approval of the Politburo.

c) To pay special attention to the reorganization of the economic department of the Cheka into a department for information of economic agencies on the progress of work in this area.

d) Under the People's Commissar, he or his deputy, who is at the head of the GPU, to form the Board of the GPU, approved by the Council of People's Commissars.

e) The further direction of affairs and the distribution of the property of the Cheka should be carried out by a special commission appointed by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, consisting of comrade t. Unshlikht, Kursky and one representative of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Comrade Yenukidze.

e) Save for the State Political Administration. in the matter of clothing, food supply and the use of means of communication, the rights of the military department. The circle of persons to whom these rights are granted should be instructed to establish the same missions.

g) The issue of recognizing employees of the State Political Administration as military personnel



transfer to the same commission with the involvement of representatives of the RVSR and the bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions faction for discussion of this issue.

h) Instruct the commission to carry out both of these decisions (paragraphs "e" and paragraph "g") in accordance with the Soviet procedure and to leave the old procedure until the decision of the commission.

i) Instruct comrade Unshlikht, together with comrade Kursky, to draw up a summary of the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars that remain in force, in view of the fact that they do not contradict the adopted decision.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 259. I. 2. Original. Typescript.

No. 4

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON COORDINATION WITH THE POLITBURO OF THE DECISIONS OF THE PRESIDUM  
OF THE VTsIK RELATED TO  
THE STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION" (3)

February 15, 1922

No. 97, paragraph 15-s - On the coordination with the Politburo of the decisions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee related to the State Political Administration. (comrades Yenukidze, Unshlikht).

Make Comrade Yenukidze personally responsible for ensuring that not a single issue related to the State Political Administration is submitted for resolution by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee without prior approval from the Political Bureau.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 266. L. 5. Original. Typescript.

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No. 5

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATION ON THE GPO

February 27, 1922

No. 104, paragraph 5-c - Regulations on the State Political Administration (comrade Unshlikht).

For the final review of the draft regulation on the GPU submitted by the commission, a commission should be created consisting of comrades. Stalin, Kamenev, Sklyansky, Unschlichg and Kursky, who is instructed to submit to the Politburo on Thursday 2/12 the final text of the regulation with the agreed wording of the amendments.

RGASPI F. 17. Op. 3. D. 273. I. 2. Original. Typescript.

No. 6

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA V.M. MOLOTOV ON THE  
TRANSFER TO THE POLITBURO OF THE REGULATIONS  
ON THE GPU, PROVINCE, TRANSPORT  
DEPARTMENTS AND DISTRICT AUTHORITIES

March 6, 1922 No.  
80627

At the same time, I enclose in 3 copies for the meeting of the Politburo approved by the commission: the 1st regulation on the State Political Administration, the 2nd regulation on the provincial departments of the GPU, the 3rd regulation on the transport departments of the GPU, the 4th regulation on county authorized gubernia departments of the GPU.

The regulation on the special departments of the GPU is directed to the approval of Comrade. Sklyansky.

Application: mentioned. \_

Deputy Chairman of the GPU Unshlikht

Approved by the commission 22.1. 22

In development and addition to the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922, the following is approved:

POSITION

ABOUT STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

I. General provision

1. The State Political Directorate (GPU for short) is under the NKVD.

2. The chairman of the GPU is the people's commissar of internal affairs or his deputy appointed by the Council of People's Commissars.

3. To resolve the main issues and the direction of work, as well as issues that require agreement between the individual parts, a Collegium is formed under the chairman of the GPU, the members of which are approved by the Council of People's Commissars.

4. To carry out the tasks assigned to it, the GPU organizes on the ground:

a) provincial departments of the GPU under the State Executive Committee;

b) regional departments of the GPU under the Central Executive Committee of the autonomous republics and regions;

c) special departments of the GPU of fronts, military districts and armies, special departments of divisions and border guards;

d) transport departments of the GPU on railway and waterways;

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e) plenipotentiary representations of the GPU for uniting, directing and coordinating the work of local bodies on the outskirts and in autonomous republics and regions.

5. The GPU is an institution with a strictly centralized administration with the rights of the active units of the Red Army in matters of the use of the railway. and waterways of communication, state means of communication (telegraph, telephone and radio), supplying employees with food, uniforms and other benefits associated with this provision (according to the resolution of the STO of September 17, 1920).

6. All staff members of the GPU and its local organs are considered to be in active military service and are assigned all the rights, duties and benefits associated with this provision.

7. The estimate of the GPU is approved by the Council of People's Commissars, all estimates of local bodies are passed and approved in the general manner according to the estimate of the GPU.

8. At the direct disposal of the GPU are special troops, consolidated into a separate army of the State Political Administration, in the number established by the STO, and subordinate in all respects to the Chairman of the State Political Administration.

9. The State Political Administration delegates its representative with the right of a decisive vote to the plenum of the Supreme Tribunal of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, while the individual boards of the Supreme Tribunal include representatives of the relevant parts of the GPU.

The provincial departments of the GPU delegate their representative to the collegium of the provinces of the revolutionary tribunal, the special departments to the corresponding revolutionary military tribunals, and the transport departments to the corresponding railway revolutionary tribunals.

## II. Tasks of the State Political Administration

10. The tasks of the GPU are:

a) prevention and suppression of open counter-revolutionary actions (both political and economic);

b) the fight against all kinds of bandit and armed uprisings;

c) the fight against the obviously criminal attitudes of employees of economic enterprises to the tasks given to them, as well as the disclosure of counter-revolutionary organizations and individuals whose activities are aimed at undermining the economic organs of the republic;

d) protection of state secrets and combating espionage in all its manifestations (information, harmful, political, military and economic);

e) protection of railway and waterways, combating theft of goods and crimes aimed at destroying transport

or decrease in its carrying capacity;

f) political protection of the borders of the RSFSR, the fight against economic and political smuggling and illegal border crossings;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars for the protection of the revolutionary order.

### III. Means for the implementation of the tasks outlined

11. The means for the implementation of the tasks assigned to the GPU are: information, search, surveillance, arrest, seizure, search, inquiry, preliminary investigation and registration:

a) collection and communication to the appropriate state institutions of all information that is of interest to them from the point of view of the fight against counter-revolution, both in the political and economic fields;

#### DOCUMENTATION

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b) undercover surveillance of criminal or suspicious persons, groups and organizations on the territory of the RSFSR and beyond the cordon;

h) issuance of permits for travel abroad and entry into the RSFSR of foreign and Russian citizens;

d) expulsion of unreliable foreign citizens from the RSFSR;

e) viewing p / t and other correspondence, both domestic and foreign;

f) proceedings for the purpose of search in compliance with the rules and procedures established by Art. 7 decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922, arrests, searches, seizures, requests for certificates, information and extracts from business papers, reports and reports;

g) the suppression of armed counter-revolutionary and bandit uprisings with the help of GPU troops;

h) carrying out inquiries and sending cases of discovered criminal acts for hearing to the judicial authorities in compliance with Art. 7 resolutions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 6.II.22;

i) registration of persons convicted and suspected of criminal acts and their cases; registration of unreliable administrative and leading personnel of state institutions, industrial enterprises, command and administrative personnel of the Red Army.

Statistical and political development of registration data.

Registration and summation of abnormal phenomena in the life of the RSFSR in order to identify their causes and consequences.

12. The People's Commissariat of Justice exercises general supervision over the legality of the actions of the GPU and its local bodies.

"Approved" November 24-22 Yenukidze, Krshenko, Unshlikht "Approved"  
February 5-22 Stalin, Kamenev, Kursky, Unshlikht

## POSITION

ON THE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE POLITICAL  
ADMINISTRATION § I. General provision

The transport departments of the GPU are bodies that perform the tasks assigned to the GPU by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 on the railway and waterways.

### § 2. Maintenance tasks

The tasks of the transport departments are:

- a) the fight against open counter-revolutionary actions, including banditry;
- b) the fight against espionage;
- c) protection of railway and waterways;
- d) fight against cargo theft;
- e) protection of public peace and order;
- f) criminal investigation functions;
- g) assisting the NKPS bodies in the restoration of transport in cases where they apply to the TO;
- h) fulfillment of other special assignments for the protection of the revolutionary order.

Note: All of these tasks are performed by TOs within the right-of-way of railways and towpath 1 of waterways.

1 Towpath - a strip of coast intended for people or horses pulling the ship on a towline (rope, rope). "That burlbki go tow" (Nekrasov). - Comp.

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### § 3. Means for the implementation of tasks

TO carries out its tasks by:

- a) information, reconnaissance and search, the production of preliminary inquiry and the adoption of preventive measures.

Note: in its actions, TO is guided by p.p. the 7th and 8th resolutions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 on the GPU;

- b) the closest connection and mutual information with the bodies of the People's Commissariat of the Way.

#### § 4. Organizational structure

1. The organizational structure of the TO is parallel to the structure of the NKPS bodies.
2. The local bodies of the TO of the GPU are: on the railways - district, road, linear TO of the GPU, their branches and operational points, and on water transport - regional, district TO of the GPU and their operational points.

#### §5.

To protect railways, combat theft of goods, banditry and the illegal use of transport, the TO have at their disposal GPU troops attached to them.

#### §6.

The internal organization and distribution of maintenance works are provided for by special schemes, plans and instructions approved by the GPU.

#### §7.

Credits for the maintenance of the TO of the GPU are issued in the general order for all bodies of the GPU.

"Approved" 24.11.22 Yenukidze, Krylenko, Unshlikht "Approved" 5.11.22 Stalin, Kamenev, Unshlikht, Kursky

#### POSITION

##### ABOUT PROVINCE AND REGIONAL

##### DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

1. In order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, the GPU organizes provincial and regional departments of the State Political Administration on the territory of the provinces of the autonomous republics and regions.
2. Provincial departments of the GPU are organized under the GIK and are subject to all orders of the GPU.
3. Regional departments of the GPU are organized under the Central Executive Committee of the autonomous republics and are directly subordinate to the GPU.
4. At the head of the provincial and regional departments of the GPU are their chiefs, appointed by the local provincial executive committees with the approval of the GPU.
5. The heads of the provincial and regional departments of the GPU bear full responsibility for all their work to the GPU.
6. Chiefs of the lips. and region departments regularly inform the relevant State Election Commission and the Central Executive Committee, as well as the provincial and regional congresses of Soviets about the political situation in the provinces. and regions.
7. States of provinces, and region. departments are developed and approved by the GPU, and changes in such are allowed only with the permission of the GPU.
8. All lip estimates. and region departments pass and are approved in the general order according to the estimate of the GPU.

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9. For the execution of operational tasks of the lips. and region departments are given parts of the GPU troops in the amount determined by the GPU. Commanders of units attached to the lips. and region departments, are operationally subordinate to the heads of the respective provinces. and region departments.

10. The heads of provincial and regional departments, in exceptional cases, have the right to use the Workers' and Peasants' Militia for operational purposes.

11. In order to carry out information and search on the territory of counties (cantons, uluses) of a given province or region of the provinces. and region departments create the institution of district (canton, ulus) commissioners, subordinate exclusively to the head of the provincial and regional departments and working on the basis of a special instruction.

12. Commissioners of provincial and regional departments have the right to search, observe and work undercover on cases.

Note. In exceptional cases, in politically unsettled counties or those engulfed in unrest and uprisings, the heads of provincial and regional departments have the right to grant operational rights to the county commissioners, such as: arrests, searches and seizures.

13. The materials obtained by authorized persons are transferred for further development to provincial and regional departments.

Note 1. The tasks of the provincial and regional departments of the GPU are set out in § 16, paragraphs. "a", "b", "c" and "e", of the General Regulations on the State Political Administration.

Note 2. Means for the implementation of the tasks of the provincial and regional departments are set out in § 17 of the Regulations on the State Political Administration.

"Approved" 24.11.22 Yenukidze, Krylenko, Unshlikht "Approved" 5.II.22  
Stalin, Kamenev, Unshlikht, Kursky

#### REGULATIONS ON THE COUNTY (CANTON, ULUS) AUTHORIZED PROVINCE AND REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

##### I. General position of the GPU

§ 1. Provincial and regional departments of the GPU, in order to organize a systematic search and inform in the implementation of the tasks assigned to them, establish district commissioners in the respective counties, cantons and uluses and in large industrial areas.

§ 2. District commissioners are appointed, subordinate and fully responsible for their work to the heads of the respective provincial and regional departments of the GPU.

§ 3. County commissioners do not have punitive rights (arrests and searches), and all operations to prevent or suppress the activities of criminals are carried out by the provinces. and region departments through specifically for this

the purposes of the exiled delegates. In cases of exceptional necessity, in order to prevent a planned crime, or if the criminal can hide, the operation is carried out through the county militia on the instructions of the commissioner. Detained criminals are sent by the police directly to the provinces, or region departments, and materials on the case - through the authorized person. In order to maintain secrecy, the employees of the authorized person do not participate in any operations carried out in their area.

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accept, and work only on awareness, observation and selection of incriminating material and information. On each operation carried out through the police, the authorized person must submit to the beginning. lips. department a thoroughly motivated report with a detailed explanation of the need for such.

Note. In exceptional cases, in politically unsettled or unrest-ridden counties and districts, beginning lips. or region departments have the right to allow operational functions (arrests, searches and seizures) to be authorized by the county.

§ 4. Financing and supply of the Commissioners takes place through the lips. departments.

§ 5. Establish new commissioners in counties and districts where there were none before, lips. and region departments have the right only with the permission of the GPU, about which a thoroughly motivated report must be submitted indicating what reasons and circumstances necessitate the establishment of a new commissioner, confirmed by the provincial executive committee.

## II. Tasks of county commissioners

§ 6. The tasks of the county commissioners are:

- a) comprehensive coverage of the political and economic life of the county;
- b) detection, installation and coverage of the activities of persons, political groups, parties hostile to Soviet power, collection and processing of materials and incriminating data on the criminal activities of these groups or persons;
- c) identification, installation and coverage of the activities of persons undermining the military and economic power of the state, and - in exceptional cases, with the special permission of the provincial departments - the selection of materials and information about major malfeasance;
- d) supervision over the storage of political, economic and military secrets of the republic from encroachment on them by espionage;
- e) timely information of the lips. and region departments on criminal and sabotage activities of the above persons and groups with the expectation of timely prevention and suppression of their criminal activities;
- f) registration and registration of the categories of criminal and suspicious persons listed above.

## III. Means for the implementation of the tasks outlined



§ 7. The means for the implementation of the above tasks are:

- a) a widely organized information network;
- b) external and internal undercover surveillance of criminal and suspicious persons;
- c) registration and accounting of a criminal and suspicious element, as a reference book about their previous activities;
- d) timely and regular information to the provincial and regional departments and the provision of incriminating materials to them in order to bring the indicated criminals to justice.

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"Approved" 24.11.22 Yenukidze, Krylenko, Unshlikht "Approved" 5.11.22  
Stalin, Kamenev, Unshlikht, Kursky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 49-62. Script. Typescript.

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No. 7

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE REGULATIONS ON THE GPU

March 9, 1922

No. PO, p. 5-s - Regulations on the State Political Administration (comrade Unshlikht).

- a) Approve the regulation on the State Political Administration.
- b) Adopt by a special resolution. "Give the right to the RVSR, in agreement with the GPU, to remove from the staff of the institutions of the GPU persons of military age who are subject to mobilization."
- c) Approve the regulation on the special departments of the GPU.
- d) Instruct the GPU and comrade Stalin to develop the question of the relationship between the bodies of the GPU and the government of the independent republics and carry it out by agreement with the governments of the independent republics.
- e) Accept the following proposals of Comrade Unshlikht: "Extrajudicial verdicts of the Cheka and its bodies in cases, the nature of which is determined by Article 8 of the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 6.II, are reviewed as necessary (amnesty, early release, etc.) .) by a commission chaired by a representative of the GPU and two members of the representative of the Verkhtrib and the NKJ.

Cases on political crimes, k.-r., espionage, banditry, as well as on cases of employees of the Cheka who have extrajudicial sentences of the Cheka and its bodies, have been reviewed. GPU.

Recognize it necessary that the investigation of cases of malfeasance and other crimes of employees of the GPU is conducted by the organs of the GPU, and it is permissible to issue extrajudicial sentences in these cases by the GPU with the knowledge of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

The GPU shall be granted the right to isolate citizens of foreigners in the camp before the exchange by agreement with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and with the knowledge of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

All materials of investigative proceedings in cases under investigation by the GPU, passing through the judicial authorities, are sent to the archives of the GPU upon receipt of the verdict into legal force.

Tribunals, people's courts and other courts and investigative institutions of the RSFSR are obliged to send copies of their sentences and decisions on cases sent to the GPU and its local bodies to the GPU or its local bodies, as appropriate, within 48 hours from the moment the verdict was passed, it was decided.

Particularly important cases or cases requiring complete secrecy, referred by the GPU and its local bodies for hearing to the revolutionary tribunals, are subject to hearing in special sessions of the tribunal, the chairmanship of which is entrusted to a representative of the local department of the GPU in the tribunal.

#### APPENDIX TO MINUTES No. 110 OF MEETINGS OF THE POLITBURO

FROM 9.11.1922

#### POSITION

ABOUT SPECIAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATE POLITICAL  
ADMINISTRATION (IN THE NORMAL STATUS)

I. The Special Department is an organ of the State Political Administration that performs the following of the tasks assigned by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 to the GPU:

a) The fight against counter-revolution and corruption in the Red Army and Navy.

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b) Combating espionage in all its forms (intelligence and harmful), directed against the interests of the RSFSR, both on the part of the states surrounding the republic and their individual parties, and on the part of Russian counterrevolutionary parties and groups.

c) Combating open counter-revolutionary actions and outbursts (banditry) by reconnaissance of enemy forces and disintegration of his ranks.

d) Protection of the borders of the RSFSR and the fight against political and economic smuggling and illegal border crossings.

e) Fulfillment of special tasks of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Councils of fronts, armies and military districts in connection with the preservation of the interests of the Red Army and Navy.

II. A special department of the State Political Directorate is subordinated to a network of special departments of the GPU of military districts, organized by the Special Department of the GPU in those military districts, the political situation of which makes it necessary.

III. The special departments of the military districts are a special organization of centralized administration, in all respects subordinate to the Special Department of the GPU; The Revolutionary Military Councils on the political line, through one of their members and the military commissars of the division, are given the right to control the implementation of what is mentioned in paragraph 1 "e".

Note. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic has the right to submit for approval by the GPU its candidates for the positions of the beginning. persons, departments of fronts, armies and military districts.

GV. Special departments of the active armies and special departments of the border military districts are equated with field active units of the Red Army, with all the ensuing consequences.

V. In the border military districts, under the authority of a special department of the military district, special border departments, points and posts are organized, performing the tasks of paragraph "d" of § 1.

VI. As part of the Gubernia Political Department of the GPU, if necessary, special departments can be organized as an independent part of it.

VII. Each division of troops organizes a special branch of the division, which is subordinate to that Special Department of the GPU of the military district on whose territory the division is located.

VIII. The special department of the GPU of the military district is responsible for the fulfillment of the tasks of the SO of the GPU on the territory of the military district and manages to the full extent: directly the work of the special departments, border special departments and through the chairmen of the provincial political departments the work of the special departments of the provincial political affairs, as well as the provincial political departments as a whole in accordance with the above tasks Special Department of the GPU.

IX. The procedure for arrests, searches, seizures and investigations is carried out in accordance with the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 (for martial law).

§ 1. In areas declared under martial law, as well as in areas of active armies, the rights of special army departments and special departments of the corresponding military districts are expanded within the following limits: b) the right to administrative expulsion of elements of the population who actively oppose the pacification of an area declared under martial law; c) the right to detention for the purpose of isolation and investigation for more than two months without a special decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

RGASPI. F. 17.0p. 3. D. 270. L. 2-3. Script. Typescript.

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Xe 8

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) "ON ARA"

March 9, 1922

No. 1Yu, p. 6 - About ARA (Unshlikht)

Instruct Dzerzhinsky to have special supervision over the political activities of the AR, obliging Comrade Eiduk to report on this line to Comrade Dzerzhinsky (4).

RGASPI F.17. Op.Z. D. 279. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

No. 9

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT BANDITISM"

March 9, 1922

No. 110, p. 7 - On banditry (Unshlikht)

Accept the following proposal from Comrade Unshlicht:

Grant the State Political Administration the right to:

1. Direct reprisals: a) with persons caught in armed robberies, b) criminals, recidivists caught with weapons.
  2. Exiles to Arkhangelsk and imprisonment in the Arkhangelsk concentration camp: a) underground anarchists and left SRs, b) all recidivist criminals.
  3. Check all persons who have a permit for the right to carry weapons. Coordinate the technique with the RVSR.
- a) Instruct Comrade Unshlikht to come to an agreement with Comrade Krylenko on intensifying the activities of the Revolutionary Tribunals in the fight against banditry.
  - b) Instruct Comrade Dzerzhinsky to take decisive measures to reorganize the criminal investigation department and the police, paying special attention to the capital cities.
  - c) Approve the Moscow Soviet action on the issue of banditry.
  - d) Recognize it as necessary to equalize the militia in salaries with the workers.

Instruct the NKVD to carry out this resolution within 3 days.

RGASPI F.17. Op.Z. D. 279. L. 3. Original. Typescript

No. 10

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) ON THE  
EXCLUSION OF MENSHEVIKS AND SRs FROM STATE  
AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

March 20, 1922

No. 114, paragraph 13 - On the removal of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries from the bodies of the Trade Unions, the People's Commissariat of Rud, cooperative and economic. (Report of the commission appointed by the Politburo dated December 8, 1931) (comrade Unshlikht)

- a) Approve in principle the agreement presented by the commission.

b) Instruct Comrade Unshlikht to submit by Wednesday a draft resolution on the Assistance Bureau under the cooperative and economic bodies (5).

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 283. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

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No. I

CIRCULAR LETTER No. 21 OF THE  
SECRET-OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GPU "ON THE  
ORGANIZATION OF A BUREAU OF ASSISTANCE TO THE BODIES OF THE GPU  
IN PLACES"

April 25, 1922

#### INTRODUCTION

The reorganization of the bodies of the Cheka into the bodies of the State Political Administration introduced significant changes in the terms of reference of the latter. This, however, does not in any way reduce our duties, 1 which consist in preventing and curbing all attempts to overthrow the power of the workers and peasants or to weaken all its gains.

The organs of the GPU now have to develop their work in a situation immeasurably more difficult and complex than in their time the organs of the Cheka.

In the new conditions, much is much easier to overlook, not to notice. The enemy managed to improve his apparatus and the very methods of counter-revolutionary work.

Information problems during the period of the Cheka were usually filled with operational measures, thus preventing the enemy's counter-revolutionary plans at the very beginning, catching him by surprise and liquidating his attempts in most cases at the very beginning. The current situation, on the contrary, significantly narrows the freedom of action of the organs of the GPU in the field of operational measures and preventive measures, which also gives the enemy a corresponding benefit.

From this follows the need for all possible assistance to the organs of the GPU in their responsible work by members of our Party, who should help us in intelligence and information work. The Communists involved in this work, being in daily contact both with loyal citizens and with elements hostile to us, are thus in a position to give us considerable help. For the implementation of the above, at the co-institutions, the "Assistance Bureau" is organized for the bodies of the GPU as a center,

as well as in the field.

Properly organized, with well-selected, fully capable members, "B. WITH." will render great assistance to the organs of the GPU in their work,

taking a significant part of the installation work from intelligence.

Partially freed in this way, the intelligence service will be able to take up its direct work - external surveillance, which will enable the Gubotdels to more easily cope with intelligence work, thus refining its methods.

In accordance with this, the following instruction on the "Bureau of Assistance" to the local GPU bodies is approved, according to the circular telegram of the Central Committee of the RCP to the Gubernia and Regional Committees of March 23, No. 11543.

1 Here and below, words underlined in the original are highlighted. - Comp.

#### DOCUMENTATION

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Beginning SOGPU Samsonov

Appendix 1

#### TELEGRAM

To all the Gubernia and Regional Committees of the RCP(b). In order to intensify the struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the bodies of the CNT, cooperatives and economic bodies, the Central Committee of the RCP proposes: first, under the above institutions, to create a special bureau for assistance to the organs of the GPU in the localities, whose tasks should include taking S.- R. and the Mensheviks of the above-mentioned institutions, second, monitoring them in the institutions at the direction of the GPU organs, third, giving information and assisting the GPU organs, fourth, providing the GPU organs with the necessary information. Special instructions will be given to party cells through the aforementioned institutions on the form of organization of the assistance bureau and their relationship with the organs of the GPU. In the bodies of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the work of the assistance bureau should be taken over by the communist faction. This is proposed for guidance and execution March 22, 1922 Nr 11543/1812.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the  
RCP Molotov Appendix 2

#### INSTRUCTIONS FROM GPU ON ORGANIZATION "BUREAU OF ASSISTANCE" FOR LOCAL GPU AUTHORITIES

##### A. Assistance Bureau Organization

1. In every state, public, cooperative and private institution or enterprise, as well as in the university and where it seems possible the presence of communists, a "Bureau of Assistance" to the Gubernia Department of the GPU is organized.

2. The "Assistance Bureau" includes, as a rule, three members.

3. Members of the Assistance Bureau are appointed. The appointment of members of the "Assistance Bureau" is made by the responsible leaders of the institution or enterprise (mandatory communists), in agreement with Gubotdel

Note. In case of impossibility to apply § 4, the Provincial Department of the GPU acts at its own discretion.

4. Members of the "Bureau of Assistance" can only be members of the RCP, who work in the order of party discipline and do not use any type of remuneration.

5. Party seniority of members of the Assistance Bureau is determined for a period of not less than 3 years (for industrial areas, the experience can be reduced to 2 years).

6. The "Assistance Bureau" is designed in such a way that it, through its individual members, covers the entire institution as a whole or its most important departments. If possible, the introduction of two members working in the same department should be avoided.

7. Only responsible leaders of the Institution (manager, members of the collegium, responsible secretaries of the committees) can enter the "Bureau of Assistance".

8. Until further notice, "Bureau of Assistance" is not organized in counties, but only in provincial centers.

9. The "Bureau of Assistance" does not have any office or apparatus.

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#### B. Main Tasks and Responsibilities of the Assistance Bureau

10. The tasks of the "Bureau of Assistance" include all possible assistance to the Gubernia Department of the GPU both in the general work of the latter and in the performance of special tasks.

11. Members of the "Assistance Bureau" are systematically collecting information about all kinds of anti-Soviet phenomena, as well as identifying K.-R. element in a given institution or enterprise, as well as outside it, acting on the instructions of the Gubernia Department of the GPU.

12. The tasks of the "Bureau of Assistance" should include the study of the personnel of all categories of employees of this institution in the sense of their political reliability, their party affiliation and their distribution among departments and departments of this institution.

13. The "Bureau of Assistance" takes into account the identified members of anti-Soviet parties and other counter-revolutionary elements, filling out a special secret questionnaire for each person (questionnaire form is attached); the questionnaire is filled out only personally by members of the Assistance Bureau.

Note. The questionnaire should indicate from which sources the information was obtained and its reliability.

14. Monitoring the influx and distribution within the institution of members of anti-Soviet parties in the above institutions.

15. The Assistance Bureau, under the strict personal responsibility of its members for failure or disclosure, may recruit reliable communists to carry out certain special tasks.

16. Facilitating the entry into the service of secret officers of the GPU in institutions, enterprises, etc.

17. Since the physiognomy of the personnel of an institution or enterprise is especially prominently revealed at general meetings, the Assistance Bureau as a whole or its individual members, in alternation, are obliged to attend all general meetings of employees.

18. Members of the "Bureau of Assistance" meet at least twice a month to discuss the political state of the personnel of an institution or enterprise, submitting two-week reports on this to the Gubernia Department of the GPU.

19. The Assistance Bureau, in contact with Gubotdel, develops a plan to improve the political state of an institution or enterprise (layoffs, transfers and business trips).

#### B. Relations between the Assistance Bureau and Gubotdelov of the GPU

20. The "Assistance Bureau" allocates from its midst a permanent representative for communication, through which all information passes to the Gubernia Department of the GPU and all tasks to the "Assistance Bureau".

21. Members of the "Assistance Bureau", if necessary, transfer information directly to the Gubernia Department of the GPU, in addition to their permanent representative.

22. Upon the departure of any of the members of the Assistance Bureau, a new member is introduced into it, of which the Gubernia Department of the GPU is notified.

23. The "Assistance Bureau" conducts its work under conditions of extreme secrecy.

#### D. Organization of the management of the work of the Assistance Bureau

24. To communicate and manage the work of the Secret Branch of the Gubernia Department, the GPU allocates one authorized person and one or two assistants, who are the link between it and the "Assistance Bureau" of all institutions.

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25. The Commissioner passes in processed information, materials and completed questionnaires to the "Assistance Bureau" through the NACHSO to the Commissioners for political parties according to their affiliation.

\*

26. The authorized representative receives from the same authorized representatives of various kinds tasks, performing them through the appropriate "Promotion Bureau".

Note. The representative for the "Assistance Bureau" should be a good old Chekist, who is recommended to be left in this job for a long time.



APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 82-83. Script. Typescript.

No. 12

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE GPU  
IN THE FIGHT AGAINST BANDITISM

April 27, 1922

No. 4, paragraph 16 - 0 granting the GPU the right to direct executions on the site of bandit elements (proposal by Comrade Unshlikht).

Present: t.t. Unshlikht, Kursky, Krylenko.

a) Grant the GPU the right to directly execute on the spot bandit elements (i.e., participants in armed robberies) captured during the commission of a crime.

b) To entrust the legal wording of the resolution on behalf of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to a commission consisting of comrade t. Kursky, Krylenko, Kalinin and Unshlikht.

c) To entrust the same commission with the legal formulation of the decision on granting the GPU the right to expel criminal elements.

d) All questions raised in connection with this by Comrade Unshlikht should be submitted for preliminary consideration and formulation by the above-mentioned commission with direct submission to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 290. L.4. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Unshlikht, Kursk, Krylenko, Kalinin.

No. 13

NOTE I.V. STALIN A.D. TSURUPE ON THE  
COMPLAINT OF I.S. UNSHLIKHTA TO NARKOMFIN

May 5, 1922

No. 3388s

/tpv 8 'Ts'ORU™' P R ° S U (I beg you) to listen to the complaint of comrade. Unshlichta (GPU) against the People's Commissariat of Finance, violating the decision of the Central Committee on the supply of employees of the GPU, later issued in the Soviet order.

Please let me know about the next one. (6)

SECRETARY OF THE CC I.

STALIN APRF. f. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 14

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON ADDITIONS  
TO THE REGULATIONS ON THE STATE  
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

May 10, 1922

No. 81041

Given the impossibility of bringing a number of cases to court and at the same time the need to get rid of arrogant and harmful elements, the State Political Administration proposes to make the following additions to our position:

"In addition to the development of the regulation on the State Political Administration of the Republic of February 6, 1922, to grant the State Political Administration the right to:

a) administrative exile to certain provinces for up to 2 years for anti-Soviet activities, involvement in espionage, banditry and counter-revolution; b) administrative expulsion from the RSFSR for a period of up to 2 years of unfavorable Russian and foreign citizens.

This decision must be published by the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, so that expulsion abroad would guarantee us against the unauthorized return of the deportee. Simultaneously with the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the NKJ must introduce into the criminal code articles on penalties for unauthorized entry into Russia. I believe up to 2 years in prison for illegal entry, and if it was aimed at clearly counter-revolutionary goals - up to capital punishment

niya.

Deputy Chairman GPU UNSHLICHT

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 92. Original. Typescript.

No. 15

NOTE I.V. STALIN A.D. TSURUPE ON THE  
IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE GPU

May 15, 1922

No. 3600/s

Tov. Tsyurupa, do not refuse to communicate your opinion both on the substance of Unshlikht's statement of May 10 and on the direction of the entire case. Personally, I think that nine-tenths, if not all ten-tenths of Unshlikht's questions could have been resolved in the Soviet order, if we take into account the fact that there was a general directive of the Central Committee on the mandatory improvement of the position of GPU employees.

Please return the attached correspondence on 27 sheets to the Bureau of the Secretariat at the same time as your conclusion\*.

SECRETARY OF THE CC  
STALIN APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 5. Original. Typescript.

Published without correspondence.

DOCUMENTATION

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE MATERIAL SITUATION OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE GPU"

May 18, 1922

No. 7, paragraph 15 - 0 on the financial situation of the employees of the GPU (comrade Unshlikht). To accept the following proposal of Comrade Tsyurupa: recognizing the possibility of reducing the staff of the GPU to the limits assumed by the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to it, the PB considers it necessary to firmly and adequately provide its employees with food, material and monetary allowances. The PB recommends that deputies be guided by this directive when approving the staffing and estimates of the GPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 293. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

No. 17

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON ADDITIONS  
TO THE REGULATIONS ON THE STATE  
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

May 23, 1922

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In relation No. 81041 of May 10, I asked that the regulation on the State Political Directorate be supplemented with the right of administrative exile for two years for anti-Soviet activities and administrative expulsion from the RSFSR for 2 years. The ruling was then to be carried out in the Soviet manner.

In connection with the new tasks assigned to the State Political Administration, this is necessary. I ask you to raise this question at the next meeting of the Politburo.

Deputy Chairman of the GPU  
Unshlikht APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 97. Original. Typescript.

No. 18

OFFER V.I. LENIN ON THE DIRECTIVE OF THE POLITBURO

in connection with the Assessment of the Congress of Physicians

in a LETTER to N.A. SEMASHKO WITH A CONDUCTIVE CC

May 23, 1922

No. 3878

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

To vote

On the instructions of Comrade Stalin, the proposal of Comrade Stalin is being submitted to you for a vote. Lenin about the directive of the Politburo in connection with the All-Russian Congress of Doctors (see the attached letter from Comrade Semashko).

Comrade Lenin's proposal on the back of Comrade Semashko's letter.

^ Pom. Central Secretary Nazaretyan

Copy

very secret

T-schu Lenin and members of the Politburo.

Dear comrades. The recent All-Russian Congress of Physicians revealed such important and dangerous currents in our lives that I consider it necessary not to leave the members of the POLITBURO in the dark about

thirty

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

but these currents, which are so successfully used by the Cadets, m-ki and a-ry; all the more so since, as far as I know, these trends are widespread not only among doctors, but also among specialists in other specialties (agronomists, engineers, technicians and lawyers), and all the more so because many even responsible comm. not only are they unaware of this danger, but they frivolously bow their ears to the whispers of such specialists.

The essence of the trend revealed at the congress is reduced in the most general terms: 1st, a campaign against Soviet medicine and the praise of zemstvo and insurance medicine; 2, in basing in further construction on "freely" elected, amateur organizations of the population, built from the bottom" (exact resolution of the congress); on those patterns that the speakers painted - Cadets, m-ki, s-ry on this canvas. 3. On a sharp desire to stand outside the general professional working-class movement and 4. On the desire to organize on this basis, among other things, through their own printed organ.

To combat these currents, it seems to me, it is practically necessary: 1) to be extremely careful in questions of the reorganization of our Soviet system. In this regard, NEP gave rise to a kind of former liquidationism in our country, when, with a thoughtful air and with irony, they begin ...\* before the specialists of the foundations of our Soviet construction. Any idea of "Zemshchina" must be burned with a red-hot iron. There should not be any attempts to restore ("city councils") (the idea of Comrade Vareikis). From this point of view, I personally think that in the city administrations of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in my opinion, it would be necessary to prescribe

to carry out reforms in the field of Soviet construction only with the approval of the Politburo. 2) In particular, to consider any attempts to replace Soviet (class) medicine with zemstvo ("folk") and insurance ("outside the Soviet") medicine as politically unacceptable. 3. The State Publishing House should not allow specialists and their communities to publish newspapers and magazines of a socio-political (non-scientific) character, otherwise these magazines, newspapers like the journal Pirogovsky Ob., which is now allowed, will objectively degenerate into organs of anti-Soviet propaganda; Permission for each periodical should be coordinated with the relevant department and the GPU. 4. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to be extremely circumspect in establishing the boundaries of the autonomy of special sections (doctors, engineers) in general trade unions and in no case allow separate independent unions of specialists.

As for the removal of the "top" doctors of the doctors and doctors who speak at the congress (Dr. Granovsky, Magul, Vigdorichik, Levin), this issue must be agreed with the GPU (on what grounds of administrative or judicial investigative , not to create popularity for their antics, bearing in mind that no more congresses are expected?)

Semashko 21.5.22

\*\* Comrade's hand mark Lenin: "Comrade. Stalin. I think it should be top secret (without multiplying) show this to Dzerzhinsky and all members of the Politburo and issue a "directive". "Dzerzhinsky (GPU) is instructed to work out a plan of measures with the help of Semashko and report to the P / Bureau (2 weeks? Deadline).

22.V. Lenin

"For" - Stalin, "For" - Trotsky, "For" - Kamenev, "For" - Rykov, "For" - Molotov.

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Comrade's hand mark Tomsky: "I abstain, because the issue of the congress of doctors requires a different formulation of the matter. In many ways, we ourselves are to blame, and primarily Comrade Semashko. Tomsk.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 3-4. Copy. Typescript.

\* gap in the text.

\*\* typewritten text of the Nazarene.

No. 19

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONGRESS OF PHYSICIANS  
AND RESULTS OF VOTING ON THIS ISSUE

May 26, 1922\*

No. 8, p. 22 - Comrade Lenin's proposal for a directive from the Politburo in connection with the All-Russian Congress of Physicians.

Instruct comrade Dzerzhinsky (GPU), with the help of comrade Semashko, to work out

plan of measures and report back to the Politburo within a week. (7)

#### VOTING RESULT

1. t. Stalin - for

2. t. Trotsky - for

3. L. Kamenev - for

4. V. Molotov - for

5. N.I. Rykov - for

6. M. Tomsy - I refrain, because the question of the congress of doctors requires a different formulation of the matter. In many ways, we ourselves are to blame, and primarily Comrade Semashko.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 1-2. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of PB members on May 24, 1922.

No. 20

#### NOTE F.E. DZERZHINSKY TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE MEMORIES OF THE GPU  
ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET GROUPINGS Among the  
INTELLIGENTIA

June 3, 1922

No. 15456/t

At the same time, I am forwarding a memorandum on anti-Soviet groups among the intelligentsia, with a draft GPU resolution of the Politburo. (8)

GPU CHAIRMAN Dzerzhinsky

Owls. secret

1. INTRODUCTION: The new economic policy of the Soviet government created the danger of uniting and consolidating the forces of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois FUPp, which are finding ever-increasing support in the conditions of the development of the NEP.

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The anti-Soviet intelligentsia makes extensive use of the opportunities that have opened up for it to organize and gather its forces, created by the peaceful course of Soviet power and the weakening of the activity of repressive organs. An alarming symptom of the organization of the future cohesive counter-revolutionary front is the spontaneous emergence of a significant number of private public unions (scientific, economic, religious, etc.) and private publishing houses, around which anti-Soviet elements are grouped. The power of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia and its close-knit groupings is further strengthened by the fact that a certain "peaceful"

liquidation mood. The weakening of repressions inspired the hopes of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, and lately its various sections in various forms have been conducting stubborn counter-revolutionary work against the Soviet government. "The anti-Soviet intelligentsia have chosen as the main arena for the struggle against the Soviet power: higher educational institutions, various societies, the press, various departmental congresses, the theater, cooperation, trusts, trade institutions, and recently religion, etc. \*

## 2. ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Both the students and the anti-Soviet professors in higher educational institutions carry out counter-revolutionary work mainly in two directions.

leniyah:

\*a) the struggle for the "autonomy" of higher education and b) for the improvement of the financial situation of the professors and students and the struggle for "autonomy"\*, both in the circles of active anti-Soviet students and professors, in essence, has exclusively political goals directed against influence in the higher school of the Communist Party and the class principle in school. Under various pretexts and pretexts, the counter-revolutionary students and professors, chiefly from the mountains. Moscow and Petrograd strives for the reign in higher education of certain principles that correspond to their political views. On this basis, a stubborn secret struggle is being waged in higher education throughout the entire existence of Soviet power. Recently, the struggle for the hegemony of the professorship in higher education has taken on particularly acute forms, and our opponents are not in the least embarrassed in the means of achieving their goals. Conscious of their strength (thanks to the small number of red professors), the counter-revolutionary elements in higher education create fertile ground for educating the students in an anti-communist and anti-Soviet spirit, the counter-revolutionary elements in higher education create and strengthen their party organizations (cells with. -r., Mensheviks, cd)\*. The struggle to improve the material conditions of the professors and students, just like the struggle for "autonomy", is used by the anti-Soviet elements of the VUZ as an instrument of political struggle. The last circumstance was best revealed in the recent strikes in higher education (at Moscow University, the Higher Technical School, etc.). The GPU has received information that the Moscow professors, led by the "united council of professors," are preparing a new strike on economic grounds, hoping to start one on the first day of the S.R. trial. The instigator of this speech is the professorship of the Higher Technical School. This strike, according to the calculations of professors, should also carry away the technical staff of higher

## DOCUMENTS \_33

educational institutions, as well as students. A similar speech is being prepared in Petrograd\*.

The situation in higher education requires the adoption of a number of decisive measures to stop and prevent counter-revolutionary actions of the professors.

## 3. ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES

Around the private societies that have emerged recently (scientific, commercial

in industry, etc.), the anti-Soviet elements that survived the defeat of the revolution are rallying, which in the first years of Soviet power did not show much activity and therefore remained untouched by the punitive organs. \* Recently, there has been a certain concentration in private societies of counter-revolutionary groups that come out in the public life of the country with certain political goals, to one degree or another disguised, but definitely directed towards the overthrow of Soviet power. For example, the Pirogov Society, which exists semi-officially, tends to play the traditional role of artfully disguised political opposition against Soviet power.

There is a clear confusion in the very procedure for registering private companies. While one department does not allow the opening of any society, another registers the same society.

#### 4. ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE PUBLISHING HOUSES

\*The permission of the Soviet government to private publishing houses and periodicals gave the anti-Soviet intelligentsia a powerful weapon of struggle, which they did not fail to use\*. In the capital cities and in the provinces, a significant number of publications appeared with more or less pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies: the journals *The Economist*, *Economic Renaissance*, *Chronicle of the House of Writers*, the journal of the Pirogov Society, etc.

Political groups are organized around certain publishing houses, which to this day remain the most implacable opponents of Soviet power. For example, in the publishing house \* "Zadruga" members of the party n.-s. (Melgunov, Myakotin, Peshekhonov and others) and some members of the Central Committee. party k-d. (Kizevetter); Around the publishing house "Bereg" are grouped mainly members of the Central Committee. Cadets, former members of the Tactical Center, the National Center, the Council of Public Figures, who were brought to trial in 1920 and subsequently released from prison. The publishing house "Kniga" is in the hands of Ts.K. Mensheviks.

Private printing makes it possible, firstly, to combine certain k-r. groupings around certain political slogans, and, secondly, the flooding of the book market with anti-communist literature, priestly-mystical publications and various kinds of pornography.

At the same time, some central departments of the Soviet authorities have allowed actual freedom of the press, which makes it possible to use certain special organs for opponents of Soviet propaganda (Narkomzem, Narkomzdrav)\*.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

#### 5. ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

##### AT VARIOUS DEPARTMENTAL CONGRESSES

Congresses and All-Russian conferences of specialists, organized by various People's Commissariats, are used by the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia to organize



organization of its forces on an all-Russian scale, in order to carry out decisions that are contrary to the policy of Soviet power. These congresses are also used as platforms for anti-communist propaganda. "For example, the Congress of Agricultural Cooperation was used by the Socialist-Revolutionaries to convene the 10th Council of the Party\*. The history of the Glavkustprom Congress in this respect is also very indicative. medicine, which revealed the tendency of doctors to become outside the general professional working-class movement and organize themselves through their own printed organ.

## 6. ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

### IN COOPERATIONS, TRUSTS AND TRADING INSTITUTIONS

The most convenient place for uniting and concentrating anti-Soviet elements (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Cadets, etc.) is cooperation\*. On the one hand, due to the fact that too few Communists work in the co-operative bodies, and, on the other, because the co-operation gives the anti-Soviet elements a wide opportunity for direct rapprochement with broad sections of the labor elements of the Republic. In connection with the great rights granted to the cooperatives, the anti-Soviet elements in it not only concentrate and rally their forces, but have the opportunity to enrich their organizations with material resources. The same phenomena should be noted in trusts, trade establishments and associations.

## 7. ACTIVITIES OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

### IN MATTERS OF RELIGION

The seizure of church valuables and the split of the Orthodox Church are used mainly by the Black Hundred intelligentsia. In addition to the usual agitation against the seizure of valuables and direct resistance to the latter, the highest Black-Hundred intelligentsia, both spiritual and lay believers, has noticeably revived and is preparing the ground for a united religious front to combat the atheism of the Soviet regime.

\*All of the above indicates that in the process of the development of the NEP, a certain crystallization and rallying of anti-Soviet groups and organizations takes place, shaping the political aspirations of the emerging bourgeoisie. In the not too distant future, given the current pace of development, these groupings may form into a dangerous force opposing Soviet power. The general position of the Republic makes it necessary to decisively carry out a number of measures that can prevent possible political complications\*.

Specially authorized GPU Ya. AGRANOV

Moscow June 1, 1922

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 7-12. Script. Typescript.

\*

Underlined in pencil.

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No. 21

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT ANTI-SOVIET GROUPINGS  
AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE"

June 8, 1922

No. Yu, p. 8. - On anti-Soviet groups among the intelligentsia

(t. Unshlikht).

a) accept (with amendments) the following proposal of Comrade Unshlikht:

1. In order to ensure order in higher educational institutions, form a commission of representatives of the chief trade union with the OGPU (Yakovlev and Unshlikht) and representatives of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee to develop measures on the following issues:

a) about filtering students by the beginning of the next academic year; b) on the establishment of a strict restriction on the admission of students of non-proletarian origin; c) on the establishment of certificates of political reliability for students who are not seconded by professional and party organizations and are not exempt from paying fees for the right to study. Convening a commission for Comrade Unshlikht, a week's time. (9)

2. The same commission (see paragraph 1) to develop rules for meetings and unions of students and professors.

To propose to the Political Department of the State Publishing House, together with the GPU, to carry out a thorough check of all printed organs published by private societies, sections of specialists under the trade unions and individual people's commissariats (Narkomzem, Narkompros, etc.).

b) Clauses 3 and 4 of the draft resolution (see Appendix) to be adopted as the basis, making the following amendments: in clause 3 of the "GPU", replace "NKVD". The end of clause 3 should be amended: "Local congresses or meetings of specialists are permitted by Gubispolkoms with a preliminary request for the conclusion of local bodies of the GPU (Provincial Departments)."

For the final formulation of p.p. 3 and 4, the development of forms of conduct and consideration of the need for conduct in the legislative order to create a commission consisting of com. Kursky, Dzerzhinsky and Yenukidze. Convening a commission for Comrade Yenukidze. Working time is one week.

c) Point 5 to be transferred to the same commission with the obligatory summons of Comrade Tomsy or Rudzutak.

d) Propose to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to issue a resolution on the creation of a special meeting of representatives of the NKID and the NKJ, which will be given the right, in cases where it is possible not to resort to more severe punishment, to replace it with expulsion abroad or to certain points in the RSFSR.

E) For the final consideration of the list of those subject to expulsion from the top

groups of hostile intellectual groups to form a commission consisting of comrades. Unshlikht, Kursky and Kamenev.

c) The issue of closing publications and press organs that do not correspond to the direction of Soviet policy (the journal of the Pirogov Society, etc.) should be transferred to the same commission (see paragraph e).

g) Reject point 8 of the draft resolution.

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LUBYANKA, January 1922 - December 1936

#### APPENDIX TO PR. MEETINGS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP dated 8.VI.22

No. 10, items 8-6

pp. 3, 4 and 5. Comrade's proposals. Unshlikht, handed over to the commission.

3. Establish that not a single congress or All-Russian conference of specialists (doctors, agronomists, engineers, lawyers, etc.) can be convened without the appropriate permission from the NKVD. Local congresses or meetings of specialists are permitted by the provincial executive committees with a preliminary request for an opinion from the local bodies of the GPU - Gubotdelov.

4. Instruct the GPU through the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to carry out from 10.VI. re-registration of all societies and unions (scientific, religious, academic, etc.) and prevent the opening of new societies and unions without the appropriate decisions of the GPU. Unregistered societies and unions shall be declared illegal and subject to immediate liquidation.

5. Propose to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to prevent the formation and functioning of unions of specialists other than general professional associations, and to take the existing sections of specialists under trade unions under special registration and under special supervision. The statutes for the sections of specialists must be revised with the participation of the GPU. Permission to form sections of specialists in trade union associations may be given by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions only upon agreement with the GPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 296. L. 2-3. Script. Typescript.

No. 22

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE GPU TO FOREIGN MISSIONS  
IN MOSCOW AND TO OUR MISSIONS ABROAD"

June 22, 1922

No. 13, item 6 - On the attitude of the GPU to foreign missions in Moscow and to our missions abroad (PB post of 15.VI. of this year, pr. No. 12).

Approve the following agreement between the NKID and the GPU:

1. The GPU does not take any repressive measures against members of foreign diplomatic missions who enjoy immunity without prior agreement with one of the members of the board of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The decree extends not only to arrests, but also to searches, visits by agents of the GPU to apartments, detention on the street or anywhere else.

2. With respect to other employees of foreign missions who do not formally enjoy diplomatic immunity, the GPU does not take the repressive measures specified in paragraph 1, except with the knowledge of one of the members of the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

RGASPI. F.17. Op.Z. D. 299. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

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No. 23

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE CONSIDERATION OF THE LIST OF DELEGATES  
TO BE EXPECTED TO THE CONGRESS OF PHYSICIANS

June 22, 1922

No. 13, p. 13 - Report of the commission of appointments. P/Bureau 8.VI. this year to consider the list of delegates to the congress of doctors to be expelled for using their position for anti-Soviet agitation (Provision No. 10, paragraph 8-d. (Comrade Unsh Licht).

Instruct Comrade Unshlikht to divide the list of doctors to be expelled into 3 groups within 3 days: 1) for arrest and immediate expulsion in stages; 2) to arrest and conduct an investigation on the distribution of illegal literature; 3) for arrest and expulsion by stages with the provision of a weekly period for the liquidation of their cases.

RGASPI. F. 17.0p. 3. D. 299. L. 3-4. Script. Typescript.

No. 24

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MENSHEVIKS"

June 22, 1922

No. 13, item 15 - 0 activities of the Mensheviks (Unshlikht)

a) Approve the operations proposed by Comrade Unshlikht.

b) Instruct comrade Unshlikht together with comrade t. Kuibyshev and Zelensky once again check the lists of arrested Mensheviks.

c) Invite Comrade Unshlikht to submit to the Politburo a list of the most active Mensheviks active in the workers' districts, such as Sormovo, Bryansk, etc. (10)

RGASPI. F.17. Op.Z. D. 299. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

No. 25

LETTER F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN about the  
DIFFICULT SITUATION OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE  
GPU WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE NOTE OF V.N. MANTSEVA

b July 1922

(To all members of the Polit and Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP)

Yesterday, 3/VII, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau, the secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Donetsk Gubernia Committee reported on the impossibly difficult situation of the staff of the Gubernia. Dep. the GPU, about the flight of the Communists from the GPU, about even leaving the Party, and so on. The Organizing Bureau has not heard such reports from impartial comrades. The Kiev department of the 1st PU, for example, existed on the 1.4 billion monthly released to it from February to May inclusive. At the same time, a note by Comrade Mantsev, describing the situation in Ukraine, where it is no worse than in the RSFSR.

Serious attention needs to be paid to this. The organs of the GPU are still necessary for the security of the state.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

I now have one request - to instruct the Narkomfin, the People's Commissariat for Food and the People's Commissariat of War, so that the state supply allocated to us according to the estimate, both food and clothing, and money, should not be a fiction, but be transferred to us completely. Only under these conditions will we be able to fight corruption with an iron fist, reduce the staff to the maximum limits, select the best, and fulfill our task.

With communist greetings F. Dzerzhinsky

July 6, 1922 June 20, 1922

Dear comrade Dzerzhinsky!

I am writing to you with a letter in which I would like to draw your attention to the plight of the GPU organs and employees in Ukraine. I think that this is a general question, and in Russia their situation is hardly any better. The monetary reward that is paid to an employee is meager, just like a food ration. An employee, especially a family one, can exist only by selling everything he has on the market. And he has very little. And so he is in a state of permanent starvation. On this basis, there is a general decrease in efficiency, the mood of employees is embittered, discipline is falling, and exceptional conditions are needed in order to make them work at the right moment, at least half as much as before. Further, a number of cases of suicide due to hunger and extreme conditions were registered.

him exhaustion. I personally receive letters from employees in which they write that they are forced into prostitution so as not to die of hunger. Dozens, if not hundreds, of employees were arrested and shot for raids and robberies, and in all cases it was established that they went on robbery because of a systematic hunger strike. The flight from the Cheka is rampant. Especially threatening is the decrease in the number of communists among the employees. If earlier we had 60% of Communists, now we can hardly count 15%. There are very frequent, if not everyday, cases of leaving the Party on the basis of hunger and insecurity of material existence. And it is not the worst who leave, but the majority of the proletarians.

I think there is no need for me to draw conclusions from the above. They are clear. Here I have to say the following. We took all measures both along the Party and along the Soviet line. We have achieved something. But all this is money. By the way, places are a big help. The Cheka live on their funds rather than on those issued from the center. The latter are so scanty that they cannot be taken seriously.

I pass to the last. This position of the staff of the Cheka forced the South Bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (and it was informed by the localities) to raise the issue of it at one of the meetings of the faction, where I was also present. There a mixed commission was chosen from among our representatives and the Southern Bureau to examine the question. And this commission came to the following conclusion: the state cannot maintain the apparatus of the Cheka to the fullest extent, and therefore it is necessary to reduce the staff to the limit and, accordingly, reduce the functions of the Cheka. And we have already reduced the staff by 75 percent. What else to reduce. Are we allowed to do this. For the work of the Cheka is becoming more complex and strenuous, and to carry it out, even with the minimum number of employees available, is becoming more and more difficult. There is one way out - so that the state authorities finally understand that such institutions as the Cheka must be fully satisfied.

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It is necessary that perfectly satisfying credits be given. And the government must do it.

I beg you to put this question, because the danger of the final collapse of the Cheka is very close. Well, if the Cheka is not needed, then this must be said directly and firmly. And then we will act accordingly. If you need materials about the Cheka and its employees, let me know.

With communist greetings

V. Mantsev

5/VII-22

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 245. L. 4-5. Copy. Typescript.

No. 26

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
REASONS FOR NOT PRESENTING THE REPORT FOR MAY 1922

July 6, 1922

No. 15560

The GPU brings to your attention that, in accordance with the agreement with the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP, the GPU submits its report to the Central Committee by the 7th day of each month. Sending reports is usually preceded by a reminder from the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Failure to receive this reminder at the beginning of June with. d. prompted the GPU to apply to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which explained that the preparation of the May report as an exception was not necessary. Because of this, the May review, of course, was not sent.

At present Inf. Dep. The GPU is busy compiling a report for May June. The report plan has been significantly improved and expanded. In spite of this, however, the review will be released before the deadline you indicated (July 20) and will be delivered to the Central Committee no later than July 15.

Previous OGPU Dzerzhinsky  
RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 253. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

No. 27

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE EXPULSION OF INTELLIGENTSIA

July 20, 1922

No. 18, p. 13 - Report of Comrade Unshlikht (post. P / Bureau No. 17 p. 17. from 13.7). Recognize the work of the commission as unsatisfactory, both in the sense of the insufficient size of the list, and in the sense of its insufficient substantiation.

Return the lists to the commission, instructing it to create the necessary auxiliary subcommissions and submit to the Politburo a new, strictly substantiated list within a week. Instruct the same commission within the same period to prepare the closure of a number of press organs. (P)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 304. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 28

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
NEED TO ACCELERATE THE EXPULSION  
OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

July 20, 1922

No. 81371

Owls. secret

The information we received from foreign sources definitely establishes that interested circles of white emigration became aware

about the supposed repressions against the anti-Soviet intelligentsia in Soviet Russia.

Some anxiety in the professorial and literary world has recently been observed in Moscow: they are waiting for some kind of mass arrests, deportations.

This awareness of the counter-revolutionary camp indicates that our method of questioning representatives of the interested central departments and individual responsible comrades about the circles of anti-Soviet figures known to them led to the fact that the strict secrecy necessary in such cases was violated and with further delay in the conduct of the operation, the latter would not who will not be a surprise and will not at all give the necessary results. It should also be noted that the professorship is leaving for the summer holidays.

\* In view of this, it seems extremely necessary to hastily carry out the planned operation, which we bring to your attention \*.

Deputy prev. GPU Unshlikht

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 31. Original. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 29

MEMORIAL I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
DELEGATES OF THE CONGRESS OF PHYSICIANS

July 21, 1922

No. 81203

According to the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of 8.VI, the commission, consisting of Comrades. Unshlikht, Kameneva decided: for the use of their position as congress delegates for anti-Soviet agitation, calculated to undermine confidence in the Soviet government at the time of external difficulties, to send them administratively to the Orenburg province, Kyrgyzstan and Turkestan, giving them a week to liquidate the cases of the following doctors: Granovsky, Stankevich, Gorvits-Vlasov, Dembo, Lovinsky, Magul, Kogan (Kharkov), Frumin (Kiev), Vostrov (Kaluga), Yakhnin (Vitebsk), N.I. Gurevich (section Vsemedikosantrud).

Deputy prev. GPU Unshlikht

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 27. Original. Typescript..

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON MEASURES FOR THE EXPULSION  
OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA



July 27, 1922

No. 19, paragraph 13 - Report of Comrade Unshlikht on the implementation of the decision of the Politburo of 20.7.22 (Reg. No. 18, paragraph 13).

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Unshlikht, Kursky and Kamenev to work out the question of the technical implementation of the measures prescribed by the Politburo, both in terms of establishing the necessary expenses and in terms of obtaining visas.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 305. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

No. 31

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. STALIN WITH THE  
APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT DECISION OF THE VTsIK ON  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPIRY

July 31, 1922

No. 81418

Pursuant to the resolution of the Politburo of June 8, § 8, paragraph "g", I am sending the draft resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee developed by us on administrative expulsion.

DEPUTY GPU UN SHLICHT

PROJECT

RESOLUTION OF THE V.TS.I.K.

About administrative expulsion

W.C.I.K. DECIDES:

1) Create under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs under his chairmanship a Special Conference of representatives of the NKVD and the NKJ, to whom to grant the right, in cases where it is possible not to resort to more severe punishment, to replace it with expulsion abroad or to certain points R.S.F.S.R.

NOTE: The composition of the Special Meeting is approved by the Presidium of the C.I.K.

(2) Orders for the expulsion of each individual must be accompanied by detailed indications of the reasons for the expulsion.

-i) When approving the expulsion, the Special Conference specifies the exact area of the expulsion and its term.

ÿÿÿÿ The list of Paradises of places of expulsion is approved by the Presidium on the proposal of the Special Conference. e\_ ^ The term of administrative expulsion cannot exceed 5 years with the loss of the highest active and passive suffrage for the whole time

t NOTE: Expulsion abroad may be without specifying a period, •• until the decision to cancel it.

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6) The deportee may travel to the place of expulsion at his own expense, subject to the consent of the relevant authorities that submitted the proposal to the Special Conference  
about the deportation.

7) The families of the deportees may go to the place of expulsion to live together with the deportee.

8) A person exiled to a certain area comes under the open supervision of the local organ of the GPU.

9) The place of residence of the expelled person is determined by the GPU body in whose area the expelled person arrived, in accordance with the instructions of the Special Conference.

10) Escape from the place of expulsion or the route to it is punishable by the court in accordance with Art. 95 of the Criminal Code, followed by expulsion for the initial term after serving the sentence. (12)

11) The Special Meeting draws up instructions in the development of this resolution. (13)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 33-34. Script. Typescript.

No. 32

COVERING NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN WITH  
THE APPENDIX OF THE LISTS  
OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA OF MOSCOW,

PETROGRAD AND TWO LISTS WITH  
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSONS MENTIONED

August 2, 1922

No. 81425

In pursuance of the decision of the Politburo, I am sending the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo commission, a list of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia of Moscow, a list of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia of the city of Petrograd, and two lists to these lists with the characteristics of the persons mentioned.

Application: mentioned.

Deputy prev. GPU UNSCHLICHT

PROTOCOL

MEETINGS OF THE POLITBURO COMMISSION OF THE CC RCP

There are TT. Unshlikht, Kamenev, Kursky, Yagoda, Agranov.

Listened: lists of anti-Soviet intelligentsia.

Decided: a) to approve, as amended:

b) doctors 1) Israelson (Orel), 2) Falin (Vologda), 3) Rozanova (Saratov), 4) Gutkin A.Ya. (Peter), 5) Anzel E.S. (Peter), 6) Zbarsky D.S. (Peter), 7) Sadykov Yu.N., (Peter), 8) Bronstein I.E. (Peter), 9) Pavlova P.P. (Peter), 10) Kargens N.K. (Peter), 11) Soloveichika E.B. (Peter) - to be sent administratively to the northern or eastern provinces of the Republic for use in the specialty for a period of 2 years.

c) All other persons indicated in the lists attached to the protocol, to be sent abroad as persons who have not reconciled with the Soviet regime during the almost 5-year existence of Soviet power, continuing counter-revolutionary activities at a time of external difficulties for the Soviet Republic.

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d) Arrest all the intended persons, charge them within 3 days and offer them to go abroad at their own expense. In case of refusal to leave at his own expense, send him abroad at the expense of the GPU. Those who agreed to leave should be released from custody.

e) Submit to the Central Committee an estimate of the costs of this operation.

f) To confirm the closure of the political department of the State Publishing House of the publications The Economist and the collection Mornings.

g) Shut down the Petrograd publications: Economic Renaissance, Literaturnye Zapiski, and Vestnik sel'skokhozyaistvo, published in Moscow, for its tendentious anti-Soviet trend, and the journal Mysl, published in Petrograd, for its anti-Soviet mystical-idealistic trend.

nie.

Chairman UNSHLIKHT  
Secretary AGRANOV

LIST OF ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA (Professor,  
Moscow)

Professors of the 1st Moscow University

1. Stratonov Vsevolod Viktorovich, 2. Fomin Vasily Emelyanovich.

Professor of the Moscow Higher Technical School

4. Yasinsky Vsevolod Ivanovich. 5. Brilling Nikolay Romanovich. 6. Kukolevsky Ivan Ivanovich. 7. Zworykin Vladimir Vasilievich.

Professors of the Petrovsko-Razumovskaya Agricultural Academy

8. Artobolevsky Ivan Alekseevich, 9. Ushakov.

Professor of the Institute of Railway Engineers

10. Tyapkin Nikolay Dmitrievich.

In the case of the Free Economic Society

II. Gloomy Alexander Ivanovich.

Professors from various educational institutions

12. Ovchinnikov (Ryazan), 13. Velikhov Pavel Apollonovich, 14. Loskutov Nikolay Nikolaevich, 15-Troshin (Kazan), 16. Novikov M.M., 17. Ilyin N.A.

#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET PROFESSORS OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE

18. Uspensky Alexander Ivanovich, 19. Tsvetkov Nikolai Nikolaevich, -0. Bordygin Vasily Mikhailovich, 21. Korobkov Nikolai Mikhailovich.

#### GENERAL LIST OF ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET PERSONS IN THE CASE OF PUBLISHING HOUSE "BEREG"

22. Trubetskoy Sergey Evgenievich, 23. Feldstein Mikhail Solomonovich.

#### LIST OF PERSONS IN CASE 813 (Aprikosov's group)

24. Abrikosov Vladimir Vladimirovich, 25. Kuzmin-Karavaev Dmitry Vladimirovich, 26. Boykov Alexey Lvovich, 27. Arbuzov Alexey Dmitry

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#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET AGRONOMISTS AND COOPERATORS

28. Rybnikov Alexander Alexandrovich, 29. Lyubimov Nikolai Ivanovich,

30. Matveev Ivan Petrovich, 31. 33. \* Romodanovsky Nikolai Pavlovich\*, Kondratiev N.D., 34. Kilchevsky Vladimir Agafonovich, 35. Bulatov Alexey Alekseevich (Novgorod), 36. Segirsky Alexander Ivanovich, 37. Shishkin Matvey Dmitrievich (Vologda), 38. Bakka (left s.r.), 39. Maloletnikov Nikolai Vasil'evich, 40. Klezetsky (Tver').

#### LIST OF DOCTORS

41. Israelson (Orel), 42. Falin (Vologda), 43. Rozanov (Saratov).

#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET ENGINEERS (Moscow)

44. Palchinsky Petr Iokimovich, 45. Parshin Nikolay Evgrafovich, 46. Yushtin Ivan Ivanovich, 47. Weisberg, 48. Kozlov Nikolay Pavlovich, 49. Sakharov Andrey Vasilyevich.

## LIST OF LITERATORS

50. Semyon Ludvigovich Frank, 51. Rozenberg, 52. A. A. Kizevetter, 53. Veniamin Sergeevich Ozereckovsky, 54. Alexander Naumovich Yurovsky, 55. Nikolai Petrovich Oganovsky, 56. Yury Isaevich Aikhenvald, 57. N. Berdyaev. A., 58. Ozerov Ivan Khristoforovich, 59. Osorgin Mikhail Andreevich, 60. Matusevich Iosif Aleksandrovich, 61. Efimov (professor).

31. VI 1.22 L. Kamenev Kursk Unshlikht

## ADDITIONAL LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA (Professor Moscow)

1. Kravets Torichan Pavlovich, 2. Izgaryshev Nikolai Alekseevich. LIST OF LITERATORS

3. Kudryavtsev Vasily Mikhailovich, 4. Myakotin Venedikt Alexandrovich, 5. Peshekhonov Alexei Vasilyevich, 6. Stepun Fedor Avgustovich, 7. Chernolussky Vladimir Ivanovich, 8. Izyumov Alexander Filaretovich.

31. VI 1.22 Kamenev Kursk Unshlikht

## LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA OF THE CITY OF PETROGRAD

A list of writers whose characteristics were discussed at a meeting on July 22 at the GPU chaired by Comrade Unshlikht in the presence of specially invited Yu.M. Steklov, Znamensky, Ionov and Lebedev-Polyansky

1. SOROKIN Pitirim Alexandrovich. Professor of sociology at St. Petersburg University, an employee of the "Economic Renaissance", "Artel case" and others. Former social revolutionary. The figure is undoubtedly anti-Soviet. Teaches students to orient their lives towards St. Sergius.

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The last book was hostile and contains a whole series of insinuations against the Soviet power.

2. Izgoev-Lande A.S. Right cadet, old Vekhovets. Pretty strong figure. I have always been a Bolshevik Cadet. This is his dangerous side. His Fools and Wise Men is a good pamphlet on the Bolsheviks. He is a smart and cunning writer. Until now, he has avoided all contact with us, and is doing rather hard work in the House of Writers. The soul of all the protests and resolutions that are passed there. Comrade Steklov notes that Izgoev survived all the hardships, but still did not go abroad.

3. ZUBASHEV E.L. Employee of The Economist, professor at the Institute of Technology, former rector of the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute. He was radical in the old way, and perhaps in 1905 he was a member of a group of radical lawyers or right SRs. In fact, the head of the Economist magazine, a harmful person. And the best proof of his article in The Economist. Until now, the sovereign has retained the old conservative traditions. Council.

4. BRUTSKUS. Professor S. Academy, an employee of the "Economist". Harm

ny man. Right SR, but in the land question belongs to a special group of the Cadet persuasion.

Tov. Wednesday for deportation abroad.

5. Kagan A.S. Kagan is a wealthy man who systematically subsidizes economists and other publishing houses. An old shareholder of Golike and Wilmbor. Now he is the chairman of the board of the Union of Writers, where he is taking a sharp line against us.

6. LUTOKHIN. One of the organizers of the Economist magazine. Taking advantage of his position in the Glavboom, he gives the Economist paper on preferential terms. In the articles he leads an anti-Soviet line.

7. PUMPENSKY L.A. Employee of the Economist, right-wing Menshevik.

8. FROMET. Artel business employee. Cadet cooperator. Comrade Sereda for expulsion.

9. ZAMYATIN E.I. Employee of "Chronicle", "Litzapisok". Hidden inveterate White Guard. He is the author of an illegal resolution, which he held at a meeting of the House of Writers, in which Andrei Bely was reprimanded for his works in defense of Soviet Russia. He speaks in his literary works entirely against the Soviet regime. He is in close campaign with the fugitive Remizov. Remizov is a definite enemy. Zamyatin is the same. When exiled abroad, he will become a dangerous leader. It is necessary to send to Novgorod, to Kursk, but not abroad, by no means.

10. PETRISCHEV A.B. Member of the Central Committee of MS. According to IONOV, until recently he lived in Bryansk, worked and even lectured at a party school. He came to Petrograd and was very sympathetic towards us. But he ended up in the House of Writers, where he was polished, so expulsion to another city would bring him back to his sanity. He should have been sent at least to Bryansk. Commission with the participation of Bogdanov for expulsion abroad.

I. BULGAKOV S.N. Professor, pop. Lives in the Crimea, Black Hundreds, churchman, anti-Semite, pogromist, Wrangelist. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

12. VOLKOVYSSKY M.I. And

13. HARTON Boris. Associate "Literary Notes". Organizers in the House of Writers. Former stock market chroniclers. They did not write anything and do not write. Inveterate enemies of Soviet power, but cunning and dexterous. If they were removed, it would be possible to undermine the core that holds the position against

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14. CHADAEV I. Writer from the collection "Maine". Author of a vile article in the magazine "Utrenniki".

15. KARSAVIN. Professor Peter, University. Philosopher-mystic. Churchman. Completely gone into mysticism, does not conduct any work.

16. LOSSKY. Professor Peter, University, editor of the magazine "We". Ideologically harmful.

Karsavin and Lossky received in 1920-1921. through the head of the white organization, Tagantsev, financial support from white émigré circles. (14)

#### LIST OF DOCTORS IN PETROGRAD

17. Gutkin A.Ya. Tavricheskaya street, 7. Doctor of the Nevsky-Petrograd region. He sympathizes with the Mensheviks, a malicious opponent of the Soviet power. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

18. KANTSEL Efim Semenovich. Podolskaya street, 34 apt. 9. Doctor-surgeon (not an eye doctor). Works in the medical control commission. Opponent of Soviet power, one of the organizers of counter-revolutionary-minded doctors. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

19. ZBARSKY David Solomonovich. Zabalkansky lane 40, apt. 6. Doctor of the Control Commission, Menshevik. Hostile to all undertakings of the Soviet power. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

20. SADIKOVA Yu.N. Sergievskaya street, house 24. Doctor of the Vyborg Children's Hospital. Cadet. Openly and viciously speaks at meetings of doctors. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

21. BRONSHTEIN Isai Evseevich. Left for Moscow. Doctor, malicious Menshevik. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

22. PAVLOV Pavel Pavlovich. See Hospitals of the Victims of the Revolution. A member of the Black Hundreds, he was a policeman, spoke at general meetings against the Communist Party and Soviet power, and conducted counter-revolutionary agitation among the staff. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

23. KARGENS Nikolai Konstantinovich. See hospitals Botkin, an active opponent of Soviet power, is conducting anti-Soviet agitation. Former bailiff, was repeatedly arrested. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

24. SOLOVEYCHIK Emmanuil Borisovich. Kirochnaya, 1/8. Doctor of the military sanitary department. The right hand of the bureau of the section of doctors, which has a counter-revolutionary direction. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov for the arrest and deportation to the northern and eastern provinces for use in the specialty.

#### LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COUNCIL OF PROFESSORS

##### PETROGRAD

25. POLITICS. Secretary of the United Council of Professors. Monarchist, active member of the council. Executor of all his decrees.

Commission with the participation of Comrade. Bogdanov for expulsion. Glavprofobr for deportation.

26. ODINTSOV Boris Nikolaevich. Professor-Economist of the Agricultural Academy (natural). Monarchist. The main inspirer of the council and an active organizer of right-wing professors and students. At the joint meetings of professors, he delivered a counter-revolutionary speech and forbade the collegium to take positions from the Petroprofobra. Glavprofobr for deportation.

#### PROFESSORS UNDER THE TAGANTSEV CASE

27. LAPSHIN Ivan Ivanovich. Kirochnaya d. 7 apt. 20. Professor General. pedagogical otd. Peter, University. He received material support through Tagantsev (the leader of the military conspiracy) from a white foreign organization. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

28. POLNER Sergei Ivanovich. Raznochinnaya, house 10, apt. 24. Technical school teacher. Received material support from Tagantsev. Glavprofobr for deportation.

29. ANTONOVSKAYA Nadezhda Grigorievna. Lermontovskaya street. Lecturer. Received financial support from Tagantsev. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

30. SELIVANOV Dmitry Fedorovich. V.O 14 line 61. apt. 13. Professor of Mathematics Peter, University. He received material support from Tagantsev, Glavprofobr for expulsion.

31. FRENKEL Grigory Ivanovich. Professor. Had a relationship with a member of the military conspiracy prof. Lazorevsky (the case of Tagantsev) on the development of a project on the forms of leaving a loan for the future white government. Glavprofobr for deportation.

32. OSTROVSKII Andrey Solyanoy per., 16/4, apt. 9. Serves in the state bank, formerly. professor, had a connection with a member of the military conspiracy prof. Lazorevskii (the Tagantsev case) on the development of a project on the form of drawing up a loan for the future white government. The characterization of Comrade Sergeev is politically not ours, pernicious, can be withdrawn without damage.

33. Butov, Pavel Ilyich. IN. 21 line d.Yu k. 2. Professor, geologist, maintained illegal communication with foreign countries. He published in foreign white press, had connections with Tagantsev's organization. He was aware of Tagantsev's counter-revolutionary work (the blowing up of a monument, etc.). He was arrested in May 1921. REFERENCE: 1907-1917 was a Bolshevik. Glavprofobr for deportation.

34. VISLOUKH Stanislav Mikhailovich. Detskoye Selo, farm No. 1. Professor, geologist, had connections with Tagantsev's counter-revolutionary organization. He was arrested in May 1921 and sentenced to imprisonment in a camp. Glavprofobr for deportation.

35. WITZER German Rudolfovich. Former factory owner. Had connections with Finland. Accused of spying for Finland. He was arrested by the Cheka in 1921. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

36. KORSCH. Lesnaya, d. 13. Member of the cd party, informer of the Wrangel organization, located in Finland.

37. NAROYKO. Million street. Professor. Appearance for couriers Schmidt (head of the white organization in Finland). Glavprofobr for deportation.

38. STEIN Victor Meritsovich. Professor at the Polytechnic Institute



and editor of the journal Economic Renaissance. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

39. SAVICH. Manager of the Academy of Sciences. Black Hundreds. Conducts anti-soviet G<sup>2</sup> agitation. Former Prosecutor of the Kharkiv District Chamber. Glavpro Foor for expulsion.

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40. Bogolepov A.A. Professor - lawyer of Petrograd University. Organizer of public opinion of the teaching board in the struggle for the autonomy of the Higher School and in the conflict with the Glavprofobr on the appointment of the rector. Glavprofobr for deportation.

41. OSOKIN Vladimir Mikhailovich. Nikolaevskaya d. 61 apt. 2. Head. Dep. Sowing Union. handicraftsman, right SR.

42. BOLSHAKOV Andrei Mikhailovich. Kolomna st. 23 sq. 9. Professor of the Herzen Institute. Right s.r. Glavprofobr does not object to the deportation.

43. GUSAROV Ignatius Evdokimovich. Severn Union Instructor. Kustar. Karavannaya d. 14 apt. 9. Right s.r. Enjoys influence.

44. ERMOLAEV Nikolai Nikolaevich. Troitskaya d. 10 apt. 3. Control of the board of the Union of North. Artisanal Right s.r. Released from arrest on a subscription with an appearance at the GPU.

45. EREMEEV Grigory Alekseevich. Head Department of the Union Severn. Kustar. Right s.r.

46. TELTEVSKY Alexei Vasilievich 8th Christmas. 32 sq. 12. Instructor of the Severn Union. Artisan. Right s.r.

47. Evdokimov Petr Ivanovich. Troitskaya st. d. 10 sq. 3. Member of the board of the Severn Union. Artisan. People's Socialist since 1905. Irreconcilable opponent of Soviet power. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### LIST OF PETERSBURG LITERATORS

48. GERETSKY Viktor Yakovlevich. Znamenskaya d. 29 apt. 10 Writer. 40 years old. He took part in the counter-revolutionary collection "On the Change of Milestones." Prominent member of the House of Writers. Cadet. The Literary Commission is not aware of it.

49. KROHMAL Viktor Nikolaevich. Nadezhdinskaya 23 sq. 4. Manager of the Centrosoyuz. 46 years old. He was arrested twice in the case of the White Guard conspiracy and on charges of counter-revolutionary activities. Menshevik. T. Khinchuk is against expulsion.

50. ROZHKOV. Menshevik. Writer. Book employee. Cautious

quite popular among students. Gosizdat acquires its entire history. Literary commission against expulsion. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others against expulsion.

51. CLEMENS. Former Rech employee. He considered himself in the group of teaching staff in 1908-09. Basically a tiny figure.

LIST

## ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA (Professor)

Professor of the 1st State University.

1. STRATONOV Vsevolod Viktorovich. Professor. Astronomer. 49 years old. Lives on Povarskaya street, Trubnikovsky lane, 26, apt. 21. He was an official for special assignments under the governor of the Caucasus and the editor of the official Black Hundred newspaper. One of the ringleaders and leaders of the February strike (1922) at the university. When accepting students, he led the bourgeoisie and the White Guards. A definite anti-Semite. At one time he worked as a consultant in an academic center, where he was considered his own, in fact he is

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a vicious opponent of Soviet power. As a scientific value value is not is.

Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of t.t. Bogdanov, Khinchuk, Sereda, and Likhachev spoke in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

2. FOMIN Vasily Emelyanovich. Professor, histologist, 48 years old, lives at 4 Gussyatnikovsky lane, apt. 1. One of the active organizers of the strike among doctors. A definite opponent of Soviet power, one of the organizers of the anti-Soviet elements of the professors. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of t.t. BOGDANOVA, KHINCHUK, SEREDA and LIKHACHEV spoke in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

## PROFESSOR OF THE MOSCOW HIGHER TECHNICAL SCHOOL

3. YASINSKY Vsevolod Ivanovich. Lives on Bolshoi Kharitonevsky lane, 1-2, apt. 28. Entrance to the apartment from Myshkovsky Lane. The leader of the right side of the professorship, always comes up with anti-Soviet agitation, both at meetings of the teaching staff and in conversations with students. Former member of the All-Russian Committee for Assistance to the Starving. Leader of the professors' strike. Thanks to its leadership in the KUVU, it holds in its hands economic power over the non-partisan part of the professorship and uses this influence to settle scores with those who sympathize with the Soviet authorities. In other respects, it is nothing serious. Produce

search, arrest and deport abroad. Commission with the participation of t.t. BOGDANOVA, KHINCHUK, SEREDA and LIKHACHEV spoke in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for exile.

4. BRILLING Nikolay Romanovich. Lives on Malo-Znamensky per. 7, apt. 26. B. dean of the mechanical department. Belongs to the leading group of the right professorship. At lectures, he conducts anti-Soviet agitation, enjoys influence among students. He has connections with the counter-revolutionary organization. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrades BOGDANOVA, KHINCHUK, SERED, and LIKHACHEV spoke out in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

5. KUKOLEVSKY Ivan Ivanovich. Lives on the 4th Sokol, floor. per., D. 2, apt. 2. Dean of the mechanical department, one of the most right. Conducts anti-Soviet agitation even at lectures. A participant in a professorial strike, he quit his job when the Glavprofobrom appointed a new board. He speaks at student gatherings and gathers reactionary-minded young teachers around him. Conduct a search, arrest and send for Fanitsa. Commission with the participation of t.t. BOGDANOVA, KHINCHUK, SEREDA and LIKHACHEV spoke in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

6. ZVORYKIN Vladimir Vasilievich. Lives on the corner of Baumanskaya and Lrigadirsky per. Engineer. Former member of the Basmanny Committee of the Cadet Party. Former member of the Moscow City Duma. Church warden of the School Church. A definite opponent of Soviet power, he conducts monarchist agitation among the students. Conduct a search, arrest and send for Fanitsa. Commission with the participation of t.t. BOGDANOVA, KHINCHUK, SEREDA and LIKHACHEV spoke in favor of deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

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#### PROFESSOR OF THE PETROVSK- RAZUMOV AGRICULTURAL ACADEMY

7. ARTOBOLEVSKY Ivan Alekseevich. A former professor of theology, he lost his chair since the October Revolution, but all the time he maintained a close relationship with the Academy. Monarchist by conviction. He was the head of the "Union of Peasant Students" at the Academy. All his sermons are clearly Black-Hundred in nature. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of t.t. Bogdanov, Sereda, Khinchuk and Likhachev for expulsion. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

8. USHAKOV. Professor of jurisprudence, an ardent defender of Stolypin's land laws. Monarchist. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

#### PROFESSOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING WAYS OF COMMUNICATION

9. TYAPKIN Nikolai Dmitrievich. Professor. Lives at Bakhmetevskaya d. 15, apt. 2. Monarchist by conviction. One of the active leaders and initiators of all counter-revolutionary actions at the institute. Leader of the December strike. An old royal dignitary.

Former head of the department of waterways and highways of the Ministry of Communications. He openly preaches his monarchical convictions. On December 6, 22, he devoted part of his lecture to the memory of Nicholas II, as the founder of the Institute. In 1905, Tyapkin participated in the suppression of the strike of students and workers and at the same time had contact with the police. Associated with a white organization. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

#### IN THE CASE OF THE FREE-ECONOMIC SOCIETY

10. UGRYUMOV Al-dr Ivanovich. (MURALOV for sending him abroad.) Professor. Lives along the Arbat, Nikolsky per., 19, apt. 2. Lecturer at the workers' faculty of one of the universities. President of the Society of Farmers. He is the head of both the Free Economic Society and the Society of Farmers. Member of the editorial board of Vestnik sel'skokhozyaistvo, a body of anti-Soviet-minded agronomists. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of t.t. Bogdanov and others for expulsion. Glavprofobr for deportation.

#### PROFESSORS OF DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

11. OVCHINNIKOV. Professor at Kazan University. He clearly and openly opposes the policy of the Soviet authorities in relation to higher education. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

12. VELIKHOV Pavel Appolonovich. Lives at Bakhmetyevskaya, 15 sq. 8. Has strong connections with the faculty and among the university professors. Was related to the national center. Currently associated with and assisting an active white anti-Soviet organization. The program developed by Velikhov is close to the program for organizing traffic rules.

Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

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13. LOSKUTOV Nikolai Nikolaevich. Lawyer, party member Ph.D. In 1918 and 1919 he was a member of the "Council of Public Figures". He was arrested in the case of the "Tactical Center" (15) in the spring of 1920 and brought to trial by the Supreme Tribunal. He has close ties with Velikhov's circles, is associated with a military organization. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad.

14. TROSHIN. Professor of Kazan University; dean of the medical faculty. He organized around himself a significant group of counter-revolutionary professors. A certain opponent of the Soviet power, conducts anti-Soviet agitation even at lectures. In his work, the dean pursues a certain policy against students, Jews and communists. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion, Glavprofobr for the expulsion.

15. NOVIKOV M.M. Former rector of Moscow University. Cadet. He was arrested in the case of the "Tactical Center" in the spring of 1920. A certain active opponent of the Soviet power; sabotages the decrees of the Soviet authorities in relation to c. schools. Works in scientific and technical. department of the Supreme Economic Council.

Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others.

for the deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

16. Ilyin N.A. Philosophy professor. Lives at Krestovozdvizhensky per., 2-12, apt. 36. In the spring of 1920, he was arrested in connection with the case of the "Tactical Center" in connection with the meetings of members of the "Nat. center" (16). Definitely anti-Soviet. In the spring of this year, he attended illegal meetings at the apartment of Professor Avilov, where abstracts and reports of a counter-revolutionary nature were read. Arrest and send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET PROFESSORS ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE

17. USPENSKY Alexander Ivanovich. Rector of the Archaeological Institute. Organized a group of monarchist professors. He has a close relationship with Patriarch Tikhon and the clergy surrounding Tikhon. Illegal meetings of churchmen take place at Uspensky's apartment. In the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Zapfront there is a case about Uspensky in connection with opposition to the seizure of church valuables.

Send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

18. TSVETKOV Nikolai Nikolaevich. Professor of the Archaeological Institute. A close friend of Uspensky. An active figure in the Black Hundred clergy. Consists in friendship with a group headed by Uspensky. Send abroad, Glavprofobr for expulsion.

19. BORDIGIN Vasily Mikhailovich. Professor of the Archaeological Institute, a monarchist, is a member of a group of churchmen led by Uspensky. Representative of the Archaeological Institute in the joint meetings of professors. Send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

20. KOROBKOV Nikolai Mikhailovich. Professor of the Architectural Institute in the Department of Egyptology; he recently became a professor, as a scientific value of no value. A close friend of Patriarch Tikhon, he forwards Tikhon's messages through foreign missions. Former artillery officer. Member of the Uspensky group. A prominent figure in the so-called "Anti-Jewish League." Send abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

#### GENERAL LIST OF ACTIVE ANTI-SOVIET PERSONS IN THE CASE OF PUBLISHING HOUSE "BEREG"

21. TRUBETSKOY Sergey Evgenievich. Lives on Bolshoy Ozhevsky per., d, 2 sq. 1. Former prince. Member of the "Tactical Center" (1918-1919), in whose case Verkhtribom was sentenced to death, which was replaced by a ten-year prison. He attended illegal meetings at Professor Avilov's apartment. He had a connection with a group organized around the publishing house "Bereg". Works in NK agriculture. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission^ with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the deportation.

22. FELDSHTEIN Mikhail Solomonovich. Lives in Starokonyushen

nomu pereulok, 25 sq. 1. Active, takes part in the publishing house "Bereg". Attended illegal meetings of the anti-Soviet group at the apartment of Avilov, formerly. member of the National Center. In the case of "Takt, Center" he was sentenced to death, replaced by prison, imprisonment. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### LIST OF PERSONS IN CASE No. 813 (Abrikosov's group)

23. ABRIKOSOV Vladimir Vladimirovich. Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Moscow. Son of ex. owner of a confectionery factory in Moscow (Aprikosova). The initiator of the illegal meetings taking place in his house about the union of the Roman Catholics. and Orthodox churches. A close friend of Patriarch Tikhon and the protonotary of the Pope Exarch Fedorov, who is the head of the Catholic rite in Petrograd. Conduct a search and arrest and send abroad. Lives on Prechistensky Boulevard, house 29 of the Jerusalem Compound, sq. 3.

24. KUZMIN-KARAVAEV Dmitry Vladimirovich. 36 years old, serves as manager of the garden departments of Glavleskom. In 1922 he converted to Catholicism. A participant in all meetings of Abrikosov and a zealous follower of the idea of uniting the churches. Send abroad. Lives on Povarskaya street sq. 6.

25. BAIKOV Alexey Lvovich. Professor at the Lazarev Institute, participant in Abrikosov's meetings. At a meeting on May 4 at Arseniev's apartment, where the question of organizing a united anti-socialist front was discussed, he ardently advocated the unification of churches and proposed that the formation of leadership heads and the selection of an anti-Soviet element begin. Lives at Sivtsev Vrazh, 35, apt. 17. Conduct a search, arrest and send administratively abroad. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

26. ARBUZOV Alexey Dmitrievich. 62 years old, b. senator. He served in the RVSR (currently does not serve anywhere). Participated in a meeting with Abrikosov. At the meeting on April 3, he proposed to those present to accept theses, on the basis of which it would be possible to negotiate with the pope on the issue of uniting the church. Lives at 3, Denezhny Lane. Conduct a search, arrest and deport him abroad.

#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET AGRONOMISTS AND COOPERATORS

27. RYBNIKOV Al-dr Al-drovich. Professor, participant of the 1st and 2nd All-Russian congresses of the industrial cooperation. At both congresses he delivered reports in a sharply oppositional spirit. He urged the need to remove all cooperation from the hands of the Bolsheviks in order to bring and preserve at least the remnants of it to new days. Adjoins the so-called group of non-party people. Neza

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Depending on the results of the search, arrest and deport him abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

28. LYUBIMOV Nikolay Ivanovich. Lives at Bolshaya Dmitrovka 4. Member of the Board of All Russia. union of agricultural cooperatives. By political convictions, a cadet. Among the anti-Soviet elements, the cooperatives stand out for their irreconcilably sharp opposition to the Soviet power. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

29. MATVEEV Ivan Petrovich. Volkhonka 6. apt. 9. Member of the Board of the All-Russian Union of Agricultural Cooperation. By political convictions, a cadet. He was a member of the organizing bureau convened by Vseros. congress of agricultural cooperatives. Moreover, the selection of participants in the congress was made exclusively from among the old cooperators of the Kadet type who had proven themselves in anti-Soviet work. Regardless of the results of the search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion. (T. Muralov for expulsion).

30. ROMODANOVSKY Nikolai Pavlovich. B. Molchanovka, 34, apt. 3. At the congress on 9. XI-22 he was elected a member of the Council of the All-Russian Island of Agronomists. An old member of the C.-D. While in Kaluga, he maintained close contact with the cadet circles in Moscow, was invited to all congresses, as one of the most active and resolute members of the Cadets party. A definite opponent of Soviet power. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion. Tov. Muralov for deportation.

31. N.D. Kondratiev Professor. Prominent and closest collaborator of Vestnik sel'skokhozyaistvoi, an organ of anti-Soviet-minded agronomists. Eser, was involved in the Tactical Center case. For participation in the "Union of the Renaissance" (17) he was sentenced to death, commuted to imprisonment. Keeps in touch with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, although officially from the S.R. party. came out. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

32. KILCHEVSKY Vladimir Agafonovich. Works in consumer cooperation. Reads lectures at the cooperative institute. Right SR, opponent of Soviet power. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

33. BULATOV Alexey Alekseevich. Lives in Novgorod. Cadet. Chairman of the Novgorod Trade Association of Handicraft and Trade Cooperation. 49 years old. Former nobleman and landowner, had about 400 acres of land. Under tsarism he served in the zemstvo. Under Kerensky, he was Commissar of the Provisional Government. In 1918 he was under trial on charges of non-compliance with the orders of the Soviet power. 24 / VIII-22 on the All-Russian. congress of agricultural cooperatives was elected a member of the Council of the All-Union Agricultural Cooperation. One of the main anti-Soviet figures of the 2nd All-Russian. congress of handicraft and trade cooperation, which took place on 28 / GV-22, where he took an active part in a group of non-party people who were definitely in opposition to the Soviet power. It is necessary to search, arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

34. SEGIRSKII Al-dr Ivanovich. Lives in Moscow at Bolshoy Uspensky lane, 5, apt. 40. People's socialist, major cooperator, candidate of the Constituent Assembly. According to the list of N.S. from the Smolensk province. Member of the 1st Fan, Congress of handicraft cooperation. Member of the All-Russian agricultural congress. cooperation, where he was elected to the board (Comrade Chairman of the Board). He has connections with prominent anti-Soviet elements of cooperation. Member of the All-Russian congress of agronomists, where he was a member of the Presidium of the congress and where he was elected a member of the Council of All Russia. islands of agronomists. Malicious adversary 'ovvlasti. It is necessary to carry out a search, arrest and deportation from Moscow abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

35. SHISHKIN Matvey Dmitrievich. Old Menshevik. Lives in Vologda, in exile, was a member of the Constituent Assembly. Permanent organizer of the opposition to the Soviet power in the cooperative movement. A malicious opponent of Soviet power. Send abroad or to remote places. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

36. BAKKAL. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary, survived with great difficulty from the Central Union, where he was an employee and conducted malicious agitation. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

37. MALOLETNIKOV Nikolay Vasilievich. Lives on Knyazhnaya street, house 12, apt. 1. Serves at the Moscow Regional Agricultural Experimental Station. Prominent member of the party c.d. He was put forward as a candidate for the Moscow constituency as a member. Const. meetings from parties. Nar. freedom.

Conducts anti-Soviet propaganda among the employees of the washing factory. Groups cadet elements around itself. A malicious opponent of the Soviet power. It is necessary to conduct a search and send abroad. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

38. KLEZETSKY (Tver). Chairman of the Tver Gubernia Union, cooperator. A vicious opponent of the Soviet power. Active.

Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### LIST OF DOCTORS

39. ISRAELSON. Doctor, lives in Orel, delegate to the 2nd Vseros. congress of medical sections of Vsemedicosantrud from the city of Orel. He took an active part in the debate at the congress and voted for anti-Soviet resolutions. Opponent of Soviet power. Send to the northern or eastern provinces for use in the specialty. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

40. FALIN. Doctor, lives in Vologda. An active participant in the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Physicians of the Vsemedicosantrud section, he took an active part in debates and voting for anti-Soviet resolutions. Send to the northern or eastern provinces for use in the specialty. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

41. ROZANOV (Saratov). Doctor. At congresses, he opposes Soviet power. Send to the northern or eastern provinces for use in the specialty. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET ENGINEERS (Moscow)

42. PALCHINSKY Peter Iokimovich. Organizer and temporary secretary of the Free Economic Island, chairman of the mining section and the mountain club of the All-Russian Association of Engineers. Chairman of the Russian-technical island. Chairman of the commission on a loan abroad, member of the agricultural islands. At all meetings he speaks in a defiant tone and always on behalf of the public. All his speeches at meetings have a sharp awakening character. Leader of the public anti-Soviet movement among engineers. Works in Gosplan. It is necessary to arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.



43. PARSHIN Nikolay Evgrafovich. Member of the All-Russian Association of Engineers. Attends carefully only those meetings of the WAI that are of a socio-political nature. According to intelligence information, in the July days of 17, under Kerensky, he took an active part in the search for Vladi

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Mir Ilyich and served in counterintelligence. Served with Denikin. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

44. YUSHTIN Ivan Ivanovich. Secretary of the Petrograd branch of the Russian-German association. Scientific secretary of the KUVI. Managing director of the international cooperative engineering partnership. Member of the Presidium of the Russian Technical Island, Palchinsky's closest friend and assistant, like-minded person. Arrest and send abroad.

45. WEISBERG. Chairman of the International Cooperative Engineering Association. Member of the initiative leadership head, a close friend and supporter of Palchinsky. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

46. KOZLOV Nikolai Pavlovich. Member of the All-Russian Association of Engineers, supporter and follower of Palchinsky Active. Arrest and exile over the page. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

47. SAKHAROV Andrei Vasilievich. Member of the All-Russian Association of Engineers. In the construction section, he makes presentations in which he carries out the thoughts and policies of the initiative group of engineers. Arrest and send abroad. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### LIST OF LITERATORS

The characteristics that were discussed at a meeting on July 22 under the chairmanship of Comrade Unshlikht in the presence of specially invited comrades - Yu.M. Steklov, Znamensky, Ionov and Lebedev-Polyansky.

48. FRANK Semyon Ludwigovich. Professor, philosopher-idealist. Passes on the undercover case "Coast". He took part in secret meetings with Avilov. Opponent of higher education reform. Right cadet of the "Rul" direction. Undoubtedly harmful. He was removed from Saratov for anti-Soviet activities. In its general direction, it is capable of taking part in the church counter-revolution. Frank is not dangerous as a direct fighting force, but all his literature and speeches in the legal society and in the Petrograd Philosophical Society are aimed at creating a united philosophical and political front of a definitely anti-Soviet character. Tov. Semashko for deportation. Glavprofobr for expulsion.

49. ROSENBERG. B. editor of Russkiye Vedomosti. Right k-d. Enemy of owls of power. Member of the board of "Zadruga". To be sent out.

50. KIZEVETTER A.A. Member of the "Zadruga" partnership, ex. a member of the Union of the Renaissance, a member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, was walking through the Tactical Center. One of the spiritual leaders of the Right Cadets. Undoubtedly, it can serve as a rallying point for anti-Soviet forces.

51. OZERETSKOVSKY Veniamin Sergeevich. Member of the association "Zadru"

ha. Former senator. Lawyer. Previously, he was a SR. Close to Melgunov and Myakotin. Harmful.

52. Yurovsky Al-dr Naumovich. A harmful cadet from Manuilov's group, a representative of Struvist Russia with strong political overtones. He made reports and wrote something. As a smart, cunning person who kept Mgcho as a group, he is clearly anti-Soviet. Serves in tivo in the Artistic Council, a member of the editorial board "Coast".

Oganovsky Nikolay Petrovich. Member of the Free-Economic Department of Va - Member of the Academic Council of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture. Right s.r. Enesovskoy direction, of course, is anti-Soviet. Speaks at agricultural meetings. islands. the decay of the editorial board of the Bulletin of Agriculture. Former member of the Constituent

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assembly. Now that an intelligentsia community is accumulating, Oganovsky can gather around him the petty-bourgeois youth. He enjoys great influence among the students.

Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion. Glavprofobr for deportation.

54. AIKHENVALD Julius Isaevich. A writer, a typical ideologue of Kadetism in art. He does not hide his distrust and antipathy towards the October Revolution, and despises the creativity of revolutionary-minded youth. It groups around itself the bourgeois cultural intelligentsia and youth. Wagging cadet. He wobbled all the time. In 1918 he wrote articles on political topics. Wrote "Leon is a warm heart." Trotsky's characterization is more or less acceptable, and then he glorified Gumilyov (as a nobleman). Socially harmful.

Polyansky proposes to send them to remote provinces. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for deportation abroad.

55. N.A. Berdyaev Close to the publishing house "Bereg", was involved in the case of the "Tactical Center" and in the "Union of the Renaissance". A monarchist, then a right-wing cadet. The Black Hundreds, religiously inclined, takes part in the church counter-revolution. Ionov and Polyansky for deportation within Soviet Russia. Commission with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others for deportation abroad.

56. OZEROV Ivan Khristoforovich. Professor of Financial Law. Adaptable to all regimes. Undoubtedly, he stands for the bourgeois-landowner system. Reactive. He voluntarily returned from the borders of Southern Russia, where he fled to Denikin in 1920. Prepared to escape abroad, but was arrested. Now he is not actively working, but he participates in bodies that are hostile to us. As a scientific value, it is currently of no value. There is reason to believe that he has connections with foreign publishing houses. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion. Glavprofobr for deportation.

57. OSORGIN Pavel Andreevich. A Right Cadet, undoubtedly of an anti-Soviet trend. Employee of "Russian Vedomosti". Editor of the Pro-

cookie." His books are published in Latvia and Estonia. There are reasons to think that he maintains contact with foreign countries. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

58. MATUSEVICH Iosif Aldrovich. Secretary of the Writers' Union. He is trying to fight us on professional grounds. Petty journalist during the war. Now the whole union is on his shoulders. He groups a definitely anti-Soviet public around him. If it is removed, then the union will be upset and the Soviets will take over. There is now a struggle in the union between the young public, the Soviet one, and the old people, who prevent the young from taking positions.

59. EFIMOV. Professor at the Karl Marx Institute. The churchman, an enemy of Soviet power, openly delivered a pogrom speech. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others for the expulsion.

#### ADDITIONAL LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA (Moscow)

professorship

1. KRAVETS Torichan Pavlovich. Professor at the Institute of Communications Engineers. Physicist. Lives on Bakhmetyevskaya d. 15 sq. 2., works in N. T. Dept. VSNKh. He usually presides over professorial meetings, and is popular among professors and students. Was the head teacher

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giving board during the February strike and throughout the conflict with Glavprofobr over the appointment of the rector. Associated with a white organization. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. T. Bogdanov spoke out against the expulsion. Glavprofobr for deportation.

2. IZGARYSHEV Nikolai Alekseevich. Professor at the Karl Marx Institute, 49 years old. Lives at 17 Lyalinsky Lane. He is the main leader of the February 1922 strike at the Institute. Hostile to Soviet power. Works in the scientific and technical department of the Supreme Economic Council. Conduct a search, arrest and send abroad. Glavprofobr for deportation. Tov. Bogdanov points out that about Izgaryshev N.A. there are good reviews, so he objects to the expulsion.

#### ADDITIONAL LIST OF LITERATORS,

the characteristics of which were discussed at a meeting on July 22 at the GPU, chaired by comrade. Unshlikht in the presence of specially invited comrades. Yu.M. Steklov, Znamensky, Ionov and Lebedev-Polyansky.

3. KUDRYAVTSEV Vasily Mikhailovich. Cadet. Member of the board of "Zadruga". Melgunov's associate. To the Soviet power is sharply hostile. The Literary Commission is not aware of him.

4. MYAKOTIN Venedikt Aldrovich. Member of the t-va "Zadruga". Member of the Central Committee N.S., was the chairman of the Union of the Renaissance. He was involved in the case of Takt, Tsentra. He was declared an enemy of the people by Verkhtrib. One of the ardent enemies not only of Soviet power, but of socialism in general. The commission, with the participation of Comrade Bogdanov and others, is against deportation in view of his harmlessness.

5. IZYUMOV Al-dr Filaretovich. Member of t-va "Zadruga", candidate member

Council. Close to Melgunov. Opponent of the Soviet Union. The Literary Commission is not aware of him.

6. PESHEKHONOV Alexey Vasilievich. Member of the t-va "Zadruga". Chairman of the Labor People's Socialist Party. Until now, he worked in Kharkov at the Central Statistical Office, now he has moved to Moscow. In 1918-19. was a member of the Renaissance Union. It is similar in type to Myakotin. Commission with the participation of comrade Bogdanov and others against expulsion, with the exception of comrade. Wednesday, who considers the expulsion necessary.

7. Stepun Fedor Avgustovich. The philosopher is mystical and SR-minded. In the days of Kerenskyism he was our ardent, active enemy. Works in the newspaper of the right SR. "The will of the people". Kerensky distinguished him and made him his political secretary. Now he lives near Moscow in a working intelligentsia commune. Abroad, he would feel very good among our emigration, and he could turn out to be very harmful. Ideologically connected with Yakovenko and Gessen, who fled abroad, with whom he once published Logos. Employee of the publishing house "Bereg". The characteristic was given by the literary commission. Tov. Wednesday for deportation. T.t. Semashko and Bogdanov are against expulsion.

8. Chernolussky Vladimir Ivanovich. Member of the t-va "Zadruga". Right I-s - Cadet aspirations. An ardent enemy of Soviet power and socialists in general. In recent years, neither active nor passive work has been carried out.

APRF. f. h. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 36-44, 46-58. Script. Typescript.

val \* ^ which surnames included in different lists are repeated in the document: Aichen suijd » akkal, Berdyaev, Kizwetter, Osorgin, Frank, etc.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 33

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE  
LIST OF ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

August 10, 1922

No. 9795 with

No. 21, paragraph 7 - Approval of the list (vol. Unshlikht).

a) Approve.

b) Propose to the GPU to subject everyone to a search, to arrest only those about whom there is a fear that they might hide, and to subject the rest to house arrest.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D.307. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

No. 34

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. STALIN WITH THE  
APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT PROVISIONS ON  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE GPU OF  
THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC AND THE GPU UNDER THE NKVD OF THE RSFSR

August 15, 1922

No. 81077

I am sending you a draft regulation on the relationship between the GPU of the independent republics and the State Political Administration under the NKVD of the RSFSR, adopted at a meeting of authorized representatives of the GPU.

Application: mentioned.

Deputy prev. GPU UNSCHLICHT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GPU OF THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC AND THE  
STATE POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE NKVD OF THE RSFSR

§ 1. In the independent national republics, emergency commissions for the fight against counter-revolution, speculation and crimes should be abolished according to their position.

In order to carry out a political search and fight against state crimes (decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 and the Regulations on the State Political Administration of the NKVD of the RSFSR), instead of them, organize state political departments under the Central Executive Committee of independent republics as independent departments.

§ 2. Heads of the GPU of the independent republics are appointed by agreement between the CEC of the republic and the GPU of the RSFSR.

§ 3. The head of the GPU under the Central Executive Committee of an independent republic is at the same time a full representative of the GPU of the RSFSR.

§ 4. The head of the GPU of an independent republic in his work is directly subordinate to all orders of the GPU, bears full responsibility to him under the control of the Central Executive Committee and the Congress of Soviets of the independent republic.  
faces.

§ 5. The head of the GPU executes all the tasks of the CEC of an independent republic that fall within the competence of the GPU in accordance with the regulations on it.

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§ 6. All organs of the GPU of an independent republic retain the unity of their organizational structure. The states of local bodies are developed and approved by the GPU of the RSFSR. Changes in the staff and structure, in accordance with local circumstances, can occur only with the permission of the GPU of the RSFSR.

§ 7. All provincial bodies of the GPU on the territory of an independent republic are subordinate to the department of the GPU of the independent republic.

§ 8. In the work of the special departments, the transport departments of the GPU and the protection of the borders of the republic, the unity of the operational and administrative leadership throughout the Federation is maintained.

§ 9. The number of GPU troops on the territory of an independent republic is established by the GPU of the RSFSR on the proposal of the local department of the GPU.

§ 10. All GPU troops on the territory of an independent republic are subordinate to the PP of the GPU of the RSFSR of the given republic.

§ 11. All general orders, operational tasks of the GPU of an independent republic are obligatory for its local departments.

§ 12. The provision of the GPU of an independent republic and its employees with all types of financial, food, clothing and other allowances takes place in the general manner according to the estimate of the GPU of the RSFSR.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 93, 94-94v. Script. Typescript.

No. 35

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
ESTIMATE OF COSTS FOR THE  
EXPIRY OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

August 22, 1922

No. 81511

Personally S. secret

At the same time, forwarding an approximate cost estimate for the expulsion of anti-Soviet intelligentsia abroad, I ask for the release of a special fund of 50 billion rubles for this purpose.

APPENDIX: estimate.

Deputy Chairman of the GPU Unshlikht

ESTIMATE

for the expulsion of anti-Soviet intelligentsia abroad

For the expulsion of one person from Moscow to Berlin, you must pay: ®) visa .49 million

b) two days of road-food. 8 million

c) railway ticket from Moscow to Sebezh. 15 million

d) railway ticket from Sebezh to Berlin. 13.000 DM

D) travel expenses and allowances

from Sebezh to Berlin. 2.000 germs, marks.

h monthly cost of living in Berlin

for a political worker of the 3rd category. 5.000 germs, marks

2. 1,000 German marks at the black exchange rate is equal to 6-7 million rubles.

3. In total, 67 people are subject to deportation from Moscow, 53 people from Petrograd, 77 people from Ukraine. In total - 217 people.

CA FSB RF. f. i. Op. 6. D. 117. L. 135-136. Copy. Typescript.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 36

NOTE I.V. STALIN F.E. DZERZHINSKY AND I.S.  
UNSHLIKHTU ON ENGINEER  
BAGDATYAN ARRESTED FOR SPECULATION

August 23, 1922

Recently I found out by chance that t.t. Krasin, Yenukidze and Serebrovsky appealed to the GPU with a request to release engineer Bagdatyan, who had been arrested for speculation and bribery, under the guarantee of these comrades. Knowing Bagdatyan for a long time as a man unconditionally hostile to the Soviet power and guilty of a whole series of crimes against the working class of Russia, I consider it my duty to declare that it would be an irreparable mistake if the GPU respected the request of the comrades named above and released the engineer Bagdatyan.

I. Stalin

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 187. L. 6. Original. Manuscript.

No. 37

REPORT OF GPU I.V. TO STALIN ON THE STATE OF THE  
OPERATION FOR THE EXPIRY OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA

August 23, 1922

No. 81521

On behalf of Comrade Unshlikht, I am sending a report on the status of the operation to expel the anti-Soviet intelligentsia on August 23, 1922.

Application: mentioned.

Secretary of the Collegium of the GPU Ezerskaya

Deputy Previous GPU comrade. Unshlikhtu

REPORT

ON THE STATE OF THE OPERATION FOR  
THE EXPIRY OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA ON AUGUST 23, 1922

1. During the reporting two days, according to our telegrams, Shishkin and Bulatov, arrested from Vologda, were sent.

2. We have arrested 3 people who have remained unidentified so far - L.N. Yurovsky, Osorgin and Izyumov, and Professor Velikhov were transferred from house arrest to the inner prison.

3. In total, according to the Moscow list of 67 people subject to arrest and deportation abroad, we have arrested:

A) house arrest 11 people: 1. Maloletnikov Nikolai Vasilyevich, 2. Lyubimov Nikolai Ivanovich, 3. Rybnikov Alexander Vasilyevich, 4. Novikov Mikhail Mikhailovich, 5. Kizevetter Alexander Alexandrovich. 6. Vasily Emelyanovich Fomin, 7. Ivan Khristoforovich Ozerov, 8. Andrey Ivanovich Ugryumov, 9. Alexander Filaretovich Izyumov, 10. Alexander Naumovich Yurovsky, 11. Mikhail Andreevich Osorgin.

B) 14 people were arrested and kept in the internal prison: 1. Tyapkin Nikolai Dmitrievich, 2. Brilling Nikolai Romanovich, 3. Kravets Torichan Pavlovich, 4. Trubetskoy Sergey Evgenievich, 5. Bakkal Ilya Yulievich, 6. Kilchevsky Vladimir Agafonovich, 7. Ushakov Ivan Ivanovich, 8. Kondratiev

LOCUMENTS \_61[

Nikolai Dmitrievich, 9. Pavel Appolonovich Velikhov, 10. Alexei Vasilyevich Peshekhonov, 11. Nikolai Dmitrievich Korobkov, 12. Alexander Ivanovich Uspensky (temporarily in Smolensk at the trial of churchmen), 13. Bulatov, 14. Shishkin.

C) 21 people were released after declaring their desire to travel abroad at their own expense: 1. Arbuzov Alexander Dmitrievich, 2. Sakharov Andrey Vasilyevich,

3. Kuzmin-Karavaev, 4. Baikov Alexander Lvovich, 5. Abrikosov Vladimir Vladimirovich, 6. Matveev Ivan Petrovich, 7. Zvorykin Vladimir Vasilyevich, 8. Kukolevsky Ivan Ivanovich, 9. Parshin Nikolai Evgrafovich, 10. Matus Vych Joseph Alexandrovich, 11. Vasily Mikhailovich Kudryavtsev, 12. Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank, 13. Nikolai Nikolaevich Tsvetkov, 14. Vasily Mikhailovich Bordygin, 15. Vsevolod Ivanovich Yasinsky, 16. Mikhail Solomonovich Feldshtein, 17. Nikolai Alekseevich Berdyaev, 18. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Rozenberg, 19. Artobolevsky Ivan Alekseevich, 20. Aikhenvald Yuliy Isaevich, 21. Stratonov Vsevolod Viktorovich. All of them made commitments to finish their business and go abroad within a week.

D) 8 people were not arrested in Moscow: 1. Izgaryshev Nikolai Alekseevich, 2. Ozeretskovsky Veniamin Sergeevich, 3. Ilyin Ivan Aleksandrovich,

4. Segirsky Alexander Ivanovich, 5. Stepun Fedor Avgustovich, 6. Loskutov Nikolay Nikolaevich, 7. Myakotin Venedikt Alexandrovich, 8. Palchinsky



Peter Ioakimovich.

E) There are 11 people in other cities: 1. Kazan - professors Ovchinnikov and Troshin, 2. Tver - Klezetsky, 3. Kaluga - Romodanovsky, 4. Orel - Israelson, 5. Saratov - Rozanov, 6. Petrograd - Yushtin, Weinberg, Kozlov, 7. Batumi - Oganovsky, 8. Gomel - Chernolussky. A secondary request was made to local provincial departments about the results of the arrests.

E) In total, therefore, the list is missing from the indicated two people - Falin, who was arrested earlier and poured out under the supervision of the GPU, and Yefimov, who is being held in the Taganka prison.

4. Of the 14 people kept in the internal prison, 4 (Tyapkin, Kravets, Krivenko and Velikhov) were transferred along with their cases to the KRO GPU. The remaining 10 people are subject to deportation abroad at the expense of the GPU and under escort.

5. No information was received from Ukraine, a secondary telegram was sent with a proposal to hasten the answer.

6. The Petrograd Gubernia Department presented the following summary of the results of the operation: from August 16 to 17, 30 people were arrested according to the order of the GPU on the list of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia of the city of Petrograd: 1. Vasily Nikolaevich Stroeve, 2. Konstantin Ivanovich Savich, 3. Sergei Lukyanovich Zubashev, 4. Dmitriy Fedorovich Selivanov, 5. Nikolai Nikolaevich Ermolaev, 6. Petr Ivanovich Evdokimov, 7. Lapshin Ivan Ivanovich, 8. Kargens Nikolai Konstantinovich, 9. Lutokhin Dolmat Aleksandrovich, 10. Kozlov Nikolai Pavlovich, 11. Ostrovsky Andrey Andreevich, 12. Petrishchev Afanasy Borisovich, 13. Yushtin Ivan Ivanovich, 14. Brutskus Boris Davydovich, Dr. Klган Abram Saulovich, 16. Polner Sergey Ivanovich, 17. Meltevsky Alexander Vasil'evich, 18. Gusarov Ignatii Evdokimovich, 19. Eremeev Grigory Alekseevich.

All the above persons will be sent abroad under escort at the expense of the GPU.

\*• Leonid Alekseevich P Umpence, 2. Evgeny Ivanovich Zamyatin, 3. Boris Osipovich Kharitonov, 4. Aleksandr Solomonovich Izgoev-Lande, 5. Karg | in Lev Platonovich, 6. Volkovysk Nikolay Moiseevich, 7. Lossky Nikolai Anufrievich. The above 7 people, according to their desire, will be released abroad at their own expense.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

1. Sadykova Yulia Nikolaevna, 2. Kantsel Efim Semenovich, 3. Gutkin Abram Yakovlevich, 4. Bronstein Isai Evseevich. The above 4 people are sent to the eastern provinces for use in the specialty of combating epidemics.

7. A visa to enter Germany for all those subject to expulsion has already been received. With the timely receipt of money, all the money to be deported at the expense of the GPU can be sent within the next few days.

BEGINNING WITH GPU SAMSONOV

HEAD OF THE 4th DEPARTMENT OF THE GPU RESHETOV

August 22, 1922

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 76-81. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page of the report there is a handwritten note: "t. Stalin."

No. 38

PROVIDING NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. STALIN TO  
THE CONCLUSION ON THE CASE  
OF ENGINEER A.V. SAKHAROVA

August 23, 1922

No. 765133

In transmitting herewith the conclusion on the case of Engineer Sakharov, who was arrested during the operation on August 16-17, I ask permission for his release on the grounds that I have presented to you personally.

Deputy prev. GPU Unshlikht

CONCLUSION ON CASE 15/578  
SAKHAROV ANDREI VASILIEVICH  
according to the certificates in the accounting department does not pass

I, the head of the 4th department of the SO GPU Reshetov, having considered the case of engineer Andrei Vasilievich Sakharov, accused of anti-Soviet activities, found that Sakharov could be released from arrest without consequences, to be used as a specialist in economic -industrial organizations of the Soviet Republic.

The case should be terminated by investigation.

Beginning 4th branch SO GPU RECHETOV

August 18, 1922

APRF. F. 3. Op. 59. D. 3. L. 37-38. Script. Typescript.

No. 39

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE QUESTION OF THE LISTS OF THE ANTI-SOVIET  
INTELLIGENTIA EXPECTED FROM RUSSIA

August 24, 1922

No. 23, pLO - On the list (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

Grant Comrade Dzerzhinsky the right to change the list with a report to the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 309. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. STALIN  
ABOUT ENGINEER BAGDATYAN

August 26, 1922

No. 81551

C.K.R.K.P. comrade STALIN

In response to your request, I inform you that the Bagdatyan case was sent on August 4 to the Supreme Tribunal. In fact, there are petitions in the case, ie. KRASINA YENUKIDZE and SEREBROVSKY.

Deputy Chairman of the GPU UN

SHLICHT of the Central Administration of the FSB of the Russian Federation. F.1. Op. 6. D. 117. L. 138. Copy. Typescript.

No. 41

REPORT OF GPU I.V. TO STALIN ON THE STATE OF THE  
OPERATION FOR THE EXPIRY OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA  
ON AUGUST 26, 1922

August 27, 1922

No. 81558

On behalf of Comrade Unshlikht I am sending a copy of the report on the status of the operation for the expulsion of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia on August 26.

Application: mentioned.

Secretary of the Board of the GPU Ezerskaya  
RAPORT

STATUS OF THE OPERATION FOR THE  
EXPIRY OF THE ANTI-SOVIET INTELLIGENTIA AS OF AUGUST 26

1. During the reporting two days, according to our telegrams, the arrested Romodanovsky was sent from Kaluga.

2. Arrested from the remaining unidentified 2 people: Palchinsky and Izgaryshev.

3. In total, according to the Moscow list of 67 people subject to arrest and deportation abroad, we arrested:

a) house arrest of 11 people indicated in the previous report, and Izgaryshev, who was arrested on August 24. Total 12 people;

b) arrested and kept in the inner prison 14 people indicated in the previous report, and arrested on August 25 Palchinsky and Romodanov

sky. Total 16 people;

c) 6 people not arrested in Moscow;

d) 10 people are in other cities;

E) and released for travel at their own expense, indicated in the previous report 21 people.

4. Of those subject to expulsion:

a) 33 people released and leaving at their own expense, of which questionnaires were filled out and documents of 16 people were submitted to the INO GPU on receipt of an iepassport \_ in total with those submitted earlier 23 hours,

b) as the most active and serious anti-Soviet figures, a P ° D escort of 6 people is expelled.

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5. There was no new information about the results of the operation in Petrograd and Ukraine. Ukraine has been made a second proposal to hurry up with the announcement of the results.

Deputy head of the 4th department of the SO GPU Zarskiy

August 25, 1922.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 175. L. 82. Copy. Typescript.

No. 42

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
ACCELERATION OF THE CREATION OF GLAVLITA

September 2, 1922

No. 81578

In view of the wide distribution in recent times, k.-r. literature, I consider it necessary to concentrate both the received and internal private and cooperative publications in Glavlit, to which I entrust the distribution of literature.

To do this, it is necessary to take measures to speed up the organization of Glavlit, the absence of which hinders the fight against the c.-r. literature.

Deputy Chairman of the GPU Unichit

CA FSB RF. F. 1. Op. 6. D. 117. L. 162. Copy. Typescript.

No. 43

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT SAILORS" (18)

September 21, 1922

No. 27, p. 9 - About sailors (Unshlikht's proposal) (comrades Yagoda, Danilov).

a) To consider the issue of seafarers, create a commission composed of com. Antonov (from the military department), Messing (GPU) and comrade. Komarov (Sevzapburo of the Central Committee). Convening a commission for Comrade Messing. Prior to Comrade Antonov's arrival, appoint Comrade Danilov as his deputy, who must begin work on the commission immediately upon Comrade Sklyansky's return from vacation;

b) in view of the extreme political importance of Kronstadt and the extremely important work ahead, leave Comrade Kuibyshev in Kronstadt.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 313. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

No. 44

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE RIGHTS OF THE GPU" (19)

September 28, 1922

12159s

No. 28, p. 2 - On the rights of the GPU (pr. PB of 9.III. this year No. PO, p. 7). Presence t.t. Yagoda, Krylenko, Dzerzhinsky.

Approve the draft post. All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the rights of the GPU with the following amendments: paragraph 1 - to be deleted;

in paragraph 2 "a" - delete the end of 2. - with the words: "or clearly convicted" to the end of the paragraph. Paragraph "b" shall be adopted as amended by the commission.

Item 3 of the draft shall be replaced by the wording proposed by the commission.

P. 5 - to be adopted as amended by the commission.

ppCUMENTS \_65

Annex to the protocol of the Politburo No. 28 of 28.IX.22, p. 2

Draft resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, approved by the Politburo on September 28, 22 in the development and addition of the regulation on the State Political Administration. The Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided:

1. Grant the GPU the right to: a) extrajudicial decisions, up to and including execution, in relation to persons taken at the scene of a crime during armed attacks for the purpose of robbery.

b) Grant the right of exile and imprisonment to a concentration camp to a meeting on expulsion at the NKVD, formed in accordance with the decree on expulsion with a precise definition of the categories of persons who can be expelled and with a limitation of the term of imprisonment at the place of expulsion for the same period, i.e. up to three years.

2. The conduct of investigations in cases of malfeasance of employees of the GPU bodies should be concentrated in the GPU with the obligatory participation of persons from prosecutorial supervision, with the right to issue extrajudicial sentences in such cases by the Collegium of the GPU with the knowledge of the NKJ. (20)

3. Recognize that the GPU has the right to independently resolve issues of initiating and terminating an investigation in cases under its jurisdiction.

4. a) Establish, as a rule, that under the GPU, the functions of prosecutorial supervision should be entrusted to a special assistant to the prosecutor of the republic, and in the localities to assistants to provincial prosecutors, with at least 3 years of party experience.

b) In cases of political crimes and on charges of espionage, limit the conduct of prosecutorial supervision to monitoring compliance by the GPU bodies with a 14-day term for bringing charges, a 2-month term for detention without referral of cases to court, if within the same period it is not requested – Permission was granted from the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to continue isolation and after the notification by the GPU authorities of any arrest made by them in such cases no later than 2 weeks from the date of detention (Articles 131, 148 and 149 of the Criminal Procedural Code.) ( 21);

c) In all other cases handled by the GPU, the Prosecutor's Office supervises in full the rights granted to it by law, in particular by monitoring the exact execution of Art. Art. 111.116, 119, 121, 131, 139, 142, 143, 148, 149, 151, 161, 162, 163, 164, 186, 195, 207, 208, 211, 214, 215, 216, 219 and 230 Ang.- percent code. (22)

d) Establish that in all cases the prosecutor's office communicates directly with the heads of the provincial departments of the GPU.

5. Oblige revolutionary tribunals, people's courts and other judicial institutions:

a) all materials of the investigative proceedings on cases transferred to the GPU and its bodies, to be sent to the archives of the GPU upon the entry into force of the verdict. copies of their verdicts and decisions on cases referred to them by the GPU and its local authorities, to send to the GPU and its local authorities according to their jurisdiction within 48 hours from the moment of the verdict.

c) To establish, as a rule, that when hearing cases on political crimes, a representative of the GPU is introduced into the composition of the court, delegated by the GPU to the Collegium of the Tribunal in accordance with the provision with the obligatory closing of the doors of the meeting in all cases when a public hearing can uncover the work of the organs of the GPU (Articles 19, 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). (23)

Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee

APRF. f. h. op. 58. D. 2. L. 99-100. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Krylenko, Kalinin, Yagoda.

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 45

NOTE N.V. Krylenko I.V. TO STALIN ON THE RIGHTS OF THE GPU  
EXTRA JUDICIAL SENTENCES (24)

SECRET

October 9, 1922

No. 87s

In connection with the decision of the Politburo of 28/1X on the rights of the GPU, I inform you that \*me and comrade. Yagoda, no agreement was reached\* on the issue of redrafting the rights of the GPU to issue extrajudicial sentences in cases of employees of the GPU. \*I insist on the proviso that 1) the GPU has such rights only in exceptional cases, "and not as a general rule" and 2) every time, not only with the knowledge, but also with the "sanctions" of the NKJ.\*

At the same time, I point out once again that the question of whether the GPU can conduct an investigation on any crime or only on cases referred to its jurisdiction by law, i.e., is subject to a fundamental resolution. in cases of counter-revolution, espionage, banditry and in connection with the protection of the borders.

I ask you to put both questions on the agenda of the Politburo with a challenge to me and comrade. Kursky.

With comradely greetings Krylenko APRF. F. 3.  
Ol. 58. D. 2. L. 112. Original. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 46

COMMISSIONING MESSAGE OF THE BUREAU OF THE SECRETARIAT OF  
THE CC RCP(b) TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE  
STATEMENT BY L.D. TROTSKY ON THE CASE OF THE PETROGRAD SAILORS

October 16, 1922 7648/s

Bureau of the secretariat  
In a round robin

Owls, secret

Members of the Politburo comrade Kamenev, Lenin, Molotov, Tomsy

On behalf of Comrade Stalin, for information, the statement of Comrade. Trotsky dated 15 / X of this year. for number 490.

Please mark reading as follows. member Politburo, oh

than inform the secretariat by phone number 59 (upper Kremlin).

Pom. Secretary of the Central Committee Nazaretyan

Tov. Stalin!

I ask you to let the members of the Politburo into a circle

No. 490 Sov. secret

Tov. Dzerzhinsky

Copy to members of the Politburo (for information)

In the case with the Petrograd sailors, about which a commission was sent by Comrade. Antonov-Ovseenko, there is a complete abnormality and irregularity in the functioning of the organs of the GPU. These irregularities consist in the fact that preliminary investigation, collection of information, observation, reporting upwards

#### DOCUMENTS \_67

and so on. take place completely without the participation of the most authoritative party workers of Morved. So, for example, in Petrograd all this was hidden from comrade. Naumova is a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, and in Moscow - comrade. Zofa.

It was precisely in the question of the Baltic Fleet that the GPU had already made major mistakes in the past, about which the Politburo issued certain decisions. But even now one gets the impression as if the workers of the GPU considered it a matter of honor for themselves to present a "surprise" and not to work out the issue together with those workers who are closest to the cause.

15.X.22 TROTSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 114-115. Script. Typescript.

No. 47

NOTE V.I. ZOFA L.D. TROTSKY,  
REDIRECTIONED F.E. DZERZHINSKY AND THE  
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

October 16, 1922

Ÿ492

On behalf of Comrade Trotsky, in addition to No. 490 dated 15/X, I am forwarding a note from Comrade. Zof No. 3360/s. 16/X-22

Secretary RVSR Sermuks

October 15, 1922



No. 3360/s

According to your order of October 15 this year. I report:

I, as well as the Revolutionary Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, the Marine Department of the PUR and other leading political bodies of the fleet - \*was not aware of the materials collected by the GPU on the fleet, as well as the conduct of any investigation by the GPU about the alleged counter-revolutionary mood in the Baltic Fleet \*.

The very question was submitted by the GPU to the Politburo during your absence from Moscow, and without any prior knowledge of Morved. Already after the first decision of the Politburo on this issue, \* I personally (27/9-22) tried to find out from Comrade Yagoda the essence of the matter, but Comrade Yagoda did not give me a direct answer, referring to the fact that this issue was dealt with Antonov-Ovseenko Commission\*.

During the work of the Antonov-Ovseenko commission in Petrograd, Comrade Naumov, in turn, tried to get clarifications from Comrade Messing, but again, he did not receive a clear and direct answer.

I reaffirm that, despite all the attempts on my part in Moscow and on the part of the leading experienced workers of the Baltic Fleet in Petrograd, to establish permanent normal relations in the work of Morved with organs 1, there is still a clearly biased attitude towards the fleet from the latter. The development of information collected by the GPU authorities, as well as all operations on his part in the fleet, are carried out without the knowledge of Morved - as a result of which all errors and blunders result.

Commissioner of the Maritime Forces of the Republic of Zof

APRF. f. h. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 117. Script. Typescript.

That \_ ® the text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Dzerzhinsky, copy n ZLIN ^ ~ for members of the Politburo of the Central Committee (for information)".

Underlined in pencil.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

#48

NOTE L.D. TROTSKY TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC RCP(b) IN THE CASE OF THE MORVVDA IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANSWER OF F.E. DZERZHINSKY

October 17, 1922

Secret

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC, copy to Comrade Dzerzhinsky

In forwarding Comrade Dzerzhinsky's reply, I ask that the question of the work of the GPU be raised at the next meeting of the Politburo.

October 17, 1922 TROTSKY

Attachment: letter from comrade Dzerzhinsky No. 15924/2 dated 17.X.

On No. 490 dated 15.X

comrade Trotsky a  
copy of comrade. Stalin

The progress of the case on the mood of the Kronstadt sailors was coordinated by the GPU with the secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Stalin, it will be possible to find out from him about the reasons that prompted to give one, and not another direction of the case.

10/17/1922

No. 15924/2

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 121-122. Script. Typescript.

No. 49

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE WORK  
OF THE GPU

October 18, 1922

15928/G

On No. 49307 dated October 17, 1922, comrade. Trotsky.

I have no objection to raising the question of the work of the GPU in the Politburo in accordance with the proposal of Comrade Trotsky. I ask you to put it next week, as I and Comrade. Yagoda is going on vacation tomorrow, but comrade. Unshlikht returns only this Saturday or Sunday. My request is to call to the Politburo comrade during consideration of this question. Unshlikht.

Chairman of the GPU Dzerzhinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 120. Original. Typescript.

No. 50

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE WORK OF THE GPU"

October 19, 1922

15/251s

No. 32, item 2 - On the work of the GPU (comrade Stalin).

The issue will be adjourned until the next meeting. In addition to t.t. Unshlicht call t.t. Messing and Naumov.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 318. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 69

No. 51

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"On the work of the GPU"

October 26, 1922

No. 33, paragraph 14-0 of the work of the GPU. (Politburo No. 22 of 19X.) (Comrades Unshlikht, Messing, Naumov, Zof).

Recognize as a mistake the GPU's failure to inform the political leader of the fleet Naumov at the time of receiving new information about the fleet.

To propose to the GPU with the appropriate bodies of the military and naval departments to develop within a week, on the basis of the relevant rules, more specific and precise forms of mutual information of joint work, which would fully ensure the interests of the case. To suggest to Comrade Unshlikht that he submit to the Politburo a written report on the arrests in the fleet, about which Comrade Zof announced at this meeting.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 319. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

No. 52

M.S.'s NOTE Boguslavsky I.V. STALIN AND M.I. FRUMKIN  
ON THE CANCELING OF THE MANDATES OF THE  
ADMINISTRATIVELY EXPIRED

December 2, 1922

No. 6945

on No. 1932

We inform you that Yugov's mandate was canceled by the attitude of the MKH on November 4, number 6641, and Yasinsky 6642.

Both copy relationships are addressed to you.

1G Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Council Boguslavsky

Moscow

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 9. Copy. Typescript.

No. 53

NOTES GPU I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT

ISSUE OF MANDATES TO ADMINISTRATIVE EXPIRED

December 4, 1922

No. 250322

Owls. secret

Various people's commissariats, central state institutions practice issuing mandates to the anti-Soviet element sent by the GPU into administrative exile in Russia and abroad, in particular: Lotoshnikov - Tsentrosoyuz. Yasinsky - M.K.Kh, Yugov - Moskustprom, which nullifies the significance of the administrative expulsion of this element.

'-reading this situation as abnormal, the GPU asks that all people's commissariats of the DR-state institutions of Moscow be given an order to annul the mandates already issued and to prohibit issuing them in the future.

Deputy Chairman of the  
GPU Unshlikht Pomnach SO  
GPU Deribas Secretary Kalugin

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Owls. secret

No. 250379

In addition to our no. . otd. Vneshtorg of the Moscow Council Berdakin (non-partisan) was appointed with the knowledge of the Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Council M.I. Rogov as a trade representative of Mosvneshtorg in Germany, admin, exiled member of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks Yugov-Frumson; 2) Board of Central Trade. Dep. The Supreme Council of National Economy appoints the active Menshevik B.I. and in order to obtain a visa for him, he applies directly to the German embassy in Moscow with a request to speed up the visa. All these appointments and appeals are made by responsible communists who are at the head of institutions.

In order to prevent similar phenomena in the future, the GPU asks you to issue the appropriate orders: 1) to prohibit the employment of an administrator in Soviet institutions. deported abroad, 2) to prohibit direct relations between Soviet institutions and foreign missions in Russia, and 3) to bring the party comrades who allowed the above phenomena to justice.

At the same time, a copy of the CTO's attitude to the German embassy is attached.

RSFSR Copy from a copy

VSNKh-TSUS

Central Trade Department Board

No. 764 28949

November 28, 1922

To the German Embassy in Moscow

The Board of the TsTO VSNKh hereby asks for assistance in urgently obtaining a visa for the right to enter Germany for citizen Boris Iosifovich Bogdanov, who is leaving for Berlin to take up the post of trade representative of the TsTO VSNKh.

The original was signed by the Chairman of the Board of the TsTO Dossier, Managing Director Golyashkin, head. foreign trade Menzon. Secretary of the Administrative Department Krzhizhanovskaya.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 6-8 Copy. Typescript.

No. 54

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) "ON ROZHKOV"

December 7, 1922

No. 39, p. 15 - 0 Rozhkov (comrade Zinoviev).

a) Postpone the expulsion of Rozhkov.

b) Rozhkov's article and his statement to be published in Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Contact the secretary of the Petrograd Provincial Committee on the moment of publication of the article. Zalutsky. The article should be published with Comrade Steklov's comments, who should conclude an inquiry to the rest of the Mensheviks who left the Menshevik platform about their new positions. Submit comments for preview Comrade Stalin.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 326. Original. Typescript.

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LOCUMENTS \_

No. 55

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT  
THE EXPIRY OF THE UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENTIA

December 12, 1922

No. 82235

Sov. secret

Considering the expulsion abroad of the nationalist elements of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet intelligentsia (out of the total number of those sentenced by the Central Committee Commission) as politically undesirable in view of the possibility, if this measure is carried out, of disrupting the process of decomposition of the Ukrainian emigration that has begun and strengthening the politically active groups of this emigration, which are still building their calculations on the insurrectionary -bandit movement, the GPU, in response to a request from the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, indicated that there were no objections on its part to the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to replace Ukrainian professors-nations with expulsion sheets abroad with expulsion to remote points of the RSFSR.

At the same time, the GPU considered it necessary, in view of the absence here in the center of sufficient materials on the degree of belonging of one or another professor to Ukrainian nationalist groups, in order to avoid delays in the matter of expulsion, to give the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine the right to finally determine the group in respect of which the expulsion abroad should be replaced by expulsion within the RSFSR.

According to the decision of the Organizing Bureau of 20. XI this year. The GPU issued an order to its representative in the Ukrainian SSR to take urgent measures to deport all persons sentenced to deportation under the Ukrainian list abroad. Further hesitation on this issue and a new revision of the decision on expulsion may undermine the entire political significance of this measure and create in the circles of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, who are probably well aware of all the vicissitudes of the question of deportation, the impression of uncertainty and indecision of the Soviet power. Therefore, the GPU considers it necessary to keep in force the decision of the Orgburo of 20.XI.22.

APPENDIX: correspondence on 6 sheets\*.

Deputy Chairman GPU UNSHLICHT

CA FSB RF. f. 1. Op. 6. D. 117. L. 328. Copy. Typescript.

\* Published without attachment.

#56

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC  
RCP(b) "ON THE MENSHEVIKS" (25)

December 14, 1922

No. 40, item 10 - On the Mensheviks (comrade Unshlikht).

p»> ® in relation to the previous decision of the Politburo about Rozhkov to expel Yash Vaskov > by establishing the strictest supervision over him, and at the first manifestation of any social and political activity hostile to the Soviet power, expel him abroad.

To lower Rozhkov in reversal of the same decision of the Politburo to print without RGASPI. F.  
17. Op. 3. D. 326. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 57

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVELY EXPECTED ABROAD"

December 14, 1922

No. 40 p.22 - On administratively deported abroad

- a) Give all the people's commissariats and other state institutions of Moscow an order to annul the mandates already issued and to prohibit issuing them in the future;
- b) Prohibit the employment in Soviet institutions of those administratively exiled abroad;
- c) Prohibit direct relations between Soviet institutions and foreign missions in Russia;
- d) Bring Party comrades who allowed the above phenomena to Party responsibility.

RGASPI. F.17. Op.Z. D. 326. L. 5. Original. Typescript.

No. 58

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. STALIN AND L.D.  
TROTSKY ON THE NEED TO CARRY OUT  
DISINFORMATION WORK

December 22, 1922

26723/s

Department of  
counterintelligence S. secret

With the transition of our republic to a peaceful position, with the opening of the borders for foreigners, the intelligence agencies of the bourgeois states, taking advantage of the opportunities that had opened up for them, intensified their work. Since during the war period enemy intelligence was mainly interested in the location and condition of our Red Army, now they are directing their attention mainly to highlighting the state of our industry, to obtaining information about the political work of our Party and Soviet bodies, the work of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. etc.

For the republic in this period of respite, during the period of diplomatic negotiations with the capitalist states, it is extremely important to disorientate its opponents, to mislead them.

Skillfully, systematically surrounding our opponents with a network of disinformation will allow us to exercise some influence in the sense we want on their policies, will allow us to force them to build practical conclusions on incorrect calculations. In addition, disinformation helps our direct fight against foreign intelligence services, facilitates the penetration of our agents into the intelligence agencies of bourgeois states, and so on.

In order to organize systematic disinformation work, the GPU proposes to create under him a special bureau from representatives of the departments most interested in this work - the Intelligence Agency, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the GPU.

The tasks of the bureau should include: 1) taking into account information received by both the GPU and the Intelligence Directorate and other institutions about the degree of awareness of foreign intelligence about Russia, 2) taking into account the nature of information of interest to the enemy, 3) finding out

4) compiling and technical production of a whole series of false information and documents that give the opponents a wrong idea about the internal situation in Russia, about the organization and

#### DOCUMENTATION \_'

the state of the Red Army, on the political work of the leading party and Soviet bodies, on the work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, etc., 5) supplying the enemy with the above material and documents through the relevant bodies of the GPU and Intelligence Department, 6) developing a number of articles and notes for the periodical press, paving the way for the release into circulation of various kinds of fictitious materials.

The GPU asks the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to give its consent in principle to the conduct of disinformation work and to the creation of the aforementioned bureau.

Deputy prev. GPU UNSHLICHT  
Deputy. early CRO PILLAR

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 131-132. Copy. Typescript.

No. 59

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT DISPINFORMATION" WITH APPENDIX  
OF OFFERS I.S. UNSHILCHTA

January 11, 1923

21371/s

No. 43, paragraph 8 - On disinformation (proposal by Comrade Unshlikht).

8. Accept Comrade Unshlikht's proposal, adding to paragraph 6: "with their submission in each individual case for consideration by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee."

Annex to the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party dated 11.01.23, protocol No. 43 (proposals by Comrade Unshlikht, adopted by the Politburo on 11.01.23)

The tasks of the Bureau should include:

- 1) Accounting for information received both by the GPU and the Intelligence Agency and other institutions about the degree of awareness of foreign intelligence services about Russia.
- 2) Accounting for the nature of the information of interest to the enemy.
- 3) Finding out the degree of awareness of the enemy about us.
- 4) Compilation, technical production of a whole series of false information, documents giving wrong ideas to the opponents about the internal situation in Russia, about the organization and state of the Red Army, about political work, about the leading party and Soviet bodies, about the work of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, etc. d.
- 5) Supplying the enemy with the above material and documents through the relevant organs of the GPU and the Intelligence Department.
- 6) Development of a number of articles and notes for the periodical press, preparing



the ground for issuing various kinds of fictitious materials into circulation with their submission in each individual case for consideration by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee.

Deputy prev. GPU UNSHLICHT  
APRF. f. h, Op. 58. D. 2. L. 129-130. Copy. Typescript.

No. 60

STATEMENT M.M. Litvinova I.V. STALIN  
ABOUT THE DEISINFORMATION BUREAU REDIRECTIONED  
TO I.S. UNSCHLICHTU

January 75, 1923

No. 10060/s

On behalf of Comrade Stalin, at the same time, it is forwarded to your urgent statement of the statement @ comrade. Litvinov dated January 11, 23, No. 26. Please return the conclusion along with the material.

Pom. Secretary of the Central Committee Nazarethyan

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

Secret  
January 11, 1923

No. 26

Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP comrade. Stalin

I received the resolution of the Politburo dated January 11, No. 43 "On disinformation", together with the proposal of comrade. Unshlikht.

I consider it necessary to point out that about Comrade Nothing is known to the Unshlikht of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and it is also unclear from the resolution itself which bureau is being referred to and under whose jurisdiction this bureau will be. One can only guess that this is an active disinformation of foreign governments and that the proposed bureau will be located under the GPU. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is aware of the need to circulate misleading information in one case or another, and often uses this method. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, however, in no case can consider the GPU competent to decide when and in what ways information should be put into circulation. In particular, the other day I just ordered all plenipotentiaries to systematically refute all false and dubious information about Russia that appears in the foreign press. It may happen that the information disseminated by the newly created bureau will be immediately refuted by our embassies. In view, however, of the decision of the Politburo that has already taken place, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs asks "to supplement \* this decision with a new clause obliging the GPU not to take any steps and not to release any information into circulation without prior approval from one of the members of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Deputy People's Commissar Litvinov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 135-136. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Copies - to the members of the Collegium Chicherin - Lausanne."

\*—\* Inscribed by Litvinov by hand.

No. 61

NOTE I.S. UNSHLICHT AND R.A. PILLYARA I.V. TO STALIN ON A  
LETTER TO M.M. LITVINOVA ABOUT THE  
BUREAU OF DISINFORMATION

January 17, 1923

No. 240608

Sov. secret

It is clear from Comrade Litvinov's letter that the NKID shares our point of view on the need for systematic disorientation of the enemy and that the NKID is engaged in this disorientation.

As for Comrade Litvinov's proposal to coordinate the disinformation information published with one of the members of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, it is obviously caused by Comrade Litvinov's ignorance that, according to the proposal of the GPU, adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP, the disinformation bureau should include a competent YKID representative.

Deputy prev. GPU UNSHLICHT  
Deputy. early KRO GPU PILLAR

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 133. Original. Typescript.

LP CUMENTS \_75

LOKVDNAYA NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA IN  
THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) ON THE GALICIA GROUP (26)

February 2, 1923

5342/s

In connection with the negotiations of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs with the representatives of the Galician group of Petrushevich, who are currently in Moscow, the GPU considers it necessary to point out the following: on the proposal of the GPU of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, the issue of financing the Petrushevich group was negatively resolved, based on a corresponding assessment of this group as a possible instrument of British politics.

2) According to intelligence information available in the GPU, Konovalets, who is an agent of the Polish defensive, continues to be in close contact with Petrushevich's group.

Taking into account the complexity and acuteness of the international situation and proceeding from the assessment of the Petrushevich group as a possible agent of the Entente (Petrushevich's connection with England, and through Konovalov's connection with the Nth Department of the Polish General Staff), the GPU, considering the relations of the NKID with the above representatives - the group, fraught with the danger of the inevitability of revealing these relations and, consequently, the possibility of creating for the Soviet Republic, if not a catastrophic, then, in any case, an extremely difficult situation, strongly speaks out against any official agreements with the group Petrushevich in the person of his agents sent by him, gr. Breiter and Ivan Kossak.

Deputy prev. GPU Unshlikht

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 141-141v. Script. Typescript.

#63

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
MERZ CASE

February 5, 1923

No. 2647

Secret

The case of Merz (the arrested commissioner for repatriation) threatens to become complicated. It caused extreme excitement in Warsaw. The issuance of transit visas to Poland was stopped, and another courier from Berlin could not leave. Obolensky even writes about the possible rupture of diplomas and relations. He is probably referring to the possibility of a raid on our mission, which will force us to withdraw it.

The collegium asks the Central Committee to suggest Comrade Unshlikht to complete the investigation of the case

@RTs tomorrow and release those arrested on bail.

"The matter cannot be delayed. It is necessary to make an immediate decision and then interview the members of the PB by telephone.

Litvinov

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 240. L. 15. Copy. Typescript.

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No. 64

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) "ON MERTS"

February 6, 1923

No. 48, p. 23-s - About Merz (comrade Litvinov).

Instruct Comrade. Unshlikht to complete the investigation into the Mertz case on February 7th and release those arrested on bail.

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 240. L. 14. Copy. Typescript.

No. 65

NOTE V.I. NEVSKY, P.N. LEPESHINSKY AND A.I.  
ELIZAROVA TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

WITH A REQUEST FOR AMNESTY N.A. VIGDORCHIK

February 27, 1923

No. 2402

In view of the upcoming March 14 this year. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the 1st Congress of the RSDLP, Istpart asks for amnesty for the organizer and chairman of the 1st Congress, Vigdorchik, who is now in Irkutsk.

Eastpart Presidium

V. Nevsky P.  
Lepeshinsky A.  
Elizarova

APRF. F. 3. Op. 59. D. 10. L. 118. Original. Typescript.

No. 66

NOTE I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
AMNESTY OF N.A. VIGDORCHIK

February 28, 1923

No. 3386/s

In response to your proposal to give an opinion at Eastpart's request for an amnesty for physician Vigdorchik, Natan Abramovich must report that Vigdorchik is one of the old and prominent Mensheviks and has always been the political leader of the entire medical opposition. As a delegate to the All-Russian Congress of Physicians, he took an active part in it and contributed to the implementation of the anti-Soviet resolution.

Its vysypka was made with the consent of comrade. Semashko and Vsemedikosan labor by order of the Central Committee of the RCP.

I believe that Istpart's petition for amnesty for Vigdorchik in connection with the 25th anniversary of the RSDLP as a participant in the 1st Congress must also be rejected because the Mensheviks time a whole series of active actions to coincide with this anniversary.

Deputy Previous GPU Unshlikht

APRF. F. 3. Op. 59. D. 10. L. 119. Original. Typescript.

## DOCUMENTS \_77

No. 67

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE RELATIONS OF THE NKID AND THE GPU" (27)

March 1, 1923

No. 52, p. 8. - On the relationship between the NKID and the GPU (comrades Molotov, Litvinov, Chicherin, Unshlikht).

- a) Approve the decision of the commission on the relationship between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the GPU (Minutes No. 1 of 11/17/23).
- b) Take note of the report of the commission on its consideration of three cases on behalf of the Politburo of November 8, 23 (minutes of the commission No. 2 of February 28, this year).
- c) Leave the NKID to find a form to liquidate the Merz case, using this case to the maximum for political purposes.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 240. L. 16. Copy. Typescript.

No. 68

FROM THE ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT F.E. Dzerzhinsky in the Central Committee of the RCP (b)

ABOUT RESTRUCTURING THE STATE  
APPLIANCE AND FIGHTING ECONOMIC CRIMES

March 16, 1923

Although they are dedicated communists, they have no idea about economic issues in general, about what our NEP and our state capitalism in particular are, and therefore the decisive questions of crimes outside of time and space, without any economic prospects - this is ours. GPU... The main task of the GPU is to inform the heads of organs by means of personal and written reports that they are also engaged in a merciless struggle under the leadership and on the instructions of the head of the department.

Published: F.E. Dzerzhinsky - head of the Cheka-OGPU. M., 1967. S. 119, 121.

No. 69

MEMORIAL I.S. UNSHLIKHTA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
CONCENTRATION OF ALL LINES OF  
INTELLIGENCE WORK IN THE GPU

March 28, 1923

5480s

Increasing in recent times, cases of direct appeals to representatives of the NKID by a number of persons with proposals of a secret political nature (for example, the proposals made by Comrade Chicherin and the delegate Ietrushevich) are cited along with a specially adapted for intelligence

efficient work of the GPU apparatuses and parallelism, which inevitably leads to completely unnecessary expenditures in foreign currency, as well as to negative impacts for the organs of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of a political nature. avoiding undesirable political ° VODSTOV While objecting to the need to save currency and eliminate consequences, the GPU asks the Politburo to establish: 1. All lines of intelligence work (diplomatic,

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lytic), with which the NKID sometimes comes into contact, are concentrated exclusively in the organs of the GPU.

2. In individual cases, when the representatives of the NKID are provided with certain promising opportunities in the field of intelligence work, the representative of the NKID necessarily coordinates his steps in advance with the GPU or with its local bodies.

Deputy prev. GPU Unshicht

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 2. L. 140. Original. Typescript.

No. 70

NOTE I.S. UNSCHLICHTA ETC. SAMSONOVA  
TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC RCP(b) ON STRENGTHENING THE  
FIGHT AGAINST THE MENSHEVIKS AND SRs

March 29, 1923

No. 50342

In response to the decision of the Central Committee on the need to step up measures to combat the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in St. Petersburg, the GPU reports that on the question of measures to combat the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the GPU has taken measures that have already yielded very favorable results.

As regards the Mensheviks, the GPU submits to the Central Committee a number of new practical proposals for their approval.

Deputy Chairman GPU  
UNSHLICHT Beg. SO GPU SAMSONOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 59. D. 3. L. 77. Original. Typescript.

No. 71

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE MENSHEVIKS" WITH THE APPENDIX OF  
THE NOTES F.E. DZERZHINSKY ON  
MEASURES TO COMBAT THE MENSHEVIKS

March 29, 1923

No. 25317s

No. 59, item 1 - On the Mensheviks (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

- a) Approve in principle the proposal of comrade. Dzerzhinsky on measures to combat the Mensheviks.
- b) for the final development of these measures to monitor their implementation, create a commission consisting of comrade t. Molotov (with the right to replace Comrade Kui-byshev), Bukharin and Unshlikht.
- c) instruct this commission to organize a narrow meeting (70-100 people) of the most responsible workers with information about the activities of less vikov.
- d) instruct the same commission to discuss the possibility of staging a broad process, specifically on the basis of the materials of the Zarya group.
- e) to instruct the same commission to discuss and implement the party responsibility of the leaders of Soviet institutions in those cases where, with their knowledge, at least individual Mensheviks find a place for themselves in their apparatus.

## LOCUMENTS

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Appendix to the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party

No. 59 dated 29.III.23, p. 1.

Minutes of the meeting on the question of measures to combat the Mensheviks in accordance with the order before. GPU comrade Dzerzhinsky dated 22.Sh.23

There are t.t. Menzhinsky, Messing, Samsonov

Note before. GPU on measures to combat the Mensheviks

### 1 . Measures of struggle along the party line

1) Conduct a special campaign against the Mensheviks in the press specifically where the active activity of the Mensheviks is noted (factories, factories, workshops, etc.), and in particular, in the Far East, St. Petersburg and Moscow.

2) In the provincial committees, select special comrades of the newspaper workers, who will be instructed to carry on a campaign against the Mensheviks in the press.

3) To combat the influence of the Mensheviks, the party organs should pay special attention to the Komsomol.

### 2. Measures of struggle through the GPU

1) Obtain the sanction of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) for the right to carry out mass operations on a state scale against the Mensheviks, the Bund and Poalei Zion.

2) As a rule, the place of exile for the Mensheviks should be for adults - the Narym Territory, for youth under 25 years old - the Pechora Territory and

for especially sick people - Turkestan on the Kashgar border.

3) The removal of Mensheviks from institutions and enterprises should be coordinated with the heads of such.

4) To recognize as necessary the expulsion of the Mensheviks from all forms of cooperation, in particular.

5) Recognize it as necessary that in the course of an inquiry into the Mensheviks, the latter's refusal to actively work or leave the Party cannot be taken into account if there was no special statement about leaving the Party before October 1922.

6) Recognize the need to organize filtering commissions at universities with representation of the GPU for students, and commissions should function only when students are recruited at the beginning of the academic year.

7) Until the end of the current academic year, active Menshevik students seize.

8) An extremely strict exclusion of the Mensheviks from the NKPost, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Profintern in order to cut off the links of the Mensheviks with foreign countries in places.

9) Strengthen the work of the INO GPU abroad in the direction of suppressing communications 3 i " Ensheviks with Russia. Do the same for the Comintern and the Profintern.

10) To intensify the struggle against the Mensheviks, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the GPU, give instructions to the localities.

l) Involve party comrades to give the organs of the GPU all possible information to help in the fight against the Mensheviks.

^ ^ 2) For any assistance by the communists to the Mensheviks and a guarantee for them, the first to be brought to strict party responsibility.

„ Secretary Samsonov

Smarta 1923

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Appendix to the protocol No. 59 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

dated 29.III.23 point 1

Minutes of the meeting on measures to combat the Mensheviks in accordance with the order before. GPU comrade Dzerzhinsky dated 23.Sh.23

Present: t.t. Menzhinsky, Unshlikht, Samsonov, Messing, Trilis ser, Berry



Note Prev. GPU on measures to combat the Mensheviks and the decision on this issue by the troika, vol. Menzhinsky, Messing, Samsonov

1. On the party line:

1) Adopt the resolutions of the troika in full with additions: a) develop an intensified campaign in the press against the Second International; b) in order to fight in the press against the Mensheviks, the Bund and Poalei Zion, ask the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to work out special theses and present them in places for guidelines; c) to draw serious attention of the party organization to the state of Marxist circles and to prevent former

Mensheviks.

2) Paragraph 1 of the decisions of the troika should be edited as follows: "to obtain the sanction of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) for the right to produce in the state. the scale of simultaneous searches and the results of the seizure of the Mensheviks, the Bund and Poalei Zion.

3) The submission of lists of Mensheviks to the Main Directorate and the centers is to be declared unacceptable, since experience has shown that this only yields negative results.

4) To ask the Central Committee of the RCP(b) that the central administrations and centers be instructed that all the demands of the GPU on the personal removal of the Mensheviks should be binding on them.

Secretary Samsonov

March 24, 1923

APRF. F. 3. Op. 59. D. 3. L., 78-80. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Molotov, Kuibyshev, Bu-Kharin, Unshlikht.

No. 72

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE PERSONAL SECURITY OF K. RADEK (28)

May 21, 1923

No. 7, item 17 - Unshlikht's proposal.

Inform Comrade Radek that he must strictly follow the instructions given to him by the GPU to ensure his personal safety.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 355. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 73

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"On the Composition of the Board of the OGPU"

September 6, 1923

No. 31, p. 18 - On the composition of the board of the OGPU (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

a) Approve the collegium of the OGPU of the USSR in the following composition:  
comrade Dzerzhinsky - chairman

comrade Menzhinsky - 1st deputy comrade Yagoda  
- 2nd deputy comrade Mantsev - member  
of the collegium comrade Boky - also  
comrade Peters - also  
comrade Messing - also  
comrade Balitsky - also  
comrade Mogilevsky - also

and the tenth member of the collegium of the head of the Intelligence Department ex officio.

b) Approve the collegium of the GPU of the RSFSR in the following composition:  
comrade Dzerzhinsky - chairman

comrade Menzhinsky - 1st deputy comrade Yagoda  
- 2nd deputy comrade Medved - member  
of the collegium comrade Vorontsov - also  
comrade Pavlunovsky - also  
comrade Belsky - also comrade  
Evdokimov - also comrade  
Apeter - also comrade Moroz -  
also Comrade Kashirin -  
too.

c) Confirm comrade Yagoda as a member of the Council of the ChON from the OGPU.

d) Submit for preliminary consideration by the Secretariat the issue of introducing members of the collegium of the OGPU to the collegium of the NKVD and the Supreme Court.

RGASPI F.17. Op.Z. D. 379. L. 5-6. Script. Typescript.

No. 74

#### LETTER F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN about MEASURES AGAINST Malignant Speculators

October 22, 1923

One of the important factors that inflate the prices of manufactured goods are malicious speculators who have chosen as their profession inflation of prices (especially currency) and entangling trusts and co-operatives and their workers with their machinations. Especially Moscow - the location of the main

trusts, Tsentrosyuz and banks - they are attracted to themselves. They come here from all over the X ends of the USSR. They take over the markets, the black market. Their method of action is bribery and corruption. If you ask how they live, they will not be able to tell you, but they live with full glamor. For them, with the housing shortage in Moscow, there is always plenty of the most luxurious apartments. These are parasites, corrupters, leeches, malicious speculators, they corrupt, gradually and imperceptibly drawing in our business executives...

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My proposal is to allow the Commission on Expulsions to extend its rights of expulsion in relation to these malicious speculators, accepting for consideration cases regarding these elements on my reports, that is, the Chairman of the OGPU F. Dzerzhinsky.

I am sure that within a month we will heal Moscow of these elements and that this will undoubtedly affect the entire economic life.

CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 56. L. 99. Copy. Typescript.

No. 75

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE "WORKING GROUP" (29)

November 1, 1923

No. 41, item 7 - Report of the Commission on Internal Party Affairs (comrades Molotov, Menzhinsky).

a) Accept the proposals of the commission (protocol of the commission of October 31, item 2) - see the appendix.

b) Add to the text of the first of the commission's proposals the following: "to give the commission the right to determine the final list of those released."

APPENDIX to paragraph 7 of pr. No. 41 of 1.XI. 1923

From the protocol of the commission of the PB (pr. No. 28 p. 3) dated 31.X.23

2. Decree of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of December 31, 23, pr. No. 10

2.1) Agreeing on the whole with the resolution proposed by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of October 31, put this question at a meeting of the Politburo no later than November 6th.

2) By the specified deadline, to propose to all members of the "R.G." imprisoned in the GPU and to those involved in this case to give a written statement in the spirit of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (clause 1 of the appendix to the pr.

3) To ask the Central Control Commission to discuss the question of the desirability of receiving the same statements from other so-called. involved in the "R.G." case.

4) To propose to all members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission by November 5th to hold the conversations assigned to them with those involved in the activities of "R.G." comrades; in particular, to instruct Comrade Tomsy to speak with P. and M. Al.

5.a) Not later than November 5, determine the attitude towards the party of all members of the "R.G." imprisoned in the GPU and comrades involved in this matter.

b) Consider that an indispensable condition for the retention of members of the "R.G." and included in the "R.G." comrades must be an unconditional recognition of their mistake and a readiness to atone for their guilt before the party.

c) To ask the Party Collegium of the Central Control Commission, with the participation of a representative of the ICC, to consider the question of the further stay of the liberated comrades in the Party.

6) Predetermine that, with a few exceptions, the members of R.G. can be released under the indispensable condition that they be sent to this or that difficult work outside Moscow.

7) To recognize as absolutely necessary the placement of articles in the Communist Revolution and Pravda with information about the attitude of the party towards R.G. and R.P., suggesting that Comrade Bubnov ensure that these articles appear in the near future.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 1. L. 23-24. Script. Typescript.

LOCUMENTS \_ 83

No. 76

NOTE I.V. STALIN SIBBURO Central Committee of the RCP(b)

IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECISION OF THE SIBBURO ON EXILES

November 3, 1923

No. 6982/S

Secret

In response to your decision of 13/IX-23, an excerpt from a letter from the GPU is reported about the exiles.

"The GPU informs that there are no objections on its part to the review by the plenipotentiary representation of the GPU in Siberia of the lists of all previously sent to Siberia and left at the proposal of the NKVD commission in work centers with a view to transferring these exiles to other areas at the discretion of the PP."

"As for the first part of this resolution, the GPU, without objecting to it as a principle, asks that the GPU be left with the right in certain cases, conditioned by intelligence-operational and political necessity, to determine exactly the place of exile, especially since in fact such order and practiced.

Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin

Tov. Menzhinsky GPU

On behalf of Comrade Stalin, a copy of the extract from the decision of the Sibburo Central Committee on the question of areas of exile is being sent to you.

Please provide information on the merits of the above decision. (30) Appendix: extract

Pom. Secretary of the Central Committee

October 22, 1923

Secret

Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of September 13, 1923

Heard: \$2.-0 exiles (comrade Beck). The question arose at a GPU conference. Decided: 1. To ask the Central Committee Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee not to indicate the area of exile for those deported to Siberia from the center, but to provide their distribution by districts to the PP of the GPU for Siberia. 2. Allow revision of the lists of all those who were previously sent to Siberia and left at the commission's proposal in the work centers.

Secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) Zaslavsky

APRF. f. 45 . Op. 1. D. 170. L. 13-14. Script. Typescript.

No. 77

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) ON GALICHIANIS

November 13, 1923

45, p. 13 - Proposals of the PB Commission on International Affairs on the issue of the Galicians, (PB No. 41, p. 30 of 1.XI.23).

Continue to subsidize Petrushevsky, provided that our representative is on his headquarters. Raise his monthly subsidy to \$1,500. Further raise his subsidy even more after checking it out.

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Accept Sidorin's offer. Keep in mind the possibility of subsidizing it.

Check Tyutyunik's certificates about his organization in Galicia. In the case of his solidity, consider it possible to provide him with material support. Entrust this to Comrade. Frunze.

In order to check all organizations secretly introduce our people into them.

Find out the position of the Heads. Councils 4 sich. archers and goats.

Find out the role of Gervsky. Instruct Comrade Kalyuzhny to find out the position of all parties in the Carp. Rus'.

Stop subsidizing Galician Muscovites (Pelekhaty, Velnitsky, Volya Naroda, Zhizn), if any.

Send 2000-3000 Galician soldiers from Czechoslovakia to Ukraine, reducing our expenses to a minimum. Filter them carefully. Entrust this to the GPU.

To entrust the GPU with the execution together with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, since there will be diplomatic tasks. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs must find out the conditions and the possibility of covering the costs of Czechoslovakia. government.

Party-political and military-technical work in countries with a Ukrainian population should be carried out from Kharkov. General leadership for Moscow.

Secret diplomatic and political intelligence - from Moscow (31).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 1. L. 28. Original. Typescript.

No. 78

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT THE ARREST OF G.I. MYASNIKOVA

November 22, 1923

No. 47, p. 34 — Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposal for the immediate arrest of Myasnikov (PB No. 46, p. 25 of 15.XI.23).

Accept. (32)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 1. L. 31. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 19, 1923.

No. 79

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY

November 24, 1923

No. 48, p. 2 - On the s.-r.-ah (comrade Menzhinsky).

1) To recognize as necessary the liquidation of the hunger strike by the S.-R. on the following grounds:

a) Send Vedenyapin to the Crimea or the Caucasus according to the doctors' conclusion.

b) Transfer GPU Ratner to the inner prison and whom the GPU finds necessary.

## DOCUMENTS \_85

c) To make concessions to those who remained in Butyrki in the sense of the possibility of making a promise under certain conditions.

d) Concessions to be made under the condition of the immediate elimination of the hunger strike.

2) To instruct the GPU to work out the question of the possibility of transferring to the provinces some of the least prominent SRs under the condition of maximum isolation.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 1. L. 33. Original. Typescript.

No. 80

### LETTER F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE ARREST OF KONKOV-GOBBI WITH A SUMMARY APPENDIX

November 28, 1923

Nami (OGPU) was arrested red-handed by an English spy, a communist since 1918, Konkov-Gobbi, an employee of the Gudok editorial office. With this information about. deed. In this connection, it would be right to carry out a purge of the Gudok editorial office and a purge of the Menshevik contagion from the Gudok printing house, if there is at least a grain of truth in the reports of the spy Gobbi, and also to verify his information, to appoint a troika consisting of Andreev (Chairman CCC)

and me.

In connection with the international situation, transportation must be cleared of Mensheviks and unstable elements who are reaching out to British intelligence at all costs.

### F. DZERZHINSKY

Citizen Gobbi-Konkov was born in 1891 in the Vilna province of the Antopol vol [ost] of the village of Pelemeli. The parents are peasants. In 1914 he graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Warsaw. During the imperialist war, he worked in the Warsaw district of communications as an engineer. The February revolution found him near Radashkovichi in the railroad De. In April 1917, he was delegated to the Congress of Soldiers' Deputies from the engineering units of the Zap. front in Gomel.

After returning from the congress to the detachment, he began communist work in the troops under the leadership of the party organization of Gomel (comrade Abramovich), for which he was arrested by the authorities of the Provisional Government and imprisoned. After 1 1/2 months of detention he was released.

Before the advancing Gobbi was evacuated to the Center (at the beginning of 1918). On behalf of Comrade Aralov (a member of the Supreme Military Council), he went to the mountains. Kursk to the road works department of the Southern Front. Here he officially joined the RCP (in March 1918). He was accepted without recommendation. In 1919 he took an active part in the attack on the Crimea as a commander of a railroad detachment. During the retreat, he ended up in Tula, where he fell ill with typhus and was evacuated to the city of Yaroslavl. In 1920, after recovering, he went back to the detachment to the Southern Front, where he participated in the

Wrangel's appointment, after which, starting from November 1920, he held a number of responsible positions in the city of Melitopol (member of the Melitopol Revolutionary Committee, member of the collegium of the Council of National Economy, editor of the Melitopol Izvestia newspaper, member of the filtration commission of captured Wrangelites, etc. ). Subsequently, he was appointed by the provincial committee in the city of Aleksandrovsk to the post of head of the provincial committee and a member of the board of the provincial department of builders.

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In November 1921 he entered Glavsilikat (in Moscow) as a senior inspector. After the liquidation of Glavsilikat, he was appointed director of a plant in the village of Batraki (near Syzran) in April 1922. In January 1923 he was sent to the Omsk railway as the head of the track section. There he worked for the Sibirsky Gudok and was a correspondent for Pravda in Siberia (on behalf of Maria Ilyinishna Ulyanova).

In the month of June s/g Gobbi received a two-month vacation and came to Moscow. In August this year, he went to work at Gudok. His appointment to this work was agreed with the political secretary of the NKPS comrade. Vasiliev and the Central Committee of the RCP represented by Comrade. Gordon and Daminko.

During the party check, Gobbi received recommendations from members of the Melitopol Ukom of the RCP, vol. Belotserkovets, Barabash, Slyadnev and Yakovenko.

With the secretary of the English mission, gr. Hardy Gobbi met in early November this year at the Museum of Fine Arts. He was introduced to Hardy by the latter's mistress, with whom Gobbi was also acquainted. In the conversation, Hardy said that it would be desirable if any of the Russian journalists were engaged in propaganda of the idea of a rapprochement between Russia and England. For this, the English mission is ready to give a reward. 15/XI this year Gobbi met Hardy's mistress in the street and asked her to arrange a meeting with Hardy at all costs, as he had very important material to pass on to the latter. The measures taken by the GPU succeeded in preventing Gobbi's meeting with Gardi; instead of Hardy, our employee came to meet with Gobbi with a confidential letter from Hardy. To this imaginary English spy, Gobbi gave the following details about the internal situation of the party:

At the plenum of the Central Committee, which took place recently, there was a considerable disagreement between Trotsky, on the one hand, and Stalin, Zinoviev, and Radek, on the other. After Radek's report at the Military Academy on the political situation in Germany, two currents appeared in the Central Committee of the RCP and the RCP in general: 1) adherents of Radek and Stalin, who definitely wished the USSR to actively intervene in German events, and 2) adherents of Trotsky, pledged against any interference in German affairs. The differences on this issue were so significant at the plenum of the Central Committee that Trotsky resigned. The Central Committee did not accept the resignation and begged Trotsky to take the resignation back so as not to split the party at such a crucial moment. Among the rank and file members of the party, 80% are on the side of Trotsky. 80% of party members are dissatisfied with the policy of the Central Committee of the RCP. Comrade Dzerzhinsky declared at the plenum of the MK RKP that he would crush the "workers' opposition" even if this meant putting a communist against a communist. This announcement caused outrage in most of the cells. Dissatisfied cells are organized in order to force the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party to convene an emergency party conference, at which



the dissatisfied will give a decisive battle to the Central Committee.

Gobbi promised to give the British fuller information about disagreements in the party in the future, for which he wanted to use his acquaintances in the Central Committee of the RCP (by the way, according to him, Comrade Molotov's wife or close acquaintance), information about the Red Army, pointing to their connections with responsible military officials (Muralov and students of the Academy of the General Staff), as well as all the information of interest to the British about the railways of the USSR.

The arrested Gobbi pleaded guilty to attempting to convey the above information to the British. According to him, his desire to earn money pushed him to espionage, since he needed money for his marriage. In a conversation with an alleged English spy, Gobbi declared that he belonged to the "workers' opposition."

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In the GPU, Gobbi reported the following (briefly): in the cell of the Gudok editorial office there are three groups: 1) Gobbi and Rokas, 2) Romanovsky, Pototsky and Vrio, and

3) Fine, Uritsky, Gutler, Antonov and Drozlovsky. The first, standing on the platform of the Central Committee, the third is of a sharply oppositional character, and the second is staggering between the first and the third. That the third group belongs to the "workers' opposition" follows from the following:

1) Antonov published Myasnikov's book;

2) there are several facts indicating that Gudkom is publishing the illegal Menshevik magazine Sotsial-Democrat;

3) during the arrests of members of the "workers' opposition" gr.gr. Gutler and Antonov said that "the underground Moscow committee had failed," that "it would be most difficult to put it together again," and that the turn of their arrest would soon come;

4) during a strike on the Northern (Northern) Railway. D. Gutler said that it was "already beginning" and that all dissatisfied opposition groups were very upset that the strike did not go as planned, i.e. that it did not cover the entire Moscow railway junction;

5) Recently, at a faction meeting, Uritsky made a proposal to unite the Vperyod magazine groups around Gudok (Rabochaya Spring, Link, Kuznitsa, etc.), which, according to Uritsky, to a large extent belong to the "workers' opposition" and who, after the break with Voronsky, were left without a publishing house;

6) at one of the closed meetings, Yaroslavsky declared that Gudok was the center of the "workers' opposition." The cell raised the question of how to deal with this statement. To Romanovsky's proposal to everyone who is dissatisfied with the policy of the Central Committee, Gutler and the rest of the opposition group sharply protested, saying "it is still not enough for us to swear allegiance to the Central Committee, so that we think on the orders of the Central Committee";

7) the factory committee, the factory management and 90% of the workers of the Gudka printing house are ardent Mensheviks. There are only two communists among the workers in the printing house;

8) the third group repeatedly discussed the need to attach each of the members of the group to one of the Moscow cells. zheldor.

node for work in mass;

9) Drozlovsky, a member of the group, is already working in the cell of loaders of the Northern Railway.

28/XI-23 Moscow

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 315. L. 1-5. Script. Typescript.

#81

NOTE F.E. DZERZHINSKY TO THE  
POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) ON THE NEED TO  
STRENGTHEN THE FIGHT AGAINST BANDITISM

January 29, 1924

No. 194 t

t® after the day, both criminal and political banditry began to actively develop, both in cities and in villages with the attack and robbery of LEMEM AND to the derailment of trains.

We already had a number of notes on this subject from Comrade Chicherin in connection with the robbery of representatives of missions and diplomatic couriers: Polish, Italian, British, Persian.

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It must be said frankly that one of the reasons for the lack of success in the fight against banditry is the formalism and red tape of our courts and the inconsistency in the actions of the courts, the criminal investigation department, the police, and the organs of the GPU.

So I'm making suggestions:

1. The leadership of the fight against banditry, both political and criminal, both in the city and in the countryside, shall be entrusted to the OGPU and its local bodies.
2. For this purpose, promptly subordinate the criminal investigation and police bodies to the OGPU.
3. Grant the right to the OGPU to resolve cases out of court on charges of banditry, not only of persons captured with weapons, but in general those who took part in banditry.
4. To instruct the OGPU to develop and urgently carry out a plan for the liberation of the peasant population from the bandits who are robbing him, including horse thieves.

F. Dzerzhinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 197. L. 78. Original. Typescript.

No. 82

NOTE G.V. CHICHERIN IN THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

REGARDING F.E. DZERZHINSKY ON THE FIGHT AGAINST  
BANDITISM

January 30, 1924

No. 64chs

With regard to Comrade Dzerzhinsky's appeal to the Politburo dated January 29, No. 194 / t, the NKID collegium would consider it possible to introduce the system proposed by Comrade Dzerzhinsky of granting special powers to the OGPU to combat banditry in the form indicated by him only in those areas where banditry, precisely indicating their limits. Granting the OGPU the right to extrajudicial settlement of cases, according to the board of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, is possible only for bandits captured with weapons in their hands. A further expansion of the right of the OGPU to extrajudicial settlement of cases would be considered dangerous by the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Narkomindel Chicherin

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 197. L. 80. Original. Typescript.

No. 83

NOTE N.V. KRYLENKO TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

REGARDING F.E. DZERZHINSKY ON THE FIGHT AGAINST  
BANDITISM

February 1, 1924

No. 308s  
SECRET

With regard to Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposals on methods of combating criminal and political banditry, I consider it necessary to state the following:

in the ten months of the past year, 971 were sentenced to death by courts, 296 by tribunals, and a total of 1,267 people, with 721 people or 57% for robbery and participation in gangs. The verdict was approved against 497 people or 39% of the total.

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During the same period, the GPU convicted 121 people, 16 of them for robbery and banditry. The total number of convicts in respect of whom the sentence was carried out is 604 people, which gives an average of two people per day. This percentage cannot be considered low, and, on the contrary, must be recognized as excessively high. If all the sentences were carried out, then it would double and reach 4 people a day.

Thus, it is impossible to complain about the weakness of repression in relation to the fight against banditry.

The explanation given by Comrade Dzerzhinsky about the reasons for the growth of banditry in the form of formalism and red tape in our courts is mainly incorrect.

All cases of banditry, as a general rule, are handled by the GPU, and the case goes to court after it has been marinated at the GPU. Cases are usually heard either in military tribunals or in the criminal departments of the gubernatorial courts, where they no longer lie later, because in these cases the investigation is always relatively simple and does not require any special additional actions.

After the last decision of the Politburo, at the suggestion of Dzerzhinsky to reduce judicial red tape, circulars were sent to all courts stating that not a single case was delayed in courts for more than three months, and the provincial prosecutor's office and provincial courts were obliged to report two weeks on the number of missed cases.

Because of this, Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposal to grant the rights of extrajudicial reprisals in general against persons who took part in bandit raids, in fact, leads to extrajudicial reprisals against all those in respect of whom "according to intelligence data" there is a suspicion that they are involved in bandit gang, bandits' guides, hiders, accomplices, etc.

Taking into account that recently the OGPU has adopted the practice of expanding its jurisdiction by applying to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee for permission to consider this or that case out of court, first considering the case and passing a sentence, and then asking the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to approve this sentence, — it becomes quite clear that, even within the limits of the current legislation and practice, the GPU has sufficient scope and sufficient possibilities for taking urgent measures to combat banditry.

I consider it necessary to categorically speak out against the third paragraph of Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposal, as for the first and second paragraphs on the operational subordination of the criminal investigation bodies and the police to the OGPU, this encounters formal obstacles due to the formal subordination of the bodies to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and they can, therefore, only be subordinated in secret order OGPU. Fundamentally correct considerations of T zerzhinsky should be implemented at the time of the general reform of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, according to which the police and the search should be included in the system of the GPU.

c Finally, point 4, in the form in which it was formulated by Comrade Dzerzhin Kim, can be accepted only on the condition that the said "plan for the liberation of the peasant population from the bandits who offend him, including in

about the number and horse thieves "was for preliminary enforcement under

rgnut discussion in the appropriate Party and Soviet authorities.

With comradely greetings Krylenko

ALRf. f. h, Op. 58. D. 197. L. 79-79v. Script. Typescript.

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No. 84

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE FIGHT AGAINST BANDITISM"

February 14, 1924

No. 70, p. 7 - On the fight against banditry (Dzerzhinsky, Krylenko, Beloborodov, Chicherin).

Recognize the need to intensify the fight against banditry, both political and criminal, both in the city and in the countryside, entrusting its leadership to the OGPU and its local bodies, subordinating to it the criminal investigation and police agencies in operational terms, recognizing necessary, a corresponding temporary expansion of the rights of the OGPU in the field of extrajudicial repressions, as well as instructing Comrade T.T. Dzerzhinsky, Krylenko and Beloborodov to submit to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR an appropriate concrete plan for expanding the rights of the OGPU to extrajudicial repressions and freeing the peasant population from bandits so that the areas, terms and methods of struggle were indicated in this plan.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 418. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

No. 85

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky G.I. BLAGONRAVOV ON THE CLEANING  
OF THE EDITORIAL APPARATUS OF THE GUDOK NEWSPAPER

March 12, 1924

Another 2/KhP P/bureau instructed Andreev, me and the representative] of the Central Executive Committee to review the Gudok apparatus in connection with the Konkov-Gobbi case. T. Andreev did not call us, the matter died out. Please collect information about the Gudok device and send it to me with a conclusion. Is there any need for our trio to address this issue now?

F.D.

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 315. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

No. 86

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT COUNTERFEITERS (33)

March 29, 1924

No. 82, p. 2 - Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposal on the fight against counterfeiters (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

To accept the proposal of Comrade Dzerzhinsky - to give the OGPU special powers to combat counterfeiters and to instruct the Central Executive Committee of the USSR to urgently carry out this expansion of powers in the Soviet order.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 430. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

No. 87

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT ROZHKOVA" (34)

May 22, 1924

No. 91, p. 15 - About Rozhkov, (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

Accept the offer. Dzerzhinsky about the transfer of Rozhkov to Moscow. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 439. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 88

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE LITIGATION OF THE WHITE GUARDS  
IN ARMAVIR"

June 3, 1924

No. 1, p. 12 - On the trial of the White Guards in Armavir (Comrades Mikoyan, Menzhinsky, Peters, Stuchka).

To consider it necessary to give an exemplary punishment to the perpetrators of the case, establishing that, in any case, all the most active counter-revolutionaries from among the accused, and above all the officers who came illegally from abroad and carried on active counter-revolutionary work, should be subjected to capital punishment.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extract was sent to: comrade Mikoyan; telegram to message request Yugovostkraikom 27/VII-24.

No. 89

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE FIGHT AGAINST THEFT IN MOSCOW"

June 27, 1924

No. 5, p. 8 - On the fight against theft in Moscow (comrade Dzerzhinsky).

8. a) Accept Comrade Dzerzhinsky's proposal to instruct the OGPU to accept

urgent measures to stop thefts, b) Propose to coordinate the work of the OGPU with the same work of the police.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to Comrade Dzerzhinsky."

No. 90

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE RELEASE OF D.D. DONSKOY

And July 1924

No. 8, p. 8 - Request for comrade. Soltz.

Agree with the proposal of the OGPU on the release of Donskoy with deportation to remote areas (35).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 7. Original. Typescript.

Yagoda \* 16X0X6 there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Stuchke,

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No. 91

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON SENTENCES OF COURTS ON POLITICAL CASES"

July 11, 1924

No. 8, p. 16 / opr - On the verdicts of courts in political cases (PB No. 85, p. 9-B) (Proposal of comrades Krylenko, Solts).

a) Establish, as a rule, a preliminary report by the provincial and military prosecutors about all the processes of a political nature that are supposed to be staged, for which it is possible and expected to be submitted to the central prosecutor's office simultaneously with the approval of the indictment, but before going to court.

b) Oblige the central prosecutor's office, together with a member of the Central Control Commission specially assigned for this purpose, to review the submissions of the local prosecutor's office and report to the Politburo.

ALRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 9. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the PB on 11.7.24.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Solts, Krylenko and Janson.

No. 92

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF KIDS"

July 17, 1924

No. 11, p. D. About the incident with comrade. Kobetsky. (vols. Kopp, Chicherin, Yagoda). E. c) In the future, the appointment of the main residents of the GPU to the diplomatic corps should be made by agreement with the secretary of the Central Committee.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 10. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Chicherin, Andreev.

No. 93

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF KIDS"

August 7, 1924

No. 16, p. 2 - B. Report of the PB commission on the Galicians (PB 3 / V1ÿ pr. No. 7 p. 1-C) (comrades Chicherin, Unshlikht).

B. Approve the decision of the commission (see annex).

Application text

First of all, 200 people should be accepted, namely 50 people of Ukrainian origin and 150 especially reliable Galicians, of whom a company in Ukraine can be made up.

The second batch of Galicians to be received must be made up of skilled workers, and Comrade Zatonsky is instructed to find out exactly which of them can be used. In any case, those who undertake to work in Baku can be used.

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In addition, 200 families of agricultural workers can be accepted and settled in the Cherkasy district. This requires an expense of approximately 60 tons. Rubles.

V Organs of the OGPU will purge in order to isolate the most reliable elements. This decision should not be presented as final and



as excluding the possibility of the return of others, so that the mood of the rest of the mass would not experience an unfavorable turn through this.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 23. Original. Typescript.

ÿ The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Chicherin, Quiring, Menzhinsky.

No. 94

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ESTONIAN COMPUTER PARTY

August 28, 1924

No. 20, p. 7. Report of the PB commission on proposals X. (PB dated 21 / VIII pr. No. 19 p. 12), (comrades Manuilsky, Unshlikht).

Approve the following committee proposals:

- 1) To give the activities of the Estonian Communist Party a militant character by assisting it in the preparatory measures for providing an armed rebuff to the attempts of a fascist coup.
- 2) Check through the relevant authorities the economic and political state of Estonia and the degree of revolutionary ferment, which makes it possible to count on the success of the movement.
- 3) Appoint a permanent commission composed of com. Unshlikht, Trilisser, Manuilsky, Chicherin and Ryastas to assist the Estonian Communist Party. Convocation of a commission for Comrade Manuilsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 12. D. 2. L. 30. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Manuil skomu — everything; t.t. Unshlikht, Trilisser, Chicherin, Ryastas - 3).

No. 95

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT SAVINKOV" (36)

September 18, 1924

No. 24, p. 16 - About Savinkov (Dzerzhinsky).

1. Issue a directive to the Press Department to ensure that the newspapers, in their statements about Savinkov, observe the following:

- a) Savinkov should not be personally humiliated, should not be taken away from him the hope that he can still go out into the world;
- b) Influence in the direction of encouraging him to expose by the fact that we do not raise doubts about his sincerity;

I. To instruct the Press Department, on the basis of this directive, to give clarifications to the editors of newspapers and to offer them all doubtful articles, etc. coordinate with the press department.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 464. L. 5. Original. Typescript.

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No. 96

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT SENTENCES IN POLITICAL CASES

November 5, 1924

No. 33. p. 8 / s - Proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on sentences in political cases (PB from ZO.X pr. 32 p. 22). (vols. Quiring, Kursky).

8. In explanation of the resolutions of the Bureau of 17/IV of this year. (pr. 85 p. 30) and dated 1 1 / VTI-24 (PB 8, p. 16) and the telegram of the secretary of the Central Committee Comrade Molotov dated 27 / IX of this year. (No. 1600/s) to establish, as a rule, that local indictments are preliminary reviewed by a special commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, consisting of comrades. Kursky, Kuibyshev and Dzerzhinsky.

Convocation of the Commission for Comrade Kursky. (37)

ALRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 23. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kursky, Kuibyshev, Dzerzhinsky, Tovstukha.

No. 97

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE OGLU WITH  
REGARD TO PERSONS ENGAGED IN FORGING DENCHEK (38)

November 20, 1924

No. 36, p. 1 - On the expansion of the rights of the OGPU in relation to persons involved in the counterfeiting of banknotes (PB of 29.III.24, pr. No. 82, p. 21).

In view of the refusal of the OGPU from its proposal, the issue from the agenda of the Politburo take off.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 3. D. 476. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Menzhinsky, Kursky,

Sokolsky".

No. 98

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"About EKRП (POALEI-TSIOI)" (39)

December 4, 1924

No. 39, p. 40 - About EKRП (Poalei Zion) (pr. OB No. 47 dated 1.XII.24, p. 16).

In view of the fact that the EKRП (Poalei Zion) itself is disintegrating, it is considered inexpedient to liquidate it by the measures of the GPU, but also to prevent its registration with the NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 46-47. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Dzerzhinsky, Beloborodov, Kviring, Krinitsky, Molotov, Antipov.

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No. 99

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

", about the COMMISSION ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS"

December 1924

No. 40, p. 28 / s - On the commission for political affairs (according to Art. PB of 5 / XI pr. No. 33 p. 8). (comrade Krylenko).

a) Deputy t.t. Kursky, Kuibyshev and Dzerzhinsky to appoint comrades, respectively, to the commission on political affairs. Krylenko, Shkiryatov and Menzhinsky. Convening a commission for comrade Kursky (or comrade Krylenko).

b) Instruct the commission to consider specific proposals of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 29. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Krylenko, Shkiryatov, Menzhinsky, Quiring.

No. 100

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE ESTIMATE OF THE OGPU"

January 8, 1925

No. 44, p. 9 - About the estimate of O.G.P.U. (PB dated 24/XII, pr. 42 p. 2). (T.T. Molotov,

Menzhinsky, Reinhold).

Approve the unanimous decision of the commission on the determination of the total amount according to the estimate of the OGPU in the amount of 56.5 mil. (52 million for OPTU and 4.5 m for convoy troops) (40).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 56. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Falcon nikov, Menzhinsky.

No. 101

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE  
GERMAN STUDENTS

February 6, 1925

No. 0090  
SECRET

The NKID asks the Politburo to decide by polling Members P.B. urgently the following question:

Over three months ago, the OGPU arrested in Moscow three non-Srgo\* students—Kinderman, Wolsht, and Dietmar. These students arrived in quite legally, having received the necessary visas, thanks to the presentation of membership cards of the Communist Party. The OGPU considers these membership cards forged and suspects the students of belonging to right-wing fascist organizations and of intending to commit terrorist acts on our territory. The detention of these students aroused a strong campaign against the USSR in the German part, and the greatest interest in the fate of the students was shown not by the right-wing press, but by the democratic press (Frankfurter

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Zeitung" and "Berliner Tageblatt"), the rector of the University of Berlin and other professors, as well as the parents of the detainees. The press indicates that students have been in jail for more than 3 months without being charged, and their affiliation to the Communist Party is indicated. At the same time, assumptions are made that students are subjected to torture and torment in the OGLU, as a result of which the OPTU allegedly refuses to meet anyone with the arrested. The campaign is getting stronger every day. The German ambassador here is accused of inaction, although not a day passes without the ambassador or his staff turning to us on this matter. Yesterday, Rantzau declared that this case in Germany takes the dimensions of the May incident (raid on the Trade Representation) and

may lead to them leaving their post.

The embassy seeks not so much the release of students as an immediate meeting with them in order to convince and convince the German public

The main opinion is that the students are "alive" and "not tortured by the OGPU".

The OGPU strongly objected to the meeting, fearing that it would have a harmful effect on the course of the investigation. Students, convinced of the interest shown to them, will not give the necessary testimony. Unfortunately, we cannot indicate this motive to the German embassy. The embassy asks for a meeting in the presence of the OGPU officers, with the exception of any business conversations.

The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to meet the German embassy halfway and meet with the arrested no later than Sunday, February 8th. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs asks the Politburo to make an appropriate decision.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 266. L. 6-7. Script. Typescript.

No. 102

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky V.R. MENZHINSKY AND G.G. Yagoda  
ON THE CASE OF GERMAN STUDENTS

February 9, 1925

In connection with the incident with Litvinov and Rantzau concerning the German "students," Comrade Stalin asked whether it was possible for some foreign correspondents (English or American) to show, ext. prison, including the Germans, in order to knock out the argument that they are "tortured"?

F. Dzerzhinsky

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 202. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

No. 103

NOTE F.E. DZERZHINSKY TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ON THE QUESTION OF MURDERS IN THE VILLAGE OF SELKORS"

February 15, 1925

About the village  
correspondents to paragraph 18 pov. session

PB dated 11/19/25

I consider it harmful to print articles, notes, reports on the killings of village correspondents in newspapers, as well as reports on legal processes related to them. These messages in our press first of all organize the forces hostile to us, teach them what mistakes to avoid in order not to get caught, and encourage them to follow the same path. We see that, despite the repression and the noise in the newspapers, the number of murders is growing. In my opinion, what is needed is not a hype in the newspapers at all, but a huge, lengthy work arising from all our resolutions and slogans. "Facing the Village" Repressions are necessary, but neither they nor the murders themselves should be advertised. These

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the murders indicate that the issue of relations with the countryside and in the countryside has become seriously complicated and aggravated, and that the method of combating evil by the "selcors" needs to be revised, because it has actually gone bankrupt. The method of denunciation in the press without sufficient and necessary organizational preparation is unrealistic.

ny method of struggle. After all, we know that everywhere, the lower, the worse, the mass of abuses, the mass of arbitrariness. The single combat of the most honest selcor with this evil can only end in his defeat. What is needed here is not single combat, but a series of coordinated long-term measures. The village correspondents must communicate directly or through the newspaper with the commissions for work in the countryside and with the provincial committees and must not only be personally checked, but also constantly instructed. Correspondences should be drawn up in such a way as to take into account their practical positive result. The information received from a trusted village correspondent must be comprehensively worked out with a plan outlined for how to renew and improve the grassroots Soviet apparatus, whom to rely on, whom to promote, and so on. This is a huge current work, to which, in my opinion, the Central Committee, and the Gubernia Committees, and the Central Control Commission, and the provincial Committees of Committees should devote a lot of effort and attention.

Newspaper hype is not able to replace this work.

F. Dzerzhinsky

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 294. L. 25. Original. Typescript.

No. 104

NOTE F.E. DZERZHINSKY TO THE  
POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b) ON SELKORS

February 25, 1925

No. 1145/G About village correspondents

To p.\_pov. session PB

25/11-25

Secret

On the issue of villagers

According to the far from complete data of the OGPU, the picture of terror (murders, beatings, attempt on life, arson against Soviet workers, village correspondents, communists, Komsomol members and the poor) in the countryside in the regions of the USSR is presented in the following form:

January

Of the 388 cases, 24 years fall into months:

1924

1925

Center

37

24

January

4

Sev. West

18

5

February

—

West

33

thirty

March

3

Volga region

23

7

April

6

Ukraine

24

27

May

18

Crimea

1

June

39

Southeast

22

5

July

28

Kyrgyzstan

3

4

August

27

Ural

5

1

September

32

Siberia

177

21

October

39

DVO

4

—

November

58

Transcaucasia

2

December

84

Turkestan

—

1

Total for 1924



338

Total

338

127

January 1925

127

98

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Of the 218 cases of terror in September and December, it falls by 24.

Falls on

24 IX-XII

Including  
selcors

January  
1925

Including  
selcors

Murders

50

15

37

2

Injuries

10

2

13

1

beatings

67

22

24

7

Organization attack.

31

8

23

3

Threats

26

5

18

1

Arson

31

3

10

—

Other types of terror

3

—

2

—

Total

218

55

127

14

These figures are very significant: they say:

1. The question of terror in the countryside goes much further than the question of terror against the villagers.
2. Terror in the countryside is growing symptomatically and menacingly, intensifying and expanding in all the main regions.
3. It is necessary to draw the attention of all gubernia committees and gubernias to this phenomenon. The CC, obliging them to pay maximum attention to studying each case separately and taking a number of necessary measures, which should be orientatedly outlined and worked out by the commission of the Central Committee for work in the countryside.
4. Do not publish reports in the newspaper about murders in the village (motivation in my previous letter).

11/21/25

F. DZERZHINSKY

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 294. L. 22-23. Copy. Typescript.

No. 105

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT INTELLIGENCE" (41)

February 25, 1925

No. 50, p. 26 - On intelligence (PB of 19/11-25, project No. 49, p. 17). (comrade Kuibyshev). Approve the proposal of the commission (see annex).

Appendix to paragraph 26 of Ave. 50 PB of the Central Committee of 25/11-25

Top secret (Approved by the  
PB of the Central Committee 25 / P-25)

Draft resolution of the Politburo Commission on active  
intelligence

1. Active reconnaissance (sabotage, military subversive groups, etc.) in the first period of its existence was a necessary addition to our military measures and carried out the combat missions assigned to it from the center.

With the establishment of more or less normal diplomatic relations with the countries adjacent to the USSR, the Intelligence Department repeatedly issued directives on the cessation of active operations, however, acquired

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During the previous period, the traditions of groups organized abroad, as well as the weakness of the leadership on the part of the communist parties of the spontaneously growing movement of the foreign peasantry, from which the cadres of sabotage groups of active intelligence were recruited, did not make it possible to organizationally lead these groups, which often did not comply with the laws given directives. Hence a whole series of speeches that harmed our diplomatic work and hindered the work of the relevant communist parties.

2. In view of the very clearly defined impossibility of directing the work of foreign partisan groups by means of circulars, and taking into account that the communist parties have already realistically raised the question of seizing the spontaneously growing movement in the border regions under their influence, recognize it as necessary:

a) active reconnaissance in its present form (organization of communications, supplies and leadership of sabotage detachments on the territory of the Polish Republic) - liquidate;

b) in no country should there be our active combat groups carrying out combat acts and receiving direct means, instructions and guidance from us.

3. All combat and insurrectionary work, detachments and groups, insofar as they are politically expedient (which is determined in a purely party order), must be transferred to the complete subordination of the communist parties of a given country and be guided exclusively by the interests of the revolutionary work of a given country, resolutely refusing to from intelligence and other work in favor of the Military Veterinary Department of the USSR.

The rest of the active reconnaissance groups, as well as the military subversive and sabotage groups of the previously existing type, since they will not enter the circle of the party organization, are liquidated.

4. Instead of active reconnaissance in its present form, for purely military purposes of the USSR, special points should be organized in the neighboring states in the most secret way for examining and studying military facilities, establishing contact with the right people, collecting materials, etc.,

those. to prepare for destructive work during the war behind enemy lines. Thus, the points are informational and preparatory in nature, however, so that at the appropriate moments they can turn around for combat. These points are in no way associated with the Party, and individual workers are not members of the Party.

The heads of the central intelligence apparatuses in our country and abroad keep in touch exclusively with authorized representatives of the Central Committees of the respective Communist Parties.

5. The chiefs and leaders of the former Active Intelligence, who were exposed at the border, are replaced immediately, without waiting for a general liquidation, which requires a longer time and an extremely cautious approach.

6. Strictly conspiratorial small groups with the necessary weapons are organized in our zone. In the event that our territory is occupied by the enemy, their task is to disorganize the enemy rear and conduct guerrilla warfare.

\_ The border zone on our side must be cleared of active

Rtisan, which, as stated, independently cross the boundaries of "I combat work. Without embittering them and leaving them registered for use in

At the beginning of the war, they should be evacuated to the inner districts.

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8. For the painless implementation of all these measures and to avoid discontent, separation or degeneration of individual groups or individuals, it is necessary to allocate appropriate amounts. It is also necessary to establish and satisfy a firm estimate for work for the future in the amount that guarantees the organized and sustained work of all employees.

9. Carrying out all of the above is entrusted to the RVSR with a report to the PB.

10. Responsibility for the condition of the borders and the passage of the partisans through them shall be placed entirely on the bodies of the GPU.

11. A change in the above methods of work, caused by the peculiarities of the situation (for example, Bessarabia), can take place only by a special decision of the Politburo.

12. The implementation of this line must also be conditioned by its diplomatic use. All the planned measures can only turn out to be harmful if a firm and clear policy towards Poland, already outlined by the PB, is not pursued. It should be emphasized that the Polish government in this matter has no direct evidence against us, but is based only on conjectures. Therefore, any attacks from the Polish side must be given a resolute rebuff.

13. Once again draw the attention of the Communist Parties of the eastern outskirts of Poland to the need to embrace and lead the peasant movement in the outskirts, to assist the peasantry in its struggle, giving the movement an organization

private character and using all possible forms of it, such as non-Party peasant committees, defense committees, and so on.

#### PRIVATE JUDGMENT

In view of the establishment of the fact that the OGPU PP in Minsk comrade. The bear gave the order to carry out a well-known case and organized it without permission or instructions from the direct superior, but, taking into account extenuating circumstances, to provide comrade. Dzerzhinsky to impose an administrative penalty in the form of a reprimand.

V. Kuibyshev

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 78-81. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhinsky, Unshlikht, Chicherin.

No. 106

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF KIDS"

March 5, 1925

No. 51, p. 1 - B. About students (comrades Litvinov, Menzhinsky, Pyatnitsky).

I. Approve with amendments the following decisions of the commission appointed by the delegation of the RCP in the Presidium of the ECCI:

a) Instruct Comrade Katz to acquaint the Central Committee of the KKE with the Kinderman case and report Kinderman's testimony on how he joined the Durlakh party organization of the KKE and that the persons who signed both the party book and the certificate for the right to travel to Russia serve in intermediary office of Father Kinderman.

To draw the attention of the Central Committee of the KKE to the fact that a copy of the document issued by the Durlach party organization is in the hands of the German ambassador in Moscow.

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Through comrade Katz, to propose to the CPG to take measures against the penetration of alien, hostile elements into the ranks of the KKE, b) To propose to the Central Committee of the KKE, through comrade Katz, to acquaint both party members and workers in general with how Kinderman joined the KKE, since among the members of the KKE one can see displeasure at the arrest of the supposedly German communist.

c) Familiarize with the materials of the inquiry (which may be presented in accordance with the interests of further investigation) representatives of the sections of K.I. and representatives of the foreign (if it is politically necessary) and Russian press in order to launch a newspaper campaign—with the publication of relevant documents—simultaneously in the USSR and abroad.

All this to be carried out in shock order.

I. Recognizing that it is desirable to expedite the completion of the preliminary investigation and refer the case to court, oblige the OGPU to present its views on this issue at the next meeting of the Politburo.

III. Consider it necessary to immediately publish the article or interviews. Katz in the Kinderman case. To entrust the carrying out of this decision to T.T. Pyatnitsky and Dzerzhinsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 82-83. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Dzerzhinsky, Pyatnitsky.

No. 107

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE REMOVAL

March 19, 1925

No. 53, item 37 - Proposal of the OGPU. (comrades Agranov, Yaroslavsky).

Accept the proposal of the OGPU and the Central Control Commission:

a) M.Ya. Brown-Rakitin exiled administratively to Turkestan. B) Kuznetsov N. to be released from custody with deportation to the Semipalatinsk province.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 90. Original. Typescript.

L The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 19.11.25.

— „ The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Agranov; "• Yaroslavsky".

No. 108

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE GENERAL STAFFS OF FOREIGN STATES

March 26, 1925

No. 54, p. 15 - About the meeting.

a) Create a commission of representatives of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the OGPU and the Military Department for the detailed development and systematization of the available information on the undertaking actions of neighboring countries, in particular, on the meeting of the General Staff ov and about the role of England in this meeting.

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b) Propose to the commission to submit to the Politburo their views on the question of possible measures to disintegrate this bloc, if this bloc really exists.

c) To instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to publish in the Soviet press the information about the meeting of the General Staffs and to carry on an appropriate campaign in the press.

d) To instruct the NKID to submit to the Politburo, as information accumulates, but at least once a month, systematic reviews of the international situation and foreign policy.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 92. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts have been sent: comrade Chicherin - that's it; comrade Frunze - everything; comrade Dzerzhinsky - everything.

No. 109

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE NKID"

April 2, 1925

N9 55, p. 1 - B. On the exchange, (comrades Unshlikht, Dzerzhinsky, Litvinov, Frumkin, Bogutsky).

B. - b) Accept the following proposals from Comrade Dzerzhinsky:

1. Instruct the courts and the prosecutor's office that those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes related to Poland and espionage in favor of Poland are tried with all the severity of existing laws, without the use of commutation of sentences.

2. In relation to those convicted by the courts, according to paragraph 1, no amnesty and pardon can be applied (by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics) without the prior consent of the PB Commission (comrades Dzerzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Krylenko).

3. To carry out the sentences to capital punishment, which were detained (by the Central Executive Committee), on Polish spies and counter-revolutionaries convicted by the courts.

4. Propose to the OGPU to intensify the fight against Polish espionage and counter-revolution.

5. Through the ECCI and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, launch a broad printed and oral campaign in connection with the murder of Comrade T.T. Vechorkevich and Baginsky in all countries and in the USSR, especially among the broad masses of workers and peasants and in the Red Army, instructing Agitprop to deal with this matter and informing Comrade Tomsy about this to bring to the attention of the British trade unions.

c) Instruct comrade Dzerzhinsky to talk with comrade Krylenko about the process Us sasa.



RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 99-100. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts have been sent: comrade Chicherin - that's it; comrade Litvinov - everything; comrade Dzerzhinsky - b, c; Comrade Kursk - b, c; Comrade Yenukidze - 6-1, 2, 3; comrade Kiselev - 6-1, 2, 3; Comrade Pyatnitsky - 6-5; Comrade Dogadov - 6-5; comrade Syrtsov - 6-5.

\*\* The document is published without an attachment.

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No. NO

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF KIDS"

May 21, 1925

No. 64, p. 2 - V. About students (PB dated 13.III.25, project No. 52, p. I-F). (comrades Menzhinsky, Chicherin, Litvinov).

a) Appoint the following composition of the Supreme Court in this case: chairman - comrade Yaroslavsky, members - comrade comrade Ulrich and Cameron.

b) Carry out the present decision in accordance with the Soviet order.

c) Propose to the boards of the court, together with Comrade Menzhinsky, to submit their opinion to the next meeting of the Politburo.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 120. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent: comrade Yaroslavskomu — everything; comrade Menzhinsky - everything; comrade Ulrich - a; comrade Cameron - a.

No. 111

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. STALIN WITH THE  
PROPOSAL TO INCLUDED V.R. MENZHINSKY TO THE  
BOARD OF THE NKID (42)

May 23, 1925

In connection with the information organized by the OGPU on foreign affairs, as well as with our struggle against espionage and the counter-revolution organized by the capitalist countries, it would be very desirable in the interests of the cause and defense of the country to have closer contact between our work and the NKIDel. For this purpose, I am submitting a proposal to include Comrade Menzhinsky in the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

F. Dzerzhinsky

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 349. L. 3. Copy. Typescript.

No. 112

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ABOUT CONTRAGITATION

June 11, 1925

No. 66, p. 2 - Message from Comrade Menzhinsky (Comrade Menzhinsky).

In order to analyze and study materials on questions of intervention and to organize, on the basis of their counter-gitation, a commission should be created consisting of comrades. Chicherin, Menzhinsky and Bukharin.

Convening a commission for comrade Menzhinsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 124. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhin skomu; Comrade Chicherin; comrade Bukharin.

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No. 113

ARREST REPORT K.G. KINDERMAN,

T.E. VOLYDTA AND M.N. DITMARINA

June 23, 1925

On October 13, 1924, Karl Germanovich Kinderman and Theodor Emilievich Wolsht, students of the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin, arrived in Moscow from Germany. Two days later they were joined by the citizen of the Republic of Estonia Maxim Napoleonovich Ditmarin, aka von Ditmar, a student at the same university. They arrived in Moscow from Germany - the first two through Riga, and the last through Revel. All three posed as members of the Communist Party of Germany, who arrived in the USSR as scientific excursionists, and as such turned to the People's Commissariat of Education and the Comintern, seeking connection and support. On this basis, they managed to get a meeting with a number of senior officials of the above-mentioned institutions. During their visits, they expressed an extraordinary interest not only in the structure of these institutions, but also in finding out the persons playing a leading role there, and in finding out the whereabouts and days of meetings and receptions of a number of responsible workers. Finally, their behavior aroused the suspicion of the German students who lived with them in the same dormitory, Comrade Fridman and others, who saw in them objects that were completely uncharacteristic of communists, such as the badges of German student corporations, spurs, crosses, etc. The same suspicion was aroused by their behavior among members.

new German and Estonian sections of the Communist International and political émigrés, from whom they sought to obtain addresses, handwritten notes, etc.

Based on the information received by the OGPU, the mentioned Kinderman, Wolsht and Ditmar were arrested on October 26, 1924 on suspicion of espionage and preparation for committing terrorist acts on the territory of the USSR, in which two of them, Kinderman and Ditmar, in the end, after a long denial, they confessed, Wolsht, in spite of his stubborn denial, was finally convicted by the testimony of his co-proceedings. The data of the preliminary investigation and the interrogation of the accused themselves present the following unconditionally established:

1. Karl Germanovich Kinderman, as a young schoolboy, was acquainted with employees of the military intelligence bureau in Donau-Ehingen. After graduating from high school, he studied at various universities in Germany, in particular from the age of 22 at the University of Berlin. By this time, he established a connection with the 1-A department of the Berlin police presidium, where he, as a paid employee, participated in its work, performing various assignments in the working quarters, moreover, he practiced in one of the detective bureaus and, as a police trainee -presidium, had access to the secret museum of department 1-A.

Before the war, his father was a member of the Socialist Party and by the end of the war he was a member of the soldiers' councils, where he was suspected of embezzling 80,000 marks. To maintain his mandate as a member of the city council, he joined the Communist Party, but, being exposed as a blackmailer, was expelled from the latter. Then he was engaged in the collection of debts from the poorest population according to the claims of drawers, being the owner of the collection bureau. As such, he had a number of agents. Among them was the deputy chairman of the local group of the German Communist Party in Durlach and the province of Baden,

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who, at the insistence of his patron, obtained a party card for his son Karl and issued half a dozen certificates of belonging to the checkpoint

Karl Kivderman, who was hostile to the latter as a result of the troubles and scandals that befell his father during his activities in the revolutionary movement, sought, as he says, to wash away the dark stain from his surname by participating in the fascist movement, for which he managed to falsify with the German nationalists, establishing a close relationship with them, hiding his Jewish origin for this. These connections were used by the presidium police to involve Kinderman in a terrorist adventure. Having infiltrated the fascist organization of Earhart, Karl Kivderman, as an agent of department 1-A of the police presidium, informed the department about the tendency that had arisen in the fascist organization to organize terrorist acts against the leaders of the USSR, agreeing at the same time to take part in the implementation of these intentions.

2. Teodor Emilievich Volynt, the son of the reactionary professor Emil Wohlsht from the city of Beuparl am Rhein, in 1918, while still a schoolboy, was mobilized into the so-called auxiliary service in the Hilfstist. After graduating from the gymnasium in 1920, he worked on the estate of Baron Falkenstein in Friedberg on Neumark as a student trainee, receiving allowance from the latter, an ardent reactionary, until his departure for Russia. Having joined the organization "Consul" during his studies at the university, he was an active participant in right-wing student corporations, such as Neomachia and Saxo-Prussia, in which he was deputy chairman. To a terrorist group

"Consul", together with Kinderman, entered in the autumn of 1923. Prior to that, he had come forward as a determined and brave terrorist, who repeatedly carried out dangerous assignments for the Consul organization. On behalf of this organization, he repeatedly illegally visited the Ruhr area during the occupation of the latter by the French, where he actively fought against the separatists, and, being also associated with the 1-A department of the Berlin police presidium, received a fake document from him and, as an assistant carpenter penetrated into the French-occupied area. The police presidium knew Volsht and, giving him the document, knew that he was not a carpenter. He participated in the suppression of workers' unrest, and, according to Bauman's testimony, he himself boasted of murders - "the liquidation of many communists."

3. Maxim Napoleonovich Ditmarin, also known as von Ditmar (the last surname is his real surname), the son of a landowner impoverished after the war, joined the student team for another 17 years, intended to suppress unrest during the revolutionary movement in Estonia. After graduating from a secondary school, in the autumn of 1922, he left for Germany to continue his education, where he joined the fascist organization "Consul", on behalf of which he traveled to different factories as a worker and led the youthful fascist organization "Jung -deutscher-order", for which he entered into contact with workers' organizations through the communists Kritzer and Schindler in order to illuminate the communist party before the fascists. In 1922, on behalf of the "Consul", he was sent to the University of Berlin, from where, through the fascist student organization "Přtudentenwerk", he was sent as a laborer to the port of Bremerhaven, together with the famous fascist Horbert Jonzon. Upon his return from Bremerhaven, he was sent to Munich, where he participated in a workers' demonstration, being simultaneously associated with the fascist and Russian White Guard circles. For participation in this working demonstration, he was fictitiously expelled by the police from Munich, after which he went to Vienna, where, at the suggestion of the fascist Yungauz, who supplied him with money, he offered his services to the Soviet embassy in covering the public

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Shist and Russian White Guard circles with the aim of provoking the Vienna embassy of the USSR. During 1922 and 1924, Ditmar was repeatedly a diplomatic courier for the Estonian, Lithuanian and German governments and twice unsuccessfully tried to enter the service of the Berlin trade mission of the USSR to conduct espionage there on behalf of the Nazis. Upon arrival from Vienna to Munich, Ditmar was sent by the Consul organization to participate in the terrorist group of Karl Yushderman, with whom he contacted through the Berlin office of the Consul organization. At the same time, on the recommendation of the above-mentioned comrades Kritzer and Schindler, he resumed his ties with the communists, and he managed to get a new party card to replace the one he lost in 1923. He was sent to the Kinderman group not only as an experienced fascist, but also as a person, well knowing Russian language and Russian conditions. Dietmar's Baltic origin, however, aroused distrust of him on the part of Kindermann and Volsht, who, wanting to find out Ditmar's true fascist convictions, more than once tested his devotion and loyalty by spying and secretly searching him.

For the same purpose, in order to obtain a party card, Kinderman went to his homeland in Durlach in the summer of 1924, where, through members of the Communist Party of Germany, Dalmus and Miller, he received a party card from the Durlach organization.

a ticket and two recommendations from its chairman, Weiss, to Oskar Kohn and to the USSR trade mission in Berlin; stamps of party contributions backdated from March 1924. Having written six certificates of his membership in the KKE, he slipped them to Miller's signature. In turn, Volute took steps in the last months before leaving for the USSR for the same purpose to get closer to the communist circles in order to join the KKE, and in May 1924 he demonstratively voted for the communist list in the university elections. Lacking, however, a party document, he began to directly impersonate a member of the Koblen group of the KPD, for belonging to which he was allegedly expelled by the French occupation authorities from his native town of Beuparl-on-Rhine. All these steps to provide themselves with the necessary party documents were taken by Kinderman, Ditmar and Wolypt in 1924 on the direct instructions of the Consul organization, when it was already planned to send them to the USSR. The decision to send the group to Russia for terrorist acts was taken by the local committee of the Consul organization in pursuance of a directive received from Munich in the autumn of 1923. At a series of meetings of the Berlin committee it was decided that the group should carry out a series of terrorist acts against the responsible Union, and the first attempt, which Kinderman, Volut and Dietmar were supposed to carry out, was a terrorist act against Stalin. The details of the assassination attempt were not discussed at the meeting: in this respect, the group was given freedom of action, in accordance with the situation and place. But it was decided to stop at two means: a revolver and poison. At this meeting, they were instructed to carry out the following espionage activities: 1) intelligence of the Kremlin; 2) apartments of responsible employees; 3) the internal organization of the Comintern; 4) whether it finances the CHRG; 5) in what way and through whom is the connection of the Comintern with Berlin carried out; 6) the possibility of compromising the trade mission and embassy in Berlin in this regard; 7) establishment of methods and places where illegal passports and documents are produced; 8) directives of the Comintern to the military organizations of the KKE.

"Pravda" No. 140, June 23, 1925

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT STUDENTS"

June 25, 1925

No. 68, p. 11 - About students (comrade Yaroslavsky).

a) Instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to respond to the verbal note that: 1) the witnesses Rosé and Fink were not arrested, but on the exact basis of Ug. Etc. Code. The RSFSR were invited to the witness room and legal measures were taken with respect to them so that they would not communicate with other witnesses before their testimony in court, and 2) that these measures have now been canceled and replaced

us by taking away a signature on non-intercourse with other witnesses.

b) It is left to the court, if there is sufficient proof of the accusation, to make a decision on bringing the witnesses who came from Germany to the court.

c) In this case, the court asks the government to clarify whether it has the right, in the existing international legal relations with Germany, to arrest the perpetrators, in accordance with the laws of our state.

d) The Government decides in this case that in view of the absence of an agreement between the USSR and Germany on the mutual extradition of political criminals and in view of the fact that these persons were summoned diplomatically as witnesses, they should not be arrested and brought to justice.

e) The Court on this basis decides to send these persons abroad.

f) The moment of implementation of individual paragraphs of this resolution is determined by the court.

g) Establish a commission consisting of comm. Krestinsky, Trotsky, Menzhinsky and Krylenko, who will consider and resolve the issue of documents.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 136-137. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent: comrade Yaroslav skomu — everything; comrade Chicherin - everything; comrade Trotsky - well; comrade Krestinsky - well; comrade Menzhinsky - f; comrade Krylenko - Well.

No. 115

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF KIDS"

July 23, 1925

No. 72, p. 1 - K. On the conspiracy against the Japanese ambassador in Moscow (comrades Yagoda, Chicherin).

Conspiracy to liquidate whenever possible without publicity.

Persons directly involved in this case, and in particular those who led it, should be expelled from the USSR; in this case, members of the Diplomatic Embassy are also subject to expulsion.

To establish the list of those subject to expulsion, etc. Chicherin and Yagoda.

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Tov. Yagoda to inform MK in the sense that the reason for the arrests and deportation is the connection of these persons and the conspiracy itself with British agents.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 156-157. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts sent to: comrade Chicherin - All; comrade Yagoda - everything.

No. 116

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SUPPLEMENTARY ALLOCATIONS OF THE OGPU"

July 23, 1925

No. 72, p. 19 - On the extra budget appropriation of the OGPU (comrade Bryukhanov).

To authorize the release by the Narkomfin in addition to the estimate of the OGPU for 1924-25, 250,000 rubles for expenses on overseas work, carried out by agreement between the Narkomfin and the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 157. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 23.11.1925.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Yagoda; comrade Bryukhanov.

No. 117

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.P. TOVSTUKHI I.V. STALIN  
ON THE INTENTION OF F.E. DZERZHINSKY TO ARRIVE IN SOCHI

August 12, 1925

No. 7760  
with Top Secret

Belenky and Dzerzhinsky leave for Kislovodsk on the 15th. He wants to take you to Mukhalatka. May arrive in Sochi 20-21. Give consent.

Tovstukha

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 35. L. 42. Copy. Typescript.

The document contains Stalin's handwritten note: "My archive."

No. 118

J.V. STALIN'S NOTE TOVSTUKHE  
ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF F.E. DZERZHINSKY IN SOCHI

August 1925

No. 38

With pleasure I am ready to receive Dzerzhinsky and his friends at work. Stalin. I don't mind about Belenky. Stalin.

RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 35. L. 43. Original. Manuscript.

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No. 119

J.V. STALIN'S NOTE TOVSTUKHE ABOUT THE  
ORGANIZATION OF RECREATION IN THE CRIMEA

August 1925

Tov. Tovstuha!

Last time I wrote to Belenky of the GPU to arrange for me a place in Mukhalatka (Crimea) by August 15-20, however, in order not to disperse anyone there and not to embarrass me because of me. I did not receive an answer from Belenky, perhaps because he is not in Moscow. Therefore, I ask you to convey this request of mine to Yagoda or to some other of Belenky's deputies for the protection of members of the Central Committee and report the results "urgently".

Stalin

RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 35. L. 50-51. Script. Manuscript.

\*—\* Underlined with two lines.

No. 120

NOTE by I.V. STALIN AND A.S. BUBNOVA G.G. Yagoda and V.M.  
MOLOTOV ON THE RELEASE OF A.Ya.  
BELENKY FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE MUKHALATKA

August 1925

Belenky committed a number of gross indiscretions that compromised the members of the Central Committee and the GPU. It's not the first time he's done stupid things. It is necessary to immediately release him from conducting Mukhalatka along the lines of the GPU. Appoint Yagoda instead of Belenky, or someone else as directed by Yagoda. The matter is urgent (43).

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 35. L. 53. Original. Manuscript.

No. 121



DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT CHECHNYA, INGUSHETIA AND DAGESTAN"

September 17, 1925

No. 79, p. 2 - On Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan (PB dated 23.VII.25, project No. 72, p. 17)  
(vol. Unshlikht, Yagoda).

a) Extend the disarmament operation to Ingushetia, entrusting this operation to the troops of the OGPU and the Military Department, on the same basis on which it was carried out in Chechnya.

b) Instruct Comrade Kalinin to call to Moscow the members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Chechtsik, who took part in the anti-Soviet movement, and take appropriate measures.

c) Grant the OGPU the right to resolve the issue of the application of capital punishment, in agreement with the local authorities. (44)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 172. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Yagoda - All ; comrade Mikoyan - all (in cipher); t. Unshlikhtu - "a"; comrade Kalinin - "b".

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

ON THE SENTENCES OF A.R. GODU AND E.M. Timofeev

September 17, 1925

No. 79, p. 22 - Message from comrade. Berries.

Propose to the OGPU that Gotz and Timofeev be sentenced to two years' imprisonment. (45)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 173. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 8.9.1925.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Yagoda."

No. 123

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT CHECHNYA AND NORTH OSSETIA"

September 24, 1925

No. 80, p. 22 - About Chechnya and the North. Ossetia (telegram of the Sevkavkraykom dated 19.IX)  
(comrade Yagoda).

a) Do not object to the disarmament of North Ossetia.

b) Do not object to the arrest of four members of Chechtsik, instructing the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR to preliminarily issue the deprivation of powers of a member of the CEC of the USSR Sharipov, and Chechtsik - the deprivation of powers of four members of Chechtsik.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 175. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 20.9.1925.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to: comrade Yagoda - everything; t. Unshlikhtu - "a"; comrade Yenukidze - "b"; Comrade Kalinin - "b"; Sevkraykom - everything (in cipher).

No. 124

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE NKID"

November 14, 1925

No. 90, p. 1-B - On emigrants (PB dated 5.XI.25, project No. 84, p. 1B). Approve the decisions of the commission (see Appendix No. 1)

Application No. 1

kp. 1-In pr. No. 90

ON WHITE EMIGRATION

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on 12.XI.25)

1. Establish the following procedure with respect to the TSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR:

a) The issue of the return of persons belonging to the category mentioned in Comrade Ordzhonikidze's telegram No. 383 is resolved on the spot by agreement with the local authorized OGPU. Upon agreement, the authorized NKID notifies the NKID by telegraph with a copy to the permanent representative of the given republic in Moscow. Upon receipt of the notification, the NKVD, without entering into a discussion of the issue on the merits, immediately instructs the appropriate embassy or consulate to issue a visa.

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b) The authorized representative of the OGPU gives consent after the obligatory preliminary request of the OGPU.

c) With regard to the admission of foreigners to the republics, the same rule remains

row.

2. Consider it premature to give a positive resolution to the question of re-emigration from overseas countries, since we do not have our own filtering apparatus there.

3. Recognize the possibility of establishing a facilitated procedure for the return to the USSR from France of emigrants - workers and peasants, giving preference to those qualifications that will be indicated by the Supreme Council of National Economy.

4. Do not consider it possible to recommend that the government take into account the costs of transporting emigrants to the USSR.

5. Instruct the NKID and the OGPU to jointly develop a draft technical conditions for the application of the facilitated procedure mentioned in paragraph 3.

RGASPI. F.17. Op.Z. D. 530. L. 1, 9-10. Script. Typescript.

No. 125

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE NKID"

December 10, 1925

No. 94, p. 2. - G. About the Germans (comrades Litvinov, Menzhinsky, Artuzov).

a) Recognize it necessary to keep in force the old order, which provides for the coordination of the OGPU with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on issues related to the arrests of foreigners.

b) Oblige the NKID to give answers to the OGPU on the indicated questions no later than within 24 hours.

c) To oblige the OGPU to provide the NKID with all the necessary materials, reporting them personally to the People's Commissar or his deputy, with a full guarantee that they will remain confidential.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 2. L. 206. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Litvinov; Menzhinsky.

No. 126

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION OF THE INO OGPU ON THE  
POLICY OF ENGLAND AND CHINA WITH A NOTE APPENDIX

F.E. Dzerzhinsky V.L. GERSON ON THE  
NEED TO REPORT TO I.V. STALIN

January 24, 1926

INO OGPU No. 251

London reports from 3.1.-26

England and Russia

From the Foreign Office comes a number of reports concerning relations between England and Russia, from which it can be concluded that England has taken steps or is supporting steps that should be for the Soviets. government disaster.

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In mid-December, the Foreign Office sent a strictly secret circular to all British representatives abroad, the contents of which are known only to what they are strictly prescribed with all the information, reports, etc., received by them about the Sov. Russia, in the future, treat strictly confidentially and transfer to London. Further, all envoys must themselves do everything to establish which Russian emigrants are in the given country according to political groupings, what Russian organizations exist, what goals they pursue, where they receive financial support from, how the corresponding government treats Russians, etc.

Similar questions were received by British intelligence for development. This intelligence then began confidential negotiations with the Russians, who are the leaders of the emigrants, partly in France, but also in Constantinople and Prague, in order to identify adherents of individual leaders of Russian organizations and the possibility of using them.

According to Reuter, the point is to establish whether the emigrants living abroad, with sufficient financial support and other assistance, are able to launch a counter-movement of the Owls. government in order to overthrow the Moscow government, or at least part of Russia, which has access to the sea, to create a second government, under whose leadership the enemies of the Soviets living in Russia could gather. government. Reuter's further suggestion is, as both The Times and the Daily Telegraph acknowledged, that some indications in this sense have been given in Peking, which are now being tried to be carried out; the present Japanese cabinet is allegedly very interested in this. In any case, it seems to be quite established that the Chinese generals, especially Chang-Tso-Lin, took the side of plans directed against the goals of the Soviets. government. On the one hand, even the possibility of starting a movement against the communists from China and then transferring it to Siberia and Asiatic Russia is not ruled out.

It is further firmly established that between a certain trustee of the British government and the chief leaders of finance and industry, there were strictly confidential negotiations on the question of the further position of England in relation to the Soviets. government. At the same time, apparently, an agreement was reached, both on the part of the government, and on the part of finance and industry, to boycott Russian trade, not to give it credits and to increase economic difficulties in Russia, as far as possible.

On the part of English finance, this point of view is also being developed in America in order to bring about a corresponding change there.

That the British government does not want to be alone in this struggle is evident from the fact that Chamberlain had a conversation with Mussolini about enlisting Italy to cooperate in this matter. Mussolini, however, allegedly rejected this proposal.

position and declared that he was with the Sov. Russia will cope without someone else's help and support and will more willingly defend Italian interests.

Further, London knows that the fiasco that Chicherin recently suffered in Paris is due to the influence of England on Briand.

The talks which the agents of British intelligence have been carrying on with the Russian monarchist leaders seem to indicate the unification of the various troupes, and a meeting of Russians has already been appointed for this purpose.

So far, nothing more can be found out in London, but the press conference indicated that the press should behave more cautiously towards Russia, since the messages concerning Russia are mostly propaganda in favor of Russia, inspired by the Soviets. government, England are no longer supported.

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January 24, 1926

T. Gerson

This very important message must be reported (through Tovstukha) to Comrade Stalin, paying attention to the date, i.e. long before the complications on K. Voet. railway In addition, Stalin must be told what kind of document this is. Obviously Min. In. affairs of Germany. Is not it?

F. Dzerzhinsky

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 384. L. 2-4. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky, Yagoda, Chicherin, Berzin, Ordzhonikidze, Artuzov, Deribas."

No. 127

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE COMMISSION ON POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS"

March 25, 1926

No. 17, paragraph 28-e - Questions of the commission on political affairs (comrade Krylenko).

a) To confirm the decision of the Politburo of April 17, 1924 (pr. No. 85, item 30) on the issue of local courts not passing sentences to capital punishment in political cases without prior authorization of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

b) Assign to comrade. Kaganovich personally responsible for the implementation of this decision.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 37. Copy. Typescript.

\* There is a typewritten note in the text: "T.t. Kaganovich, Krylenko.

No. 128

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky F.F. KILEVITS ABOUT THE  
FIGHT AGAINST TEXTILE SPECULANTS (46)

March 28, 1926

Tov. Kilevits. Dear comrade.

It is quite obvious that the speculators are and will continue to take advantage of the decline in textile production for their own speculative purposes and to buy in reserve and for resale for a huge profit. It would be necessary to take up the development and implementation of a number of countermeasures, both of an economic nature and of administrative influence (and through the OGPU). This elaboration of measures should be taken up by the military-technical cooperation. Get busy. I think we should send a couple of thousand speculators to Turukhansk and Solovki.

F. Dzerzhinsky

RGASPI. F.76. Op. 3. D. 231. L.5. Copy. Typescript.

\*

In the upper left corner there is a handwritten note: "Appropriate measures have been taken. 3.1-.26"

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No. 129

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE FIGHT  
AGAINST SMUGGLING

March 1926

According to negotiations with you for the purpose of your personal information\*, I consider it necessary to inform you of the threatening situation in which the fight against smuggling, both import and export, is in the DVK.

The size of smuggling can be judged by the following figures: the bodies fighting against smuggling (OGPU and Customs) detained contraband goods for 1,977,428 rubles in 1925. If we proceed from the generally accepted calculation that 10% of the total mass of smuggled goods is detained, then as an approximate 'minimum' amount of all smuggled goods placed at \* 19.774.200\* rubles. DVK can be considered

The fragmentary information that we have indicates that the entire Territory is dressed and supplied exclusively with smuggling, including here both officials and members. The CPSU (b), and the police, and customs, and to a large extent, the organs of the OGPU. A significant part of the gold and furs sails abroad.

Such a wide development of smuggling is explained partly, of course, and inevitably appearing in the explanations of local comrades by "objective reasons", usually referred to in the DVK as "local conditions".

However, the main obstacle to intensifying the fight against smuggling and its productivity is the abnormal and unacceptable attitude towards smuggling observed in a number of local party and Soviet organizations and among the party masses of the DVK, which consists in promoting it and in the wide use of it. .

Unfortunately, the OGPU has not had the opportunity, for material reasons, to send a special authoritative commission to the DVK for an in-depth examination of the Border Guard of the DVK in order to combat smuggling. However, the report of a representative of the Border Guard Department, who traveled to the DVK on a special operational assignment, without any investigative purposes, as well as letters and messages from individual employees, paint a very disappointing picture and require decisive intervention. Sending in the coming days to the DVK a special authoritative commission for an exhaustive examination of the case of the Border Guard, identifying and destroying all the decayed and criminal element of it and setting up work on the b / kb, I must indicate that:

1. Local Provincial Committees and Provincial Executive Committees were often supplied with everything they needed from abroad by smuggling, giving orders for the passage of the rooms to the local bodies of the OGPU and sometimes even issuing receipts for reception.

(The Amur Gubkom and the Provincial Executive Committee transported office supplies, products for 'endless\* banquets on 'every\* occasion and on the instructions of the 'banquet commission').

2. With the light hand of the Gubkoms and Gubernia Executive Committees, all other bodies, including the police and our provincial departments (Amur, Primorsky), were engaged in the transportation of paper and paper.

3. A number of officials of the highest ranks, members. The VKP(b) are supplied all the time with smuggling, they systematically go to the nearest kitty-towns and settlements to buy things, and sometimes to revelry. Nikolsko-Ussuri and

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Vladivostok vol. and their families go to Pogranichnaya for this (a special car takes them there and back on Sundays); The Blagoveshchenskys go to Sakhalin. Trips to Harbin are extremely frequent, again without business, but exclusively for shopping and entertainment.

4. Grassroots Soviet workers and the population know and can see all this, and hence the mass open employment of c/b, the greatest moral decay and the view of c/b as the most legitimate business and bitterness against the border guards, who take away change from the peasants and let the executive committee and provincial executive committee contraband cargoes.

Since all the information we have is fragmentary and superficial, relating to the period of late 1924 and early 1925, I do not put before you the question of sending a special Central Control Commission to the Far East, but I would ask you to write on behalf of the Central Committee such a letter to the Far Eastern comrades, which - which would decisively change the attitude of the Far East towards

smuggling and would root out the unacceptable sentiments of individual comrades.

Only under this condition, Comrade MEDVED, the newly appointed OGPU PP in the Far East, will be able to straighten out both the general line of the fight against smuggling and clear all organs, including ours, from secret and overt smugglers.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU: BERRY

CA FSB. F. 2. Op. 4. D. 143. L. 145-147. Copy. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 130

NOTE TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

N.V. KRYLENKO, V.R. MENZHINSKY AND M.I. FRUMKINA ON  
STRENGTHENING ANTI-SMuggling

March 1926

Secret

In order to strengthen the fight against smuggling, we consider it expedient, without carrying out any special resolutions in the Soviet order that change the current Regulations on the OGPU and the limits of the powers already granted to it, to recognize as necessary:

a) temporarily, for a period not exceeding 6 months, to propose, in a party order, to the Prosecutor's Offices of the Union Republics not to require judicial review of cases of persons suspected and convicted of smuggling goods, facilitating such transportation, buying smuggled goods and false branding of such goods with customs marks . To apply more strictly to such persons the rights granted to the Special Conference under the OGPU to expel them, exile and imprisonment in a camp for up to 3 years (p. b. Art. 4 of the Regulations).

b) in relation to persons convicted of armed smuggling, accompanied by violence against members of the border guard, apply the relevant paragraphs of the Regulations on the OGPU, which give him the right to extrajudicial reprisals up to and including execution, as in relation to bandits, each once from a special resolution of the CEC.

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c) oblige the OGPU and the Prosecutor's Office of the Union with p.zh. Art. 10 of the Regulations, after a 6-month period, submit an accurate report on the results achieved to clarify the question of the advisability of further carrying out the same measure;



d) when carrying out this measure, the Prosecutor's Office retains all the rights of supervision that it has under the Regulations.

With communist greetings: Krylenko

Menzhinsky

Frumkin

CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 4. D. 143. L. 275. Copy. Typescript.

No. 131

CONCLUSION P.A. KRASIKOVA TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION OF THE  
POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ANTI-SMUGGLING (47)

March 1926

Secret on  
No. 1209/s

CONCLUSION

I. Having become acquainted with the material sent by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which is contained in a memorandum to the Politburo, comrade vol. DZERZHINSKY and FRUMKIN and an extract from the decision of the Central Commission for Combating Smuggling under the People's Commissariat of Trade on the issue of granting the OGPU the right to extrajudicial consideration of cases in relation to the most malicious and dangerous types of smuggling.

I. With an opinion on the same issue signed by KURSKIY, DZERZHINSKY and  
FRUMKIN, I BELIEVE:

a - to consider it right to strengthen the fight against smuggling and transfer this fight to the organs of the OGPU.

b - to determine the term for the transfer of powers to the OGPU at about six months.

c - to oblige, after 6 months, the OGPU and the Prosecutor's Office of the Union to provide a report on the results achieved in order to clarify the question of the expediency of further carrying out the same measure.

d - the preservation of the Prosecutor's Office of all the rights of supervision, which it has under the Regulations.

But at the same time, I consider it necessary to point out the differences on this issue:

a - in the list of cases, the consideration of which is supposed to be transferred to the OGPU, "buyers of contraband" are indicated, paragraph -b- it would be more correct to say those involved in the systematic purchase of contraband for the purpose of "trade".

b - to recognize as a general rule the case of smuggling subject to consideration not only in the order of the Special Conference, i.e. the right to determine punishment for up to 3 years, but also higher than this, for which it is recognized as acceptable in

In exceptional cases, consideration of cases of smuggling in the Collegium of the OGPU, subject to the consent of the Prosecutor under the OGPU, and in case of disagreement, the issue of sending cases to be referred to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for permission.

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Granting this right is necessary not only because there may be cases of armed resistance against border guards, which, of course, can be equated with banditry, because, as practice shows, there are cases of cash smuggling organizations that have branches on the territory of one Federal Republic and even acting on the territory of several republics - for example, the ANENKOV case - and, apparently, it happens when applying measures of social protection to persons heading a certain organization, to choose a greater measure than to the elements, from the actions of which the state suffered less damage. If the scheme I propose is not adopted, then it will be more difficult to vary in determining the measure of social protection.

In the resolution on this issue, it could be indicated that execution can be used in the presence of armed resistance, and in all other cases, when considered by the Collegium of the OGPU, imprisonment for a period of 10 years is used as the maximum measure.

c — I do not see any grounds for the present resolution to be adopted exclusively in the party order and not formalized in the Soviet order. For the sake of uniformity, it is necessary that this resolution be formalized in the Soviet order, in order thereby to achieve the concentration of the consideration of smuggling cases in Moscow, and not in individual Soviet Republics. Otherwise, it is impossible for the Prosecutor's Office to "submit an accurate report on the results achieved in order to clarify the question of the expediency of further carrying out the same measure" and which report is quite rightly considered necessary, etc. KURSKIY, DZERZHINSKY and FRUMKIN.

PROSECUTOR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF  
THE UNION OF THE SSR KRASIKOV

CA FSB. F. 2. Op. 4. D. 143. L. 275, 276-276v. Copy. Typescript.

No. 132

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
STRENGTHENING THE WORK OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE

April 14, 1926

No. 3387/s

Sov. secret

Based on the materials at our disposal, it is beyond doubt established that the Polish and limitrophe headquarters, on instructions from the British, began to carry out extensive sabotage work against our Union and significantly expanded their reconnaissance network on our territory.

Due to the fact that the enemy for planting reconnaissance and sabotage

group uses its past connections, as well as its residencies currently operating on our territory, mainly safe houses, through which passive and active intelligence is planted (which the Estonian process in Leningrad revealed with sufficient obviousness), and also in view of the fact that such agents of the enemy are planted through defectors, our Plenipotentiary Representations in the field have been ordered:

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1) to carry out operations with the tasks of destroying enemy intelligence ties, both existing at the present time and those that existed before, which can be used for sabotage work by the enemy, for which purpose to expel all persons whose apartments were visited by spies;

2) expel defectors and the entire suspicious element from the areas where the most important enterprises, warehouses and structures are located, the destruction of which would weaken the defense capability of the Union.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58.D. 240. L. 80. Original. Typescript.

No. 133

NOTE F.E. Dzerzhinsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
PREPARATION OF POLAND FOR WAR WITH THE USSR

July 11, 1926

A whole series of data speaks with undeniable (for me) clarity that Poland is preparing for a military attack on us with the aim of separating Belorussia and Ukraine from the USSR. This is precisely the whole work of Piłsudski, who almost does not deal with the internal affairs of Poland, but exclusively with military and diplomatic ones in order to organize forces against us. In the near future, Romania should receive huge masses of weapons from Italy, including submarines. At the same time, the activity of all the White Guards in the limitrophes and against the Caucasus was revived. Things are not going well for us with Persia and with Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in our country, in wide circles, the mood is very complacent, and it is necessary to give instructions to the Revolutionary Military Council, and also to check the state of the Red Army: its mood, supplies and our mobilization and evacuation readiness.

Piłsudski treats our territorial divisions with complete disdain and counts on our party disintegration in connection with our fight at the Fourteenth Congress. I am afraid that such a view of him may push him to come out earlier than we suggest (in the Revolutionary Military Council they said the year 1927).

This issue needs to be addressed. I think that it is necessary to give the task to

my urgent need to discuss this issue in Comrade Rykov's commission (defence commission).

RGASPI. F. 76. Op. 3. D. 364. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

No. 134

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE BLACK SEA FLEET"

June 14, 1926

No. 33, p. 5. - On the Black Sea Fleet (comrade Yagoda).

Take note of Comrade Yagoda's report on the arrests of the officers of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets.

RGASPI. F. 17! Op. 162. D. 3. L. 88. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Voroshilov.

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No. 135

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"DRAFT CIRCULAR ABOUT OGPU"

August 5, 1926

No. 45, paragraph 27 - Draft circular on the OGPU (Menzhinsky, Stalin). Approve (see Appendix No. 5).

Annex No. 5 to  
clause 27 of Ave. No. 45

Secret

CIRCULAR

TO ALL Central Committees of the National Communist Parties, Regional Committees, Regional Bureau of the Central Committee,  
Regional Committees and District Committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on 5.VIII.26)

A huge loss for the entire party as a whole, Comrade. Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky is especially hard on the organs of the OGPU.

The loss of the organizer and leader of the Cheka-OGPU coincides with a moment when, due to its internal and external situation in our Union, special difficulties and responsibility of the task are assigned to the OGPU.

The VChK-OGPU, the armed section of our party, now more than ever demands special attention from our entire party.

The ranks of the Chekists, rapidly thinning due to hard and extremely hard work, require replenishment. Meanwhile, cases are not uncommon when local party organizations, without the consent of even the leaders of the OGPU, transfer employees to party and Soviet work, and there is a danger that such cases will become more frequent, especially now, after the death of Comrade Dzerzhinsky.

Warning of this danger, the Central Committee considers it its duty to stress with all its might that such practices, such cases must be decisively and irrevocably put to an end.

The Central Committee considers that the local party organizations are obliged to provide the OGPU with all possible assistance in replenishing the bodies of the OGPU with appropriately seasoned and staunch party members.

The Central Committee has no doubt that the local party organizations will fulfill their duty in strengthening the ranks and authority of the OGPU organs.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 17. D. 579. L. 6, 17. Original. Typescript.

No. 136

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DAGESTAN" WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE DECISION  
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE DISARMAMENT OF DAGESTAN (48)

August 19, 1926

No. 48, p. 13 - About Dagestan (comrades Yenukidze, Korkmasov, Unshlikht, Menzhinsky).

a) Approve the decisions of the commission (see Appendix No. 1) with the following Amendments  
by Comrade Stalin: paragraph  
3 - to be deleted.

item 4 - state the trace, in a way (marking it with paragraph 3):

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"3. To recognize as the only expedient way to carry out the disarmament of Dagestan the method of political and administrative influence of party and Soviet bodies on the population, combined with the method of military force, used only in exceptional cases of special need by decision of a special commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) consisting of a member Central Committee comrade Bubnov (chairman), commander of the North Caucasian Military District Uborevich, comrade Korkmasov, comrade Samursky and Evdokimov. Recognize as absolutely necessary close political assistance from the Dagestan government and party organizations of the Dagestan Republic, on the basis of a plan developed by the command of the North Caucasus Military District and an authorized representative of the OGPU.

In paragraph 5, delete the beginning before the words: "deem it necessary ..."

Delete the note to paragraph 7.

P.p. 11 and 12 are excluded.

Add trace. Clause 10: "To allow compensation for weapons confiscated from the poor in the amount of 5 rubles. for each rifled rifle, taking into account that the compensation falls into the hands of the real poor.

b) Instruct Comrade Bubnov's commission to consider all additional proposals that do not contradict the resolution approved by the Politburo.

c) Offer the commission to leave for Dagestan as soon as possible.

APPENDIX ^ ÿ I kp.

13 Ave. No. 48

ON THE DISARMAMENT OF DAGESTAN (Approved

by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 19, 26)

1. - To recognize as necessary the disarmament of the population of the Dagrespublika and for this purpose to withdraw from it all rifled weapons (such as: rifles, carbines, fittings, revolvers, both automatic and non-automatic, machine guns and guns).

2. - Consider it possible to leave weapons in the hands of the Red partisans according to a special list approved by the OGPU.

3. - To recognize as the only expedient way to carry out the disarmament of Dagestan, the method of political and administrative influence of party and Soviet bodies on the population, combined with the method of military force, used only in exceptional cases of special need by decision of a special commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as a member of the Central Committee comrade. Bubnov (chairman), commander of the North Caucasian Military District Uborevich, comrade Korkmasov, vol. Samursky and Evdokimov. Recognize as absolutely necessary close political cooperation on the part of the Dagestan government and party organizations of the Dagestan Republic on the basis of a plan developed by the command of the North Caucasus Military District and an authorized representative of the OGPU.

4. - Recognize it as necessary to start operations for the disarmament of Dagestan from September 1 of this year.

5. - Disarmament should be carried out formally on behalf of the Dagestan government, about which a special order should be issued jointly by Dag. CEC and the military command of the North Caucasus Military District.

6. - In order to coordinate the activities of the command and the OGPU with the Dagestan government on all issues of a political and all-Soviet order, create a commission consisting of comrades. Uborevich, Evdokimov, Volodin, Dolgat

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and Samursky (or instead of the last comrade by appointment, Comrade Kork Masov).

7. - For the duration of the disarmament operation, create a troika for extrajudicial reprisals against bandits as part of com. Evdokimov, Kaul and Mamed-Bekov.

8. - Recognize it necessary to immediately issue a subsidy to the military command and the OGPU for the disarmament operation in the amount of 356,000 rubles (of which the military department - 256,000 rubles and the OGPU - 100,000 rubles).

9. - Simultaneously, in parallel with the disarmament operation, to propose to the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Dagestan to develop a number of practical measures of an economic and political nature in relation to the Dagestan Republic for their implementation after disarmament.

10. —To allow compensation for weapons confiscated from the poor in the amount of 5 rubles. for each rifled rifle, provided that the compensation falls into the hands of the real poor.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 3. L. 104-106. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yenukidze, Bubnov, Korkmasov, Menzhinsky, Unshlikht - all; Kuznetsov - p. "a" with app. item 8".

No. 137

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE ESTIMATE OF THE OGPU"

August 26, 1926

No. 49, p. 12 - On the estimate of the OGPU (PB dated 5.VIII.26, project No. 45, p. 30) (comrades Menzhinsky, Janson, Kuznetsov).

a) Reduce the estimate of the OGPU approved by the Commission by 314 thousand rubles, allowing the OGPU to regroup according to individual articles within the approved estimate.

b) Instruct the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee to consider the issue of releasing the organs of the OGPU from paying rent for the offices they occupy\*.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 3. L. 108. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhinsky, Kuznetsov, Miroshnikov - all; Yenukidze - b.

No. 138

MEMORIAL V.R. MENZHINSKY AND N.V.  
Krylenko I.V. STALIN

ON THE LIMITS OF COMPETENCE OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION

Owls. secret 18  
September 1926

N° 17k

Dear comrade.

From the experience of the work of the Political Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the consideration of court cases of a socio-political nature, it became clear that it was necessary to accurately determine the limit of the competence of the commission. The need for such a provision is justified, on the one hand,

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the fact that from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) very often not only cases directly subject to consideration, i.e. cases of social and political significance, but in general any requests, requests and proposals of local party organizations in one case or another, including cases in which sentences have already been passed - a petition for the application of capital punishment this or that person, etc. On the other hand, the practice of the Political Commission under the Central Committee of Ukraine, the protocols of which are at our disposal, shows that the Political Commission of Ukraine has extended its powers to almost all cases, and not only resolves the question of how this or that case should be heard, show trial or not, but also the question of what measures of repression should be applied to individual accused, in other words, this commission actually appropriated the functions that until now belonged only to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

The excuse of the Commission of Ukraine that it submits its decisions for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks cannot be considered serious, because, of course, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is not in a position to verify the correctness of decisions in all that mass of cases. , which are considered in Ukraine; The commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks receives information about these cases only when it receives them from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

All together compels the Political Commission to ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to approve the following as guiding norms for the activities of the Political Commission: provisions:

- 1) The Political Commission consists of 3 comrades by appointment of the Politburo of the Central Committee and extends its activities to the entire territory of the Union, without exception;
- 2) Local Soviet and Party organizations must send indictments to the Political Commission in all those cases to which local Party organizations attach social and political significance or consider it necessary to hear in show trials (including cases not only for political crimes, and according to others: the case of GENELIN, etc.);
- 3) The Political Commission reports to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on all those cases that it considers to be of social and political importance in order to receive the appropriate directives and transfer them to the local judicial bodies;
- 4) The Political Commission is likewise entrusted with the obligation to give opinions on all those inquiries and individual cases on which local party organizations apply to the Central Committee of the AUCP(b). The Commission sends these conclusions directly to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, from



on which their staging, if necessary, to the Politburo depends;

5) Political commissions under the national Central Committees of the Party, if any are organized (Ukrainian and others), have the same prerogatives as the Political Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, with the only difference that all the protocols of their resolutions and decisions are sent for approval directly to the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;

6) No direct directives are given to Party organizations and Courts on the merits of cases considered by the Political Commission.

With comradely greetings: Menzhinsky

Krylenko

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 44-44v, 45. Original. Typescript.

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No. 139

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE COMMISSION ON POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS"

September 23, 1926

No. 55, p. 9 - Questions of the commission on political affairs (comrade Krylenko).

b) Approve the proposed t.t. Krylenko and Menzhinsky draft regulations on the commission of the Central Committee for political affairs (see appendix) with the following amendments:

In paragraph 2, the words in brackets are deleted; p.p. 4 and 5 are excluded.

At the end of paragraph 2, add: "Local party committees cannot give any directives to the judicial and investigative bodies on the cases indicated in this paragraph, before their preliminary consideration by the Politburo of the Central Committee."

Annex to  
paragraph 9 prot. No. 55

#### POSITION

On the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on political, (judicial) cases  
(APPROVED by the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 23, 26)

1) The Commission of the Central Committee for Political Affairs consists of three comrades by appointment of the Politburo of the Central Committee and extends its activities to the entire territory of the Union, without exception;

2) Local Soviet and Party organizations must send indictments to the Commission of the Central Committee for Political Affairs on all those cases to which local Party organizations attach social and political significance or consider it necessary to listen in the order of show trials. Local party committees may not issue any directives to the judicial and investigative bodies on the cases indicated in this paragraph, until they have been previously considered by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee;

3) The Commission of the Central Committee for Political Affairs reports to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on all those cases that it considers to be of social and political significance in order to receive appropriate directives and transfer them to the local judicial authorities;

4) No direct directives are given to party organizations and courts on the merits of the cases considered by the Political Commission (where they exist).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 3. L. 120-122. Script. Typescript.

Partially published: Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s: Sat. documents. Comp. O.V. Khlevnkzh, A.V. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L.A. Horny. M.: AIRO XX, 1995. S. 58.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Krylen to, Menzhinsky, Kursky, Janson - all; all provincial committees, regional committees, district committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties - "b"; Chudov - "a \* - in cipher."

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No. 140

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE BURYAT-MONGOLIAN REPUBLIC" (49)

October 7, 1926

No. 58, p. 9 - On the Buryat-Mongolian Republic (comrades Menzhinsky, Voroshilov).

To accept Comrade Menzhinsky's proposal to grant the OGPU organs the rights to combat banditry in the Buryat-Mongolian Republic without declaring a state of exception and publishing in newspapers.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to: comrade Kalinin; comrade Menzhinsky; comrade Voroshilov; comrade Syrtsov - in cipher; Buryat-Mongolian Regional Committee - in code.

No. 141

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE DRAFT NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION PREPARED BY THE  
OGPU

December 16, 1926

No. 73, item 30. - Question of the OGPU (comrade Yagoda).

30. - To accept, with amendment, the draft publication proposed by the OGPU (see appendix).

APPENDIX No. 1

Draft publication  
(approved by PB on 7.XII.26)

FROM UNITED STATE POLITICAL OFFICE

In recent months, cases of armed robberies of shops, cooperative and other organizations have become more frequent in Moscow.

By the measures taken, 9 robbery gangs were detained, who committed 47 armed robberies of shops. The inspirers and leaders of these gangs turned out to be recidivists who had been repeatedly convicted of robbery and theft.

On December 8, 1926, the Collegium of the OGPU, on the basis of § 10 of the Regulations on the O.G.P.U, approved by the Central Committee of the USSR on November 15, 1923, having considered the cases of the detainees, DECIDED:

- 1) ARAPOVA Fedor Semenovich, nickname "Arapka",
- 2) ERSHOV Anatoly Maksimovich - Semenovich, nickname "Psych",
- 3) LUKYANCHIKOV Ivan Yakovlevich, nickname "Paxon",
- 4) LYULYAEV Dmitry Georgievich, aka GRUZINOV, nickname "Red",
- 5) RYBCHEVSKY Igor Leonidovich,
- 6) SYROV Alexander Konstantinovich, nickname "Cheese",
- 7) KUZNETSOV Pavel Gavrilovich,
- 8) MORINA Alexei Fedorovich,

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- 9) KUDRYAVTSEV Petr Fedorovich,
- 10) SHCHELETAEV Mikhail Ivanovich, nickname "Begemot",

11) KATYSHEV Pavel Alexandrovich, nickname "Count Cut",

12) FAMILY Alexander Egorovich,

13) KHARLAMOV Ivan Ivanovich,

14) KARASEVA Grigory Nikolaevich

subject to the highest measure of social protection - SHOOTING. The rest of the participants are imprisoned in a concentration camp for different periods. The sentence has been carried out.

"\_ " December 1926

Moscow

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 30-31. Script. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 7.X1.26.

ÿ\* There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to Comrade Yagoda."

No. 142

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE STATEMENT OF I.V. STALIN (50)

January 13, 1927

No. 78, p. 3 - Statement of Comrade Stalin.

Submit at the next meeting of the Politburo a report of the OGPU on the measures it is taking to combat explosions, fires, etc., organized by malefactors at economic enterprises.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 42. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to Comrade Menzhinsky."

No. 143

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT MUSAVATISTS"

February 17, 1927

No. 87, p. 45 - On the Musavatists (PB from Z.P. 27, project No. 83, p. 1) (comrades Menzhinsky, Ordzhonikidze).

Approve the proposals of the Politburo commission on the case of the military conspiracy in Baku:

a) Subject to execution the persons directly involved in espionage, and members of the CPSU (b), participants in the conspiracy: Gaanov, D.A.G.O., Akhundov,

D.M.O., Seid Rzayeva, M.B.M., and Ibragimova, M.A.O.

b) Subject the remaining thirty people to various punishments of 10 years or less extrajudicially through the OGPU (51).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 65. Original. Typescript.

\*\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 17, 1927.

There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: Comrade Menzhinsky; comrade Orakhelashvili; Baku - Central Committee of the AKP - to Mirzoyan - in code.

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No. 144

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON PROTECTION OF MILITARY INDUSTRY PLANTS

March 3, 1927

No. 89, p. 3 - Report of the OGPU (PB of 3.11.27, project No. 83, p. 21) (comrade Menzhinsky).

3. - In view of the lack of protection of the most important factories of the military industry, as well as the largest factories that are of direct or indirect importance for the defense of the country, create a commission consisting of comrade t. Menzhinsky (with the replacement of comrade Yagoda), Kuibyshev (with the right to replace) and Rudzutak (with the right to replace), instructing the commission to find out the state of affairs with the protection of these plants from the possibility of their explosions, arson, etc., and also to investigate the reasons that impede the normal operation of the factories, and submit to the Politburo a draft of practical measures to improve the security of the factories. Convening a commission for comrade Menzhinsky.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 70. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhin skomu; comrade Kuibyshev; comrade Rudzutaku.

No. 145

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON MEASURES TO COMBAT DIVERSIONS

March 31, 1927

No. 93, p. 3 - Question of the OGPU (PB dated 24.III.27, project No. 92, p. 27). (t. Yagoda).

a) Approve the proposals of the meeting of the collegium of the OGPU together with plenipotentiaries and heads of departments on measures to combat sabotage

this, fires, explosions, accidents and other harmful acts (see appendix) with the following amendments: In paragraph 1 of section 1, exclude the representative of the Central Control Commission from the commission and insert: "under the chairmanship of the representative of the OGPU."

Item 4 of section 1 and item 5 of section 3 - to be deleted.

b) Approve the following composition of the central commission under the OGPU:

from the OGPU - comrade Menzhinsky (with the replacement of comrade Yagoda) - chairman of the commission,  
from the Military Veterinary Department - comrade Unshlikht. VSNKh - comrade Mantsev. NKPS - Comrade Rudy.

All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions - Comrade Belenky.

c) To entrust the Secretariat of the Central Committee with drawing up a circular to the party organizations in accordance with clause 2 of section 1.

Annex to clause  
No. pr. PB No. 93

## ON MEASURES TO COMBAT DIVERSE, FIRES, EXPLOSIONS, ACCIDENTS AND OTHER HARMFUL ACTS

(As amended by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 31, 1927)

### SECTION 1st

1) To carry out measures to combat fires, explosions, accidents and other harmful acts, which are both the result of sabotage and negligence of the administration of enterprises, as well as for constant monitoring

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control over the state of protection of fire-fighting equipment and safety installations in warehouses, factories and enterprises of state importance, create a permanent Commission at the OGPU in the center: from representatives of the Military Veterinary Department, OGPU, Supreme Council of National Economy, NKPS and VTsSPS under the chairmanship of a representative of the OGPU - and on places at PP OGPU similar commissions.

2) To ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, through a special circular on party organizations and a campaign in the press, to explain to the workers about the danger threatening the cause of socialist construction from fires, explosions and damage to machine installations, both as a result of sabotage by foreign states and negligent attitude the workers themselves and the administration to the cause of protecting the enterprise, to oblige the workers themselves to monitor the safety of the enterprise.

3) Introduce at all enterprises of state significance the personal responsibility of the director for taking measures to protect the enterprise and its individual parts, obliging to have responsible persons in certain parts of the enterprise (workshops, etc.).

4) To consider it necessary to abolish civilian guards at enterprises of national importance, for which it is proposed that the OGPU, together with the Supreme Council of National Economy, once again revise the list of factories and enterprises, singling out those of national importance from the total number, in order to establish military or paramilitary guards on them, quantitatively and qualitatively. →

but ensuring the safety of objects.

To recognize as necessary the transfer of protection of enterprises of the military industry, strategically important points and structures on the railways, as well as especially important state structures and enterprises - to the troops of the Military Veterinary Department or the troops of the OGPU, with the content of the aforementioned protection by government decrees, according to the estimates of the relevant departments.

The form and procedure for the protection of objects of state importance shall be established by the OGPU together with the Supreme Council of National Economy, the Military Veterinary Administration and the People's Commissariat of Civil Aviation within two weeks.

5) To oblige the OGPU to check the security of factories and the most important state structures.

6) To carry out in the Soviet manner a decree on the eviction from the territory of enterprises of state importance and fire-air depots of the Military Department of all unauthorized persons living in the indicated territory.

7) Oblige the War Department to expedite the completion of work on putting the fire depots in order.

8) All measures related to this directive through the trade union should be formalized with a circular of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

## SECTION 2nd

1) Strengthen repressions for negligence, for failure to take security measures and fire-fighting equipment, bringing the perpetrators to justice both through the OGPU and the party.

2) Equate the negligence of both officials and all other persons, as a result of whose negligence there were destruction, explosions and fires, etc. state industry, state crimes

niyam.

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3) Grant the right to the OGPU to consider extrajudicially up to the application of VMN and with the publication in the press of cases of sabotage, fires, explosions, damage to machine installations, as well as cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 (section 2).

## SECTION 3rd

1) Prohibit the admission of defectors to the factories of the military industry, military depots, railways. transport and the most important enterprises of state importance, according to a special list of the latter (clause 5, section 1).

2) Establish a restricted zone for defectors with the inclusion of Ukraine, Western Military District, LVO (with the exception of the northern provinces), Moscow Military District, SKK, Transcaucasia, railway lines and industrial centers in other regions.

Exemption from this is allowed only with the permission of the OGPU.

3) Close the border for defectors and accept them only in exceptional cases through the organs of the OGPU.

4) Instruct the NKPS within 6 months to complete the cleaning of the border railways, Belarus, Ukraine and the LVO from an unreliable element, according to the lists approved by the Special Railway Commissions (DOK, CSC).

5) Comrade's order. Dzerzhinsky on the Supreme Council of National Economy No. 41 of April 4 to confirm and extend to all enterprises of state importance of other People's Commissariats (52).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4.L. 89, 94-96. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Yagoda - everything; t.t. Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Sulimov, Gorbunov, Yenukidze - a, b; comrade Kosiora - in

with paragraph 2 of section 1 and paragraph 1 of section I of the appendix.

No. 146

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF A COMMISSION TO  
DEVELOP MEASURES TO ENSURE SECRET  
IN USE OF SECRET MATERIALS (53)

April 7, 1927

No. 94, p. 1. Declaration of Comrade Stalin (comrade Stalin).

1. - Create a commission consisting of t.t. Kubiak, Pyatnitsky, Yagoda, Tsvetkova, Unshlikht, Litvinov and Karakhan, to work out, on the basis of an exchange of opinions in the Politburo, the most radical measures to ensure maximum secrecy in communications and in the use of secret materials. Convocation of the Commission for Comrade. Kubiak.

Deadline - by Monday, 11.12.27.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 97. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kubyaku, Pyatnitsky, Yagoda, Tsvetkova, Unshlikht, Litvinov, Karakhan.

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No. 147



DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION

FOR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE STATE OF MATTERS

IN THE UPPER-URAL Isolator

April 21, 1927

No. 96, p. 19 - Question of comrade. Berries.

To get acquainted with the state of affairs in the Verkhne-Uralsky isolation ward, appoint a commission consisting of: t.t. Shkiryatov, Krasikov, Deribas. Commission to oblige to go to the place.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 106-107. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 19. IV. 1927

\*\*

There is a typewritten note in the text: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Shkiryatov; Comrade Krasikov; Comrade Deribas; Comrade Yagoda.

No. 148

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT SECRET MATERIALS"

May 5, 1927

No. 100, p. 5 - On secret materials (PB dated 21.IV.27, project No. 96, p. 1) (vol. Kubiak, Litvinov, Pyatnitsky, Yagoda, Unshlikht, Karakhan).

a) Approve the draft resolution submitted by the commission on the issue of the use of classified materials (see Appendix No. 1):

From the appendix p. 7-D

"To oblige the ECCI, the OGPU and the Intelligence Agency, for the purpose of secrecy, to take measures to ensure that the comrades sent by these bodies abroad through the NKID and the NKTorg do not stand out in their official work from the general mass of employees of embassy and trade missions.

At the same time, to oblige the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to provide appropriate conditions of secrecy for the fulfillment of the special instructions entrusted to these comrades from the above-mentioned organizations.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 4. L. 123. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Litvinov; comrade Pyatnitsky; Comrade Yagoda; comrade Berzin.

No. 149

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON CHINA"

May 12, 1927

No. 101, p. 6 - About China (comrades Voroshilov, Karakhan).

- a) Accept the proposal of the Chinese Commission on the early dispatch of Chinese commanders to their destination.
- b) Permit the existing joint-stock company to conclude a verbal agreement with a delegation from China regarding the sale of military property to the national government. If the delegation considers it necessary to return to China, assist it in this.

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- c) Submit the question of a radio station for Hankow for resolution in the Soviet order, by agreement of Comrades. Voroshilov and Rykov.
- d) To instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Kosior, Yagoda, Litvinov and Berzin to review all instructions of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the ECCI, the RVSR and the OGPU on the procedure for storing archives, mailing and storing ciphers and other secret materials sent abroad, in the direction of maximum security. The term of the commission is two weeks.

Convocation for Comrade Kosior.

- e) Oblige t.t. Litvinov and Karakhan, within two days, submit to the Politburo a draft resolution in connection with the process of arrested Soviet workers in Beijing.
- f) Postpone the question of Comrade Kozlovsky assuming the duties of consul in Shanghai. Give Comrade Linda a categorical directive that he should not interfere in politics and that he should only play the role of a transmitter.
- g) Consider it necessary to send a special person to China in order to ensure the destruction of all in any way incriminating documents and to prevent the possibility of the failure of the rest. Oblige the OGPU to allocate a responsible worker for this purpose, coordinating his candidacy with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
- h) To instruct the OGPU and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to send special instructions to China with the specified worker to all comrades working in China, on the basis of this decision of the Politburo.
- i) Instruct Comrade Karakhan to draw up a draft letter with the necessary political instructions to workers in China and submit it to the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
- j) Send a cipher telegram through the OGPU on the adoption of urgent measures to maintain secrecy in work and destroy compromising documents.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 1-2. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Voroshi - lov - everything; Comrade Karakhan - everything; comrade Kosior - g; comrade Yagoda - g, f, s, k.

No. 150

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT POLITCONTROL" (54)

May 12, 1927

No. 101, p. 8 - On political control (PB of 5.U.27, project No. 100, p. 16) (comrades Litvinov, Yagoda).

a) Consider it necessary to radically improve that part of the work of the OGPU that is connected with foreigners and abroad, making the whole work more flexible and taking into account the political consequences arising from individual measures in this area.

b) Draw the attention of the OGPU to the poor organization of the case of political control over correspondence.

c) Oblige the OGPU to take urgent measures to improve the organization of work in this area.

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d) Create a commission consisting of comm. Janson and Kosior to investigate individual incidents in the field of political control over correspondence and develop measures to punish the perpetrators.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 2-3. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Yagoda - everything; comrade Janson - "g"; comrade Kosior - "g".

No. 151

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ENGLAND"

May 13, 1927

No. 102, p. 1. About England (comrades Litvinov, Karakhan).

1. - In connection with the raid on Arcos in London, the Politburo decides for the first time to take the following measures:

1) Print in the newspapers an announcement about the raid, a note from Rosengolz, and in connection with this open a press campaign that the British conservatives

followed in the footsteps of Chang-Tso-Ling, preparing a break with the USSR and breaking the peace.

2) Consider it desirable to issue a resolution of protest and individual demonstrations, including in front of the British embassy and consulates. Print in the newspapers the demands of individual business executives, professionals and Soviet workers to stop issuing orders to England. The organization of this is to be entrusted to Comrade Mikoyan.

3) To issue a directive to T. Osinsky to use the economic conference to protest against the raid. To instruct him to use the conference lobby and the contacts of our delegation at the economic conference with the foreign press for the same.

4) The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to send a letter to the General Council justifying the need for a protest on the part of the British workers against the raid.

5) Tov. Mikoyan to find out exactly what measures of economic pressure could be taken in relation to England.

6) Sending a note of protest from Moscow to be postponed until additional data is received.

7) Instruct Comrade Bukharin to find out with the representatives of the Communist Parties who have gathered in Moscow about the possibility of special campaigns by the Communist Parties abroad in connection with the raid.

8) To oblige the plenipotentiaries to immediately destroy all secret materials that are not absolutely necessary for the current work, both of the embassy itself and representatives of all Soviet and party bodies without exception, including the OGPU, the Intelligence Agency and the Comintern. The same obligation to impose on trade representatives in respect of materials held by trade missions. Oblige them to inform Moscow of their execution within 4 days. In addition, in all embassies and trade missions to oblige to liquidate that Nastya of the conspiratorial and technical apparatus, which is not absolutely necessary for current work. Remaining to be kept on a completely accurate account and direct responsibility for their activities, as well as for the entire secrecy of work, be assigned personally to the trade representatives and plenipotentiaries according to their affiliation.

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9) Create a commission consisting of t.t. Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy and Molotov to take (with the obligatory participation of comrades Litvinov and Kara Khan) on behalf of the Politburo all those measures that would be necessary in connection with the London raid.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 7-8. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Litvinov - all; Mikoyan - p. 2, 5; Tomsy - p. 2, 4; Bukharin - 7; Yagoda, Berzina,

Pyatnitsky - 8; Kotov - 2; M. Ulyanova, Gronskey - 1.

No. 152

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON MEASURES OF CONSPIRACY"

May 28, 1927

No. 106, p. 2 - On measures of secrecy.

Accept the following suggestions:

a) Completely separate from the composition of the embassies and trade missions the representatives of the INO GPU, the Intelligence Agency, the Comintern, the Profintern, the Ministry of Defense of Ra.

b) Change the ciphers every day, check the composition of the ciphers, send a special person with unlimited rights to carry out the strictest secrecy of cipher work, meaning, first of all, bypassing such countries as France, Italy, Warsaw, Tokyo, Berlin (candidate point out specifically).

c) Check the composition of the representations of the INO GPU, Intelligence Agency, Comintern, Profintern, MOPR.

d) Strictly check the staff of embassy missions, trade missions and other representations abroad.

e) Unconditionally renounce the method of cipher correspondence by telegraph or radio on especially confidential matters. Establish a system of secret trips and mailing letters, which must be encrypted.

f) The senders of secret ciphers and letters should be required to have special nicknames, forbidding them to sign their own names.

g) Abolish the system of wide information of embassy missions through the distribution of special reports.

h) Once again check the archives of the missions from the point of view of the strictest secrecy and absolute security against failures.

i) To entrust the supervision of the execution of the above points to a special commission consisting of comrade t. Kosior, Pyatnitsky and Yagoda.

j) Create a special commission composed of com. Rykov, Sheinman and Rudzutak to put in order the financial operations of the State Bank to serve the revolutionary movement in other countries from the point of view of maximum secrecy.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 24-25. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Kosior - a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i; comrade Rykov - to \*.

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No. 153

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN V.M. MOLOTOV ON  
TOUGHENING THE PUNITIVE POLICY IN CONNECTION  
WITH THE MURDER OF P.L. VOYKOVA

June 8, 1927

Received about the murder of Voikov by a monarchist. Feel the hand of England. They want to provoke a conflict with Poland. They want to repeat Sarajevo, or at least the incident with Switzerland in connection with the murder of Vorovsky.

We require the utmost discretion. It is impossible to demand our control over the Polish court during the judicial review of the case. Poland will not agree to this. Poland must express regret and give an official assurance that it will take the strictest measures to protect the safety of our people and punish those responsible for the murder. It is necessary to give an official notice or an appeal to the population of the appropriate body or person indicating that the public opinion of the USSR considers the Conservative Party in England, which is trying to create a new Sarajevo, to be the inspirer of the murder.

All prominent monarchists who are in our prison or in a concentration camp must immediately be declared hostages. We must immediately shoot five or ten monarchists, announcing that for each assassination attempt, new groups of monarchists will be shot. It is necessary to give the OGPU a directive on general searches and arrests of monarchists and all kinds of White Guards throughout the USSR with the aim of their complete liquidation by all means.

The assassination of Voikov gives grounds for the complete destruction of the monarchist and White Guard cells in all parts of the USSR by all revolutionary measures. This is required of us by the task of strengthening our own rear.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op.11. D. 71. L. 2-3. Script. Typescript.

No. 154

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON MEASURES IN CONNECTION  
WITH THE WHITE GUARD SPEECHES"

June 8, 1927

No. 109, p. 1 - On measures in connection with the White Guard performances.

1) Issue a government report on the latest facts of White Guard actions, calling on the workers and all working people to intense vigilance and instructing the OGPU to take decisive measures against the White Guards.

2) Issue also a special appeal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on this occasion.

3) Instruct the OGPU to carry out mass searches and arrests of the White Guards.

4) After the government appeal, publish a report by the OGPU indicating in it the execution of 20 prominent White Guards guilty of crimes against Soviet power.

5) Agree that the OGPU grant the right to issue extrajudicial sentences up to and including execution by the appropriate PP (at the discretion of the OGPU) to the White Guards guilty of the crime.

6) Recognize the need to strengthen the assistance of the OGPU both by workers and by material means.

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7) Recognize the trip of comrade as necessary. Ordzhonikidze in Transcaucasia. Schedule a trip of 3 weeks.

8) Form a commission consisting of comm. Voroshilov, Menzhinsky and Yagoda to strengthen security measures both in relation to central institutions and individual leading comrades. Convocation of a commission for Comrade Voroshilov.

9) Create a commission consisting of t.t. Rykov, Bukharin and Molotov to develop additional political and economic measures in connection with the increased activity of the White Guard and the role of foreign governments in this. Instruct the commission to submit their proposals for tomorrow's meeting of the Politburo. The same commission will be entrusted with editing the government communication and the appeal of the Central Committee. Convocation of a commission for t. Ry-

kov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 35. Original. Typescript

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhin skomu — everything; comrade Voroshilov - all; comrade Rykov - everything; Comrade Molotov - everything; comrade Ordzhonikidze - 7.

No. 155

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE APPEAL OF THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE OGPU

June 9, 1927

No. 110, p. 18 - On the appeal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the OGPU (PB dated 8.VI.27, pr. No. 109, p. 1).

a) consider it fundamentally necessary to issue an appeal by the Central Committee to the Party.

b) instruct the commission, created by the Politburo on 8.VI.2019, to develop a plan of appeal.

c) postpone the question of the time of issuing the appeal until a special decision of the Politburo.

d) OGPU notice to be published tomorrow 10.VI this year. (55)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 281. L. 95. Copy. Typescript.

No. 156

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF Comrade VOROSHILOV"

June 23, 1927

No. 112, p. 6 - Questions from comrade Voroshilov (PB of 16.VI.27, project No. 111, p. 8) (comrades Voroshilov, Rudzutak, Molotov).

To instruct the Politburo to resolve these issues from the commission appointed by the Politburo on July 16, with the participation of comrades. Bukharin and Rykov.

RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION:

a) Comrade Voroshilov's proposal on I. (56) should be accepted with the utmost care, so that in a month Comrade Voroshilov would report on the specific conditions of communication.

b) On the issue of preparatory measures for the sabotage] part, to recognize the need to start preparations, instructing the commission

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these as part of t.t. Kosior (prev.), Pyatnitsky, Yagoda and Berzin, within a 2-week period, outline a plan, methods and necessary funds for work in the near future.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 47. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Voroshi - lov - everything; comrade Menzhinsky - all; comrade Kosior - "b".

No. 157

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN V.R.

MENZHINSKY ON THE TASKS OF THE OGPU

June 23, 1927

Menzhinsky.

Thanks for the message. Contact the Central Committee for instructions. My personal opinion: 1) London's agents sit deeper with us than it seems, and they will still have turnouts; 2) general arrests should be used to destroy English spy ties, to recruit new employees from among those arrested by Artuzov's department and to develop a system of volunteerism



di youth in favor of the OGPU and its bodies; 3) it would be good to give one or two show trials in a court of English espionage in order to have official material for use in England and Europe; 4) the publication of Elvengren's testimony loses its credibility due to the unknown author of the article; 5) the publication of such testimonies is of great importance if it is skillfully framed, and well-known lawyers, lawyers, professors are nominated as the authors of the relevant articles; 6) pay special attention to espionage in military science, aviation, and the navy.

When are you thinking about releasing Reilly's testimony? This case *\*should\** be handled skillfully. (57)

Hello Stalin

Note: the telegram was delayed due to a garble and a request for repetition.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 71. L. 29. Original. Typescript.

*\*—\** Underlined in pencil.

No. 158

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ACCORDING TO Comrade MENZHINSKY

June 30, 1927

No. 114, p. 1 - Information t. M.

1) Give a message in the newspapers about the liquidation of Operput and his satellites. (58)

2) Transfer the case of Turov's murder to the court with a directive on the application of capital punishment to the main perpetrators and an early (1-2 weeks) investigation of the case. Give a report in the newspapers about the arrest of criminals.

3) No further mass operations to be carried out, but to concentrate the attention of the OGPU on the speedy development of an already carried out mass operation.

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4) Instruct the OGPU within two weeks to submit a written report, if possible with accurate data regarding the results of the operation already performed.

5) Grant the OGPU the right to exile the families of the executed.

6) As an exception, allow mass operations in Georgia. The figures presented to us are considered to be greatly exaggerated. Recognize the need to limit the arrests to the most active elements and in particular to keep in mind areas with a strong influence of the Gruzmeks.

7) Make Comrade Chicherin responsible for the publication of information

on the actions of British counterintelligence in the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 55. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhin skomu — everything; comrade Krylenko - "2", comrade Chicherin - "7".

No. 159

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE LINK

A.R. GODA, E.M. Timofeeva and D.D. DONSKOY

June 30, 1927

No. 114, p. 26 - Message from comrade. Menzhinsky (PB dated 9.9.25, pr. No. 79, p. 22).

To continue the administrative exile of Gotz, Timofeev and Donskoy for a year, instructing the GPU to ease it somewhat.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 56. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Menzhinsky."

No. 160

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION S.V. KOSIORA (59)

June 30, 1927

N° 114, item 31 - The question of Comrade Kosior's commission. (PB dated May 28, 27, pr. No. 106, p. 2).

Accept the following proposal of Comrade Kosior's commission:

a) All Ukrainian and Belarusian work, which was carried out through special people who are in the embassies, should be taken outside the embassies.

b) Propose to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Central Committee of the CP(b)B to implement the present decision within a month.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 30.U1.1927.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to: comrade Klimenko; comrade Knorin; Comrade Chicherin; Comrade Yagoda; comrade Pyatnitsky.

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No. 161

NOTE N.V. KRYLENKO TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF EMERGENCY COURTS UNDER THE OGPU OF THE USSR

July 1, 1927

No. 1717

The events of recent days, in particular that cry of hypocritical indignation which called forth in all strata of the bourgeoisie the "execution of the 20" (60), right down to the correspondence that took place on this subject between Comrade Rykov and the leaders of the British Labor Party, are forced to raise the question again, how expedient it is for the Soviet government to give its class enemies a pretext for this hypocritical indignation, propaganda material for the fight against us, if it is possible to achieve the same goals of harsh and severe reprisals against the class enemies of the revolution without presenting their opponents with superfluous "arguments" against us.

I believe that with the proper organization of emergency courts, there is a complete possibility of fighting both spies and hidden counter-revolution without the help of acts of extrajudicial reprisals by the OGPU, which, with all the desire, still cannot be equated with a judicial act, and already because they lack the main the moment of any judicial act is the personal interrogation of the defendant in court and his right to personally give explanations.

The late comrade Dzerzhinsky himself once held this point of view when, in 1919, he founded the Special Extraordinary Tribunal under the Cheka to try the cases of major speculators, swindlers of the economic counter-revolution, unscrupulous suppliers of military uniforms, etc. This tribunal was abolished in 1920 in connection with the next reform of all tribunals in general. Its basic principles, however, seem to me quite possible to recover now.

In other words, I propose:

1. To deal with espionage, gangster, counter-revolutionary and major cases, which the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee deems necessary to consider in a special order, establish emergency courts under the OGPU of the Union and the GPU of the republics, consisting of 3 persons: two from the Collegium of the OGPU and one member of the provincial court.
2. Sentences of an emergency court are not subject to appeal or cassation and are carried out immediately.
3. Extraordinary courts are not bound by any procedural forms and have the right, at their own discretion, to allow or not to allow at all the interrogation or interrogation of witnesses. Each case must be completed 24 hours after it arrives at this court.
4. There is no charge or defense.
5. Supervision of emergency courts is conceivable only in the current

current form of prosecutorial supervision over extrajudicial sentences of the OGPU, i.e. in the right of the Prosecutor of the Republic, who oversees the OGPU, to suspend the verdict, after which the question of reviewing the case is transferred to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee or the Central Executive Committee, according to their affiliation. As for the publicity of the session, although the Special Tribunal under the Cheka, which was created by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, acted in public, I personally believe that the sessions of the emergency courts can be open and closed, depending on the nature of the case, at the discretion

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I think that such a form of reprisal ensures the entire necessary harshness of repression and speed of production, makes it possible to wrest from the hands of the counter-revolution the weapon that it is now using in the form of slanders against the "arbitrariness" of the working-class government.

If this project is approved in principle, I would consider it expedient to create a special commission consisting of Comrade Menzhinsky or Yagoda, me and a third person at the direction of the Political Bureau (say, Comrade Ordzhonikidze) for its detailed development.

With communist greetings Krylenko

APRF F. 3. Op. 58. D. 3. L. 113-113v. Script. Typescript.

No. 162

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"REPORT OF THE COMMISSION comrade MOLOTOV"

July 7, 1927

No. 115, p. 6 - Message from the commission of comrade Molotov (PB dated 23.VI.27, project No. 112, p. 10). (comrades Molotov, Pyatnitsky).

To accept with amendments the following proposals of the PB commission (PB protocol dated 23.VI.27, No. 112, item 10), v.t. Kosior, Molotov and Tmsky:

1. In the apparatus of the embassy (only in 5 cities - Berlin, Vienna, Stockholm, Shanghai and Wuhan) there is a specially trusted person through whom Comrade P. gives instructions and receives notifications about people and money to a special incoming to the embassy to the person. An employee of an embassy has relations with the Communist Party exclusively through this incoming person, who must not be an official in the Communist Party.

NOTES: a) No copies of cipher telegrams on this line may remain in the archives of the embassy.

b) The trustee in P / p has its own code and cipher.

c) The tasks of this employee of the embassy should be known only to the plenipotentiary, the adviser and the first secretary, and his work should be absolute

but covered up.

2. The content of telegrams and letters is transmitted to the incoming person only and exclusively orally, and after the transmission of letters and telegrams, they are immediately destroyed.

3. Trusted representatives in the embassies (the indicated 5 cities) give instructions on permission to enter the USSR.

4. During July, stop sending money through the NKID. T. R. commissions to establish during this time other ways of sending money.

5. Any connection K.I. with other embassies, of course, it ends during July and is no longer carried out.

6. Checking the personnel of foreign bodies (according to the decision of the Politburo of 28.V. of this year (pr. No. 106, paragraph 2) to entrust the commission from comrades Janson and Kubiak with a subsequent report to the Politburo within two weeks.

7. To allow the transfer of materials of the OGPU and the Intelligence Department through the NKID, however, so that the content of the mail is known to the NKID or plenipotentiaries, and in exceptional cases, the personal responsibility of the leading employees of the OGPU and the Intelligence Department themselves.

Propose to the INO GPU and Razvedupru to make maximum use of legal forms of communication (telegraph, mail). It is strictly forbidden to send literature by diplomatic mail.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 61-62. Script. Typescript.

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No. 163

NOTE A.Kh. Artuzova D.I. KURSKIY IN THE TERRORISTS  
CASE

September 9, 1927

VERY URGENT  
TOP SECRET

September 12-14 in Leningrad, the Field Session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court will hear the case of five monarchist terrorists who illegally made their way into the USSR on behalf of b. gene. Kutepova.

Comrade Menzhinsky asks for your consent to issue four terrorists -

1. Stroeve N.P.,

2. V.A. Samoilov,

3. Aderkas A.E. And

4. Solsky A.A. capital  
punishment.

As for the fifth, Alexander Borisovich Balmasov, taking into account that, on the basis of his detailed and frank testimony, it was possible to discover another terrorist group - Sharin and Solovyov (killed in a shootout) and fully solve the case of the explosion in the Business Club in Leningrad, - to replace capital punishment with 10 years of a concentration camp.

All are charged under Art. 58-8, 58-9 and 58-10 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (61).

If there are no objections on your part, then it will be possible on Saturday (10/10/27) to vote this issue by telephone in the appropriate instance, as an agreed opinion of Polit. Commissions.

At the same time, a certificate on the case of terrorists is attached.

Artuzov

#### REFERENCE

on terrorist groups

On 26.VII Stroeve, Samoilov and Aderkas, armed and with forged documents, were detained while crossing the Latvian border.

The investigation and the detainees' own confession revealed that the two mentioned from this group, i.e. Stroeve and Samoilov, earlier, on behalf of the Kutevov monarchist organization and foreign intelligence services, repeatedly crossed the Russian-Latvian border and, during the return transitions, transmitted information about the location of the Red Army units, about the state of the air and sea fleet, about the location of military bases and about the general

economic and political state of the USSR.

For the collected and transmitted information, the spies received a monetary fee from both Latrazvedka and Kutevov.

Communication with these spies abroad, through the line of the monarchists, was maintained by: General Kutevov, Colonel Aleksandrov, Markov II, Krupensky and D R - leaders of the White Guard monarchist organizations. In the line of foreign intelligence, in particular Latvian: captain of the Latvian army, he is the head of the Operational Unit of the Commander-in-Chief - Winter, Head of the 2nd Latvian border checkpoint - Akkerman and assistant. Winter - Linde. Through the French counterintelligence, the mentioned spies through the intelligence of the Latin

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Viyskaya, were directly connected with the colonel of the French army Arshan and the French military agent in Riga.

The orders from the Latvian and French counterintelligences were of a purely military nature, i.e. information was required covering the activities of OSOAVIAKhIM, MOPR, as well as on the organization, recruitment and deployment of Red Army units.

For the information received, both of the above-mentioned intelligence agencies, in addition to a monetary fee, assisted Samoilov, Stroevoi and Aderkas in crossing the border, supplying the latter with forged documents and weapons.

During the last crossing of the border of the USSR, the main task of these persons was: the organization and production within the Union of terrorist acts directed against workers of the party and government. The nature of the terrorist acts was purely individual, pursuing the goal of destroying individual prominent workers both in the Center and in the field and organizing underground military cells (five).

On August 15, 1927, in the Axser region, a terrorist group, consisting of 4 people, using false documents, accompanied by two guides living in Finland, armed, each with two revolvers, and carrying hand gr - naty and bombs, crossed the border.

As a result of the persecution, this group, having killed on August 20 of this year. comrade Vedeshkin Alexander Alexandrovich - a peasant of the village. Ivanovskaya, a forest ranger who tried to detain them, split into two parties, going in different directions.

In the village of Shuya, Petrozavodsk district, two of the above group were detained and turned out to be: the first Balmasov Alexander Borisovich - the son of a general, the captain of the Wrangel army, a Finnish citizen, known to the GPU as a spy and intelligence officer of the Finnish General Staff, who worked under the direct supervision of Major Rozenshtrem , one of the most prominent and most active participants in the White Guard monarchist organization in Helsingfors, the direct leadership of which belongs to General Kutepov - the second Solsky Alexander Alexandrovich - the grandson of the chairman of the State Council of Tsarist Russia, also from the same organization. With them were found: revolvers "Mauser", "Sauer", 2 "Nagant" with a large number of cartridges for them, 2 bombs - of enormous destructive power, 4 hand grenades and a box with primers and explosive mercury and Fickford cords.

August 26 this year A second group was caught in the Petrozavodsk region, which offered armed resistance during the arrest and was destroyed on the spot, and 3 Red Army soldiers were wounded during the shootout. This group included Sergei Vladimirovich Solovyov, the son of a colonel, a direct participant in the terrorist act on the Moika on June 6 of this year, an active member of the same monarchist organization in Helsingfors; the second is Sharin Alexander Alexandrovich, one of the most prominent members of the monarchist organization in Paris, headed by Kutepov, who recently arrived in Finland with the aim of organizing terrorist acts in the USSR, who had previously repeatedly crossed the border of the USSR on the instructions of the monarchist Center in Paris in order to conduct intelligence and monarchist work in it .

With them, revolvers of the Parabellum, Mauser, Browning and Nagant systems were found with a huge amount of cartridges for them, 4 hand grenades and bombs.

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According to the testimony of Balmasov, Solsky and according to the OGPU, the following was established: a real terrorist group consisting of 4 people - Solsky, Balmasov, Solovyov and Kizyakov (Sharin), as well as the first, consisting of Operput, Schulz Maria, Voznesensky, aka Peters, Larionova, Monomakhova and Solovieva, who prepared an attempt to blow up the building of the OGPU hostel in Moscow and threw bombs in a business club in Leningrad, were organized by the representative of the Kutepov organization in Helsingfors, the murdered terrorist Zakharchenko-Schultz Maria Vladislavovna, with the direct participation and assistance Finnish General Staff, represented by Major Rozenstrem.

The second group, according to the testimony of the same - Solsky and an agent of the Finnish secret police. Explosives, etc. necessary for the preparation of bombs received through officials of the Finnish General Staff.

The tasks of the second terrorist group, headed by Balmasov and Solovyov, were of the most diverse nature, from the explosion of Volkhovstroy to the editorial offices of newspapers of district party meetings and committees. Examination of the bombs found on the terrorists established their significant destructive power, significantly exceeding the power of an explosion of a conventional type of bombs, the same with regard to poisons.

BEGINNING OKRO SALYN

6.IX. 27 y.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 226. L. 3-7. Script. Typescript.

No. 164

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

IN THE CASE OF MONARCHIST-TERRORISTS

September 15, 1927

No. 124, paragraph 27 - The question of the commission on political affairs (comrade Menzhinsky).

Approve the decision of the commission on political affairs in the case of five terrorist monarchists.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 226. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 12.1X.27.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kursky, Menzhinsky.

No. 165

STATEMENT P.A. Krasikova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
COMMISSION ON POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS



September 30, 1927

No. 0720548

Sov. secret

Under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks there is a so-called political commission, which is entrusted with issuing directives on political cases considered in a general judicial order.

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The composition of this commission includes from the judicial department the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR comrade. KURSKIY, and in his absence - his deputy comrade. KRYLENKO.

Taking into account that 1) a significant number of cases of state crimes are considered in the Supreme Court of the USSR,

2) that under such conditions the opinion of the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court of the USSR is not heard, despite the fact that it bears the main burden of conducting the process, I \* ask you to consider the issue of replenishing the composition of the existing "political commission" by introducing me to it, as Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of the USSR\*.

PROSECUTOR OF THE SUPREME  
COURT OF THE UNION SSR Krasikov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

\*  
underlined in pencil.

No. 166

NOTE N.V. KRYLENKO TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC  
AUCP(b) ON THE COMMISSION FOR POLITICAL DEFENSES

October 5, 1927

No. 171092

Owls. secret

The Political Affairs Commission under the Politburo of the Central Committee was organized exclusively as a Party body in order to inform the Central Committee of the Party of all cases of general political importance passing through the judicial institutions. It concentrates in itself all the judicial cases of all the Union republics, regardless of in which court and in which republic the case is being heard.

Cases passing through the Supreme Court of the Union represent, in terms of number, an insignificant fraction of the percentage of all cases passing through the Political Commission, and all come to the Supreme Court after they have passed the Political Commission and the Politburo of the Central Committee, if the latter deems it necessary to give

these cases any indications, and such an order has not caused any inconvenience so far.

The inclusion in the Political Commission, as a purely party body, of a representative office of the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court of the Union, as requested by Comrade. Krasikov, is therefore redundant both on formal grounds, since the Political Commission of the Central Committee is not based on the principle of representation of institutions, and in essence, since there are no business motives for such replenishment of the Political Commission Comrade. Krasikov did not cite in his statement.

The present working composition of the Political Commission (comrades Krylenko, Menzhinsky and Shkiryatov, legally it includes Kursky, Menzhinsky and Solts) seems equally sufficient.

Based on these considerations, the Political Commission would consider the proposal of comrade. Krasikov about replenishment by him of its composition to reject.

With communist greetings

On behalf of the Political Commission N. Krylenko

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 53-53v. Script. Typescript.

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No. 167

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE OF "ENGLISH SPIES"

IN THE MILITARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR

October 21, 1927

No. 131, paragraph 13 - The question of the commission on political affairs (comrade Krylenko).

Accept the proposal of the commission on political affairs to consider the case of British spies in the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR with the application of the highest measure of social protection in relation to Prove K., Prove V. and Korepanov, and in relation to the rest - Nanov and Podrezkov - at the discretion court (62).

APRF. F. 3. Op.58. D. 240. L. 83. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 21.X.27.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Krylenko, Menzhinsky.

No. 168

ANSWER I.V. STALIN ON THE ROLE AND PLACE OF  
THE GPU IN THE SOVIET STATE DURING A  
CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN WORKING DELEGATIONS

November 5, 1927

7th question

Judicial rights of the GPU, investigation of cases without witnesses, without defenders, secret organs. Since these measures are hardly tolerated by French public opinion, it would be interesting to know their rationale. Are they going to be changed or discontinued?

Answer: The GPU or the Cheka is a punitive organ of Soviet power. This body is more or less analogous to the Committee of Public Safety created during the French Revolution. He punishes mainly spies, conspirators, terrorists, bandits, speculators, counterfeiters. It represents something like the Military-Political Tribunal, created to protect the interests of the revolution from assassination attempts by the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents.

This body was created on the day after the October Revolution, after all sorts of conspiratorial, terrorist and espionage organizations financed by Russian foreign capitalists were discovered. This body developed and gained strength after a series of terrorist acts against leaders of the Soviet government, after the assassination of Comrade Uritsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee in Leningrad (he was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after the assassination of Comrade Volodarsky, a member of the Revolutionary Committee in Leningrad (he was also killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after an attempt on the life of Lenin (he was wounded by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). It must be admitted that the GPU dealt a blow to the enemies of the revolution at that time, aptly and without fail. However, this quality has been preserved for him to this day. Since then, the GPU has been the menace of the bourgeoisie, the vigilant guardian of the revolution, the naked sword of the proletariat.

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It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeoisie of all countries harbor an animal hatred for the GPU. There are no such legends that would not be composed about the GPU. There is no slander that has not been spread about the GPU. What does it mean? This means that the GPU is correctly protecting the interests of the revolution. The sworn enemies of the revolution scold the GPU, so the GPU is acting correctly.

Workers treat the GPU differently. Walk around the workers' districts and ask the workers about the GPU. You will see that they treat him with respect. Why? Because they see him as a true defender of the revolution.

I understand the bourgeois hatred and mistrust of the GPU. I understand various bourgeois travelers who, when they come to the USSR, first check whether the GPU is still alive and whether the time has come to liquidate the GPU. All this is understandable and not surprising. But I refuse to understand some of the workers' delegates who, when they came to the USSR, asked anxiously: how many counter-revolutionaries have been punished by the GPU, will various terrorists and conspirators against proletarian power still be punished, is it not time to put an end to the existence of the GPU? Where do some workers' delegates get this concern for the enemies of the proletarian revolution? How to explain it? How to substantiate it?

They preach maximum gentleness, they advise to destroy the GPU ... But, a

is it possible to guarantee that after the destruction of the GPU, the capitalists of all countries will refuse to organize and finance counter-revolutionary groups, conspirators, terrorists, arsonists, bombers! To disarm the revolution without any guarantee that the enemies of the revolution will be disarmed—well, isn't that stupid, isn't that a crime against the working class! No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The Paris Communards were too soft on the people of Versailles, for which Marx had full justification to scold them in his time. And for their softness they paid with the fact that when Thiers entered Paris, tens of thousands of workers were shot by the Versaillese. Don't the comrades think that the Russian bourgeois and landlords are less bloodthirsty than the Versaillese people in France? We know, in any case, how they dealt with the workers when they occupied Siberia, the Ukraine, the North Caucasus in alliance with the French and British, Japanese and American interventionists.

By this I do not at all mean to say that the internal situation of the country obliges us to have punitive organs of the revolution. From the point of view of the internal state, the position of the revolution is so firm and unshakable that it would be possible to do without the GPU. But the point is that our internal enemies are not isolated individuals. The point is that they are connected by thousands of threads with the capitalists of all countries, who support them with all their strength, with all means. We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. The internal enemies of our revolution are agents of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states represent the base and rear for the internal enemies of our revolution. In fighting internal enemies, we are, therefore, waging a struggle against counter-revolutionary elements in all countries. Judge now for yourselves whether under these conditions it is possible to do without punitive organs like the GPU.

No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes of the Paris Communards. The revolution needs the GPU, and the GPU will live in our country at the expense of the enemies of the proletariat (and stormy applause).

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One of the delegates. Allow me, Comrade Stalin, to thank you on behalf of the delegates present here for explaining and dispelling the lies that are being spread abroad about the USSR. You can be sure that we will be able to tell the workers in our homeland the truth about the USSR.

Stalin. No thanks, comrades. I felt it my duty to answer questions and report to you. We Soviet workers believe that we are obliged to report to our brothers in the class on all questions on which they wish to receive an account. Our state is the brainchild of the world proletariat. The leaders of our state are only doing their duty towards the world proletariat when they report to its representatives (applause).

J. Stalin Conversation with foreign workers' delegations, M.-L.: Gosizdat, 1927, pp. 44-48.

No. 169

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT YAKUTIA"

November 24, 1927

No. 137, p. 18 - About Yakutia (comrade Kubiak).

Approve the decisions of the Politburo Commission (see Appendix).

kp application.  
18 Ave. PB ý 137

DECISIONS OF THE POLITBURO COMMISSION ON YAKUTIA of 19.XI.27

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on 21.XI.27).

- a) For the elimination of the gangs currently in Yakutia - to consider the existing armed forces of the OGPU sufficient.
- b) The operation to eliminate the Yakut gangs is entirely led by the OGPU.
- c) The OGPU should take urgent measures to eliminate the bandits.
- d) Instruct the OGPU to remove all leaders and active participants in banditry from Yakutia.
- e) To oblige the Yakut Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union to provide all possible assistance to the organs of the OGPU in the liquidation of gangs.
- f) To suggest to the leaders of the OGPU for the liquidation of gangs in Yakutia, in no case, in the place of the highest measure, as social protection, should not be enforced. In special cases - coordinate with P.P. OGPU of Siberia and D.V.K.
- g) Consider it necessary to urgently release the OGPU 250,000 rubles, which should be requested from Comrade Rykov to be carried out through the Soviet line as soon as possible.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 5. L. 128, 129. Original. Typescript.

^ The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 21.XI.27.

\* There is a typewritten notation in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent to: comrade Kubyak - yv'n T Yagoda - everyone; To comrade Gorbunov - point "g" from the appendix was sent. To Yakutobsky VKL (6) - points b, c, d, e from the appendix.

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No. 170

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REBELLION IN YAKUTIA

December 22, 1927

No. 1, p. 14 - 0 of Yakutia (PB of 21.XI.27, project No. 137, p. 18) (comrades Kubyak, Yagoda, Syrtsov, Eikhe, Barakhov, Amosov).

- a) Place all responsibility for the suppression of the uprising in Yakutia on the OGPU.
- b) Propose to the OGPU to coordinate with the Secretariat of the Central Committee the issue of persons who will be personally entrusted with this responsibility.
- c) To oblige the Regional Committee, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of Yakutia to provide all possible assistance to the OGPU in all measures to suppress the uprising.
- d) Offer the OGPU to reimburse the local authorities of the Yakut Republic for the expenses incurred by them in connection with the provision of assistance to the OGPU in suppressing the uprising.
- e) In order to clarify the causes of the uprising and develop the necessary political, economic and cultural measures to completely calm Yakutia, it is necessary to immediately send a commission to Yakutia in the following composition: vol. Poluyan (chairman), Asatkin and Puzitsky.
- f) Instruct the commission to specifically investigate the situation on the Aldan and work out measures that will fully guarantee the normal development of the economic life of the Aldan District.
- g) Oblige the OGPU to immediately remove Comrade Petrov from work and recall him from Yakutia.
- h) Comrade Kosior's proposal on the subordination of Yakutia along the party line to the Sibkraikom - to reject.
- i) Remove the report of the Yakut Republic from the agenda of the next CEC session.
- j) Include comrade Kubiak on the question of Yakutia in the composition of the commission. Vinokurov (from Yakutia).
- k) To instruct the Organizing Bureau to allocate several experienced workers for permanent work in Yakutia.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: T.t. Kubyaku, Berry - everything; Yakutobsky - a, c, d, e, e, i, k (in cipher); Poluyan and Asatkin - d; Moskvina - f, l; Molotov - l; Yenukidze - and; Vinokurov - to; Kosior - and.

No. 171

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON YAKUTIA"

January 26, 1928

No. 7, p. 21 - About Yakutia.

Failure to comply with the operational orders of the OGPU, as well as political negotiations with bandits, is a gross violation of the directives of the Central Committee by the bureau of the regional committee. For these actions, involve the bureau of the regional committee and before. Vasiliev's OKK to party responsibility through the Central Control Commission and to propose to Yakutobsky for unconditional execution the following: 1) immediately step aside from any

interference in the operational affairs of the OGPU and disband the operational troika, 2) Baikalov immediately go to the disposal of the Central Committee, 3) according to the order

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upon the arrival of Ulanov, immediately dismiss Strod for violating the operational orders of the OGPU;

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 16-17. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 21.1.28.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Yagoda; Yakutovsky (in cipher).

No. 172

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

IN THE CASE OF SHAKHTINSKY SPECIALISTS

March 1, 1928

No. 12, p. 28 - Telegram comrade. Andreev from 27.11. this year

Send Comrade Andreev the following telegram:

"We consider it necessary to consider the case of the Shakhty specialists in court, with which we will give specific instructions in the coming days."

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 328. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on November 28, 28.

No. 173

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE

March 8, 1928

No. 14, p. 12 - Proposal of T.T. Molotov and Stalin.

In the Shakhty case, organize a commission consisting of comrades. Rykov, Ordzhonikidze, Stalin, Molotov and Kuibyshev. Convocation for Comrade Rykov. The Commission is to be given the right to make a final decision on urgent issues on behalf of the Politburo with a subsequent report to the Politburo.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 36. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 2.Sh.1928.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Rykov, Menzhinsky.

No. 174

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT FOREIGNERS IN THE  
SHAKHTINSKY CASE on  
March 8, 1928

N° 14, item 18 - Proposal of T.T. Molotov and Stalin (PB dated 2.Ip.28, pr. No. 14, p. 12).

1) Arrest the implicated Germans, stating to A.E.G. that the matter concerns not him, but his individual agents, having coordinated this matter with the NKID.

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2) Do not touch the British without the consent of the commission, interrogate and release the arrested Englishman, conduct enhanced surveillance of the Vickers representation, etc. in USSR.

3) Publish the statement of the Prosecutor of the USSR on Saturday, instructing comrade. Rykov to speak about this matter at a meeting of the Moscow City Council on Friday.

4) Instruct the commission as part of t.t. Rykov, Ordzhonikidze, Tomsky, Stalin (replaced by Molotov), Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky (replaced by Yagoda) and Yanson leadership of the OGPU and the judiciary in connection with the Shakhtinsk case, the development of practical work along the lines of the party, trade union, Vesenkho, Rabkrin and Gepeus.

5) Distribute a document with an introduction from the Central Committee to all members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, the people's commissars, the chief economic workers-communists, the best elements of the communist universities.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 37-38. Script. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on March 5, 28.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Rykov, Ordzhonikidze, Tomsky, Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky, Yaneon.

No. 175

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT THE "WARNING" ORGANIZATION  
IN THE DONUGOL SYSTEM

March 12, 1928



No. 3146

The Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU SKK opened a powerful organization that has been operating in Donugol for many years. In view of the fact that the aforementioned case has gone beyond the framework of this region and further development rests on the need to conduct an investigation in Kharkov (Donugol's Administration), in Moscow (the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR) - we have given an order to concentrate the investigation on the aforementioned case in Moscow, because it follows quite clearly from the case that this organization, which has a center in Moscow, directs sabotage not only in our coal industry, but also in other countries. branches of the national economy

stva.

The essence of the matter boils down to the following: in the Donetsk-Grushevsky, Vlasovsky, Nesvetaevsky, Shcherbinovsky, Gorlovsky and, probably, other mine administrations, as well as in the Administration of Donugol and the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, this organization has for a number of years been and is engaged in systematic ] destruction of the Donugol economy.

The activities of this organization are directed from Poland (DVORZHAN CHIK, former a[ktsio] nsr DGRU) and Germany (SHKAF - former chairman of the Joint-Stock Company O[bschest]va DGRU). AUERBACH and IGNATIEV ex. a[ction] of the DDGRU, by some members of the Joint-Stock] O[society] "ROPIT" and PARAMONOV through the Moscow (VSNKh of the USSR) and Kharkov Administration of Donugol in the Center. The assignment from Germany is received both by engineers] of Donugl, who are sent abroad, and are equally transferred by specialists of German] firms coming to the USSR (MEYER, OTTO, WEGNER from "A.E.G", WESLER from "F. SEYFERT", KOSTER and BAI SHTYVER from KNAPP). The work is carried out with funds received from the

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In order to carry out the tasks set, the organization carried out a number of actions that caused enormous damage to our economy. At the Donetsk-Grushevsky, Vlasovsky, Nesvetaevsky Mining Administrations, through a number of measures, the organization acted on the workers and pushed them to act against the Soviet government, party and trade union organizations, causing unrest and strikes. To do this, during the work, all the rules on mountain safety were violated. Ventilation in the mines, generally insufficient, was deliberately destroyed. Incorrect prices, incorrect measurements of the work done, and miscalculations of workers were carried out widely, as a system. The workers' dwellings were deliberately not repaired and were gradually destroyed. Repairs and new buildings were made deliberately poorly. The treatment of workers was unacceptably rude, up to and including beatings. According to the testimonies of a number of the accused, such activity of the specialists not only aroused the discontent of the workers, but also led in many cases to strikes. A number of strikes on 22-24-26 and 27 caused intentionally.

Large sums of money are used to purchase completely unnecessary equipment abroad. Orders are arranged in such a way that orders are scheduled for completion either earlier or later than the required time, and therefore large machines arrive from abroad earlier than even temporary premises are arranged for them. The mines are promised new equipment, they do not particularly support the old, it is destroyed, the new equipment is late, and very much, and the Mining Administration finds itself in a stalemate. It is also practiced to send unnecessary mechanisms and delay the necessary, sending parts of machines at different times. All this leads to large expenses, and in the end, Donugol's capital is immobilized on a large scale.

The organization deliberately misused equipment. The work of cutters was organized in such a way that they did not give the full economic effect. Cutting machines, adapted to work on hard seams, were directed to soft coals and vice versa. In the same working conditions, machines of the most diverse systems and brands were concentrated, which required a huge amount of spare parts and a large amount of excess skilled labor, led to a decrease in production, high costs for repairs, etc. The sabotage in the boiler and electrical economy consisted mainly in giving the least effect at the maximum cost of fuel, labor and money, i.e. give as little energy as possible.

The engineers included in the organization were also engaged in direct damage to the machines. According to the testimonies of the engineers] CHERNOKNIZHNIKOV, BEREZOVSKY, BASHKIN, BABENKO, SAMOILOV, foreman GAV RISHCHENKO and others, all of them were engaged in direct damage to machines, they produced a large number of major and minor accidents. So, for example, GAVRISHCHENKO deliberately destroyed the winches, made an attempt to burn the transformer and equipment of the Vlasov substation, and so on. Engineer CHERNOKNIZHNIKOV put the turbine out of action by pumping water from the stoker. On the instructions of WERNER, a representative of the AEG company, engineer] BASHKIN damaged the lifting machine. In general, the organization has produced hundreds of accidents.

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Under the guise of rationalization, the organization deliberately carried out work that brought great harm to the economy. According to BASHKIN's testimony dated January 26-28, at the ARTEM mine, the electric locomotive haulage was arranged in such a way that it was extremely easy to have a crash. In the same place, the transportation of coal was rationalized in such a way that, apart from the battle of the rolling stock, it did not give anything. At mine number 2, V.N. a number of unnecessary works, or works of a destructive nature, were carried out, and large losses were incurred to the economy. Blockages were deliberately made by means of excessive acceleration of the ledge and poor fastening. Deliberately, instead of issuing coal to the mountain, a large amount was left underground every day. A lot of harmful work has been done by using the American "fork system" method in coal mining. This system can only be used with a stable roof and good fastening. On the letter "A" these conditions were not. Such activities of the organization gave large losses.

The organization deliberately put into operation a number of unprofitable mines (KRASNENKA, FRUNZE, TAGR and ZEMLICHKA) at the cost of

more than 600,000 rubles for their restoration, yielding a very small amount of coal (5,000,000) in terms of quality that is worthless and unmarketable, and bringing an annual loss of more than 150,000 rubles, not counting the work of mechanisms and labor that can be used on the main

mines.

Produced deliberately blockages of mines: tunneling them. KRASINA on DGRU (former POPOVKA mine), mine No. 5 on Vlasovka. She flooded the Novo-Azovskaya mine and tried to blow up the mine. VOROVSKY. The organization flooded a large number of the most powerful seams. So, for example, at the OCTOBER REVOLUTION mine, the 2nd layer, at mine No. 2 - the Eastern wing of the mine, at the mine named after. VOROVSKOY - part of the 2nd layer, at the "MIROVAYA KOMMUNA" mine - a deepening layer of the mine, etc., and pumped out (or rather, delayed it) for 5-7 years. Of these, only the layers in the mines have been pumped out: them. VOROVSKY and "OCTOBER REVOLUTION", but no work has been done on them so far, and a huge number of other similar cases.

According to the testimonies of some of those arrested, but not yet sufficiently verified, along with the transportation of large equipment from abroad, weapons will be transferred to the USSR. In the same way, according to unverified information, there are indications of the transfer of money from abroad to organize insurgent detachments in the Cossack regions.

Incentives that encouraged specialists to carry out the orders and assignments of their ex. masters were both ideological and material. Engineers and technicians who were members of the organization almost regularly received an additional monthly remuneration, usually equal to a monthly salary, and, in addition, received sums of money from 100 to 500 rubles at a time. for the execution of individual orders. Thus, engineer BEREZOVSKY, according to his personal testimony, handed over to KOLGANOV, the Chief Engineer of the DGRU, KUZMA, to the Chief Engineer, Vlasovka, and NEKRASOV, the Chief Engineer, ener] y Nesvetaya For work about 200,000 rubles. Of this money, BEREZOVSKY kept personally 20,000 rubles. Engineer BASHKIN shows that he received from GORLETSKY, BEREZOVSKY, KOLGANOV and KUZMA at different times for

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sabotage activities 16-17.000 rubles. According to unverified data, the names of specialists working in the organization were reported abroad and there, at least in the name of the main characters, significant sums were invested in the bank as a reward for counter-revolutionary activities in the USSR.

For a more complete acquaintance with this case, we are hereby forwarding you an overview of the PESTS case, compiled by the OGPU PP at the SKK.\*

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 328. L. 20-25. Script. Typescript.

\* Review is not published.

No. 176

TELEGRAM M.M. Litvinova I.V. STALIN AND G.V.  
CHICHERIN ON INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS IN  
CONNECTION WITH THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE

March 13, 1928

Berlin

TOP SECRET  
OUT OF TURN

The publication in the newspapers about the arrests of German engineers in the USSR caused general excitement here. Everywhere in public places there are talks about it. Not to mention the strong bitterness in industrial circles. I foresee grave consequences for our relations not only with Germany, but also with the American industrial world. I propose to immediately form a most authoritative commission for the most urgent consideration of the question of the guilt of the arrested Germans, with the right of the commission to interrogate both the arrested Germans themselves and the Russians who testified against them. In all actions of the commission, to guarantee the mandatory participation of a representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs during direct interrogations.

LITVINOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 328. L. 165. Original. Typescript.

No. 177

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE"

March 15, 1928

No. 15, p. 17 - On the Shakhty case (comrades Yanson, Menzhinsky).

a) In order to speed up the preparation of the Donbass case for trial, to suggest that Comrade Krylenko, in view of the assignment of the duties of the prosecutor in this case, to familiarize himself already at this stage with all the available investigative material on the entire Donbass case.

b) Instruct t.t. Menzhinsky, Yanson and Kuibyshev, within a week, get acquainted with the list of all arrested engineers in the Donbass, take measures to break them down into categories according to the degree of guilt and establish the possibility of releasing those of them for whom there is no sufficient evidence.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 40. Original. Typescript.

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DOCUMENTATION \_

No. 178

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON REGULATION OF THE COMMUNIST AND TRADE  
UNION ORGANIZATIONS OF CHINA WITH  
THE COMINTER AND THE PROFINTER

March 15, 1928

No. 15, p. 36 - Question of Comrade Pyatnitsky.

To streamline the connection between com. and trade union organizations of China and the Comintern and Profintern it is necessary:

1) Organize a branch of the CHI ECCI in Harbin outside the co-institutions. The organs of the GPU must provide all possible assistance in crossing the territory of the USSR through the borders of those who go not through official checkpoints and without established visas (63).

2) Select from the employees of the X. Consulate a faithful comrade who would send coded telegrams to Moscow and receive them. This comrade would have to be secretly connected with one of the comrades of the Harbin branch of the OMS.

Nothing should be kept at the Consulate. This worker should not receive anyone, etc. (in general, the same conditions that apply to comrades who work in certain embassies in a similar job must be met by this comrade).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 41-42. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 15.11.28.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Friday to whom, comrade Chicherin, comrade Menzhinsky.

No. 179

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON SHAKHTINSKOMUDEL

March 21, 1928

No. 1110/65/ŷ ŷ  
secret

Present: t.t. Voroshilov, Krylenko, Kosior I., Kosior S.,

Ordzhonikidze, Menzhinsky, Rykov, Stalin, Janson, Chicherin.

RESOLVED:

1. Separate the Shakhty case and expedite its submission to the court in every possible way.

2. Suggest that Comrade Krylenko, with the necessary composition of responsible officials, immediately leave for Rostov and take part in the actual compilation of the investigative material.

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3. To oblige Comrade Krylenko within a month, counting from March 21, to complete the preparation of the investigative material and the indictment.

4. Oblige comrade Menzhinsky to give a completely categorical order to the yorgans\* of the GPU in Rostov and Kharkov about the full and unconditional assistance of comrade Krylenko.

5. Instruct Comrade Janson's Commission to consider I. Kosior's proposal.

6. To oblige the GPU to submit an exact list of persons arrested in the 3rd Tinsky case and the places of their detention. The release of those arrested in the Shakht[insk] case is carried out only with the knowledge of the Commission.

7. Put the Shakhty case in the Supreme Court of the USSR. The place of court is Moscow.

8. According to the agreement with the German] government, in the event of the insistence of the Germans, to allow a meeting with the arrested] Germans.

Instruct the NKID to make a notification about the arrested Germans.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 328. L. 195. Original. Typescript.

\*—\* Handwritten above the line.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Krylenko: 1, 2, 3, 4, vol. Menzhinsky: \*\*1, 4, 6, 7, 8\*\*, vol. Chicherin: 8, vol. Krasikov: 7."

\*\*—\*\* Crossed out.

No. 180

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN AND A.I. RYKOV ON THE  
RELEASE OF ARRESTED ENGINEERS

March 24, 1928

No. 122501

Owls. secret  
PERSONAL

According to the decision of the Commission on the Shakhty case, as part of Comrade T.T. YANSON, MENZHINSKY and KUIBYSHEV, which took place on March 23 of this year, the accused engineers are to be released: SVETLICHNY, CHERNENKO and MITROFANOV, necessary for comrade. LOMOVA.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 328. L. 199. Original. Typescript.

No. 181

NOTE I.V. STALIN TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO  
ON THE ARREST OF SPECIALISTS IN THE NKPS

March 1928

Menzhinsky says that he will not arrest any of the specialists in the NKPS until Rudzutak arrives.

I suggest sending Rudzugak a telegram to stay on vacation. APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 127. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains handwritten notes on the voting results: "Stalin, M. Kalinin, V. Kuibyshev, M. Tomsy, A.I. Rykov, Molotov, S. Ordzhonikidze, A. Mikoyan.

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No. 182

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE"

April 11, 1928

No. 2538/s

On the Shakhty case (comrade Krylenko).

Accept the proposal of Comrade Krylenko, agreed with Comrade Yagoda (see appendix), so that the indictment be published no later than 5 August of this year. and that no further delays be allowed in the process.

MOST SECRET

No. 2538/s

Application

to the minutes of the meeting of the commission of the PB on the Shakhty case

dated 11.IV.28

I suggest:

1) In view of the direct connection of the Donugol case (Kharkov) with the Shakhty case, which in relation to the Donugl case is only an episode,

in view of the fact that the connection with the Polish mission and the former shareholders is clearly and concretely established only in the Donugl case, while in the Shakhty case only the existence of this connection is established without a precise establishment of who, when and where had this connection,

in view, finally, of the fact that only in the case of Donugl it is possible to establish facts compromising Moscow (Rabinovich and others), in order to change the previous decision to combine both cases into one process, limiting itself to involving the top of Donugol and the Shcherbinovsky Mining Administration in the case.

2) In connection with the previous decision: to postpone the setting of the process for two weeks, i.e. until May 15, counting 10 days necessary for the accused to familiarize themselves with the case after serving them with the indictment on May 5, instead of April 21, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo.

3) In connection with this, propose that the OGPU send the arrested persons and materials on Donugol to Moscow by April 20.

4) In connection with the conclusion of the investigation in the Shakhty case, to allow the Prosecutor's Office to release those arrested, whose cases will be sent to court, sending the cases of individuals, in agreement with the OGPU, for further investigation, for deportation, etc. out of court.

5) Discuss the question of the expediency of involving in the case two more German engineers - Wagner and Seebold, in respect of which there are Instructions on wrecking work. Personally, I would think, despite the presence of direct instructions about this work from the accused Bashkin and others, not to involve them, so as not to complicate the process, limiting themselves to expulsion from the USSR.

G. YAGODA N. KRYLENKO

APRF. f. h. Op. 58. D. 329. L. 10-12. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Rykov, Krylenko, Menzhinsky.

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No. 183

NOTE L.M. Kaganovich I.V. STALIN

ABOUT THE INVESTIGATION ON THE "ECONOMIC  
COUNTER-REVOLUTION" IN THE DONBASS

April 26, 1928

DEAR comrade. STALIN!

The investigation of the \*GPU\* on the economic counter-revolution in the Donbass is over. The investigation was deployed quite deeply \*and successfully\*. The materials and results of the GPU of Ukraine are so interesting that I consider it necessary to



send you a copy of \*Balitsky's notes\* for review. These investigations have shown that the counter-revolution has gone beyond the framework of the Shakhty case and goes far beyond the limits of Donugol, that the counter-revolutionary organization has embraced a number of the largest trusts in Ukraine - Yugostal, Khimugol, YuRT. From the investigation it was established that such an organization existed on an all-Union scale in Moscow. The Moscow Center was headed by the chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR RABINOVICH, it also included the chairman of the All-Union Association of Engineers PALCHINSKY and a number of other persons: IMENITOV, FEDOROVITCH, NAZIMOV, SKORUTA, SHA LYAKIN, Strizhov, Morev, Zhebrovsky and Kasyanov.

We have accurate data showing that the all-Union center has its own cells and has extended its influence to Siberia (the Kuznetsk basin), the Caucasus (the Tkvibul coal deposit and oil fields) and the Moscow Central region (machine-building plants).

Of course, this latter requires still further study and investigation. The investigation has so far fully developed the Donugol organization.

Based on the data of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, it was established that the Donugol organization, which was widely ramified, had its own program, tactics and effective center. The entire organization has now been arrested, and all members of the Ukrainian center have fully confessed.

During the investigation, it was revealed that there were similar organizations in some other trusts, namely: Yugostal, Khimugol and YuRT.

There was a bureau of Donugol organizations and these trusts. It included the entire leading "seven" of Donugol (Head of the New Construction Department MATOV, member of the board and technical director BOYARSHINOV, Head of the Design Department BRATANOVSKY, assistant Head of the Production Department DETER, senior engineer of UNS, former manager. foreign department KAZARINOV, Deputy Head of ONS SUSHCHEVSKY, Deputy Head of ONS - now Chief Engineer of YuRT BAKHTIAROV.

From Yugostal, board member Shishkin and head were included in the bureau. Mining department SAKHNOVSKY; from Khimugol, engineers KRAMAREV, KAZAKEVICH; from YuRT board member MUKHIN, deputy. chief engineer ZHUKOV and engineer SHUVAEV.

It is precisely established that the Donugol counter-revolutionary organization was associated with the Polish and French embassies in Moscow, the Polish Consulate General in Kharkov, the French War Ministry, the political police bureau in Berlin, and certain government circles in Germany.

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The Poles took an intimate part in the very creation of the organization, generously subsidized it and widely used it for espionage and sabotage work.

The head of the Ukrainian organization, engineer MATOV, speaks quite frankly: "the organization was a sabotage group of the Polish embassy stva".

Behind the latter, of course, was the second department of the polgenstab.

The organization, being truly an agent of the imperialists, also concludes an agreement with the French embassy in Moscow on the conduct and in favor of the French of espionage sabotage work.

According to the testimony of MATOV, BRATANOVSKY, SHADLUN and others, a number of espionage materials were handed over to the French, and all members of the organization worked on collecting them. In total, the organization received several hundred thousand rubles from the French embassy.

In September 1926, MATOV, while abroad, together with Donugol's representative in France YUSEVICH, also a member of the organization, visited the French Ministry of War.

They were received by a responsible representative of the ministry, to whom MATOV made a detailed report on the work of the Donugol organization.

MATOV and YUSEVICH fill out a questionnaire at the ministry on behalf of the organization.

At the beginning of 1927, MATOV was received in Moscow by Erbet's deputy and gave him 60,000 rubles for the needs of the organization.

MATOV fully confessed to visiting the military ministry and the French embassy. At a confrontation with him, this was confirmed by another leader of the organization - BRATANOVSKY. Yusevich also confessed.

Of exceptional interest is the data on the organization's connection with the Germans.

In March 1926, in Berlin, in the premises of the AEG firm, a meeting was held with the participation of a member of the leading group of the Donugol organization, engineer KAZARINOV.

In the same 1926, KAZARINOV visited the German Ministry of Trade, in the presence of a representative of the Ministry and BLYMAN, the representative of the Union of German Industry, Dr. [Oct] REUTER, was informed by KAZARINOV about the views of the organization on the provision of 300 million credits by Germany to the USSR.

The Donugol organization was generously subsidized by the Poles, the French, German firms and its Parisian center. According to MATOV's calculations, up to 700,000 rubles were received from the Parisian center alone in 3 years. The organization received approximately 200 thousand rubles a year from consulates and intelligence services. Large sums came from the French Ministry of War through the French embassy in Moscow.

The organization was actively preparing for the intervention and practically planned completely real measures to blow up the rear from the inside.

All these materials fully and completely confirm the analysis you gave at the plenum of the Central Committee on new forms of counter-revolutionary work and on the preparation of intervention by world imperialism.

It seems to me that Comrade STALIN that one should not confine oneself only to the resolution that was adopted at the plenum of the Central Committee. The resolution is absolutely and absolutely correct, but now it is necessary to more deeply and concretely study all the conditions of work of our trusts and economic organizations and carry out such a reorganization not only of the structure, but also of the very work of the economic

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institutions that would keep us from repeating such stories.

In particular, it seems to me that it is necessary to strengthen the role of the GPU, approximately so that in large trusts there would be large workers authorized by the GPU – something like the transport organs of the GPU\*. This reorganization must be carried out under the supervision and direct guidance of the leading officials of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, otherwise I am afraid that in reality, in terms of the structure and methods of work, we will not be left in the old way.

With communist greetings, Your L. Kaganovich APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 329. L. 28-31. Script. Typescript.

\* Inscribed above the line by hand in ink.

No. 184

NOTE A.M. SHANINA I.V. STALIN  
WITH APPENDIX NOTES V.A. BALITSKY ON  
"ECONOMIC COUNTER-REVOLUTION" IN THE DONBASS

April 27, 1928

No. 3280

Owls. Secret

PERSONAL Tov. Stalin

On behalf of Comrade YAGODA is accompanied by an overview of the economic counter-revolution in the Donbass with a scheme of organization.

APPENDIX: As mentioned.

SECRETARY OF THE OGPU BOARD

(SHANIN)

Owls. Secret ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU

April 25, 1928 comrade. YAGODA G.G.

No. 437/ss

Kharkiv

Dear Heinrich Georgievich!

In view of the fact that the Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union decided to base the process of economic counter-revolution in the Donbass on the case of "DONUGLY" developed by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, we urgently

necessary for the process, completed and transferred to the OGPU.

Based on the intelligence and investigative development of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, it was established that the Donuglevskaya organization, which was widely branched, had its own program, tactics and effective center. The entire organization is now under arrest, and all members of the Ukrainian center have fully confessed.

In the course of the investigation, we revealed that there were similar organizations in some other trusts, namely: YUGOSTALI, KHIMUGLE, and YuRT.

There was a Bureau of Donugol Organizations and these trusts. It included the entire leading "seven" of Donugol (Head of the New Construction Department MATOV, Member of the Board and Technical Director BOYARSHINOV, Head of the Design Department BRATANOVSKY, Assistant

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Head Production Department DETER, Senior Engineer ONS, former Head of the Foreign Department KAZARINOV, Deputy. Head At the National Assembly Sushchevsky, Deputy. The head of the UNS is now the Chief Engineer of YRT BAKHTIAROV.

Members of the Bureau from Yugostal included member of the Board SHISHKIN and Head] of the Mining Department SAKHNOVSKY; from Khimugol - engineers KRAMA REV, KAZAKEVICH, from YURT - member of the Board MUKHIN, Deputy] Chief Engineer ZHUKOV and engineer SHUVAEV.

The work to uncover the organization in Yugostal, YuRT and Khimugol is being carried out by us in shock order, and the main defendants have already been arrested.

It is precisely established that the Donugol counter-revolutionary organization was associated with the Polish and French Embassies in Moscow, the Polish General Consulate in Kharkov, the French Military Ministry, the Bureau of the Political Police in Berlin and some German government circles.

The Poles took an intimate part in the very creation of the organization, generously subsidized it and widely used it for espionage and sabotage work.

The head of the Ukrainian Organization, engineer MATOV, speaks quite frankly: "the organization was a sabotage group of the Polish Ambassador stva".

Behind the latter, of course, was the 2nd Division of the Polgenstab.

The organization, being a true agent of the imperialists, also concludes an agreement with the French Embassy in Moscow on the conduct and in favor of the French of espionage sabotage work.

According to the testimony of MATOV, BRATANOVSKY, SHADLUK and others, a number of materials of a spy nature were handed over to the French, and all members of the organization worked on collecting them. The total was received from the French

Embassy of the organization of several hundred thousand rubles.

In September 1926, MATOV, being abroad, together with the representative of Donugol in France YUSEVICH, also a member of the organization, visited the French Ministry of War.

They were received by a responsible representative of the Ministry, to whom MATOV made a detailed report on the work of the Donuglev organization.

MATOV and YUSEVICH fill out a questionnaire at the Ministry on behalf of the organization.

At the beginning of 1927, MATOVA was received in Moscow by Erbet's deputy and gave him 60,000 rubles for the needs of the organization.

MATOV fully confessed to visiting the Military Ministry and the French Embassy. At a confrontation with him, this was confirmed by another leader of the organization - BRATANOVSKY. Yusevich also confessed.

Of exceptional interest is the data on the organization's connection with the Germans.

In March 1926, a meeting was held in Berlin in the premises of the AEG company, with the participation of a member of the steering group of the Donuglev organization, engineer KAZARINOV, Director of the Russian Department of the AEG BLIMAN, a city manager, one of the founders of the DVOR organization, a permanent Berlin agent of the organization serving the AEG

resolved a number of practical issues of communication and activities of the organization abroad. DVORZHANCHIK made a report on the creation. international association of all former industrialists and traders

Y'LP'SHKA and

BASHKIN.

meeting

Donuglevskaya

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merchants in Russia, and this Association should be associated with the Foreign Society of Creditors in Russia.

In the same 1926, KAZARINOV visited the German Ministry of Trade, in the presence of a representative of the Ministry and BLYMAN, the representative of the Union of German Industry, Dr. ROYTER, was informed by KAZARINOV about the views of the organization on the provision of a 300,000,000 loan by Germany to the USSR.

KAZARINOV fully confessed, confirms the above also MATOV.

The organization made extensive use of its ties with the AEG and other German firms, receiving from them a percentage of the total amount of orders handed over by Donugol and organizing the transfer of information abroad through representatives of these firms coming on business to the USSR - German engineers

and so on.

A number of established investigative data irrefutably testify that a powerful anti-Soviet organization on an all-Union scale has developed its activities on the territory of the USSR. The organization is headed by the Moscow Center, which consists of a group of professors and eminent specialists. The data are confirmed by the testimonies of MATOV, BRATANOVSKY, KAZARINOV, KRZHIZHANOVSKY, SOKOLOV and others. The Moscow Center was headed by the Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR RABINOVICH, this also included the Chairman of the All-Union Association of Engineers PALCHINSKY and a number of other persons: IMINITOV, FEDOROV VICH, NAZIMOV, SKORUTA, SHALYAKIN, Strizhov, Morev, Zhebrovsky and Kasyanov.

We have accurate data showing that the All-Union Center has its own cells and has extended its influence to Siberia (the Kuznetsk Basin), the Caucasus (the Tkibul coal deposit and oil fields) and the Moscow Central Region (machine-building plants).

We have already identified a number of people working there under the directives of the All-Union Organization (GORYACHEV, POTALEYEV and AGRONOMOV in Siberia, PRITULA in the Caucasus, and others).

Directly in charge of the Donuglev organization was the so-called Paris Center, which consisted of members of the Council of the Congress of Miners of the South of Russia. It includes a number of major French and Russian capitalists, former entrepreneurs of Donbass. This group is an integral part of a broad association of Russian industrialists. The latter is closely connected with the powerful Society of Former French Owners of Enterprises of Various Types of Big Industry in Tsarist Russia.

The Donuglev organization was generously subsidized by the Poles, the French, German firms and its Parisian center. According to MATOV's calculations, up to 700,000 rubles were received from the Paris Center alone in three years. The organization received approximately 200,000 rubles from the consulate and intelligence agencies. in year. Large sums came from the French Ministry of War through the French Embassy in Moscow.

It is precisely established that the Ukrainian organization specifically planned and prepared wrecking actions in case of war. On this occasion, the leading group, as well as individual members of the organization, received special, detailed directives from the Paris Center. Polish and French embassies. The data are confirmed by the testimony of engineer RZHENETSKY, KAZARINOV, BOYARINOV, BRATANOVSKY, MATOV and others.

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theoretically outlined absolutely real measures to blow up the rear from the inside.

Thus, the conclusions of comrade. STALIN in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee regarding the new forms of work of the counter-revolution and the preparation of intervention

receive factual confirmation in the materials of this case.

APPENDIX: Overview of the economic counter-revolution in the Donbass with organization chart\*.

With communist greetings, V. BALITSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 329. L. 32-37. Script. Typescript.

\* Not published.

No. 185

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN,

G.K. ORJONIKIDZE, K.E. VOROSHILOV, A.I. RYKOV IN REGARD  
TO THE CASE OF V.S. MIKHAILOV

May 9, 1928

No. 353819  
OWL. SECRET

In December 1926, the Politburo Commission, composed of Comrade. TOMSKY, VOROSHILOV and KUIBYSHEV, on the basis of our materials and a number of statements by the communist workers of the Military Industry, made a decision to dismiss MIKHAILOV (Pomnach VPU) from work in the Military Industry.

This decision of the Commission has not been implemented to date.

MIKHAILOV led and heads a group consisting of the former. generals and colonels of the tsarist army - monarchically minded, who seized the actual leadership of the entire Military Industry

ness.

This group, headed by MIKHAILOV, occupies command and technical positions along the entire line: in the Military Industrial Directorate, besides MIKHAILOV himself, there are engineers - members of the group - LINDBERG, VOLOSATOV, etc., in the Gun-Arsenal Trust - a member of the Board VYSOCHANSKII, engineer SHEIMAN and others, in the Military Chemical Trust - DEKHANOV, DOVGIEVICH and others, in the Weapons and Machine-Gun Trust - ORLOV, KANEVSKII and others, in the Cartridge and Pipe Trust - a member of the Board DYMMAN, engineers WALTER, SAVATEEV and others.

Mikhailovtsy skillfully created an atmosphere of unlimited confidence in themselves and the appearance of the only irreplaceable specialists.

To do this, they are fighting not only against young military production engineers, but also pursuing a policy of removing old specialists who are not part of the group.

Mikhailovtsy, in addition to the official one, have a close personal connection with each other, issues of great importance are preliminarily resolved by them in their apartments and only then formalized.

The slightest attempts by the communist part of the management of trusts and factories, directed against any of the Mikhailov engineers, met

face strong opposition.

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An example is the removal from trusts of Comrade. DOTSENKO, who led the fight against the MIKHAILOV group, the removal from work of KOKHINSKY, etc.

The harmful activity of the Mikhailov group is directed towards slowing down the pace and destroying individual industries.

Under various pretexts, they managed to destroy the Krasnaya Zvezda plant, the former. Baranovsky, the only one in its time for the production of 34 seconds. Pipes (only walls remained), factories of bullet production of the former. Fefelova and Anchara and the shop for the production of fuses at the Gorlovsky plant.

There was an attempt to destroy the Ulyanovsk Gunpowder Factory, and only the energetic intervention of the Leningrad Provincial Committee saved it.

During the fulfillment of a German order in 1925, engineer DYMMAN, who supervised the execution of this order, maintained a close personal relationship with the Germans and made it easier for the latter to get acquainted with our factories in detail.

Until the liquidation of the Committee for the De- and Mobilization of Industry, MIKHAILOV and his associates were at the head of the preparation of industry for defense. For more than three years, nothing real was done, the work was structured in such a way that the mobilization plan for industry could be drawn up not earlier than after more than 18 years.

Over the past two years, after the decision of the Commission Comrade. comrade TOMSKY, VOROSHILOV, and KUIBYSHEV, which has not yet been carried out, the activity of MIKHAILOV and his group retains its former direction.

This line, essentially slow disarmament, is being pursued by MIKHAILOV in the course of drawing up the five-year plan for the Military Industry. In the five-year plan, the production possibilities of the existing War Industry are underestimated, as a result of which huge sums of money are required for new construction to meet the needs of the Army in wartime. As a matter of fact, the existing War Industry, at a small cost, can fully produce the output planned by the five-year plan.

How much the possibilities of our industry were underestimated in the preparation of the five-year plan, and consequently the need for funds was exaggerated, is shown by the following examples:

a) For the reconstruction of the brass shop and the expansion of cartridge production in Tula, MIKHAILOV and VPU calculated the amount of 22 million rubles, which, upon verification, turned out to be extremely exaggerated and was reduced to 8 1/2 million lions.

b) 10.8 million rubles were requested for the expansion of the Lugansk plant. Upon verification, the amount was reduced to 6.9 million rubles.

c) The Ulyanovsk Cartridge Plant expanded without any approved



long-term plan, based on the release of 650 million cartridges per year. It turned out that the built equipment shop can produce 800 million cartridges, besides this, a bullet shop should not be built, due to the fact that the area of the existing cartridge case shop is so large that it can fit a bullet shop and even an increased program of 800 million rounds. cartridge.

Due to the underload of the factories of the Military Industry, the issue of setting them up for peaceful production is of great importance. As early as last year, MIKHAILOV was instructed to develop this issue urgently. The latter did absolutely nothing, until the moment R.Z. received the summons. STO on March 26, 1928, in which this question was listed. March 23, 24 and 25

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MIKHAILOV develops a program that has not been coordinated with anyone and is submitted for a report to the RZ STO. The value of such work is clear.

The production of weapons requires a large amount of non-ferrous metals (cartridge cases, cartridges, bullets), which are imported from abroad. This is one of the bottlenecks in our mobilization training.

In 1922, one of the comrades sent to Austria managed to get a recipe for the process and a sample of a shell case made of clad iron at the Skoda Werke plant. Everything he brought was handed over through P.A. BOGDANOVA to the Perm plant. An experimental batch was made according to the sample and recipe, which gave very satisfactory results. One of these shells is at the disposal of the OGPU, it passed the test, lay under the snow and in the water, and today has not changed its qualities. However, this production has not yet been established in our country.

In connection with the foregoing, the OGPU considers it necessary to immediately implement the decision of the Commission, comrade t. TOMSKY, VOROSHILOV and KUIBYSHEV in relation to MIKHAILOV.

At the same time, the OGPU raises the question of removing his closest assistants DYMMAN and FILIPPOVSKOY from work in the Military Industry and investigating their activities.

ZAM. PREV. O.G.P.U. BERRY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 339. L. 3-6. Script. Typescript.

No. 186

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE"

May 10, 1928

No. 24, p. 9 - On the Shakhty case (comrade Chicherin).

a) Permit the German Ambassador Rantzau a meeting with the Germans accused in the Shakhty case.

b) Instruct Comrade Bukharin to convene a meeting of delegates of foreign communist parties (English, French, German, etc.) so that they make a selection of the most odious passages in the indictment regarding the connection with this case of the relevant foreign powers and embassies, draw up articles with quotes and references to the indictment and sent these articles to

their newspapers.

c) Instruct t.t. Molotov, Chicherin and Krylenko to once again revise the published indictment towards the maximum reduction of those places that relate to the activities of foreign embassies, etc.

d) Satisfy the request of the defense to postpone the start of the process for three days.\*

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 79. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Rudzuta To U> Menzhinsky, Chicherin - everything; Krylenko - a, c, d; Bukharin - b; Vinokurov, Enukidze - g; Molotov - in.

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No. 187

NOTE I.V. STALIN TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES TO  
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) ON THE  
CASE OF THE GROUP OF SPECIALISTS OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY (64)

May 12, 1928

No. 3069-s

Sov. secret

I ask the members and candidates of the Politburo to pay the most serious attention to the document being sent out from the RCI, as well as Yagoda's note on the activities of a group of specialists in the military industry. This is a very serious and urgent matter, and it will probably have to be considered at the next meeting of the Politburo.

I. Stalin

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 40. Original. Typescript.

No. 188

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE"

May 17, 1928

No. 25, p. 10 - On the Shakhty case (comrades Rudzutak, Krylenko, Solts, Yagoda).

a) Approve the decision of the commission on tactics in connection with the behavior of the defender

kov in the Shakhty case.

b) Instruct t.t. Yagoda and Krylenko to designate a person for negotiating and report to the commission.

c) Permit the Artemovsky district to nominate two more public prosecutors. Propose to the commission not to allow them officially to the process until they are first acquainted with their candidacies.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 87. Original. Typescript.

\* There is a typewritten notation in the text about the distribution: "Extracts sent to: comrade Rudzutaku, comrade Krylenko, comrade Yagoda."

No. 189

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

About Poalei Zion

May 24, 1928

No. 26, p. 1 - About "Poalei Zion" (OB dated 21.V.28, pr. No. 37, p. 4). Approve the decision of the Orgburo dated 21.V. this year:

Agree with the decision of the MK on the need to liquidate the legally existing party of the EKP (Poalei Zion).

RGASPI. F. 17! Op. 162. D. 6. L. 93. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Kosior Yagoda, Uglanova; Orgburo.

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No. 190

NOTE to Ya.E. RUDZUTAK TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT CLEANING SPECIALISTS,

WORKING AT MOSCOW FACTORIES

June 1, 1928

No. st 209

OWL. SECRET

B. Urgent

As can be seen from Comrade RUKHIMOVICH's report attached to this, at a meeting at the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was decided to purge the specialists working in the factories of Moscow.

I ask you to urgently suspend this decision, pending discussion of this issue in the STB.

DEPUTY] CHAIRMAN OF THE  
COUNCIL OF LABOR AND DEFENSE Y. Rudzutak

1. VI-1928

Tov. Rudzutak

Yesterday, at the Meeting of business executives, employees of the GPU and the prosecutor's office at the Moscow Committee, it was decided to purge specialists at Moscow factories, regardless of whether the enterprises are local, republican or Union.

In the same place, it was decided to carry out the purge by publicly informing the workers. What I was told by the representative of the AFU VSNKh comrade Tortoriyskiy. I consider it necessary to discuss this issue in the PB.

Rukhimovich

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 332. L. 27-28. Copy. Typescript.

No. 191

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"On the note of the OGPU ABOUT WRECKING ON  
TRANSPORT" (65)

June 14, 1928

No. 29, p. 19 - On the note of the OGPU about sabotage in transport.

a) Instruct Comrade Rudzutak to convene a meeting of the main leaders of the railway within 10 days. dor. transport and railway workers' union To address the issue.

b) Distribute the document to the participants of the above-mentioned meeting, inviting Comrade Rudzutak to present immediately the list of participants.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 105. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 11.VI. 1928. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Rudzutak, comrade Menzhinsky."

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No. 192

NOTE I.V. STALIN TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES TO MEMBERS  
OF THE POLITBURO, TO SECRETARIES OF THE CC OF THE AUCP(b), TO  
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CCC WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE  
MEMORIES OF THE OGPU ABOUT "VARATIVENESS"

## BY RAILWAY TRANSPORT

June 16, 1928

About two months ago, the first note of the OGPU about sabotage on the railway was sent out. dor. transport. Now the second note of the OGPU on the issue of wrecking on the railway is being sent out. dor. transport, equipped with new materials, testimony of specialists and expert examination data. In view of the special importance of the question both from the point of view of the development of our economy and, especially, from the point of view of the defense of the country, please read the note in person and keep it as a highly secret document.

## I. STALIN

OWL. SECRET CC  
AUCP(b) - comrade. STALIN

MEMORIAL No. 2 ON THE  
ÿSYSTEM\* OF DAMAGED ACTIVITIES OF THE  
ÿCOUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION\* ON THE ZHEL.-DOR.

## TRANSPORT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

### SECTION 1

In development of the previously submitted preliminary memorandum, on the basis of additional investigative data and the conclusion of a technical expertise, consisting of major specialist engineers, the activities of the counter-revolutionary organization, aimed at destroying the locomotive fleet, are characterized extremely clearly and far exceed our - initial assumptions, built on the preliminary data of the investigation and undercover materials, about the scope of sabotage and its consequences.

The OGPU organized on all the roads of the network a sudden check of the actual state of the permanent (mobilization) stock of steam locomotives (the so-called solid cold stock of the NKPS). According to the existing orders and instructions, the steam locomotives of the mobilization reserve must be in the most exemplary condition and be ready at any moment to be served by trains. The check showed that 25% of the permanent (mobilization) stock was in a faulty condition and some of these locomotives could not even be served under military echelons.

This fact alone was quite enough to upset the mobilization. The fact that Moek. Bel. The Baltic railway, which, according to the plan of the Military Veterinary Department, is the most important in terms of the transfer of troops, showed the worst condition of the cold reserve, namely: out of the total number of steam locomotives of the mobilization stock of 65, only 2 steam locomotives turned out to be serviceable. It should also be noted that a week before our audit, the road was visited by the Traction Inspector of the NKPS,

who made a survey of the mobilization reserve and did not find anything catastrophic. The situation on this road is deteriorating.

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also by the fact that, thanks to the orders of the Traction Department of the NKPS, the vast majority of steam locomotives operating on this road do not have spare parts at all, as a result of which, if these parts break down, the locomotive fails. After the audit of the permanent (mobilization) reserve, the OGPU carried out an all-Union check of the condition of the steam locomotives with the participation of the relevant agents of the railways. The data of this actual census showed that there were 1,300 more sick locomotives. against the number shown by the official statistics of the Traction Department of the NKPS, and meanwhile, according to these fictitious data of the Traction Department, calculations of the mobilization plan were made. It is also obvious that on the basis of these false data it is absolutely impossible either to manage transport, or to conduct a correct repair policy, or to organize the correct movement of trains in emergency cases. During both censuses, acts were drawn up on the actual state of the locomotive fleet and signed by the relevant agents of the NKPS. The indisputability of these acts is recognized by the NKPS itself.

Having checked the condition of the operational (acting) park, the OGPU began to check the reserve park and found out that the reserve park was almost completely destroyed. (There were 6924 steam locomotives in 1925, 2200 remained on May 1, 1928, of which 1000 were already subject to scrapping). A mass transfer of steam locomotives suitable for operation to scrap has been discovered. The breakdown of a small part of the surviving OGPU has been suspended.

With all this data in hand, the OGPU, in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Comrade. RUDZUTAK, in view of the denial of the leaders of the Thrust in. KRASOVSKY and DMYKHOVSKY, resorted to technical expertise, in which major experts of the NKPS were involved. It was necessary to find out not the simple falsification of statistical data, even if with sabotage purposes, but all the wrecking methods of destroying the locomotive fleet, which remained unnoticed by the leaders of the NKPS. It was these methods that caused such a huge drop in the number of healthy locomotives and an increase in sick ones.

Extremely characteristic of the attitude of the specialists of the NKPS to the case is the remark of Zam. Chairman of Transplan, one of the largest engineers of the NKPS, SHUKOV, who rendered a lot of services to the OGPU in unraveling the technical side of the matter, among some other specialists. To the question of Comrade. BLAGONRAVOVA: "What is the percentage of sick steam locomotives on the network at the moment" - engineer. SHUKHOV replied: "Up to 30%." To the question: "How can he give such an answer that coincides with the data of the OGPU (actual revision), and this answer sharply contradicts the statistics of the NKPS, which at that time showed only 18%," engineer SHUKHOV said: "Each understanding engineer has a figure sick locomotives are easy to install

twist."

However, none of these competent engineers came to the Collegium of the NKPS and said that the situation with the locomotive fleet was close to disaster (specialists determine the critical point of collapse of Traction in 23% of patients).

The methods of sabotage according to traction have been elucidated, on the one hand, with the help of

the aforementioned expert Commission, and on the other hand, thanks to the interrogations of non-arrested engineers of Traction from almost all the roads of the network. And, finally, after stubborn denial, by the testimony of the arrested themselves.

The list of names and positions of the NKPS employees questioned and arrested in this case (76 people) is not published. At the end of the list there is a note notifying that the OGPU has at its disposal 728 more testimonies

characterizing the wrecker's activities on the railway. — Sot.

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As already mentioned in the previous memorandum, the pest engineers set themselves the goal of destroying the locomotive fleet.

In order to achieve this criminal goal successfully, they created a finely thought-out system of sabotage and covered up the results of wrecking with false statistics that spoke of complete well-being, while there was a breakdown.

The main points of sabotage were:

1. Almost complete destruction of the reserve 1 locomotive fleet, by handing over suitable locomotives for scrap (Rudmetalltorg).

2. Systematic and thoughtful destruction of the steam locomotives of the operating fleet by:

a) putting the steam locomotives of the operating fleet with minor repairs into the reserve fleet, where the locomotives were finally destroyed (robbery and plunder of parts, damage from rust) and their restoration required large capital expenditures (criminal pumping of funds);

b) setting technically absurd and sabotage norms for the permissible number of sick locomotives on a given road (18%) and for the permissible number of locomotives awaiting repair (0.5). As a result of the application of these norms, a long current repair was launched, and, consequently, the number of sick steam locomotives increased;

c) malicious non-supply of spare parts for steam locomotives of the operating fleet and destruction, together with the scrap locomotives, of parts suitable for use on operating steam locomotives;

d) a decrease in the number of brakes on roads, the profile of which in no way allowed this decrease, which entailed massive damage to locomotive tires, premature wear of brake shoes, transport accidents, i.e. again led to a weakening of the operating fleet of steam locomotives;

e) weakening of the railroad. repair shops by purchasing unusable equipment abroad;

f) deliberate failure to carry out a number of elementary organizational

measures with the introduction of impersonal driving (for example: the correct formulation of preventive repairs, the equipment of a depot with hot washing, which makes it possible to carry out the same work with the number of locomotives less than 10%, and preserving the boiler and firebox, etc. .);

g) the embitterment of locomotive brigades by the introduction, simultaneously with impersonal driving, which gave burns, reduced fuel standards, which taken together deprived the brigades of the bonus on some roads partially, and on others completely, which affected the attitude of locomotive brigades to steam locomotives, in the sense of worsening care for them;

h) the issuance of a number of harmful orders and orders (on changing healthy crank fingers, on allowing cracks in the wheel rim sector, on setting up connections in boilers without riveting), which caused an increase in the number of sick locomotives and a weakening of the operating fleet .

1 The locomotive fleet is divided into 2: reserve and operational.

The reserve fleet consists of steam locomotives that are not in operation, awaiting revival and, on the orders of the People's Commissariat for Commissariat of Fire, incorrectly mixed with the cemetery ones.

Operating fleet: steam locomotives in operation (healthy, in operation and waiting for it, in cold storage and sick). —  
Note. document authors.

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All this destructive activity was masked, as mentioned above, by false statistical data, squeezed into the framework of specially created malicious reporting forms.

These data spoke of the complete well-being and growth from year to year of the steam locomotive economy of the NKPS - the same well-being was also indicated by individual reports (both written and oral) submitted by pest engineers to the Collegium of the NKPS and the highest government bodies.

Here, it must be emphasized with all force that the false reporting system was introduced not only to cover up the destructive activities of the technical leaders of the Traction and was supposed to provide them with complete impunity, but was, and this is especially important to note, a major factor in itself. for the organized destruction of our locomotive economy.

Because

a) the Collegium of the NKPS could not take the necessary measures to prevent the collapse;

b) the management of the locomotive economy of the roads by the NKPS was paralyzed;

c) the entire apparatus of the Traction of Roads and the NKPS was disorganized, accustomed to complete irresponsibility and put on the path of systematic forgery and deception of the Collegium of the NKPS - the corrupting effect on the personnel of the NKPS, the malicious reporting system and forgery, as the investigation shows, is EXCEPTIONALLY GREAT.



It is impossible to pass over in silence such a fact, when the leaders of the Traction People's Commissariat of Commissariat of Railways, BENESHEVICH, KRASOVSKY and DMYKHOVSKY, gave an assessment of the roads not for their work, but for their ability to do forgeries well.

With particular clarity, all the consequences of the c.-revolutionary system are revealed when we take false statistics and compare them with reality.

According to false data, there is a curve for the rise of the locomotive economy, according to actual data, a curve for a sharp decline.

According to official statistics, the percentage of sick steam locomotives in 2028 is below the level of 25 years (in 2025 it was 22.6%, see the general census; in 2028 - 20.4%), thus, there is, as it were, improvement.

In reality, the percentage of sick locomotives for 1/V-28 is 28%, i.e. above the level of the general census of 25 by 5.4 and above the NKPS data by 1/5-28 by 7.6%, or in absolute numbers in 28 the number of sick locomotives over 25 by 1300 units.

Large capital investments in Traction, made over the past 3 years, did not give any effect.

The official statistics of the NKPS, compiled knowingly and maliciously incorrectly, say that the dynamics of the percentage of patients from year to year is favorable for Traction and, in any case, in 1928 it is better than in a number of previous years. In reality, since 1925, the percentage of sick locomotives has never been as high as in April-May 1928.

Official data says that we have 12042 healthy steam locomotives, in fact there are only 11003 of them, i.e. less by 1039 locomotives.

Official fuel calculations show that the situation is so good that the fuel consumption is below the level of 13 years, but in fact the consumption is increasing and significantly exceeding the level of 1913.

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Similar facts in the field of using a locomotive fleet, capital investments that have been criminally eaten up in the field of medium and current repairs, the purchase of equipment, etc.

The state of the steam locomotive fleet, fuel burnout, and the use of steam locomotives are especially clear from the diagrams and diagrams attached to this report.

explanatory notes to them.

Diagrams on the state of the locomotive economy Nos. 1, 2 and 3 \* were compiled by the OGPU together with major specialists of the NKPS, on the basis of an actual survey carried out by the OGPU bodies together with the railway. administration.

All acts and documents are signed by the relevant agents of the NKPS.

The diagrams for Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 on the use of steam locomotives were compiled on the basis of data from the Statistics Department of the NKPS (there are absolutely no indicated data in the Traction Department), which are undoubtedly optimistic, which indicates that the actual situation is worse than those far unfavorable conclusions which we made on the basis of these statistics.

Diagrams Nos. 8, 9 and 10 on the state of the fuel were compiled on the basis of the NKPS data, but with the use of real, and not false, equivalents maliciously invented by the leaders of the NKPS Traction.

All these materials not only clearly illustrate the investigative material on the destruction of the locomotive fleet and speak of a very low level of railways. locomotive economy, but also with all the relief show what large capital investments are eaten up by wrecking work.

What are the consequences of the destruction caused by pests to our locomotive fleet.

These consequences cannot now be determined, at least in approximate monetary terms, in any case they amount to several hundred million rubles, but the most important thing lies not even in this, but in the fact that the locomotive economy of the NKPS has been brought to such a state, with in which, in the event of mobilization and war, it would not have coped with the tasks that would have been assigned to it.

In addition, even in peacetime, in the coming years, the destruction of the reserve fleet will have a full effect, since the influx of new steam locomotives will not be able to fully cover the needs of the NKPS, in connection with the construction of new railways. lines, sidings and cargo turnover increasing from year to year, especially since more than 40% of the network does not allow new powerful steam locomotives to pass through and those steam locomotives that have been destroyed by pests could successfully work there.

With all the above data, the presence of the collapse of transport has been established. Meanwhile, in all the previous material, we dealt exclusively with the issues of the state of the locomotive fleet, but the OGPU, in the course of the investigation, had to establish sabotage in a number of other branches of the railway industry, such as: in the carriage fleet, in operation, in the fuel business. and for a number of other lines, the development of which is just beginning. The immediate task of the investigation at the present time is to identify the wrecking head, which has not yet been fully arrested. The arrest of engineer FEDOROV has been temporarily postponed. Department of Exploitation, until the defendants received consciousness not only of wrecking activity, but also recognition of the presence of a counter-revolutionary organization and those owners for whom they worked.

Until now, without a firm installation of the entire technical side of sabotage, to obtain such consciousness from experienced engineers, who have an explanation for everything

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It was impossible, which explains the delays in the arrests. The OPTU kept the People's Commissar of Communications comrade informed about the progress of the investigation. RUDZUTAK, who agreed to arrests, and on the other hand

rona, made changes both in the communist and non-communist part of the Traction Department of the NKPS. The new head of the Traction Department, having become acquainted with the data of the investigation, canceled some sabotage orders by agreement with the OGPU, in view of the fact that measures to stop the further collapse of transport must be taken immediately and without much noise, without waiting for the end of the investigation, which may drag on for a few more months.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU Yagoda nach.  
TO OGPU Blagonravov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 372. L. 25-41. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*  
Diagrams are not published

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FROM THE SPEECH OF G.G. BERRIES AT A CONFERENCE  
ON WRECKING ON RAILWAY TRANSPORT

June 19-20, 1928

No. 4524s

BERRY. I think that a better lawyer's speech in his own defense than the speech of Comrade. Pravdin, the pest specialists that were discussed here could not have been found in court. From all the speeches of the UCC and the comrades who have spoken here, one can come to the conclusion that things are not going well in transport. All those who spoke admitted the fact that the OD series of steam locomotives could no longer be scrapped. This was recognized by all. But none of the comrades who spoke here asked themselves the question: how did it happen that when - how everyone admits that a series of large-scale ODs could not be scrapped, how it happened that no one had protested against this before. No one had thought about this before, and no one had shouted before that good locomotives were being scrapped. What does it mean? This means that the organization of wreckers that settled in the NKPS had its own people on the roads - the Chiefs of Traction - who carried out this obviously criminal business. If you have only now seen the light that scrapping the OD was a crime, then why are the Heads of Traction, your subordinates, whom you blindly trusted and whom Comrade so courageously. Pravdin takes under his protection, they never reported to you, they didn't tell you anything about the fact that it is impossible to let OD into scrap. What does all of this mean? - This means that the technical leaders that you were obliged to manage acted in addition to you, through your heads, using your reckless trust in them. That's what it means.

About statistics. Everyone knows what statistics are. One can talk about more or less true or false statistics, about how much it reflects or does not reflect reality. But we're not talking about that. We say and affirm that the statistics presented in the NKPS were false, deliberately false, deliberately falsified, i.e. deliberately distorting the actual situation on the road; this statistic is

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artificially showed a deliberate decrease in sick locomotives and an increase in healthy ones. And so, on the basis of such false statistics, you managed the economy and gave this or that directive. And the most difficult thing in this matter is that these falsified data were used as the basis for mobilization calculations. That's the point, comrades.

But have you thought about it, and doesn't it seem strange to you, that only the Poles sat at the heart of the NKPS thrust: at the head KRASOVSKY, under him DMYKHOVSKY, next to him TEREMETSKY, further BESEDOVSKII, LITKEVICH, LESNIKOVSKY? Is it a coincidence that Besedovsky, Dmykhovsky's closest friend and assistant, who was in charge of all fuel calculations, is in fact an impostor, and not an engineer who held responsible positions in the NKPS, having an educational qualification of three classes of a technical school, which Dmykhovsky could not have been unaware of? It cannot be explained by chance.

If Teremetsky, who knows that he is threatened with the highest punishment for his crimes, and therefore is completely uninterested in bringing himself under this punishment by slandering himself, if this Teremetsky himself confirms that all the statistics that were compiled under his leadership for the road, was false, and if he himself tells how, according to his instructions, these statistics were falsified, is that also an accident?

And when on the Kursk road at Comrade. Ivanov, who spoke so brilliantly here and proved to us that everything is going well, the arrested 3 statisticians with the chief at the head themselves show that the figures are false, that they deliberately did this, and at the same time tell in detail on whose instructions they they did it - so this is also an accident? No, comrades, you can't get off with a single accident.

Further, about the analogy with the Shakhty case, which many of the speakers here drew. And it is also no coincidence that this analogy, in itself, suggests itself: here and there we are dealing with sabotage deliberately carried out by a group of specialists. This analogy can be carried much further. If in the Shakhty case it is precisely established that the Shakhty sabotage was directed abroad, namely through the former owners, members of the mining section of the Union of Former RTP and F. figures, then in this case the line of communication between the saboteurs in transport and the transport section of the specified union is revealed. , whose residence is in Paris, and branches in Berlin, Warsaw and in other capitals of the limitrophes. Here one involuntarily recalls the desire of the center of trade and industrialists, revealed in the Shakhty case, to adjust the coal catastrophe by 1929-30, when, according to their data, an outside strike against the USSR is being prepared.

I want to point out those points in which the case reported here by the OGPU differs from Shakhtinsky. We reported on the Shakhty case after six months of hard, painstaking work, when hundreds of witnesses were interviewed, hundreds of examinations were made, when the results of the investigative work gave full consciousness to a number of technical personnel, which led to the exposure of the main leaders of sabotage, completely later admitted their guilt. In the present case, in the case of sabotage in transport, we have a slightly different position. This case is under investigation for only one and a half to two months. Benishevich, one of the main defendants, was arrested only two weeks ago, and some of the leaders of sabotage are still roaming free. How do you want, dear comrades,

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so that we can already present you with a ready-made case on the harmonious organization of wreckers in transport with statutes, minutes of meetings, passwords, ciphers, etc. attributes of a conspiratorial organization. This is nonsense, a frivolous idea of the matter. In addition, keep in mind that this case has only just begun by the investigation, which is developing under difficult conditions (too many people know and talk about this case), that we cannot here, without complicating the investigation, come forward to you with the totality of operational and intelligence data on this case. And yet, how can one honestly deny that there is a wrecking organization in this case? If, as everyone here admitted, the scrapping of OD locomotives was one of the acts of sabotage, then it is quite clear that hundreds of expert reports and a number of testimonies of arrested specialists confirmed that Krasovsky could not work in carrying out wrecking work without Dmykhovsky, Dmykhovsky without Teremetsky, and the latter without his subordinates acting on his instructions, etc. Here the conspiracy of a number of persons to carry out the destruction of transport is obvious, here the same "single" line of sabotage in transport, in practice, significantly implemented (the collapse of the Tashkent road, elements of collapse on the roads of the front line, the destruction of the locomotive fleet) - on the face. What is it - an organization or so-so, trifles? "Coincidence," as many here claim. No, comrades, since sabotage is evident, once the saboteurs have been exposed, things will not work here without the organization of the saboteurs.

In the Shakhty case, those arrested did not immediately admit their wrecking work and participation in a wrecking organization.

MENZHINSKY. At first they recognized sabotage, and then organization.

BERRY. And who can now doubt that there was a wrecking organization in the Shakhty case? Give me time: we will come to the same conclusion with regard to sabotage in transport.

Here, many of you are arguing with Comrade. Blagonravov. This, in my opinion, is a pure misunderstanding. Tov. Blagonravov reported here the results of the examination, in which your specialists participated, he reported the testimony of Krasovsky, Beneshevich, Dmykhovsky, Teremetsky and other specialists. You are arguing with those engineers who were authority for you, whose orders you signed and executed, and now you are arguing with them. This is not a worthwhile business. Here is Comrade. Nikolsky, in my opinion, declares with great selflessness that Krasovsky, you see, is a hat. But if Krasovsky is a hat, Dmykhovsky is a boot, and Beneshevich is some other toilet utensil, then tell me, what do those who sat and directed them look like?

I think, comrades, that's the point here. This is not the first time we have heard such speeches. When we opened the Shakhty case, many comrades, just like here, beat their chests and said, how can this be? It's all nonsense! Blew up the case! They even said that it was necessary to stop the case, and some directly declared "judge us, we are to blame." Are we not taking on too much, comrades? It's all really stupidity (who would deny it) is one thing, but when there are notorious counter-revolutionaries who take advantage of every opportunity to harm our economy, it seems to me that it's a completely different matter. . Therefore, you should not be so bold and take everything upon yourself. I believe that in this case the same feature was revealed as in Shakhhtinsky, namely: what do you have, with the

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local work with these specialists, with constant communication with them, with their constant giving of instructions, you have erased in relation to them - specialists - every facet of criticism, which is obligatory for party members in relation to such specialists. I think you have lost your critical sense. Some of you go so far as to consider individual specialists, who are actually counter-revolutionaries, whose wrecking activity has been proven, to be Soviet specialists, and even take them under protection. You refute all the orders that you accepted and put into practice, and which you apparently considered correct, by your speeches at this meeting, when you say that it was impossible to break the OD. In our materials, among the testimonies, there is such that an honest specialist on the road, in the presence of Krasovsky, could not work at all. In my opinion, this indication is very important and deserves special attention. Here Comrade. Pravdin made a speech defending his specialists. But how is it that Pravdin's specialists, who carried out Krasovsky's orders on his road, did not come to Pravdin and say: these orders of Krasovsky are suspicious, things are not going well with Krasovsky? Did they do it? No. They did not come to Comrade. Pravdin and did not tell him this. Why? Yes, because this old technical staff, who worked on the railroad even in pre-revolutionary times, is the most reactionary element. I think that in the future we will certainly have to replace these old specialists with new, really Soviet specialists.

In conclusion, I must say that it would be much more useful from this meeting if, after studying the materials that we have, we would immediately, before it is too late, begin to work on correcting all the identified shortcomings and the harm that has been caused to the entire this story. I say this because I am not such a great optimist as Comrade. Rudy, and I do not have his courage to say, as he does, that by the autumn the matter can be corrected. Tov. Rudy is a very big optimist, and even if the roads stop, if there are large traffic jams, traffic jams, he will boldly say that tomorrow all traffic jams will be eliminated, destroyed and everything will be fixed. I think that all the defects in transport must be corrected immediately, so that in the future we will not have a catastrophic situation with our transport.

We signal here the dangerous situation that has been created in transport due to the wrecking work of a certain group of specialists. We're here to help fight traffic troubles. And we have the right to expect help in our work from you, comrades. With your help, we will be able to successfully eliminate wrecking work in transport. Your help is necessary and important to us, especially now, when we discover such moods in which it will be extremely difficult to develop this matter further. After all, even in the Illakhtinsk case, it was the case that, until its full disclosure, the business executives not only did not provide us with the necessary assistance, but sometimes even interfered with our work, and only then, when the whole case was solved, did all the business executives begin to help us. Here, for the final disclosure of the wrecking organization in transport, which certainly exists, we, the OGPU, need your help.

CA FSB. F. 2. Op. 6. D. 977. L. 205-211. Script. Typescript

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No. 194

NOTE G.V. CHICHERINA TO THE MEMBERS OF THE  
POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b), THE BOARD OF THE NKID AND  
V.R. MENZHINSKY ABOUT GERMAN SUBJECT SEEBOLD

July 18, 1928

No. 611/ChS

B. Hastily

C. secret

It is clear from the mail that has just arrived from Berlin that this or that decision in the Seebold case will be of great importance for our future relations with Germany. Tov. Krestinsky writes (No. 558 of July 16): "If we, by the authority of the Central Executive Committee, stop the case and expel Seebold, then this will be a sufficient punishment for him for giving bribes: on the other hand, we will not have the continuation of that tension in our relations with Germany, which we have 5 odd months." The Seebold question not only plays a large role in the general atmosphere of our relations with Germany, but also attracts the special attention of the government. Schubert asked Comrade Krestinsky about this matter, asked for its acceleration and expressed the hope that this matter would be quickly and painlessly liquidated. Tov. Krestinsky and Comrade Stomonyakov, who was with him, replied to Schubert that from the very beginning of the Shakhty story, the embassy advised Ausamt to calmly wait for the decision of our court; the course of events has shown that this advice was correct, and the same advice can be given in the Seebold case. Tov. Krestinsky continues: "But it is one thing that we answer Schubert, another thing is that I must, in my conscience, tell you. I tell you that in connection with the Shakhty case, and even at a time when we are talking about Bela Kun's admission, to raise the question of compensation for the termination of the Seebold case would be an absurd fact that would stand in glaring contradiction with our desire to consolidate good relations with the Germans. Liquidate the Seebold affair as soon as possible and tear out the Shakhty page from the history of Soviet-German relations.

Tov. Krylenko wrote the following about the Seebold case before his departure:

"Currently, the situation is as follows:

1. Seebold has been interrogated and brought on charges of bribery and nothing more. Already by the testimony he gave, the falsity of his oath given by him in Kharkov and handed over to us officially by the German embassy: Seebold swore an oath that he never knew Gavryushenko, and Seebold showed the investigator that he knew Gavryushenko. This is already enough to completely discredit Seebold as a perjurer and deprive him of his civil rights under German law.

2. Today, a confrontation was made between Seebold and Wadstieber, as a result of which each remained with his own, i.e. Wadstieber claims that Seebold gave him the money for a bribe, Seebold denies it. If you dig a little, then in some 2-3 weeks it will be possible by examining a number of

circumstances to establish a number of objective materials that will prove:

- a) The poor condition of the machines, which Seebold himself had also partially acknowledged, and therefore that there was something to bribe for,
- b) As well as, perhaps, it will be possible to establish a number of other, similar confirming circumstances.

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Comrade Krylenko further writes:

"However, since we are not interested in trying Seebold at all costs, we can go to the proposal of the Germans, but on the following conditions: based on political considerations, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides to stop the criminal case against Seebold, and limit himself to expelling him from the USSR as an undesirable foreigner. But for this it is necessary to demand from. compensation for the Germans (how much is the matter of the Narko Mindela). This is the first. And secondly, it is important to demand from them an obligation that the German press does not present this fact - the dismissal of the case against Seebold - as proof that there is no case against Seebold, because the case exists and can be brought.

For my part, I can say that the demand for compensation for the sentence sounds somewhat strange on the part of the custodian of justice. It is absolutely inconvenient to write about political motives in the decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. The NKID proceeds from the fact that the Seebold process would be extremely unfavorably received by the German government and industrial circles and would greatly hinder the further development of our relations with Germany. In view of this, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs considers it urgently necessary for the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee to issue a decision to close the criminal case against Seebold with his subsequent expulsion from the USSR. At the same time, it will be necessary to demand from the German government and the German embassy here that they take the measures at their disposal in order to prevent the German press from using such an outcome of the Seebold case for new attacks against us. The power of the German government over the German press is not absolute, and we can only speak of using the influence of the German government to influence the German press. On occasion, depending on the circumstances, the German government could be required to publish any official notes, if the course of the case led to the need for this.

Tov. Krylenko noted that Seebold's original statement, given under oath, contains statements that Seebold himself recognized as false. Our judiciary does not know the institution of the oath, but in German jurisprudence it plays an important role, and perjury, i.e. false testimony given under oath is punished very severely in Germany. In view of this, even with the termination of the Seebold case, it would be necessary to officially transfer to the German authorities materials proving the commission of perjury by Seebold. In this case, you will have to resort to the help of printing.

Tov. Menzhinsky proposes that at the same time we demand that the German government recall Paul Schaeffer from Moscow. Unfortunately



Unfortunately, this suggestion is based on a misunderstanding. We are all equally interested in having Paul Schaeffer recalled from here, but his recall cannot in any way be effected by an act of the German government. Schaeffer can only be recalled by his newspaper, i.e. Theodor Wolf. Even before the Shakhty case, I repeatedly and very energetically pressed Comrade Krestinsky in this matter and finally got him to say that he spoke about Schaeffer with Theodor Wolf, and even Comrade Krestinsky managed at that time to get Wolf's representative to express readiness to recall Schaeffer at the end of the Shakhty trial, because during the trial this would have caused a colossal scandal. Now Comrade Krestinsky will stage again

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this question. This is the way for Schaeffer to be recalled from Moscow without a big scandal and without a heavy resonance. Perhaps at some point the pressure of the German Government could be of some use, but this is hard to foresee now. The intervention of the government in such a matter in a certain situation may even be harmful. Therefore, it would suffice to tell the German embassy that the removal of Schaeffer from Moscow is absolutely necessary for our relations with Germany, and that in the event that this turns out to be necessary, we will turn to the German government for assistance.

evidence.

NARKOMINDEL CHICHERIN

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 330. L. 161-164. Original. Typescript.

No. 195

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE SHAKHTINSKY CASE" (66)

July 19, 1928

No. 34, p. 11 - On the Shakhty case (comrade Karakhan).

a) Consider it expedient that the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee liquidate the Seebold case by deporting him from the USSR as an undesirable foreigner.

b) When bringing to the attention of the German ambassador about the measures to liquidate this case, at the same time inform him that Schaeffer's behavior is undesirable and aggravates relations between Germany and the USSR.

c) To instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to present to the next meeting their views on the expediency of responding to the role of the Polish embassy, in particular Patek, revealed in the Shakhty process, and the form of response.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 114-115. Script. Typescript.

No. 196

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION of Comrade KALMYKOV" (67)

August 2, 1928

No. 36, item 1. Question from Comrade Kalmykov (comrades Menzhinsky, Kalmykov, Artuzov, Nikolaev).

- a) Resolve the matter in the manner of the GPU.
- b) As a rule, those arrested should not be returned to Kabarda.
- c) Apply capital punishment to the most dangerous elements, regardless of whether they are involved in the case of Shipshv, the uprising or Dr. counterrevolutionary affairs.
- d) Limit capital punishment to approximately 50.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 118. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to: comrade Menzhinsky\*.

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No. 197

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT SPECIALISTS"

August 2, 1928

No. 36, p. 2 - On specialists (comrade Molotov).

- a) Issue the following directive to the GPU: in carrying out work to identify counter-revolutionary-sabotage elements in economic agencies, which (work) must be carried out systematically and intensively, especially with regard to the most important industrial and transport agencies, oblige the GPU to resort to repressions, and especially to the arrests of prominent specialists, with maximum and greater caution than is currently the case, allowing the arrests of only really malicious counter-revolutionaries, wreckers and spies.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 6. L. 118. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade Menzhinskoy - a; comrade Kuibyshev - a; comrade Rudzutaku - a.

No. 198

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ACCORDING TO V.R. MENZHINSKY  
ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE USE OF OGPU MATERIALS NKID

January 3, 1929

N ° 58, paragraph 2 - Statement of comrade. Menzhinsky (PB dated 20.XII-28, project No. 55, item 8)  
(comrades Kaganovich, Litvinov, Menzhinsky).

Accept the proposed t.t. Kaganovich, Litvinov and Menzhinsky the following draft resolution:

1) Messages and original documents delivered by the OGPU must be carefully studied and taken into account by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs when developing diplomatic measures and reporting events in international politics before the Politburo.

2) The materials of the OGPU can be used by members of the board of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in conversations with diplomatic representatives of foreign powers, only in exceptional cases in the general formulation of questions without reference to specific facts; if it is necessary to decipher specific facts, mandatory agreement with the OGPU is required.

3) To consider it possible to provide plenipotentiaries with indicative information concerning their countries of residence, gleaned from the materials of the OGPU, with the involvement of one of the senior officials of the OGPU for permanent agreement.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 21. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Menzhinsky, Litvinov.

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No. 199

DECISION OF THE ORGBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON VERIFICATION OF THE  
PERSONNEL OF SPECIALISTS OF  
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

January 7, 1929

No. 91, p. 2 - On the implementation of the decision of the April plenum of the Central Committee on checking the personnel of industry and transport specialists.

(Post. OB dated 10/X-28, pr. 63, p. 1, appendix) (comrades I. Kosior, Sulimov, Rosenthal, Amosov, Dogadov, Schwartz, Lugovoi, Voronova).

a) To ask Comrade Ordzhonikidze's commission to hear reports from the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of National Economy on the progress of work on checking the composition of specialists as soon as possible, instructing Comrade. Moskvina to negotiate with the commission Comrade. Ordzhonikidze on the timing of hearing the reports of the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat of National Economy.

b) Establish that all decisions on the transfers and dismissals of specialists made by the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of National Economy during the audit must be implemented immediately in agreement with the Orgaspred, without waiting for the end of the entire audit as a whole.

c) To assign to the OGPU, on the basis of the results of the audit, the compilation, in agreement with the Supreme Council of National Economy, the People's Commissariat of the Interior, and the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, of special lists of dismissed specialists, in respect of whose further work in the Soviet bodies certain restrictions should be introduced. All local Party organizations to oblige the Party leaders of all institutions and enterprises to strictly follow the instructions of the OGPU bodies on this issue and to provide them (OGPU) with full assistance in this work.

d) To oblige the NKTrud, in agreement with the Supreme Council of National Economy, the NKPS, the NKJ and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, to submit a draft directive for consideration by the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR within a week, ensuring that specialists dismissed in the order of inspection cannot be reinstated in their positions by the bodies of the NKJ and

nkt.

Propose to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to give the necessary instructions to the trade unions at the same time.

e) Propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR and the RSFSR and the NKPS to complete the work on checking the personnel of specialists in industry and transport, sum up the results of this check and report the results to the Organizing Bureau after discussing them in the commission of comrade. Ordzhonikidze.

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 332. L. 145-146. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Moskvina, Kuibyshev, I. Kosior, Rudzutak, Sulimov, Ordzhonikidze, Yanson, Menzhinsky, Dogadov, Politburo (2 copies).

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No. 200

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE EXPIRY OF L.D. TROTSKY ABROAD

January 10, 1929

No. 59, p. 29 - O Tr.

^Export abroad for anti-Soviet work\*. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 26. Original. Typescript.

\* The decision was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on January 7, 29.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade. Menzhinsky.

\*—\* Handwritten in ink.

No. 201

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CREATION OF THE COMMISSION

TO CHECK MOBILE WORKERS

January 10, 1929

No. 59, p. 33 - Question R.Z. STO (comrade Voroshilov).

To check responsible mob workers in the Union and Republican departments, create a commission consisting of comrades. Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Menzhinsky.

Convocation for com. Voroshilov.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 26-27. Script. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 10.1.29.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: comrade. Voroshi fishing, Kaganovich, Menzhinsky, Apoga.

No. 202

STATEMENT V.R. MENZHINSKY, G.G. BERRIES AND  
M.A. TRILISSER I.V. STALIN AND G.K.

ORDZHONIKIDZE ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE  
LEADERSHIP OF THE OGPU TO THE OPPOSITION

February 6, 1929

In a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist leaflet containing a record of the July conversations between Comrade Bukharin and Comrade T.T. Kamenev and Sokolnikov about the change of the PB, about the revision of the party line, etc., there are two passages dedicated to the OGPU:

1. To Comrade Kamenev's question: what are your strengths? Bukharin, listing them, allegedly said: "Yagoda and Trilisser are with us" and further

2. "Don't talk to me on the phone - they're eavesdropping. The GPU follows me, and you have the GPU.

Both of these assertions, which mutually exclude each other, are nonsense slander either on Comrade Bukharin or on us, and regardless of whether he spoke or

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nothing like Comrade Bukharin, we consider it necessary to categorically refute this slander in the face of the Party.

Please attach our statement to the minutes of the joint meeting of the PB and the President. Central Control Commission, having distributed such to the participants of this meeting.

Menzhinsky,

Berry

Trilisser

Heinrich Yagoda. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. General Commissar of State Security. Collection of documents. Kazan, 1997, pp. 336-337.

No. 203

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON CONSPIRACY" WITH APPENDIX CORRESPONDENCE IN  
THE CASE

May 9, 1929

No. 79, p. 15. - On conspiracy (PB of 3.V.29, project No. 78, p. 26). e) instruct Comrade Yaroslavsky to investigate Comrade Bukharin's statement.

In PB.

C. SECRETS ABOUT

Regarding Comrade Bukharin's statement that the monarchists had infiltrated the party, I learned only at the meeting of the PB on 9.V. I don't remember him telling me about it before (although he claims it). I asked Comrade Yagoda for "materials" on this case. Tov. Yagoda sent me:

1) a note to him from Comrade Bukharin dated 27-11;

2) an anonymous letter from some "foreign worker" with an absolutely fantastic report that about 4-5% of the Communists of the Moscow organization (4,500 people) are agents of the White Guards. Tov. Yagoda explained to me that the OGPU considers this letter a blackmailing, charlatan anonymous letter and no investigation has been carried out on it.

Although this letter gives me the same impression of a completely frivolous document, I sent an announcement to Pravda calling this "foreign worker".

All materials on this case are reported to the P / Bureau.

May 11, 29 Yaroslavsky

Copy from a copy  
of Tov. BERRY

Tov. Berry!

I am forwarding to you the letter received in my name, as well as the envelope in which it was sent.

27-11-29 N. Bukharin

Moscow

To the highly respected Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin

I, who recently arrived from abroad, became aware that the local White Guard, monarchist organizations have organized conspiratorial groups in the VKP(b) party over the past few years.

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At present, they have about 7,000 people throughout the USSR, of which 4,500 are in Moscow alone. Many of them occupy very high places in the CPSU(b) party and are very ferocious communists, as they are called there.

I know the details, and also HOW they became known, I can tell you personally or to some party organ, not the GPU.

foreign worker.

I will stay in the USSR for a while. You can call me through the newspaper Pravda with an appeal - I ask a foreign worker to appear ...

Envelope copy

Moscow, Old Comintern Square in the Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for N.I. Bukharin  
local

Copy

To the editors of Pravda

Please place in Pravda in the ads:

"Foreign worker.

Please come to the premises of the P / Collegium of the Central Control Commission to comrade. Yaroslavsky on Monday 13-V. or 14-V at 12 o'clock. day (Ilyinka 21, 3rd floor, room 309).

Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection

February 8, 1930

Tov. Bukharin N.I. Personally

Copy of the P / B of the Central Committee of the Sov. secret

Dear Nikolai Ivanovich, I inform you that the "foreign worker" who wrote you a letter about the organization of conspiratorial groups in the CPSU (b) by the White Guards and monarchists did not appear at the call through Pravda to the Central Control Commission and therefore we have no means to find him . It remains to think that this is just a blackmailer.

Yaroslavsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 200. L. 76-80. Copy. Typescript.

No. 204

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON CHINA"

June 13, 1929

No. 84, p. 24. - About China.

To prohibit, through the OGPU, any attempts to search the Chinese consulates on the territory of the USSR or to arrest members of these consulates.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 89. Original. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on 10.VI. 1929

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No. 205

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE PROCEEDING OF THE EMPLOYEE OF THE LATVIAN MISSION" (68)

June 27, 1929

No. 86, paragraph 4 - On the trial of an employee of the Latvian mission (comrade One hundred monks, Yagoda).

a) Accept the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on setting up a process for an employee of the Latvian mission.

b) Instruct Comrade Janson to supervise a sufficiently thorough preparation and



running this process.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 93. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Stomo Nyakov, Janson, Yagoda.

No. 206

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY  
ORGANIZATION IN THE MILITARY INDUSTRY" (69)

July 18, 1929

No. 89, item 37 - On the counter-revolutionary organization in the military industry  
ness.

a) Distribute the indictment of the OGPU to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control  
Commission, as well as business executives, including directors of factories, especially in the military industry.

b) Predetermine the execution of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary organization of wreckers in the war  
industry, and postpone the execution itself until a new decision of the Central Committee on the moment of execution.

c) Invite the OGPU to present a list of persons to be shot and materials.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 99. Original. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on July 15, 1929.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yagoda.

No. 207

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE MILITARY INDUSTRY"

July 18, 1929

No. 89, p. 38. - On the military industry (PB dated 11.VI.29, pr. N9 89,

Approve the draft resolution of the PB commission on the military industry (see Appendix No. 2).

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July 15, 1929 APPENDIX No. 2

to item 38. Ex. PB No. 89  
Sov. secret

#### DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE MILITARY INDUSTRY (Approved by the

Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 15, 1929)

1

1. Modern warfare, with its enormous scale, extreme tension, deep technical nature, urgently requires the all-round development of military-technical means of combat, the use of these means in mass quantities, their receipt from industry at the time necessary for defense and constant their improvement.

These conditions for the conduct of war put before industry, already in peacetime, the task of preparing for the rapid deployment of military production with the declaration of war to satisfy the needs of defense to the maximum.

In the preparation of industry for war, the leading role is played by the personnel military industry, which has the following main responsibilities:

- a) with the declaration of war, expand their production in the first place in order to feed the Red Army before the deployment of the rest of the industry;
- b) to maintain the technology of military production at the level of the requirements of modern warfare;
- c) improve the technical means of combat, quickly manufacture new types of weapons, introduce them into mass production as soon as possible, study and disseminate experience and skills in the manufacture of weapons to civilian industry factories;
- d) during mobilization, help and promote the development of related industries in civilian industry.

The existence in the system of Soviet industry of a special war industry with very powerful factories objectively creates an advantage for the Soviet Union over the bourgeois states in the matter of the best preparation of industry for the defense of the country.

2. However, it must be stated that the military industry has not yet been prepared to fulfill the tasks assigned to it and the situation with its preparation for defense is unsatisfactory.

solid state.

Essential for the defense of the Union are the following major shortcomings in the work of the war industry;

- a) a huge underestimation of the mobilization capacities of the factories of the military industry and, in connection with this, long periods of development of factories that do not correspond to the interests of defense to meet the minimum needs of the army in case of war, with the request for a significantly exaggerated

personal funds for capital construction;

b) the duration of the mobilization deployment of military factories (from 1 to 1.5 years), which creates a very dangerous gap between meeting the needs of the war with the available stocks and the beginning of the supply of military equipment to the front.

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the production of a mobilized industry and leads to the need to have large military reserves, unbearable for the state;

c) the presence of disproportions and bottlenecks in a number of branches of military production and factories, such as, for example, gunpowder production is not provided with acids, and the production of gunpowder, in turn, does not provide the number of given shots; the production of guns, machine guns and rifles is not provided with an appropriate amount of special steels, most factories are not provided with electricity, and military chemical plants and steam power plants. This makes it impossible at the present time to fully use the production capabilities of military factories for defense;

d) putting out of action until 1927, and in some cases even direct destruction of defense plants. Examples: the Baranovsky plant was destroyed, the Bachmanovsky arsenal and the Bezhetsky rifle repair plant were disarmed; the Okhtensky, Shlisselburgsky, Shostensky and Tambov powder factories were disarmed and put out of action;

e) confusion in some cases, mainly at the Gun-Arsenal Trust, of technological processes for the production of very important military products (artillery, tanks). Examples: for two years and to date, the technological process for the production of tanks at the Motovilikha and Bolshevik plants has not been developed; for the production of anti-aircraft guns, the technological process for cutting instead of the normal 8 hours is set at 16 hours, and the gun itself, during its production, walks back and forth several times around the plant, etc. ;

f) the problem of factory repairs during the war of the materiel of artillery, rifles and machine guns and provision of artillery with limbers, charging boxes, wheels, etc., has not yet been resolved. Examples: the production of the main arsenal property - limbers, charging boxes, wheels, etc. - based on the front-line arsenals - Leningrad, Kiev, Bryansk. Not a single plant in the rear is suitable for the production of arsenal equipment. Therefore, in the event of a complication of the situation with front-line arsenals, it is not known which plants will take over the production of arsenal equipment.

With regard to the factory repair of rifles and machine guns, the situation is as follows: the Bezhetsky repair plant has been put out of action; instead of Bezhetsky, no other plant was given a task for repairs. If, however, the repair of rifles is assigned to the Tula and Izhevsk Ruzh. factories, this will reduce by 30% the release of new rifles and machine guns by them;

g) the pattern-tool business for the most important military productions has not been created and is in a state of disarray. Since during the war it would be necessary to speed up the production of molds and tools, this would inevitably lead to a lengthening of the turnaround time and a deterioration

combat qualities of the weapon. Examples: at the present time, the establishment of a molding and instrumental business does not provide production for the mobilization of the Izhevsk, Tula, Penza, Motovilikhinsky, Kovrov and other factories;

h) a huge fleet of spare machine tools was not used and partially rendered unusable; At the same time, unnecessary machine tools were ordered for import at the expense of large sums of money. Examples: until recently, there were machines without a specific purpose at the factories - Motovilikha - over a thousand; Putilov - about a thousand Chi > Leningrad pipe - 1800 machines, etc.; and only in factories in

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In the military industry, there were 8-10 thousand machine tools without appointment. Excess machine tools and equipment were issued by the Motovilikhinsky plant, Bolshevik, and others;

i) unacceptable slow production of new prototype weapons and long (3-4 years) terms of setting their production in mass production;

j) the maintenance of hitherto obsolete technological processes in all factories and the stubborn unwillingness of the apparatuses of the military industry in all its links to innovate and improve these processes;

k) shortfalls in the Gun-Arsenal and Aviatrusts, non-fulfillment of programs for the manufacture of spare parts and the lack of interchangeability of parts for individual weapons;

l) the extremely insufficient use of the fixed capital of the military industry in relation to the loading of peaceful products, and in some cases the irrational use of military equipment for these industries. Example: the Bolshevik lock-and-sight was disabled by adapting it to a tractor (from 1922 to the present);

m) unsatisfactory use of working capital in the military industry, which led, and could not but lead, to the most tense financial situation and cash breakthroughs in individual trusts; Until now, the trusts are hoping for handouts from the state, without taking sufficient measures to streamline their finances;

o) the entire development of the military industry and its preparation for war was based entirely on the caste of old specialists of tsarist Russia, and the question of training in the required number of Soviet specialists in military production until 1928/29 completely fell out of sight as a military production thinking, and the Supreme Economic Council itself. This has led to the fact that at the present time, when it has been established that most of the old specialists belong to a counter-revolutionary organization, the military industry finds itself in a critical situation with regard to technical leadership.

Such a situation in the military industry created a dangerous gap between industry and the needs of defense, as a result of which the Red Army would be deprived of the opportunity to fully use the available industrial resources for defense and would not receive a number of very important weapons in the first period of the war (heavy artillery, tanks, poisonous substances, etc.).

3. The above situation in the military industry was the following action:

a) long-term and systematic wrecking work of a large counter-revolutionary organization in the military industry (VPU, trusts, factories);

b) the lack of vigilance among the party leadership of the military industry, from the leading workers of the Military Industry of the VPU to the factories;

c) excessive trust in specialists, especially in their top (engineers Mikhailov, Vysochansky, etc.) and the absence of even minimal control over the work of specialists on the part of the leading communist composition of the military industry. In most cases, the leading communist cadres of the war industry have reduced their role in the management of industry, trusts and enterprises to mere administration on the basis of reports and reports presented to them by the apparatus (filled with and often led by wrecking elements), and did not consider for themselves obliged to delve into the essence of production, to work

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over yourself and improve in order to become a true master of the business, improve and improve the management system and study production technological processes;

d) under the pretext of military secrecy (excessive secrecy), the non-party and communist active workers in production were actually excluded from active participation in the organization and rationalization of production.

This situation led to the fact that for a number of years the decisive and leading role in the war industry was played by the caste of old specialists in tsarist Russia, for the most part part of the counter-revolutionary organization and upsetting the war industry.

4. The real situation in the military industry, revealed by the joint efforts of the People's Commissariat of the RCT of the USSR and the OGPU, turned out to be in no way consistent with the optimistic coverage that entered the system of assessing the military industry in the reports of the Central Committee. VKP(b) and the Government from the leaders of the military industry. Some achievements obtained in the field of raising labor productivity, reducing costs, improving the quality and quantity of manufactured products, introducing some new types of production, etc. - must be marked. However, these achievements are completely insufficient, neither in terms of the funds invested in the military industry, nor in terms of the amount of time spent on these achievements. At the same time, these achievements were put forward by the leaders of the military industry as indicators of the general well-being of the industry, which further helped to cover up the actual difficult situation in the preparation of the military industry for defense.

5. Significant correction of the above situation in the military

industry is provided for by the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the approved resolutions of the RZ STO on plans for the capital construction of industry for 1928/29. However, even at the present time it must be admitted that in the first half of 1928/29 the military industry was not adequately prepared to carry out the capital construction plan assigned to it, and the necessary turning point had not yet occurred in the operation of the apparatus, guaranteeing both the fulfillment of the construction plan, and urgent correction of the consequences of the work of the counter-revolutionary organization.

## II

Raising the defense capacity of the USSR requires the adoption of decisive measures to immediately correct the aforementioned difficult situation in the military industry. In accordance with this, the Politburo decides:

1. The Presidium of the Central Control Commission should urgently consider the issue of imposing penalties and bringing to justice both the current and former leaders of the military industry (Military industry, VPU, trusts and factories), guilty of insufficient vigilance for many years of and obvious sabotage and omissions in military industry and submit their proposals to the Politburo.

2. A special commission composed of com. Pavlunovsky (chairman) and

t.t. Uryvaev, Molochnikov and Bulin, and one representative each from metalworkers and chemists, to purge all personnel of the military industry down to and including factories as soon as possible.

3. Recognize the need to renew the leadership of the military industry, starting with the board of the VPU and ending with the factories.

Organizing Bureau within two weeks to carry out this event.

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4. The Organizing Bureau, within a month, mobilize at least 100 people for the military industry, mainly party members, experienced production workers and young engineers.

5. Taking into account that the military industry is predominantly highly skilled production and at the same time has insignificant technical personnel, especially after the liquidation of the wrecking organization of old specialists, the Supreme Council of National Economy should immediately resolve the issue of strengthening military industry technical personnel (through retraining, short-term courses, etc.) and at the same time develop a plan for the systematic training of technical personnel for it.

6. The Supreme Council of National Economy develop a plan (and begin its immediate implementation) to eliminate the consequences of sabotage in the military industry.

Pay special attention to capital construction, electric steam power facilities, pattern and tool making, the arsenal problem, the study and improvement (rationalization) of technological processes, the elimination of disproportions between industries and workshops, etc. In this regard, proceed from the need, already in 1929/30, to achieve the elimination of the indicated consequences of sabotage and the creation of a healthy production environment in factories and trusts.

When developing a program to eliminate the consequences of sabotage, use all available materials, specifically study each object of wrecking separately and widely involve in this work all enterprises that have been affected by sabotage.

7. The successful resolution of the huge problem of technical equipment of the Red Army, and in particular, the timely implementation of the measures approved by the Politburo for artillery, tank, aviation, chemical rearmament according to the five-year plan, is possible only if there are strong design and technical bureaus at military enterprises. → industry, working in full cooperation with all research and technical institutions of the country and attracting foreign technical assistance. Proceeding from this, the Supreme Council of National Economy should immediately strengthen the existing design and technical bureaus at the factories with experienced specialists, organize them where they are absent, and attract technical assistance from abroad. Particular attention should be paid to artillery, tank, aviation and chemical engineering.

8. The second condition for the successful implementation of the plan for the technical re-equipment of the Red Army is the rapid manufacture of prototypes of new weapons and the organization of their mass production.

Therefore, the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy, together with the People's Commissariat of Economics, to achieve by all means the shortest possible time in the manufacture of prototypes, their testing and verification, and their introduction into mass production.

Considering this task one of the most important, the Politburo categorically demands its full resolution.

9. Noting the insufficient loading of military plants with military orders, the Supreme Council of National Economy, in order to reduce the time for deploying military factories and to maximize the use of the fixed capital of the military industry, from 1929/30 to raise the rate of loading military plants with civilian products to the maximum limits. Within two months, the RZ STO to consider a plan for loading civilian industries for 1929/30.

10. The Supreme Economic Council to take measures to improve the working capital of the military industry. RZ STO to urgently consider the issue of easing the financial

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tension in the military industry and on the procedure for covering the cash gap in the Gun-Arsenal and Aviation trusts, as well as to outline measures to prevent the recurrence of such phenomena.

11. RZ STO to consider the issue of prices for the products supplied to the Military Veterinary Department at the angle of their necessary reduction, simultaneously setting firm settlement prices for all weapons, allowing indicative prices as an exception for newly established industries, and then only for the first period.

12. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Defense, the OGPU and the Supreme Council of National Economy to revise the existing order of secrecy at military factories so that the maximum participation of workers in control over production is ensured and at the same time military secrets are preserved.

13. Propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Economics within a month to clarify the relationship in terms of: a) the transfer of pilot orders, the time of their manufacture in the shortest possible time and their rapid passage through the test; b) execution of peacetime orders and timely supply of industry with technical conditions and drawings.

To establish strict supervision over the implementation of all the above measures of the RZ SRT.

Due to its special secrecy, it must be kept as a cipher.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 99, 113-121. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshi fishing, Rukhimovich, Yakovlev, Rudzutak.

\*\* The attachment contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "This resolution reproduced in five copies and distributed: 1st copy. for the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the 2nd RZ STO - comrade Rudzutak, the 3rd NK RCI of the USSR - comrade Yakovlev, the 4th Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR - comrade Rukhimovich, the 5th RVS of the USSR - comrade Voroshilov.

No. 208

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE ANTI-SOVIET CONTENT OF RAKOVSKY'S  
TELEGRAMS AND MEASURES TO PREVENT  
ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES OF THE TROTSKISTS

August 22, 1929

No. 94, p. 26. - On the telegrams of Rakovsky and others.

a) Point out to the OGPU and the NK Postel the inadmissibility of missing the anti-Soviet telegrams of Rakovsky and others, and propose not to allow this in the future.

b) Propose to the OGPU that Rakovsky be sent from Saratov to remote districts of the R-Volga or other region. The same measures should be taken with regard to other prominent Trotskyists who do not stop their work.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 137. Original. Typescript.

\*\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 19.VIII.29.

The text contains a typewritten note about the rassshka: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Trilisser -



All: comrade Antipov - "a".

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No. 209

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT sabotage"

September 5, 1929

N ° 96, item 27 - On sabotage (telegram about Ridzer dated September 1 of this year).

a) Instruct the OGPU to conduct the strictest investigation into the case of the fire at Ridtser, as well as the case of the accident at the Shatura power plant on August 5 of this year. and generally increase vigilance against sabotage in industry.

b) On the basis of the latest facts of wrecking in factories and factories, instruct the secretariat of the Central Committee to issue a directive through the party line on maximum vigilance against wrecking in industry and in general in the state economy.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 756. L. 5-6. Script. Typescript.

No. 210

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC RCP(b)

"ABOUT MENZHINSKY" (70)

September 12, 1929

No. 97, p. 54. - About Menzhinsky.

Oblige comrade Menzhinsky to follow the instructions of the doctors exactly (see Appendix No. 4).

Annex No. 4 to  
paragraph 54 of the PB No. 97

MEDICAL OPINION ON THE QUESTION  
ABOUT WORK CONDITIONS TOV. MENZHINSKY

In connection with the entry of Comrade MENZHINSKY into the performance of official duties, we consider it categorically necessary, taking into account the state of his health at the present time, to indicate that the patient must: 1) work no more than 4 days a week and in no case more than 5 hours a day; 2) Friday, Saturday and Sunday must be spent in complete rest from official employment.

The period of the regime must be set to monthly.

The regime change will be determined by a special consultation, which will meet in a month.

KONCHALOVSKY

DIETRICH

FRANZEN

ZELENSKY

RGASPI. F. 17. Op.Z. D.757. L. 9, 15. Original. Typescript.

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The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 12.9.29.

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No. 211

NOTE I.V. STALIN V.R. MENZHINSKY

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-CRITICISM INSIDE THE GPU

September 16, 1929

Tov. Menzhinsky!

First of all, how is your health? And then two words about Chekist affairs. The point is that I consider it necessary to warn you about certain painful phenomena in the GPU organizations, about which Redens told me the other day. It turns out that you (the Chekists) have now embarked on an extensive self-criticism within the GPU.

In other words, the Chekists make the same mistakes that were made recently in military science. If this is true, then it threatens to disintegrate the GPU and the collapse of Chekist discipline. Do not forget that the GPU is no less a military organization than a military specialist.

Is it possible to check this case and, if it is confirmed, to take decisive measures against this evil.

Hello I. Stalin

R.8. By the way, Comrade Menzhinsky!

I heard that Evdokimov is being transferred to Moscow for secret operative work (it seems, instead of Deribas). Shouldn't it be held at the same time by a member of the Board? It seems to me that it should .

I. Stalin

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 42. Original. Typescript.

No. 212

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT KULAK TERROR

September 26, 1929

No. 99, p. 8 - Message from T.T. Sheboldaev and Trilisser.

a) In view of the discovery of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Kulak insurgent organization in the Lower Volga region, instruct the OGPU to take decisive measures to eliminate it, by shooting up to 50 leaders of the organization, especially from among the big kulaks, regular officers and repatriates. (71)

To issue an appropriate notice to the press about the verdict with execution of the most prominent group of noble-kulak-Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the organization.

b) In addition to cases of individual terrorist attacks against representatives of grassroots Soviet and party organizations and social activists, active supporters of the Soviets of power, considered in court, establish that, as a rule, cases of anti-Soviet speeches in the countryside are also dealt with in court.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 158. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on 23.1X.29.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Grilis Se RU, Janson - everything.

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No. 213

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE ESTIMATE OF THE OGPU"

October 15, 1929

No. 102, p. 50. - Question of Comrade Menzhinsky (PB dated 12.9.29, pr. No. 97, p. 51). Approve the estimate of the OGPU for 1929-30 in the amount of 57.5 million rubles. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 179. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 15.X.29.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extracts have been sent to: comrade Gorbunov;  
Comrade Bryukhanov; Comrade Yagoda.

No. 214

NOTE G.G. BERRIES AND YA.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT  
YA.G. BLYUMKIN WITH INTERVIEW  
OF THE CC TO MEMBERS AND  
CANDIDATES TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) (72)

October 24, 1929

No. 16297 C

On behalf of Comrade Stalin, a note of the OGPU dated 21.X.29 is being sent to you for information, with a copy of Blumkin's testimony and a copy of Trotsky's directive letter attached.

Application: copy No\_ on 23 sheets.

Pom. Secretary of the Central Committee

October 21, 1929 Top secret

No. 44053

Sending you copies of Ya.G. BLYUMKIN and a directive letter from L.D. Trotsky, we inform you that BLYUMKIN was arrested at the MIII on October 5 of this year. in view of the information we received about the treacherous connection between BLYUMKIN and L.D. Trotsky during BLYUMKIN's stay in Constantinople and BLYUMKIN's intention to escape from Moscow.

During a search of BLYUMKIN, an unfinished letter addressed to comrade. TRILISSERA, in which he reports on the nature of his connection with Trotsky, on the directives received from the latter and his illegal connection with the Trotskyists upon his return from Constantinople in August this year. During interrogation, BLYUMKIN testified that he intended to send this letter to Comrade. TRILISSER and immediately escape from Moscow, as he feared the inevitable reprisals.

Deputy prev. OGPU Yagoda  
Deputy early SO OGPU Agranov

October 21, 1929

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Deputy early SO OGPU comrade. Agranov

Testimony of Ya.G. Blumkin

Around the spring of 1927, I began to lean toward the views of the Trotskyist opposition on questions of international (the Comintern) and domestic policy of the Party.

Thus, below we will talk about my party behavior over a period of more than two years.

The impetus for my solidarity with the Trotskyist opposition was not questions of internal politics, but the Comintern questions, in particular and mainly the questions of the Chinese revolution, which interested me more directly, in view of my work in the Far East, in Mongolia.

Arriving in April 1927 on a business trip to Moscow from Mongolia, where I was a representative of the OGPU and Chief Instructor of the State Internal Guard of the Mongolian Republic, I found myself in the midst of a discussion on the question of the Chinese revolution. Interested in her, I then visited Comrade. Radek at his apartment (he found Alsky and others at Radek's) and informed him of his oppositional moods.

Being to a very large extent divorced from the actual divergence between the party and the Trotskyist opposition on questions of domestic policy, as well as its factional work, I spent the whole period in Mongolia, being very overloaded with instructor Chekist and any other work (I had resident assignments for a number of adjacent countries - Tibet, Inner Mongolia, some points in China). Purely business concentration, detachment from the USSR, congestion, all this led to the fact that I did not detect oppositional activity, either analytical or practical. On the contrary, before my departure for Moscow in the spring, I repeatedly made guiding reports to the Party organization in Urga in the spirit of the policy of the majority of the Central Committee.

I arrived in Moscow in November. This was already after the street demonstrations of the opposition. The very fact of the opposition's appeal to the non-Party masses I learned with great difficulty and did not share it.

At the end of my stay in Mongolia, the GPU was informed about my oppositional moods. And that I was meeting in Moscow with some leaders of the opposition, the GPU also knew. For the GPU this was no secret. The GPU knew my vacillations.

I have to say that t.t. Menzhinsky, Trilisser and Yagoda showed a very great tolerance and readiness to help me finish with these shanks.  
niami.

Soon after my arrival, these comrades had a conversation with me, in the sense indicated above. I gave them all sorts of guarantees of my KGB loyalty, but I did not completely dissociate myself from the opposition.

Sosnovsky, to whom I appeared on my arrival in Moscow with a declaration of my solidarity with the opposition, was the only person through whom I was connected with the opposition. After listening to me, he said that he must talk to Trotsky about the form of my use. At the same time, he said that Comrade Radek and Tarkhanov (Tarkhanov was with me in Urga on his way from China) already knows about my opposition and that, in particular, Radek attaches great importance to using me as an expert in illegal technology. If the party had no other grounds, then only from this alone it could be concluded that already at that period the opposition was thinking about

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building an illegal organization. The most interesting thing in my conversation with Sosnovsky was that, as it seemed to me, he treated me with some distrust. During part of our conversation, \* Comrade was present. Boguslavsky.

During the second meeting, Sosnovsky told me that he had talked about me with Trotsky. Sosnovsky recommended that I should not put my signature under the platform of the opposition, as the oppositionist had not yet been legalized, and that they could use me in some future illegal work\*. In the meantime, could I, asked Sosnovsky, tell him whether the opposition was going to be arrested and exiled, and that in general it would be nice if, while I was working in the apparatus of the OGPU, I could inform the opposition about those issues that were connected with its immediate political fate. Sosnovsky also said that the fact of my cooperation with the opposition would be hidden from Radek and Boguslavsky under the pretext that I had once been a Left Socialist-Revolutionary (11 years ago). This struck me as particularly poignant. As if the opposition could or could not forbid me to identify with them. This circumstance, combined with my impression that they were wary of me, made me somewhat cold.

In general, the opposition in that period (autumn 1927) was in complete confusion as regards organizational prospects. On the one hand, people, apparently, were thinking about some kind of illegal work, on the other hand, they still seriously considered it necessary to obey the party, denied the formation of a faction, expecting arrests and exiles, designing illegal work, at the same time remained in a legal position, it was quite difficult to understand anything at all, and this circumstance discouraged me, a person accustomed to organizational clarity. That is why I understood Sosnovsky's proposal to inform the opposition about very limited things of interest to it through the line of the OGPU\* as some kind of undignified, incompletely thought out and completely unrelated to the purely organizational calculations of the opposition.

After this meeting, Sosnovsky and I had several meetings - 2-3. There seem to be only two. One of them was in the apartment of one of my personal friends, a doctor; the rest are in Sosnovsky's apartment. These meetings were very short, and Sosnovsky's wife, Olga Danilovna, was present, I told things of a semi-gossipy nature and myself received information about what was happening from the opposition.

It goes without saying that if I had seriously thought about getting information for the opposition, using my position in the GPU, then in spite of all the objective and subjective difficulties I would have behaved quite differently. It is very easy to answer this first basic question, which I myself raised - my behavior.

Firstly, I had nothing to do with the departments dealing with the opposition; secondly, among the workers of these departments, with the exception of two or three comrades, I never had and still do not have any personal acquaintances; thirdly, my meetings with the leaders of the GPU have always been purely businesslike, concerned with my direct work; fourth,

the general Chekist restraint and secretiveness is in itself a sufficient obstacle to informing.

If we were now to recruit all the employees of the SOU and other departments related to the opposition, and ask them if I was interested in anyone, ever and in any form, in anything, the answer would be categorically negative. . And those two or three comrades that I spoke about are comrades Agranov, Artuzov and conditionally comrade. Deribas. And here you are, comrade. Agranov, yesterday, together with Comrade. Deribas answered my mentioned question that I never

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in what form before his departure abroad did not ask you about anything and was not interested.

There is still the question of the possibility of obtaining materials. As an employee of the foreign part of the INO, I had nothing to do with the materials of other departments and never received or saw general information reports from the OGPU.

As for the materials of the INO itself, all comrades from the INO can also confirm that I have never been interested in anything except for the Mongolian cases, in which I have shown and still show great interest. It is rather difficult to obtain materials on other cases from the INO. There remain Mongolian affairs, that in them I myself am a fairly good reference book. But it was precisely these matters that Sosnovsky was not interested in. The only Mongolian case that interested him and about which Sosnovsky learned from me, on my own initiative, was the case of Nesterov and Stepanov arrested by me in Mongolia. By the way, the OGPU itself made it possible for a number of oppositionists (Rakovsky, Trotsky, Pyatakov, and others) to get acquainted with the Nesterov case. But only the characterization that I gave these people was far from being in favor of the opposition. Without having the slightest idea of the degree of involvement of these people in opposition work, I considered them, mainly Nesterov, as a pest of Soviet work in Mongolia, as an agent of the right part of the MONPRA in Soviet briefings, as a White Guard who was needed without hesitation , destroy. As for Stepanov, I arrested him mechanically, following an unmotivated order from the OGPU, but in Moscow I was not at all interested in him.

The Nesterov case was the only case related to the opposition, about which I once talked with Comrade. Agranov. On his initiative, and then not as a questioner, but as an answer to Agranov's questions about Nesterov's activities in Mongolia. Tov. Agranov can confirm what a murderous characterization I gave to this white man. But I did not hide my attitude to this matter from Sosnovsky, just as I did not hide it from anyone in the OGPU.

As I said above, my departure from Mongolia was due to the fact that Nesterov was among a number of White Guards who I took out of there. And now I was sorry that the great work that I had done in Mongolia and abroad during the year and which was part of the huge work, designed for three years, that it was disrupted, put in jeopardy due to the arrest of Nesterov.

I deliberately dwelled on the above in such detail, not because

I am suspected of something. On the contrary, you, comrade. Agranov and tov. Deribas, during our yesterday's conversation, it was quite clear that any suspicions were abandoned. But if some people could have doubts as to whether I did not use my stay in the OGPU to inform the opposition, and if my personal sincere word were not enough for these doubters, then let them have → an objective picture of my capabilities and my actual behavior.

At the same time, I ask you, of course, to remember that all the time we are talking not about informing any foreign power, but also about Party members, yesterday's leaders of many branches of Party and Soviet work, wavering revolutionaries. Comrades who were only interested in questions related to their personal fate. The latter was very typical for the opposition at that time. For example, when I once met with

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Ioselevich, my former deputy for the People's Commissariat of Trade, the only thing that interested him and what he asked me about was whether he would be arrested or not and whether I could tell him this as a friend. Ioselevich can confirm to you that I categorically refused to talk to them about this.

It is also interesting, after all, what could I tell him during two meetings with Sosnovsky. I remember this very well, and although no one asked me about it, I take the initiative to raise this question and answer it. The GPU must not have any doubts about my frankness to the end.

I remember that by chance, when I was at Deribas's, I heard that he was aware of some measures taken by the opposition to find an apartment for Zinoviev. I jokingly told Sosnovsky about this.

At that time, they planned to send me to liquidate the uprising in Yakutia. Tov. Yagoda, I was asked to get acquainted with Comrade. Puzitsky with materials. I have not seen or read these materials, because. comrade Puzitsky kept postponing my acquaintance with them until he himself was sent to liquidate this uprising, but I heard something from one brief conversation with him. And I informed Sosnovsky about the fact that we have a White Guard bandit uprising in Yakutia in connection with my proposed trip there.

I heard by chance in the GPU apparatus that one of the missions assesses the ongoing internal party struggle as a symptom of the fall of the Soviet republic.

bench press.

And I told Sosnovsky about this, but at the same time in a tone of apprehension, lest the opposition actually play into the hands of the imperialists.

That's about all that I told him during my two meetings with Sosnovsky. The great innocence, miserliness and randomness of this "information" is in itself quite obvious.

During our meetings, Sosnovsky, and especially Olga Danilovna, was mainly interested in whether I could personally give them money.



I promised them to sell some of my personal belongings and, accordingly, give money, while they expressed great retrospective regret over the fact that at one time, being in power, they did not bother to save money for a rainy opposition day.

All this happened during the end of November - December. During this period we met only two or three times. This, in itself, is quite revealing. I did not meet with any of the oppositionists during this period. In January, the opposition was expelled. I remember that I said goodbye to Sosnovsky by telephone. After that, I saw Olga Danilovna once over the course of several months. During this meeting, it was mainly about me giving money, and the main content of the meeting was the digestion of what is happening.

In March, I went to the Caucasus for treatment and was treated until May or June. Now judge for yourself how intensively I informed the opposition.

In April, in Gagra, I met with Leonid Petrovich Serebryakov, who had arrived there from Semipalatinsk. It is known that by this moment the first retreats had already taken place and moments began to appear in the party line that could not in any way arouse opposition to themselves.

My repeated conversations with Leonid Petrovich Serebryakov, from whom, back in 1919, I accepted combat missions in the rear of one of the fronts, when I almost paid with my life, convinced me that even then, at least, such oppositionists as Serebryakov, found ground for rapprochement between the party and the opposition on the main issues - the fight against

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fist, assessment of the right danger. He, Serebryakov, told me verbatim that now it would be very easy to come to an agreement, but that this is hindered by the fact that the party demands a renunciation of views, an admission of guilt, etc., i.e. the sensations are mainly psychological. Poorly imagining at the time that Serebryakov's point of view could have a shade, I regarded it as an evolution of the entire opposition. The conversation with Serebryakov pushed me very strongly away from the opposition, but the psychological wounds were very fresh, and in particular, there was a very sharp question about Trotsky.

When I returned to Moscow in May or June, then the so-called. the left course was in full swing. It found expression in the promulgation of the slogans of self-criticism and pressure on the fist, in the conclusions that the Party drew from the grain procurements, and in the well-known decisions of the April Plenum of the Central Committee in 1928.

All this softened my oppositional mood to a great extent, and struggling between political analysis and a feeling of bitterness about the fate of a number of people in the party, I personally found a way out for myself in that I gladly accepted a new offer of work abroad.

Since the discussion above was about informing the opposition by me, I will allow myself to cite the opposite fact here. The conversation with Serebryakov and his appraisal of the situation so pushed me in the direction of the Party that, having arrived in Moscow, I immediately informed Comrade. Trilisser and Menzhinsky in detail about the mood of Serebryakov, indicating that he was on his way to the party. Moreover, I even had a semi-official order from Serebryakov to discuss this with Comrade. Menzhinsky, which I did, because

considered such a proposal politically acceptable.

Upon arrival, I happened to be on Nikitskaya st. met on the eve of her departure to Barnaul with Olga Danilovna. I pointed out to her the party course, the increasing waste, and, as the latest fact, Serebryakov's mood. She greeted me at first with a reproach about the fact that I did not give money and did not appear to her, and after the political part of our conversation she directly suspected that I was an agent of the GPU. I remember how now, she told me: "What did they go to Gagra to decompose, chip off?" We parted hostilely.

From the moment of my return to Moscow and my acceptance of the offer of legal work in the East, I began to spin in business. The preparation of people, the cover - all this required all the energy and attention and traveling around Russia (Leningrad, Rostov and other points). During this period I was a disciplined member of the party. In the meantime, the party line as a left line was developing more and more widely, rejections from the opposition increased, and when I left the USSR in September, the opposition moods died out in me. True, the party line was characterized by the opposition as a left-wing zigzag of right-wing politics. I had doubts about this, but I told myself that fear is one thing - a semi-proven thing, and the facts of today's political day are another thing, quite conclusive, and that to decide whether it is a zigzag or not a zigzag, regardless already from the fact that, by proclaiming this or that policy, the party binds itself in a certain way, it will be possible only with time, after some indicative and significant period of time has elapsed.

I formulated the position for myself in this way. The radius of divergence between the Party and the opposition is narrowing every day, and that if back in the period at the Fifteenth Congress the opposition could resist the demands of capitulation, now, in the autumn of 1928, there is no longer anything to capitulate from. Grieving very hard at the fact that with this course of the party many of its natural sons are in exile and prisons, I consoled myself with the fact that in the end

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eventually the radius of divergence between them and the party on political grounds will narrow and in a year at most these people will return to the party, which to a very large extent has actually happened by now.

I think that this can be the end of the first period of my party behavior in more than 2 years, from the spring of 1927 to the autumn of 1928; the exposition in its main and characteristic points is absolutely complete.

From October 1928 to February 1929, I had no opportunity abroad, being in an illegal position, to follow the political life of the Union. The conditions of my conspiracy forced me to hide my knowledge of the Russian language at times. The only source of my observation of the life of the Soviet Union was, and then occasionally, the White Guard press, but in its obscure and malicious cuts, it was very difficult to subtract anything. However, she shed light on one fact quite fully - the fact of the struggle against the Rights, and I registered this fact as new evidence of the groundlessness of the opposition's policy. At the same time, this same fact further strengthened my confidence that the return of the opposition to the par-

This is a matter for the near future.

This is clear if one bears in mind that I understood the struggle against the Rights as a struggle not with individuals, but with a specific political program, in reaction to which the opposition, underestimating the Leninist vigilance of the Central Committee, formulated

shaft many of his theses.

That during this period a most complex process takes place within the opposition itself, that at the time when one part of it is going through the evolution that I imagined, another part (Trotsky) pulls out a special buried permanent, turns right, etc., about this I had no idea abroad. That is why, against the backdrop of my, to a certain extent, idyllic confidence that the party would keep the opposition comrades for itself completely, I was shocked by the whole thing about Trotsky's expulsion abroad.

When, in one of the European cities where I arrived in connection with my work in the East, I learned about the expulsion of Trotsky as a fact, then, first of all, from my above point of view, I was politically completely disoriented \*. It seemed to me that I had misconceived the prospect of a rapprochement between the Party and the opposition, and that it was not factional narrowness that was to blame, but the Party. First of all, it seemed to me that the expulsion of Trotsky was a symptom of the fact that the last line of the party was a zigzag. At that time I did not understand the whole specificity of the particular problem of the expulsion of Trotsky. The expulsion also terribly disturbed me in an emotional sense. I was in a state of nervous illness for several days. The fact of Trotsky's expulsion abroad was perceived by me from the angle of physical danger threatening him. For me there was not the slightest doubt that he would be killed in the next few days by terrorist elements of the monarchist emigration. \*I thought that for all his political delusions, the party should not have put him in front of this danger\*. I also thought that the party should not, by expelling him abroad, deprive him of the opportunity to return to it. Factional narrowness prevented me from seeing the reason for this not in Trotsky himself, but in the party. My first reaction was to leave immediately for Constantinople, but the interests of the cause prevailed; and I spent as much time in Europe as was necessary for the successful accomplishment of all my operations.

\*I arrived in Constantinople on April 10.

Now, from the moment I received the news of Trotsky's expulsion, the second period in my party behavior for the above period begins. emo

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The emotional shock from the fact of Trotsky's expulsion, with the political disorientation that this fact caused in me, revived the oppositional ferment in me and consolidated it at a sharp angle\*. It was in this state that I arrived in Constantinople. I was guided by the idea, first of all, to help Trotsky personally. On April 12, walking along Pera Street, at the tunnel, I accidentally met Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov, whom I knew earlier in the USSR. I greeted him and asked him for information about the events that led to the expulsion of Trotsky, and said that I was a friend and he could trust me.

The information he gave me about the mass growth of the opposition, that the fight against the Rights is a tactical step, etc., could not help to weaken my oppositional relapse. On April 16th I had my first

and the only meeting with Trotsky. It happened in his apartment on Iset Pasha Street and lasted over 4 hours. With those feelings that seized me, for the first time in many years of my work in the organs of the OGPU, I lost the feeling of Chekist discipline. At the same time, the other, purely business-like side of this discipline forced me, when going to meet Trotsky, to observe secret guarantees so as not to endanger my immediate work.

A very large part of our conversation was devoted to things of no political interest. Trotsky told the details of his exile, his life in Alma-Ata, indulged in some even more distant memories, shared his views on visas to Europe, his impressions of Turkey, etc., was interested in my life and work for the entire period before my departure abroad. When, in telling him about Mongolia, I touched on the reasons for my departure, he recalled with interest the Nesterov case.

As in my conversation with Sosnovsky, I could not tell him anything more than what was said above, especially since he himself got acquainted with this case at the GPU. Frankly, I shared my annoyance at the fact that Nesterov's arrest disrupted all my work in Urga, I shared with him.

When this personal part of the conversation was over, Trotsky turned our conversation onto a political track. He did not engage in any complete exposition of his political mood, apparently believing that I was sufficiently aware of this. First of all, I heard from him a completely clear point of view \*on the possibility of the fall of the Soviet regime, not as a distant prospect, but as a possibility of the coming months\*. I remember his literal expression that "before the wave went up, but now it goes down, rapidly down." At the same time, Trotsky did not motivate, as a result of which catastrophic processes he expresses his conviction about the fall of the Soviet power almost in the coming months. I remember clearly, speaking of my relations with representatives of the GPU in the consulate, he said to me: "I told this comrade Minsky that maybe you would call me in 3-4 months to read a report on the topic "What to do", but then it will be too late."

I had the impression that Trotsky regards his expulsion almost as one of the signs of the possibility of the fall of the Soviet regime in the coming months\*. Having limited himself to this phrase, he immediately proceeded to what the opposition should actually do in connection with such a prospect. He said that since Soviet power might soon perish, the task was to find among the elements of the Communist Party such cadres who, with the change of the Soviet regime

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some other system form the left opposition of the proletariat under the conditions of this new system, when the present Communist Party will be irremediably compromised in the eyes of the proletariat, and that \*it is necessary to build an illegal organization\* not only for today, but also for tomorrow.

I remember that the remnants of my revolutionary youth found such an inconceivably "revolutionary" task terribly tempting. Moreover, frankly speaking, I did not think much about the political meaning of this phrase. If Comrade is right. Radek, when he says that Rakovsky's only argument is: "What do you think, Lev has no head," then I was doubly, triply in the same position then. It seemed to me, in the state in which I was, that since Trotsky believed so strongly in the possibility of the fall of Soviet power, then the real task of all genuine revolutionaries was to think about the future of the proletariat.

Following this, Trotsky began to talk about his literary plans. Of these plans, some of which have already been implemented, the following deserves attention. \*He is going to prepare for printing a large secret archive, which he managed to bring with him\*. In this regard, several times he expressed surprise at how this was overlooked and how, he still cannot understand it, he was given the opportunity to take this archive with him. \* From the materials of the archive, he named the unpublished minutes of the April party conference of 17, some semi-printed materials of the same conference with Stalin's resolutions, his correspondence with Lenin, the minutes of some meetings of the Central Committee \*. At the same time, he said that some of these materials at one time, on the instructions of the opposition in Leningrad, either in Eastpart, or somewhere else, were simply stolen from the file. He said that he was now busy systematizing this material, after which he would start publishing it, and this material would amount to several printed volumes. In general, he was very fond of such exposing work.

At the same time, Trotsky remembered that I had once prepared his military writings for publication and was engaged, in particular, in compiling an essay on his trip. Proceeding from this, he asked me urgently to compile for him, for inclusion in his autobiography, a detailed information about the activities of this train. In one of the next few days, this was done by me. It was one of two literary contributions he received there.

\*Further, the conversation focused mainly around secret work in the USSR and in connection with the USSR\*.

Trotsky asked me if I did not know how much foreign correspondence was now going to the USSR compared to before the war, more or less. I replied that, in my opinion, more. And he asked for proof. As evidence, I cited, firstly, the consideration that there are now two million emigrants who correspond with the USSR from abroad, and, secondly, that the limitrophes, who used to give internal correspondence, as part of the empire, now give correspondence abroad and that with their departure many families remained on this and that side of the border. As a result, foreign correspondence, in comparison with the pre-war period, should have increased. From this, Trotsky drew the conclusion that if foreign correspondence increased, then the possibilities of its perusal coverage narrowed and that this circumstance should be used to send propaganda literature and letters by private letters. At the same time, he remembered the method of sending Vienna Pravda to Russia. He said that newspapers were enclosed by them in simple letters, which

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were sent to random addresses, and that out of ten addresses, one, and sometimes several, were addresses that turned into a force of social character

tera to the apparatus of voluntary distribution.

From this area, the second thing that interested him was the registration of all oppositionists or sympathizers or semi-sympathizers who are employed in various Soviet bodies abroad, mainly in economic bodies. Regarding this, he said that "I generally think that it would be necessary to start with this."

The third point in this area, put forward by Trotsky, was related to money. Here he said that since we are talking about opposition work for a long time, for years, not only within the framework of the Soviet regime, but also under the system that will replace it\*, then very large money is needed for work, so, approximately, five million to start. This money must be obtained either by expropriation (the word "expropriation" was not uttered. But, speaking of money, Trotsky said quite transparently that it must be obtained. Sedov later spoke directly about expropriation), or by using the opportunities available to people who sympathize with the opposition and who are in Soviet organs abroad. Apparently, in connection with this, he was interested in the fact that a number of persons were abroad. He asked me if I knew where Pusha was. I replied that, according to my information (before leaving abroad, I accidentally saw Putna), he was in Finland. He was also interested in the mood of Potemkin, the former consul general in Constantinople, now an adviser in Angora. He spoke about Potemkin in some detail, recalling a whole story connected with him. He was also interested in the whereabouts of Goldstein, who in 1925 was a resident of the OGPU in Constantinople. About Goldstein, he said that this was his old friend from the Vienna emigration, that they lived in Vienna in the same apartment, provided material assistance and all kinds of services to each other, and that Goldstein subsequently kept in touch with him, and when he left for Turkey, he came to him for a visit and for directives. I told him that Goldstein was in the official post of Consul General in Berlin and that he was apparently in a non-opposition mood. To this Trotsky answered me that he was absolutely convinced of one thing: if Goldstein refused to help him, then, in any case, the fact of Trotsky's appeal to him would remain between them.

Trotsky also asked if I knew any of the oppositionists in the Soviet consulate in Constantinople, what was the mood of the consulate cell there, and so on. He was also interested in whether I know who in various parts of Europe and the East is now a military attache. I replied that I didn't know. From his questions in this area, as one might expect, I got the impression that he is looking for every opportunity to use his personal relations and his old connections in the Soviet apparatus to organize contacts with Russia. He was especially interested in whether there was anyone in this sense in Paris. Of those whom I knew, I named him Sharmanov, who was there at the official work of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in the position of Consul General, but at the same time gave an unflattering moral assessment of Sharmanov, which later really justified itself in a scandalous form for Sharmanov. Sharmanov is expelled from scab for dirty deeds. The fourth thing that interested Trotsky was finding the possibility of establishing a direct connection with Russia. He was interested in the possibility of obtaining some kind of connection among the crews of Soviet or foreign ships plying between Russia and foreign ports. Regarding the first one, I said

to him that this is a rotten Ropitov public, which cannot be trusted even in the general Soviet sense, that with a few exceptions they are depraved semi-smuggling elements. As for foreign ships, it seems to me that French or Italian comrades should help here. In any case, I practically do not imagine the possibility of doing anything in these two directions. I suggested that some Turkish felucca should be used, which makes small cargo transportation between Turkish ports, for example, Trebizond, and our ports, Batum or Sukhum, that in general he should instruct someone to rummage among the semi-smuggling, semi-naval Greco-Turkish human material from Galata, what can be found there. But this is only part of the task. It is also necessary to have permanent people in the corresponding Soviet points, as, for example, in Batum, Sukhum or in the Crimea. We returned to the question of the felucca later, and subsequently we met with L. Sedov more than once. I will talk about this below. Trotsky then touched on some of the general prospects, favorable or unfavorable, for covert work in the USSR from abroad. I expressed my deep doubts to him about the possibility of doing any work from abroad under the Soviet way of life. The general isolation of the USSR, the difficulties and almost impossibility of obtaining visas, the impossibility of free movement from the USSR abroad and back, as it was before the war, the monopoly of foreign trade, which makes commercial cargo transportation impossible, etc. etc., all this, I said, is the strength of the Soviet system, not only in the economic sense, but also a guarantee against hostile anti-Soviet work. I told him that the bankrupt weakness of the connections of the entire counter-revolutionary emigration was also determined, in particular, by these same facts. Trotsky agreed with this, but in contrast to this, he put forward another feature of the Soviet system as favorable for secret work. This feature, as he said, is that before the revolution it was impossible to expect to find such a huge number of sympathetic elements that could be used to work in the pores of the government apparatus itself. This, he said, is our capital, which must be used in every possible way.

It goes without saying that the Party and the OPTU will draw appropriate conclusions from all these plans, but one conclusion, the socio-political one, became clear to me later on. The base of opportunities on which he thought to build his work from abroad in the USSR is catastrophically limited and is associated with methods of a semi-adventurous, wrecking nature.

True, this happened in April, two months after his expulsion (as we shall see later, by August the situation had not improved).

In general, I had an idea of complete helplessness and hopelessness.

Separately, Trotsky lingered on the question of keeping me for work. He expressed the idea that I should not arouse any suspicions on the part of Trotskyism and that in general it would not be bad if the GPU would use the fact of my stay in Constantinople to instruct me to cover him (Trotsky). I answered him that, firstly, I myself would not agree to this, and secondly, knowing me and my attitude towards Trotsky (now this has irrevocably passed), the comrades from the OGPU would react to my readiness to study such work as a kind of psychological surprise. This

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a moment in our conversation was a moment that seemed to flash by in passing. This concludes the practical and main part of our conversation.

In the future, we agreed that I would get acquainted with opposition literature unknown to me and think out those problems about which I confessed to Trotsky my great doubts about the correctness of their interpretation by the opposition (the question of the peasantry, etc.). It was decided that I would keep in touch through Lev Lvovich and that our meetings should be organized with "scientific secrecy." Trotsky was afraid of being discredited if it were discovered that he was connected with an illegal worker of the GPU.

He outlined such prospects for my literary collaboration with him, saying that he was going to publish a small organ for Russia with an output about once or twice a month. He counted on my active cooperation in it. On this we parted.

For the public surrounding Trotsky, my visit was explained as the visit of a publisher who came to him with an offer to purchase from him all his autobiographies and some works for publication in Hebrew, although, apart from Lev Sedov and Trotsky, no one saw me.

My general impression of our date was very contradictory. I remember that I was particularly struck by his thought about the possibility of the fall of the Soviet regime, but his personal charm and the dramatic atmosphere of his life, complete insecurity, some cleverly slipped political fears - all this excited me in my then state.

Of those impressions which are of some political interest, I can recover the following:

His actions at that time proceeded along four lines, firstly, personal organization, secondly, in restoring ties with the relevant political units of Trotskyism abroad, thirdly, restoring ties with the USSR and, fourthly, organizing information .

In the first respect, he was busy with feverish negotiations and relations with German, French and American publishers. Representatives of German and French publishing houses came to him, with whom he agreed on the publication of some of his works.

Through the second, he corresponded with his supporters in Germany and France; in the latter mainly with Rosmer. By this time, the latter had managed to do something for him and practically. \* Rosmer sent him several French comrades (5-6), who lived with Trotsky in an apartment, helped him work, communicate with the outside world and guarded him, he himself dealt with them \*. As for the third - connection with the USSR, then there was the weakest point, and my appearance was greeted as the main hope. In this part, he mainly made plans, having practically nothing at his disposal. His communication by this time was limited to correspondence, mostly by telegraph, with his relatives in Moscow.

The correspondence was addressed to the wife of Lev Lvovich - Anna Samoilovna Sedova,



living in the house of the Central Executive Committee, in the famous apartment number 101.

In the fourth respect, the matter was most ideally staged. He established direct contacts with all foreign correspondents in Constantinople and turned them into a kind of press bureau\*. As soon as he needed to make something the subject of publicity, create another sensation, he immediately gathered these bourgeois journalists and inspired them accordingly. He told me about his relations with these journalists.

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In the matter of personal arrangements, he had the hope of obtaining a visa to some of the European countries. Rosmer wrote to him that it might be possible to arrange a visa to Holland. He was terribly weary of his stay in Turkey, mainly because he was cut off from the Western European working-class movement.

A few days later I met with Lev Lvovich. This meeting, as well as the following meetings, were generally few in number, had no practical character, for I could not do anything practical, being in complete isolation from the Soviet apparatus. The main purpose of this meeting was to provide me with opposition literature.

I received from him, Trotsky, six articles published during this time in the foreign press, and later the works "What's Next", "Who Leads the Comintern", "Letter to a Benevolent Party Member", "The Disintegration of the Center-Right Bloc" and two or three small articles.

Sedov was very interested in the possibility of getting at least some Trotskyist in the consulate, in the Soviet Trade Fleet or in the Trade Representation. Here it is necessary to say a few words about the general character of all our meetings.

Practical in them there was always a grain, which was expressed only in the receipt and return of opposition literature by me. For the rest, the content of these meetings consisted of memories, experiencing what was happening, the exchange of everyday impressions and the communication of news from the life of Trotsky (chances for a visa, literary work, relations with the Turkish police) and plans, plans, plans.

Reading oppositional literature kept my spirit of opposition alive and, as it were, prolonged my purely emotional experience of Trotsky's fate.

Thus, from the motley content of my conversations with Sedov, I will now select and systematize only what was practical in them and what may be of some interest.

The servant, who was recommended to him by Comrade Minsky, when Trotsky was still living in the consulate, they considered an informant of the OGPU. Sedov said that they tried not to speak in her presence, hiding materials from her, but they could not refuse her because she was Russian and knew Russian.

One day Sedov confessed to me that he had a sympathetic fellow at the consulate who assisted him and with whom he sometimes spent the night.

During one of our meetings, Sedov told me that Yefim Dreitzer had died from a hunger strike in protest in the Tobolsk prison. This news shocked me. Dreitzer was my comrade in the army, in the 27-1 division, in which he was a military commissar, and I was the chief of staff and wreed. commander of the 79th brigade. I loved Dreitzer very much and, at Trotsky's suggestion, I wrote about him, and not so much about him as about the Dreitzer generation, an article signed "Own", which was to be translated into German and French and published in some opposition organs. This was my second and last literary contribution.

In one of the meetings, Sedov told me that Trotsky was concerned about the liberation of Bordiga, whom he considers in international Trotskyism, after himself, a decisive figure\*. Bordiga is imprisoned on some island in Italy, his term is about to expire, and Mussolini will probably not release him, but mechanically extend Bordiga's stay in prison and that Trotsky, in this regard, is thinking about arranging Bordiga's escape; So, if I do not agree to take on such a mission. I replied that release

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a revolutionary from a fascist prison is a good thing, that, of course, I would take part in such a thing, but in practice I can't do this, because. connected with the work, and besides, I doubt that such an operation could be performed. To this I was answered that this matter could be put on solidly with the participation of the Italian comrades; At the same time, Sedov asked if I had any connections in Italy, to which, of course, I answered in the negative.

At one of the meetings, Sedov told me that they receive information from Russia through Berlin mainly and through Paris; that they received a letter from Russia, from exile, directly to Constantinople addressed to them; that they maintain correspondence with their family in Moscow; that Trotsky would very much like to get Poznansky and Sermuks, his former secretaries, that the OGPU promised to let them out, but now they won't let them in.

Sedov also told me that the writer Panait Istrati, who had returned from the USSR, while passing either in Norway or in Holland, felt the ground regarding the admission of Trotsky there, but that, due to his impracticality, he was unable to carry this matter through to the end and that there is hope of doing this with the help of the French comrades. And the fact that Panait Istrati opposed us abroad, I learned personally upon arrival in the USSR.

Sedov repeatedly expressed fears about the possibility of an assassination attempt on Trotsky and once asked me for detailed instructions on how to organize his protection. I did it. He said that for the protection you need to have at least 8 people. I instructed him about night and day duty, about filtering carriers, about Trotsky's exits into the city, apartment location, etc. Great hopes were expressed by Sedov for obtaining a visa in the event that MacDonald's cabinet came to power in England. It happened just during the election campaign in England. This question was probed by Trotsky at Sidney Webb, who had specially come to Constantinople with his wife to meet with Trotsky. I remember that I protested about the reception of Sydney Webb, even going to talk about it at the

write to Trotsky.

By this time, Trotsky had moved (it happened in the month of May on Prince Island), to the island of Prinkipo. Sedov himself repeatedly planned to travel to Europe and the USSR, probed the ground and asked my opinion about whether he would be given a visa. He was personally confident in obtaining a visa to the USSR.

One day Sedov told me that among the French Communists sent by Rosmer there was one very useful person. The specialty of this man was that he had a bureau in Paris that was engaged in the rationalization of the apparatus in unprofitable commercial and industrial enterprises, that he was a very businesslike person with great commercial and all sorts of other connections, that Trotsky was going through him for deal with business transactions and that the moral of this fable is this: I could not use this person for myself. I refused this, firstly, because I was very distrustful of the public that surrounded Trotsky, and, secondly, because I firmly set myself the task of keeping my work and my enterprises completely secret from anyone. neither

In exactly the same way, Sedov once told me that they had their own man sent to Palestine from the USSR through the Sports International or the Profintern. It was also not reported about the arrival of Rosmer with his wife to Trotsky and about the fact that the French government refused Rosmer a foreign passport.

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At one of our meetings, Sedov returned to the question of acquiring a felucca. By this time, interest in such a felucca had increased from the point of view of my main work, since I always wanted to emancipate myself from postal communication with our legal apparatus and studied the possibilities of communication in case of war, I collected all the necessary information. The possibility of acquiring a felucca was quite real; it was just as possible to put it on the line of Trebizond, Batum or Sukhum; it would be possible to have someone in the composition of a very small team in general on a felucca, if Trotsky could find such a person.

Sedov told me that Trotsky had decided to work from Turkey only if he did not stay in Turkey, but if he lost any hope of being admitted to one of the European countries and settled in Turkey, then he would have to think carefully about the form in which it will be possible for him to carry out work from Turkey. This question was connected with those guarantees of loyalty to his behavior in Turkey, which he repeatedly gave to the Turkish authorities in order to achieve a free regime from them.

From the conversation with Sedov, the hopelessness of the communications situation in the USSR emerged with undeniable certainty, although during this period they received information from the USSR twice.

It was stated above that our first meeting with Trotsky took place on April 16, and on May 30 I left for the depths of the East. Thus, my relationship in the first period lasted a month and a half; at that time no more than five or six meetings took place, the nature of which I have described above. It goes without saying that I could not do anything practical during this period, in

Essentially speaking, it was a relationship of acquaintance, not work. At the same time, during this period, I only met a representative of our apparatus two or three times, and the very nature of the meetings, short and exclusively businesslike, ruled out any possibility of using them on my part.

During one of the meetings \*I received from Sedov a note of the famous conversation between Kamenev and Bukharin\*. Since the entire political background, the entire class side of the disagreements that Bukharin had and still have with the party, remained in the shadows from me, it is natural that this document made a heavy impression on me. I just sobbed over this document. My assistant comrade. Shin is a witness to this.

The social meaning of the differences in the Politburo between the majority of the Central Committee and the group of Bukharin and Tomsy eluded me, and it seemed to me that the struggle against the "rights" was an organizational process, and not a manifestation of the deeply principled Leninist line of the Central Committee. These obscurities delayed for some time the elimination of my last oppositional doubts.

Throughout this period, I did not leave the interests of the case for a minute. I spent two and a half months in a number of Eastern countries, working feverishly, as a result of which certain results appeared. Of course, Trotsky knew that I was abroad along the lines of the GPU, he had known this for a long time. Thus, of course, he had a very general idea of the nature of my work, but that was all. I kept my practical work a complete secret.

\*\* In general, purely business-like devotion to the task that was entrusted to me coexisted in me in parallel with my personal hesitations between the Trotskyist opposition and the party. It seems to me that psychologically this is quite acceptable, and this is an objective guarantee of my sincerity when I say this\*\*.

With the opposition literature that I received, I also introduced my assistant Comrade. Sheena, ex. member of the French Communist Party, my friend

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childhood and youth, taken by me in Paris, which I once gave a description of and which was presented by me in January to Comrade. Velezhev. The latter approved it.

I must say that Com. Shin is a magnificent revolutionary material and is heroically devoted to our cause, he succumbed to oppositional processing with great difficulty; he put forward purely logical considerations that, not being in the USSR, not knowing all the party's argumentation and practice, he could not immediately take the one-sided point of view of the opposition. He, of course, was impressed by the purely external revolutionary impressiveness of Trotskyist criticism and personally by the complex figure of Trotsky.

Comrade Shin was present at some of my last meetings with Lev Sedov. At my suggestion, a meeting with Trotsky was arranged for him. It goes without saying that he, too, succumbed to a certain kind of poison of a personal impression of Trotsky.

When I left for the East, then, not yet having the strength to vomit, I instructed Shin to meet with Lev Sedov, but the most limited number of times, in no case revealing myself. In this area I gave him very harsh and threatening directives. For two and a half months they met, as I found out about it on my arrival, three times. I bear full responsibility for Comrade Trotskyism. Shin and I have no doubt that his departure from the purely emotional sensations of Trotskyism will not encounter great difficulties; all this is based on a fragile film of personal feelings.

I returned to Constantinople on August 5 and immediately sent a telegram to Moscow stating the need for a direct meeting with Comrade V.V. Trilisser. I affirm with all sincerity and with all categoricalness that I did not adjust the necessity of my coming to the USSR to the needs of opposition work. To my happiness, I can confirm this not only with references to my sincerity, but also on the basis of some evidence. Back in January, before Trotsky's exile, it is not difficult to trace from my letters, I raised the question, depending on certain organizational questions, about my recall. It is easy to deal with Comrade. Velezhev that when we saw him in January, I personally raised the question of my recall to him, again depending on some organizational issues. And in February, before my departure for Europe, where I found out about Trotsky's deportation, I raised the same question in one of my letters in exactly the same way. Finally, in April, I sent a telegram from Constantinople in which I argued that further work rested on the question of a technical worker, and, in the event that it was not resolved, I categorically refused to continue my stay in Constantinople at all. Finally, the very nature of my telegram about permission to come to me was devoid of any categorical nature.

I informed Lev Sedov that I was leaving for the USSR and, succumbing to the inertia of vacillation, I accepted an order from him to convey Trotsky's letters to Moscow. I had to give these letters to one of the following 4 persons: Anna Samoilovna Sedova (Leo Sedov's wife), whom I had to find in GUM, in one of the institutes of the NKPS where she works, or Trotsky's daughter, or her husband Volkov, who was supposed to find her through a certain Dudel, who lives in the house of the Moscow City Council on Gnezdnikovsky Lane. in No. 9/12\*. At the same time, I received one copy of the pamphlet "What happened and how", which was sold in all bookstores in Kone.

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tantinopol, and one copy of the bulletin of the opposition, No. 1-2, printed in Paris.

On the day of my departure, I had my last conversation with Lev Sedov, who conveyed to me the following: "The main task is communication and once again communication. Those sitting in Moscow should take care to establish ties with Constantinople in every possible way - through Riga, Europe and directly with Constantinople. \*From Trotsky's directives, the main thing was that it was necessary to take final organizational shape\* that the state of affairs in the international Trotskyist organization is very pessimistic, that there are hundreds of shades between different groups of Trotskyists in individual countries, and that the number of shades increases even more when it comes to it is about the consolidation of the Trotskyist groups of different countries among themselves, which is the main fragmentation and squabbles in France, that there is almost no one to rely on. As for Germany, Urbano is the first, and in general among the German Trotskyists there are a lot of right, non-revolutionary elements that international cadres

native Trotskyism is socially very variegated and random, and that there is no one to work with thief.

The letters themselves were written chemically on the pages of two books that I had handed over to the OGPU.

In confirmation of receipt, Anna Samoilovna had to send a telegram with a conditional signature. As proof that I was a trustworthy person, I did not receive any password, but had to remind her that she had carried mail from Alma-Ata in a pillow. In the event of my return to Constantinople, I had to bring information that Anna Samoilovna would give me. At my own discretion, I had to meet with those persons whom Anna Samoilovna pointed out to me in Moscow. The entire assignment boiled down to this - it was purely informational and almost did not contain any active or organizational tasks.

Here I must note that during my two and a half months of my stay in the East, I did not have the opportunity to observe Trotsky's speeches on such issues as the day of August 1, and, on the other hand, on such facts as the waste of a number of individuals and groups from the opposition.

On August 10, I left Constantinople and arrived in Moscow on the 14th. The very atmosphere of the USSR immediately began to sober me up, and I decided not to refrain from carrying out the assignment until I had thoroughly examined what was happening in the country. I left the USSR in September 1928, arrived in August 1929, almost a year later, being during this period, on the one hand, completely cut off from the activities of the Soviet Union, from the life of the Party and, on the other hand, impression of Trotsky's expulsion. It became clear to me that a year in the life of the Soviet Union is a very significant fact. Gradually I became convinced that the struggle against the Rights was an expression of the general Leninist policy of the party, and that my impressions, derived from the recording of the conversation between Kamenev and Bukharin about the organizational character of this struggle, were incorrect impressions. I became convinced that the self-criticism proclaimed in the spring of 1928 had made tremendous progress and began to go more and more from the bottom up, that the Party was pursuing a genuinely class, profoundly Leninist policy in the countryside. A policy in which administrative measures against the resisting kulaks are combined with a deep undermining of the foundations of capitalism in agriculture in the form of vigorous collective-farm and state-farm construction. On the other hand, the success of the spring sowing campaign in 1929 convinced me

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in the fact that this policy of the Party in the countryside by no means leads to processes dangerous for agriculture, as the Rights shouted about it.

On the question of industrialization, it became clear to me that a maximum course had been taken for industrialization, an excess of which would be contrary simply to the objective resources of the Soviet economy at its present stage.

The more I thought about the five-year plan for the development of the national economy, the more it became clear to me that this was not only a plan for the socialist reconstruction of the Russian economy, but a kind of five-year plan.

summer fight plan.

Compared with the truly revolutionary atmosphere that I felt in the country in its economic process and people, in new forms of involving the masses (socialist competition, etc.), Trotsky's phrase about the Thermidorian smell that hit my nose seemed to me a bad feuilleton.

In whatever area I estimated the former oppositional moods, I came to the conclusion that reality mocked them cruelly.

yalas.

When I compared the analysis of the opposition in the spring and summer of 1927 with this picture, it became absolutely clear to me that the opposition underestimated the party, its Central Committee, and deeply, in all its fears and apprehensions, went bankrupt. Against the background of this picture, which I saw in the USSR, it seemed to me malicious and ridiculous to expect the fall of the Soviet regime. The disintegration of the opposition completed this picture.

Of course, I did not come to these conclusions immediately, it took a month and a half to get acquainted with literature and life. Acquaintance with the transcript of the April Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of 1929, which took place at the time when I was undergoing a relapse of Trotskyism abroad, played a decisive role in eliminating my internal waverings.

About a month ago, when I was still in a state of vacillation, a certain Plomper, a former party member expelled for the Trotskyist opposition (deputy director of GOSET), whom I had known since 1926, came to see me. after my arrival from abroad, I met.

The duality of my inner state also found expression in my attitude towards Plomper. Sometimes I took the party and the general line under furious protection, sometimes I yielded to some secondary, mainly moral, arguments of Plomper. Plomper himself was in an illegal position, he was very careful with me, limiting himself to stating that he was connected with some illegal remnants of the opposition. I gave Plomper personal financial support, several times I left him to spend the night at my place. To my comrades who visited me, I introduced him as Finkelstein. Having learned from him that the pamphlet "What happened and how it happened" and Bulletin No. 1-2 had already leaked from abroad to the USSR, I gave the two copies that I had, one of each, to him for reading, subject to return, he told me did not return them. I learned from Plomper that he had the possibility of reprinting a bulletin or pamphlet somewhere outside of Moscow, even in a typographical way, and that if I were a man without hesitation, I would give 250 rubles for this good cause.

Of course, Plomper did not know that I was connected with Trotsky and where I came from.

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Once, at the moment of another vacillation, I sent him a letter to Anna Samoilovna, but he could not find her, and I took the books back from him, under

pretext that I will personally transfer them to another person.

From the moment when I finally arrived at the above political conclusions, I began to experience painful hesitation on the question of the form in which I should liquidate any relation whatsoever to Trotskyism. Many psychological prejudices prevented me from immediately finding the direct path to this liquidation. Plekhanov's famous expression that we are very often socialists in ideology and petty bourgeois in psychology came true for me. This gap between the final political conclusion and the psychological feeling, it became the cause of my already another non-political rush. My condition was complicated by my purely business position. I have already said above that my concern for my work coexisted in parallel with my political mood.

On the business line, in view of the great importance attached to Comrade. Menzhinsky and Comrade Trilisser to the results and prospects of my work, I was in the stage of great organizational preparation for the development of the work done, I found and prepared people, sent them abroad, deeply and sincerely took a great interest in the implementation of a large plan of our work in the East, part of which was implemented in the past year. The thought was very painful to me that if I did not hide from the GPU the resumption of my connection with Trotsky, then the work, which to a very large extent rested on me personally, would suffer from this. At the same time, I understood that it was impossible to hide the above facts from the GPU and the Party. To this was added the fear that at a time when I had deeply, finally decided to sweep all the Trotskyist nonsense out of myself without a trace, they might not believe me, they might treat me formally. I was afraid that my older comrades would follow the path of my political and physical youth. As luck would have it, the period of these doubts coincided with a somewhat dry, cruel, as it seemed to me, attitude towards me on a purely business basis, comrade. Trilisser, one of the few comrades in the GPU who had personally studied me well. Another comrade to whom I could reveal all my experiences, comrade. Menzhinsky was ill, and besides, I was afraid of the thought of inflicting a new burden on him in his ill state. Tov. Yagoda was on vacation.

All these psychological contradictions led to the fact that I began to become incredibly entangled in my own vibrations. All this led to the fact that, despite the repeated insistence of Comrade. Trilisser to go abroad, I put off my departure, because I felt very unwell, weighed down by such a burden. In the end, I decided to complete the work I had begun, to seat, where necessary, all the new workers I had received, for which I asked Comrade. Trilisser to send me abroad, accompanied by a deputy, for no more than 2-3 months, necessary for such an operation, so that after this time I handed over my affairs to this deputy and returned back. With a corresponding request, I to Comrade. Trilisser and turned. He promised to have a serious talk with me on this subject (this was not so long ago), but we never managed to talk.

While abroad, I had the idea of seeing some of the leading comrades from among the departed. When, upon arrival in the USSR, I learned that Comrade. Radek was in Moscow (I had reason to consider Radek an old and good comrade), I rushed to him, but found out that he was away in Zheleznovodsk.

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Tov. Radek returned to Moscow not so long ago, just in time for the aforementioned



ment of my throwing. I came to him to ask him about the final position of Ivan Nikitch Smirnov and others, and to tell him, in the old factional way, that I had finally decided to move away from any kind of halfway conciliatory attitude towards the opposition. Being extremely depressed and exhausted by my experiences, I could not resist talking with Radek within the framework of a purely informational message and revealed to him, as they say, all my sore soul. Radek advised me not to put off my confession until my return from abroad, and on my purely personal friendly frankness (he gave me his word that our conversation would be of a deeply personal character) he began to do factional work. He directed me to Comrade Smilga, who knew me from the OPUK and the 1919 front. "After a conversation with Comrade Smilga and a second conversation with Radek, I felt that I was being drawn into some new factional game". This completely disorganized me, and I became nervously ill. "God worker INO - comrade. Gorskoy. She observed my condition and can characterize it. This seasoned party comrade and impeccable Chekist advised me to immediately go to the Central Control Commission or the GPU with a direct recognition of my mistakes. A few days ago I phoned Comrade Solts, asking him to take him along with Ordzhonikidze, which Comrade Solts refused to do. In the end, I decided to write Comrade Trilisser about everything, and in a state of nervous illness I decided to leave somewhere for a while.

On the 15th, I put all my affairs and papers in order, wrote the letter you know to comrade. Trilisser. At the very last moment, at half past eleven at night, I called Comrade. Gorskaya to the apartment in which I was staying in order to consult with her again. She advised me to report immediately to Comrade. Trilisser. I went with her to the Kazan station to find out if there was a train to Rostov, I went back and finally ordered the driver to go to the GPU.

Like many others, I came to the proletariat and the Communist Party from the petty-bourgeois and objectively counter-revolutionary Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in which I was a member at a very youthful age (I was not yet 18 years old). As a member of this party, eleven years ago, I already once, in immeasurably more active and dangerous forms for the Soviet Republic, used the apparatus of the Cheka on the orders of my party.

When I became convinced of the counter-revolutionary nature of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary "politics", I voluntarily presented myself with complete surrender to the Soviet government. Since then, I have corrected the mistake of my political youth not with words, but with deeds. No one can doubt how deeply and how often during all these years I was more than once ready to sacrifice and sacrificed my life for the interests of the Communist Party and the Soviet revolution. You, Comrade Agranov, know this well.

Until 1927, I was neither directly nor indirectly a member of any opposition groups. Eleven years have passed, and on a new basis, in an immeasurably smaller degree and form, as a representative of another petty-bourgeois, objectively counter-revolutionary deviation of the proletarian revolution, the Trotskyist deviation, I again intended to place factional discipline above general Party and all-Soviet discipline. It became clear to me that, to some extent, it was no coincidence that these deviations coincided and crossed on me, and I decided firmly, without the slightest remnant, relying on the results of these

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two years, sweep out of yourself the rotting tails of emotionality, etc. rubbish that prevented me from completely and completely merging with the party.

I ask the Party and the OGPU to help me in this second, after such a long period of time, my last wavering of confidence. The only guarantee I can give in this regard is that I will try to justify this trust in practice, to an even greater extent than I did when going from the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries to Bolshevism. The process of forming a revolutionary Bolshevik consciousness and character and acquiring a temper is a complex process. The last obstacle and the last barrier that I overcame in this process was my semi-Trotskyism. I declare with conviction that I now belong to the Party from head to toe and that in the struggle that it will face in devilishly difficult and difficult conditions, in the struggle for the general line, which will have to be wrested with bloodshed from the capitalist elements in town and countryside, for preparation, organization and the development of the international revolution, for the defense of the USSR, the Party can dispose of me without a trace as a disciplined member of the Party. Not only do I completely break with the opposition on all points, but I am ready, at the first order of the Party, in whatever form it deems fit, to wage an active struggle against the opposition to the best of my ability.

Ya.G. BLUMKIN

20X1929

APRF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 136. L. 94-124. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* - f \* The paragraph is crossed out in the margins with two lines, and there is also a handwritten note Sta →

line: "ha-ha-ha."

No. 215

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE WRECKING ORGANIZATION  
IN THE MILITARY INDUSTRY"

WITH APPENDIX PRINT MESSAGE

October 25, 1929

No. 105, p. 22. - On the wrecking organization in the military industry. (t. Yagoda).

Agree with the proposal of the OGPU on the execution of Mikhailov and others and accept the draft press release (see Appendix No. 3).

Annex No. 3 to  
clause 22 (o.p.) pr. PB No. 105

PRESS RELEASE

(Adopted by the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on 21.X.29).

The organs of the OGPU uncovered and liquidated the counter-revolutionary sabotage and espionage organization in the military industry of the USSR. The organization set itself the task of weakening the country's defense capability and assisting foreign invaders through sabotage and espionage.

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The overwhelming majority of its personnel consisted of the former highest ranks of the tsarist army - former generals and colonels. In this regard, the Collegium of the OGPU sentenced to death: Mikhailov V.S. - former general, nobleman; Vysochansky N.G. - former general, nobleman; Dymman V.L. - former general, nobleman; Dekhanov V.N. - former general, nobleman; Shulga N.V. - former general-guarantor under the former Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich.

The sentence has been carried out.

All other defendants in this case were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment in concentration camps.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 7. L. 188, 192. Original. Typescript.

\*

The decision was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 21.X.29.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the mailing: "Extract sent: vol. Yagoda.

No. 216

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE TROTSKYISTS"

October 25, 1929

No. 105, p. 33 - On the Trotskyists (PB of 18.X.29, pr. No. 103, p. 9).

In relation to those of the former Trotskyists who were subjected to administrative measures, who openly declare their break with the opposition and the cessation of factional struggle, the recognition of the general line of the party and the decisions of the parties as correct, the OGPU must cancel the administrative measures; As for the active former Trotskyists, the GPU softens the administrative measure for them, limiting itself to the use of a semi-exile, with the withdrawal of the places where they should be living.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 764. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

No. 217

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT BLUMKIN

November 5, 1929

No. 106, p. 30 - O B.

a) Make it clear to the OGPU that it failed in its time to open and liquidate Blumkin's treacherous anti-Soviet work.

b) Shoot Blumkin.

c) Instruct the OGPU to determine exactly the nature of Gorskaya's behavior. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 8. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 30.X.29. The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Yagoda.

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No. 218

NOTE G.G. BERRIES AND G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT  
"wrecking" IN THE METAL INDUSTRY

November 6, 1929

No. 44081

OWL. SECRET

As a result of an almost six-month investigation into the case of the metalworking engineers Khrennikov, Belonozhkin, Zhdanov and others, the OPTU has recently received a number of materials characterizing the activities of the counterrevolutionary organization in the metal industry and machine building, namely:

1) The counter-revolutionary wrecking organization in mechanical engineering arose in 1921 in the GOMZY trust, under the leadership of Khrennikov, as part of a group of specialists b. employees of the Joint Stock] 0 [society] of Sormovo-Kolomna. The organization arose and carried out wrecking according to the directives of b. shareholder MESHCHERSKY (a member of Torgprom), sent through a certain c. GLASS (also a member of Torgrom) and through the English Mission personally to KHRENNIKOV, connected with GLASS and HODGSON. The purpose of the sabotage was to prepare a concession base for b. owners.

2) The Gomza organization represented by Khrennikov for the period 1921-25 was part of the K.-R. organization that existed in Glavmetal and its Technical Council, consisting of engineers GARTVAN, BELONozHKIN, ZHDANOV, SVITSYN, TAUBE and others, which established unity of action for other (non-Gomzinsky) branches of the organization.

3) In 1925, KHRENNIKOV, already a Chairman. Metplan and a member of the Board of Glavmetal, headed and finalized the c.r. an organization that covered all branches of activity of Glavmetal, distributing for each the role of managing all branches of the c.r. organizations in the metal industry

laziness of the South, the Urals, Moscow and Leningrad (see his diagram).

From that time on, all subsequent sabotage activities of the organization amounted, according to Belonozhkin's testimony, to creating a metal famine in the country, to disrupting industrialization. Accordingly, sabotage was carried out in separate branches of the organization (Gomza, Yugostal, YuRT, Giprometz, etc.).

4) The organization acted according to the directives of the Trade Industry, with members of which both individual members of the organization (ZHDANOV, BELONOZHKIN, SVI TSYN, etc.) and KHRENNIKOV were personally connected. In addition, Khrennikov himself was associated with British intelligence agents.

5) The organization had a connection with the c.r. organizations in the NKPS, Mining and non-ferrous metallurgy.

To illustrate the foregoing, we enclose copies of the organizational scheme drawn up by KHRENNIKOV with his own hand, as well as copies of the protocols of interrogation of KHRENNIKOV, BELONOZHKIN, and NEIMAYER\*.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU YAGODA  
BEGINNING. ECONOMUPRA OGPU PROKOFIEV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 353. L. 2, 2v. Script. Typescript.

Published without interrogation protocols.

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No. 219

NOTE I.V. STALIN G.G. Yagoda and E.G. Evdokimov in connection with the statement to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) of the TROTSKISTS - PRISONERS OF THE UPPER-URAL POLITIZOLYATOR

December 8, 1929

T.t. Yagoda and Evdokimov!

I consider it a big mistake that the administration of the Upper Urals detention center adopted a counter-revolutionary document of petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. An even greater mistake must be considered the "forwarding" of him by the OGPU to the Central Committee of the party. The OPTU is the punishing hand of the Soviet power and not a mailbox serving the needs of the petty-bourgeois puppies of the counter-revolution. Our deeds are bad if you \*this\* educate the workers of the OGPU.

I return the document in the hope that you will guess to punish the administrator of the detention center for accepting a dirty libel on Soviet power as a \*legitimate\* document. It would not hurt to also punish the state. Yanushevsky.

With communist greetings, Stalin

No. 260490

TOP SECRET

We are forwarding herewith the statement of the Trotskyists, prisoners of the Upper Urals political isolator.

The statement was signed for all the prisoners by V. Yanushevsky, a former member of the Moscow Trotskyist Center.

APPENDIX: mentioned.

ZAM. Head of the OGPU  
Yagoda

Copy

In the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

I report the following:

"On the day of the 12th anniversary of the October Revolution, we Bolshevik-Leninists imprisoned in the Upper Urals political isolator send our resolute protest and indignation to the Central Committee against the incessant repressions against the Leninist wing of the party.

Reinforcing our protest by declaring a one-day political hunger strike, we consider it our duty to declare that these repressions testify that the slogan "fire to the left" proclaimed by Stalin is still the pivotal idea, the main guiding line of the policy of the Central Committee. The class meaning of this line is that the policy of the Central Committee, no matter what pseudo-left phraseology it may cover up, is directed against the interests of the proletariat and the rural poor, reduces their class well-being, weakens the proletarian dictatorship in the face of class enemies attacking it.

For a number of years the Central Committee has stubbornly ignored the growth of hostile class forces, for a number of years the Central Committee has pursued its policy of fighting to the left, under the flag of

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with "Trotskyism", helps the growth of these forces in the country, in the state apparatus, in the trade unions, in the party.

Two years ago, the Leninist opposition, in its platform, declared by the party leadership to be Menshevik and hidden from the party and the proletariat, pointed to the formidable consequences of the policy of the Central Committee and outlined ways to overcome the difficulties along the Leninist path. The platform signaled to the party, the proletariat and the poorest peasantry that, thanks to the wrong leadership, the country was going "not where the interests of the workers and peasants required,"

that Stalin's group is leading the party blindly, giving it the wrong perspective, moving it in zigzags, adapting and adjusting to the hostile elements, thereby weakening the strength of the proletarian army, that under the cover of the Stalinist line, consisting of short zigzags to the left and deep to the right, they are fighting their way the Thermidorian forces of the country and that, under the cover of the Stalin group, a right-wing faction was organized within the Central Committee of the party, preparing cadres for turning the country onto the path of capitalist restoration.

The platform signaled the growing crisis, thanks to the disastrous economic policy in town and countryside, in industry and agriculture. The platform pointed to the exorbitant growth of anti-proletarian forces that want to turn the development of our country onto the capitalist path. The platform pointed to the weakening of the position of the working class and the poorest peasantry with the growing strength of the kulak, NEPman and bureaucrat, to the weakening of the general position of the workers' state in the struggle against world capitalism, to the worsening of the international position of the USSR.

Exactly two years ago, on November 7, 1927, the Bolshevik-Leninists took to the streets of the proletarian capital to tell the proletarian masses what the opposition demands in its platform with the slogans "Let's turn the fire to the right against the kulak, Nepman and bureaucrat". It was precisely these slogans that the apparatchiks destroyed by destroying our leaflets and posters, and it was precisely for these slogans that the demonstration of the opposition on November 7 was declared counter-revolutionary and directed against the Soviet power. It was precisely for these views of ours, formulated in a platform brilliantly justified by life, that the Fifteenth Congress, with the votes of the Rights and Centrists, led by Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsy and Stalin, expelled the Bolshevik-Leninists from the party.

It is precisely for these views that the centrist leadership has thrown us into prison and exile, and for the past two years has been persecuting every worker, every member of the Party, who raises his voice of criticism against this disastrous policy of the Central Committee. For the defense of precisely these views, the leader of the international proletariat, comrade L.D., was extradited to the bourgeoisie. Trotsky. These persecutions continue and intensify, despite the fact that it is under the threat of a catastrophe, and the leadership, urged on by the whip of the opposition, was forced to admit to the whole world the existence of a rightist danger in the Party and the Comintern, the presence in the country of a kulak leading an extermination struggle against Soviet power, the presence in the country of a strengthened new bourgeoisie, enriching itself in alliance with the bureaucrat, corrupting entire organizations of the party through the bureaucrat, bribing the authorities, buying the courts and the GPU.

The Shakhta, Sochi, Ludorvai, Artyomovsk, Leningrad, Tula, Azerbaijan, Adzharstan, Irkutsk and many other cases clearly confirmed that the threat of a Thermidorian degeneration was not an invention of the opposition, was not the fruit of its "factional blindness", but was

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and is a real danger, a profound disease that has seized entire regions, is filling the entire country, and has infected huge sections of the Party.

The Central Committee, despite all the zigzags of the Stalinist majority after the 15th Congress, showed that as long as the leadership remains centrist, as long as the line of the Bolshevik-Leninists is rejected, until then the growth of hostile forces in the country, the growth of the openly Thermidorian faction cannot be prevented.

systematic deterioration of the material, legal and cultural conditions of the working class; provisions of the USSR, further expansion of the ranks of the Comintern. The incorrectness of the general line of the Central Committee leads to the fact that its individual, even correct, measures place a new heavy burden on the shoulders of the peasant poor. The entire policy of the Central Committee exhausts the proletarian masses, empties them ideologically and thereby more rapidly weakens the elements of the dictatorship, dispersing its class base. This policy does not oppose Thermidor, but promotes it, since it evens out the front of the enemies and disorganizes the ranks of the proletariat.

In fighting today against centrism, just as we did two years ago, when we were only on the threshold of prisons and exile, we are fighting in this very same way against the Rights, against kulaks, NEPmen and bureaucrats.

We answer the repressions of the centrist apparatus: no exile, no prison, no separation from our leader Comrade. Trotsky, whose fiftieth birthday we are celebrating today with documents, actions and speeches, and beyond whose borders we are wholly in solidarity, will not disintegrate our ranks.

The process of self-purification of the opposition from elements that are tottering, unsteady, tired, ideologically devastated takes place in an atmosphere of growing activity of the working class and coincides with the moment of the formation and strengthening of the international left in all countries under the leadership of Comrade. Trotsky. This creates in us an unshakable confidence in the correctness of the path we have chosen.

The situation in the USSR is such that by zigzags to the right and to the left, at random left-wing events, without a radical change in the whole policy in the spirit of the platform of the Leninist opposition, the country cannot be led out of the impasse into which it has been driven by the party leadership. Only on the basis of the platform of the Bolshevik-Leninists, only on the paths of developing genuine activity of the proletariat and the rural poor, only on the paths of a genuine, and not apparatus offensive against the kulak, NEPman and bureaucrat, only on the paths of a decisive offensive on a broad front the proletariat and the rural poor on the right forces of the country can prevent the catastrophe of October. Such a struggle is inconceivable without inner-Party democracy, without a decisive improvement in the material conditions of the working class, without organizing an alliance of the rural poor, without straightening the class front of the Soviet Union in international politics.

Against zigzags for an extraordinary party congress convened on the basis of a secret ballot. Against the fear of the masses, for inner-Party workers' democracy, for a radical change in the inner-Party regime.

For the return to the party of the entire opposition.

For the unshakable alliance of the proletariat and the rural poor.



For a broad and inexorable struggle against the kulak, the Nepman and the bureaucrat.

For the October Revolution.

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Long live the Leninist opposition.

Long live the leader of the world proletariat Comrade Trotsky.

Upper Ural political isolator - 7.XI-29

Bolshevik-Leninists:

1. Althausen 2. Azatyan 3. Anfilovich 4. Aronov 5. Arsatyan 6. Artshtein 7. Belenky 8. Beradze 9. Bulkin  
10. Gartsman 11. Geydysh 12. German 13. Hirschfeld 14. Golub 15. Gordeev 16. Graev 17.3  
Augustin 18. Zalessky 19. Zakharov 20. Zotov 21. Kazlas 22. Kamenetsky 23. Kvachadze 24. Kessel 25.  
Konstantinov 26. Kopytov 27. Kosolapov 28. Kotov 29. Extreme. 30. Kuzmin 31. Kulikov 32. Langer 33.  
Lapshin 34. Lipatov 35. Lopatov 36. Mobetko 37. Maly 38. Magaradze 39. Mikhalevich 40.  
Nevelson 41. Novikov 42. Osnach 43. Panasenکو 44. Papirmaster 45. Pereverzev 46. Piver 47.  
Podzemsky 48. Polishchuk 49. Popov 50. Potskhishvili 51. Psalmists 52. Psakhie 53. Pushas 54.  
Rappoport-Kharin 55. Rats 56. Reshetnichenko 57. Sahakyan (AMO) 58. Smolin 59. Stopalov 60.  
Tabachnik 61. Tvalgreldze 62. Teplyakov 63. Gloomy 64. Ukraintsev 65. Fedorchenko 66. Flaks 67.  
Khelidze 68. Khugaev 69. Shapiro 70. Sheinblat 71. Sheyans 72. Shkuratov 73. Yakovlev-Bubnov  
74. Yanushevsky 75. Yashvili 76. Emelyanov

7. 11.29 V. Yanushevsky

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 48. Original. Manuscript; L. 49-54. Script. Typewriting.

\*—\* Underlined with two lines.

No. 220

NOTE S.A. MESSING TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC ABOUT  
THE SPEAKER AT THE MEETING OF THE ASSETS OF THE OGPU

January 31, 1930

No. 42236

Today is the 31st of January of this year. at 5 pm a meeting of the Collegium of the OGPU will be held  
with the participation of its authorized representatives and senior officials of the OGPU. devoted to the  
question of the fist.

The OGPU asks comrade. Molotov to speak at this meeting\*.

Deputy before OGPU Messing

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 58. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a resolution: "T. Yagoda. We consider it inappropriate and wrong

the transformation of a concrete and absolutely definite directive of the Central Committee on the kulak from a subject of implementation into practice into a subject of wide agitation, at least among the active members of the Chekists. It will be quite enough if the directive of the Central Committee on the kulak is handed over to the OGPU PP. Neither Molotov nor any of the secretaries of the Central Committee will take part in the conference of "responsible" workers of the OGPU undertaken by the OGPU. We consider the conference superfluous. I. Stalin. I agree - V. Molotov.

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No. 221

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE WORK OF INO OGPU (73)

February 5, 1930

No. 116, p. 38 - About INO (comrades Kaganovich, Yagoda, Messing). Approve the proposals of the Politburo Commission with amendments.

1. Areas of intelligence work of the INO OGPU.

Based on the need to concentrate all our reconnaissance forces and assets in certain main territorial areas, the main areas of reconnaissance activity of the INO OGPU are:

1. England

2. France

3. Germany (Center)

4. Poland

5. Romania

6. Japan

7. Limitrophes

2. Tasks facing the INO OGPU

1. Illumination and penetration into the centers of wrecking emigration, regardless of their location.

2. Identification of terrorist organizations in all places of their concentration.

3. Penetration into interventionist plans and clarification of the deadlines for the implementation of these plans, prepared by the leading circles of England, Germany

mania, France, Poland, Romania and Japan.

4. Illumination and revelation of plans for a financial and economic blockade in the leading circles of the countries mentioned.

5. Extraction of documents of secret military-political agreements and treaties between the indicated countries.

6. Combating foreign espionage in our organizations.

7. Organization of the destruction of traitors, defectors and leaders of the White Guard terrorist organizations.

8. Extraction for our industry of inventions, technical and production drawings and secrets that cannot be obtained in the usual way and

9. Surveillance of Soviet institutions abroad and the identification of hidden traitors.

3. Personnel and funds.

1. To give the OGPU five most responsible party members for foreign work, who could be thrown as organizers and political leaders at the main points of the foreign work of the INO. The selection of these comrades to be carried out at the request of the OGPU.

2. During the year, give the OGPU for foreign work at least fifty especially proven and staunch party members so that they, according to a plan specially developed by the OGPU, undergo theoretical and practical preliminary training.

3. To recognize as fundamentally necessary the transfer of the work of the INO bodies from the owls. institutions on the illegal position, to implement gradually over the course of the year.

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The Organizing Committee of the Central Committee, together with the OGPU, should work out a procedure for the inclusion of employees of the INO in foreign Soviet institutions to serve these same institutions, ensuring the secrecy of this inclusion.

4. To fulfill the tasks assigned to the OGPU, increase the funds for foreign work to 300 thousand rubles in gold.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 50. D. 32. L. 115. Copy. Typewriting.

\*

The decision was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on January 30, 1930.

\*\*

There is a typewritten mark on the document: "T. Yagoda.

No. 222

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON MEASURES IN RESPECT OF THE KULAKS"

February 5, 1930

No. 116, p. 72 - On measures against the kulaks (PB of 30.1.30, pr. No. 116, p. 36.

1. In view of the fact that Siberia turned out to be unprepared to accept at the moment the required number of exiled kulak families (see the decision of the Central Committee of 30.1. the first stage covered no more than 60 thousand families of categories 1 and 2 and was completed by the end of April (the issue of the second and third stages of eviction will be discussed separately).

2. Propose to the OGPU, guided by this decision, to determine the number of evicted by districts within the first stage, the specific dates for their transportation and destination.

3. Propose to the Central Committees of Ukraine, Belarus, the North Caucasian Territorial Committee, the Regional Central Chernozem, the Lower Volga Territory and the Middle Volga Territory to adapt their actions in the field of eviction of kulaks to the specific plans of the OGPU.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 54. Copy. Typescript.

Published: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession 1927-1939. Doc. and mat. In 5 tg. / T. 2 November 1929 - December 1930 / Ed. V. Danilova, R. Manning, L. Viola. M.: (ROSSPEN), 2000. S. 175

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 4.II. 1930

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There is a note in the text about mailing to Yagoda and Yakovlev.

No. 223

DRAFT DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE PROGRESS OF THE LIQUIDATION OF  
WRECKING AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRY"

February 24, 1930

OWL. SECRET

I

Having listened to the report of the OGPU on the elimination of the consequences of sabotage at the enterprises of the military industry, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks states that until now the entire military industry has not taken sufficient real measures to eliminate these consequences and still take place.

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production of military products with reduced combat qualities in all military industries.

The situation that has arisen is explained mainly by the fact that the heads of factories, trusts, and the State Higher Political Administration have an underestimation of the entire depth of the disorder in the war industry resulting from sabotage. and from here:

1. The frivolous attitude of the majority of the leadership of the military industry to the information documents of the OGPU (comparative conclusion on sabotage of August 29) and other reports.
2. Most of the leaders (directors and members of the boards of trusts) of the military industry did not draw practical conclusions from the above documents and did not work out specific measures:
  - a) did not mobilize the attention of workers and all engineering and technical personnel to restore the lost skills of precision work;
  - b) did not take serious measures to improve the medical and instrumental art in the shortest possible time, ensuring the required quality of products;
  - c) treated formally the definition of the capacities of factories, which is why this definition has not yet been completed everywhere and there are still underestimated capacities (especially OAT and PTT);
  - d) did not noticeably improve the monitoring and control of production and product quality, especially in terms of the manufacture of high-quality steels.
3. As before, the non-Party and communist working activists were not involved in the organization and rationalization of production, due to which a number of defects remained unrepaired and further identification of sabotage acts was difficult. The orders of the Supreme Council of National Economy on declassification remained on paper, both through the fault of some heads of economic bodies, and grassroots professional and party organizations.
4. There are cases of active and passive resistance of plant directors to the measures of the OGPU to eliminate the consequences of pests.  
stva.

II

The sabotage not only undermined the supply base of the Red Army, but also caused direct damage to the improvement of military equipment, hindered the rearmament of the Red Army and worsened the quality of military supplies. Heroic efforts are needed to make up for lost time. This was not realized by some leaders of the economic bodies of the military industry, and hence:

1. Large shortfalls in military production in the first quarter of 29/30 in almost all trusts.

2. Experimental design work has not yet been put to the proper height, the cadres of technical personnel, especially designers, have not been replenished.

3. The absence of noticeable improvements in technological processes, which, with the previous disorder in drawing, patterning and instrumental work and low technical conditions, leads to a further disorganization of military production.

All this testifies that, in general, the decisions of the Politburo of 15/7/7-29 were carried out, the pace taken for the improvement and restoration of various industries of the military industry turned out to be completely unsatisfactory.

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critical, and the latter still failed to prepare for the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to it for the defense of the country.

All this obliges directors of factories, heads of trusts, the State Higher Political Administration and the Supreme Council of National Economy to mobilize all possible forces and means to eliminate, in the shortest possible time, the consequences of sabotage in the production of military products.

III

In order to quickly eliminate the consequences of sabotage and decisively improve the way things are done in the military industry:

1. Create under the trusts commissions of business executives, representatives of the OGPU, NKVM and the Central Committee of the corresponding Union, which, on the basis of the material available in the OGPU, should develop specific tasks for each production (pipe, cartridge, machine gun, etc.), with the establishment the exact shortest possible time for their implementation, involving in the work of eliminating sabotage and repentant saboteurs.

The GVPV and the OGPU should begin the work of these commissions immediately.

2. To enlist non-Party and communist activists not only to participate in the organization and rationalization of production, but also to fight and eliminate the consequences of sabotage. The Supreme Council of National Economy to put into practice the declassification order (No. 716).

3. All the economic staff (especially in the OAT and in the VCT) to increase vigilance in the further discovery of wrecking acts.

4. The indictment of the OGPU on sabotage (dated August 29) and additional materials on this issue to be sent to all district party committees on whose territory military plants are located.

To assign responsibility for the timely mobilization of the party and professional

public to eliminate the consequences of sabotage.

5. Explain to all heads of economic bodies of the military industry (directors of factories, chairmen of trusts and railways) that they are responsible not only for the general administrative management of the enterprise, but also for technical management; technical managers should be regarded only as assistants to business executives in this work.

In this regard, business executives are obliged to improve their qualifications and technical literacy. The Supreme Council of National Economy and the State Higher Educational Institution of Ukraine should help them with financial resources, temporary full release for study and temporary release from any social burden. Within ten days, draw up a calendar plan for such a release of all leading workers in the military industry.

6. The chairmen and members of the boards of trusts and SHPUs must move from bureaucratic office work to live leadership and instruction of enterprises, carrying it out by direct visits to such enterprises. With the correct organization of these trips (order and systematicity), not only the improvement of management will be ensured, but also the improvement of the qualifications of the business executives themselves.

7. Propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy to issue an order on the transition in associations and trusts of the military industry from collegiate to individual management.

8. To propose to the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR to check the progress in eliminating the consequences of sabotage and the implementation of industrial financial plans and mob plans periodically

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convene meetings of directors of military factories and boards of military trusts.

9. For the improvement of instrumental and pattern making:

a) organize a general inspection of drawings, standards, templates, patterns and working tools at all factories of the military industry and remove everything that is unusable.

b) The Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, within a month, develop a system of measures for the periodic verification of this instrument by the directorates of factories, military inspectors and higher authorities.

c) NKVM accelerate the revision of all drawings, completing it for the main products within 2 months.

d) The Supreme Council of National Economy to arrange the full use of the tool departments (shops) of military factories, organize in 30/31 special tool factories for the military industry in order to improve the quality of patterns and tools, using the latest technological achievements.

e) the NKTorg and the Supreme Council of National Economy, as early as 29/30, to provide all instrumental

the affairs of factories with the necessary amount of tool steel and, first of all, to bring in all imported equipment for these workshops.

f) In order to make the best use of the insignificant cadre of toolmakers of the NKTrudu, to revise the wage policy for this category of workers, and the NKVM in the current year to exempt from terasbors the modellers, toolmakers and all skilled workers who are not subject to conscription for mobilization in wartime ;

g) the Supreme Council of National Economy to use foreign aid more boldly (recruitment of scalers in Germany, etc.);

h) in order to accelerate the training of a highly qualified workforce, along with the strengthening of the Fabzauch, the Supreme Council of National Economy should use the CIT more widely.

10. Party and trade union organizations to mobilize the attention of workers in military industries to restore their lost skills in precision work and conduct a broad campaign to improve the quality of military products, combating the greed of the backward part of the workers and the tailism of the shop, and sometimes the factory administration, condoning this .

P. Supreme Council of National Economy within two weeks to develop new regulations on control departments, with subordination directly to the directors of factories. Reconsider and strengthen the staff of graders, pay special attention to timely grading in the production process.

12. The Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, within a month, complete the development of technical conditions and specifications for industrial products supplied to the military department, which do not yet have them.

13. Government Commission to complete the general revision of specifications by May 1, 1930.

14. NKRC check the status of work on the review of technical specifications and submit a report to the RZ STO within 2 weeks.

15. NKRKI, NKVM and Supreme Economic Council within 3 months to check the condition of the mobilization stock of the main types of military products. RZ STO, as the check progresses, set strict deadlines for bringing it to a state of combat readiness.

Oblige the NKVM to improve military acceptance in order to exclude for the future the accumulation of unusable military reserves.

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16. To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy within 1 month to submit for approval by the RZ STO an industrial assignment for capital construction for all newly built and reconstructed military plants.

17. Tov. KUIBYSHEV and comrade MIKOYAN, within 10 days, take urgent measures to ensure the timely delivery of imported



equipment according to the plan of 29/30 and ordered in previous years.

18. NKTrud to provide, on an extraordinary basis, the capital construction of military plants with the necessary personnel of workers.

19. The GPPU and the OGPU work out all wrecking materials on capital construction so that the control figures for 30/31 provide for the complete elimination of sabotage in this area.

20. In order to liquidate the remnants of the counter-revolutionary group of specialists, the Supreme Council of National Economy within a month to develop measures for the transfer of technical personnel from military factories to civilian ones and vice versa.

GV

In order to ensure the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production programs of the military industry:

1. STO and NKVM establish a real and firm production program for military products without subjecting it to frequent changes. From now on, tasks must be given in a timely manner (no later than 1/4 of the preceding operational year), so that industry has the opportunity to systematically develop.

2. The Supreme Economic Council of National Economy and the Central Committee of metalworkers to submit within two decades a project to transfer to the position of mobilized some plants, where there are serious concerns about the implementation of the program.

3. Immediately issue a directive on the release of military factories on 29/30 from the mobilization of personnel for various campaigns (sowing, grain procurement, collective farms, etc.).

V

In order to improve technical management in military factories:

1. The Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Labor within a month to mobilize engineers from the civil industry for military plants, primarily designers and metallurgists;

To this end, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR issue a decree on the forced assignment of engineers to military plants and on their attachment to these plants for a certain period.

2. To oblige the Supreme Economic Council to develop at an accelerated pace a network of paramilitary technical colleges and technical schools to the extent corresponding to the full needs of the military industry and military production of civilian industry.  
ness.

3. To oblige the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy of NKPros and NKTrud to ensure, first of all, the factories of the military industry and military productions of the civil industry, regardless of the existence of concluded contracts and agreements.

4. To oblige the Supreme Economic Council to report within a month to the RZ STO on the progress of attracting foreign technical assistance to military production and inviting specialists, as well as a plan for a significant expansion of this involvement

niya.

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5. Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee within a month to mobilize for the military industry responsible party workers (including party engineers and technicians) in the amount of 50 people and a new group of military workers in the amount of 20 people.

At the same time, to oblige local party organizations to send a certain number of party members to work at the corresponding factories of the military industry.

6. Propose to the Supreme Council of National Economy to achieve a decisive change in the state of experimental work at military production, to achieve the minimum terms for the manufacture and introduction of new samples into production in the shortest possible time, to ensure the necessary attention to experimental work at military plants and to streamline it by creating special experienced workshops for the most important industries.

To oblige the Supreme Council of National Economy to report within a month to the RZ STO on the measures it is taking in pursuance of these proposals.

To improve the health of the entire military industry, members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission are urgently sent to the main military factories for a period of at least a month. First of all, they must supervise the implementation of measures to eliminate sabotage, the bringing of military factories into full mobilization readiness by the 1/7th of this year, the implementation of the industrial financial plan for 29/30 and the capital work plan, the determination of the production capacities of enterprises, for the actual implementation of unity of command and for the transfer of shops to self-financing.

To the secretariat of the Central Committee for the next meeting to submit a list of seconded.

VI

1. Plant directors; IOZa - comrade. Ershov for not taking timely measures to eliminate the consequences of sabotage and for disrupting the production program, to remove him from work, announce a severe reprimand, and deprive him of the right to hold responsible economic positions for 2 years.

Director of the plant number 50 comrade. DMITRIEV for the untimely adoption of measures to eliminate sabotage, be removed from work and reprimanded.

To the director of TOZ comrade. SITNIKOV should be reprimanded for insufficiently active elimination of the consequences of sabotage, obliging him to rectify this matter as soon as possible.

Director of the plant number 42 comrade. Shmyrov should be reprimanded for non-fulfillment of the program and the poor condition of the plant, suggesting that the situation be rectified as soon as possible.

2. The Central Committee warns all workers in the military industry that from now on all persons who, by their actions, resist the measures of the OPTU to eliminate the consequences of sabotage, will be brought to justice.

3. Report to the Supreme Council of National Economy on the progress of the implementation of this decision, as well as the decision of the PB of 15/7/29-29, in 3 months.

Kuibyshev\*

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 340. L. 200-209. Script. Typescript.

\* Visa of the PB member who submitted the project.

\*—\* Inscribed in pencil instead of the crossed-out word "such."

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No. 224

NOTE I.V. STALIN TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES FOR  
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC, TO MEMBERS OF THE  
PRESIDIUM OF THE CC, WITH APPENDIX  
MATERIALS OF THE OGPU ABOUT PERVERTS IN KOLKHOZ CONSTRUCTION

March 7, 1930

No. 20538C

Top secret

To members and candidates of the Politburo of the Central Committee: vols. Andreev, Bauman, Bukharin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kosior St., Kuibyshev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Petrovsky, Rudzutak, Rykov, Stalin, Syrtsov, Tomsy, Chubar.

To the members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission: vol. Ilyin, Lebed, Ordzhonikidze, Solts, Shkiryatov, Yakovlev Ya.A., Yanson, Yaroslavsky.

In sending out the following documents on the distortion of the party line in the field of collective-farm construction, I think that the question as a whole should be discussed when drawing up the order of the day of the Politburo on March 10th.

I. Stalin

Appendix: 1) Note by Comrade Evdokimov; 2) Telegram from Comrade Eikhe; 3) Note by Comrade Syrtsov.  
Ex. ŷ\_ on 7 sheets\*

Tov. Stalin

Materials coming from the localities cite numerous facts of perversions, excesses on the part of a part of the grass-roots Soviet apparatus and local brigades.

when carrying out practical measures of sowing campaigns, collectivization, dispossession.

Almost everywhere there are facts of summing up the middle peasants and even the poor, in some cases the former. red partisans, under the category of dispossessed; facts of exceptionally rough treatment of the population by workers of the grass-roots apparatus are recorded in places; many facts of looting and division of the property of the dispossessed, as well as arrests of the middle peasants for not bringing in seed grain are recorded; threats of arrest and eviction for not joining the collective farm, and so on.

Information about abuses, despite the measures taken by regional party organizations, continues to come in and to this day from most districts and in some places is increasing quantitatively. The most rough forms of inflections are noted in the Zinoviev, Kherson, Poltava and Uman districts of Ukraine.

In some districts, specially organized district troikas gave the commissioners sent to the places (villages) the wrong instructions for dispossession. Dekulakization was carried out out of touch with the issue of collectivization without sufficient participation of the Soviet public and the involvement of the rural poor and middle peasant activists.

The most characteristic facts of distortions that took place in these areas in the process of dispossession are given.

KHERSON DISTRICT. In the village of Bereznigovatsky, dekulakization was carried out without making an inventory. Part of the seized property was stolen. The brigade, led by the secretary of the local cell of the CP (b) U Butenko, undressed the daughter of one kulak and began to strangle her father. The property of two middle peasants is

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but it was taken without an inventory, one of them was stripped, his 12-year-old daughter was left in one shirt. The 17-year-old daughter of a kulak has a brigadier under the leadership of the head. The KNS, a member of the CP(b)U, took off their pantaloons. One kulak was driven out barefoot into the street without a hat in his underwear. One of the middle peasants was undressed together with the child and thrown out into the street. The request of the mother to give the child to the child was rejected by a member of the brigade and a member of the party.

NOTE: The secretary of the Bereznigovatsky district committee of the CP(b)U and the head of the RIC were promptly informed about what was happening in the area, but only after repeated warnings did the district committee limit itself to issuing a reprimand to some workers. Some participants in the disgrace committed during dispossession fled from the Bereznigovatsky district to other districts.

ZINOVIEVSK DISTRICT. Previous Grigory Kononenko of the Malo-Pomoshnyansky headquarters at the village council summoned the middle peasant and the middle peasant to deliver the sowing material. After the latter refused, he took them to a separate room, where he tried to force the middle peasant to stick his genitals into the mouth of the middle peasant.

Omelchuk Ilya, a member of the headquarters of the brigade for collecting seed material from the village of Timonovka, due to the refusal of an average 40-year-old woman to take out wheat, sent her to another headquarters with the following message: "Take her to a dark corner and rape her there." The Malo-Pomoshnyansky staff summoned a 28-year-old middle peasant, suggesting that he immediately give a signature on the implementation of

planting plan. When the middle peasant refused to give a subscription, he was forced to dance to the sounds of a string orchestra until he fainted, after which they put him in a cold room, keeping him there for 1.5 hours. The same brigade raped two kulaks, beat a 65-year-old old man, who was forced to sing, dance, poured water over him, gave a lit cigarette in his teeth, etc.

At the Perchunov headquarters, all the work is arranged in such a way as to make it possible to beat the peasants without publicity. When the population found out about the beating of one poor man, the poor directly declared that they would deal with such representatives of the authorities.

In with. Novo-Alekseyevka, the brigade ordered a 65-year-old man, who refused to hand over the seed material, to undress and take off his boots, then they made him march around the room for about 30 minutes and began to throw him from side to side until the old man collapsed from exhaustion. Following this, a box was placed on the old man and the whole team sat on it, then they made him dance and offered to drink 40 glasses of wine. Turpentine was added to the third glass, then a belt was thrown around his neck and one of the brigadiers began to hang him up. The old man lost consciousness, and the next day the brigade ordered him to be silent, otherwise it would be worse.

In with. In Novo-Aleksandrovka, Yerokhin, secretary of the cell of the Young Communist League, forced the middle peasant to drag the end of the noose stretched around his neck. The middle peasant was suffocating, and the secretary scoffed: "Drink water, drink."

NOTE: The perpetrators of hooligan-provocative actions have been brought to justice.

UMAN DISTRICT. In a number of villages, the middle peasants were dispossessed. Individual workers of the village councils "did not have instructions whether it was possible to carry out the dispossession of the middle peasants." The most unfavorable situation is in the Bugsky and Oratovsky districts.

In with. Yankovka, Bug district, 45 owners were dispossessed, including 35 middle peasants. Dispossession was carried out by the head. agitprop of the Republic of Kazakhstan RCP (b) Lysenko and authorized and member of the RIC Lewandovsky. During dispossession, activists beat one woman with a rifle butt. Part

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things were assigned. Part of the middle peasants, being evicted, found themselves on the street. In with. Sologubovka, Oratovsky district, a decision was made to evict 25 households, including middle peasants. The middle peasant Nazarchuk, who was on the list of deportees, hanged himself. Work in the village on dispossession was carried out with the sanction of the authorized RIK. The bringing of the middle peasantry under dispossession took place in Talnovsky, Zvenigorodsky and other districts.

POLTAVA DISTRICT. In the Sheshak region, 500 farms have been dispossessed, while in the region there are a total of 340 expert farms and it itself is not a region of continuous collectivization.

In the Zenkovsky district, all property was taken away from the dispossessed. In one case, a dispossessed person was stripped naked.

In the Zachepilovsky district of continuous collectivization, 370 households were dispossessed. During dispossession, all property was dismantled. In Chernyshansky, Novo-Senkovsky and friend, village councils, part of the wearable things seized from the kulaks was distributed to the poor. In the Belotserkovsky district, the property of a poor peasant, two middle peasants, dispossessed for their unwillingness to join the SOZ, is described. In the Sakhnovsky district, during dispossession in the village. Kolomiytsevo, all warm clothes were removed from the kulaks. In one case, several women were forcibly undressed. Authorized RIK Shapoval in with. Nadezhdino "dispossessed" the middle peasant, who the next day left for three-day labor camps.

Arrests and evictions of middle peasants were noted in a number of villages in the Rublevsky district.

In the CENTRAL BLACK EARTH REGION we give several characteristic facts of curvature. Moreover, their number in the area of significance

seriously.

In the village of Kurlak, Shchuchinsky district, Borisoglebsky district, the head of the village council, the representative of the RIK and 3 members of the village council appeared at the apartment of the village correspondent of the newspaper Novaya Derevnnya, an activist-middle peasant, and stated that the property was subject to inventory and seizure as "kulak". In the absence of the village correspondent, they drove his wife and undressed young children out into the street, described and folded things, locked them in a chest, taking the keys with them.

In with. Stitches of the Sosnovsky district of the Kozlovsky district at the end of January, property was seized in the village for a fine. All livestock and all real estate were taken away. In the morning, when they started feeding the cattle, there were many frozen lambs. The cattle was left unattended. During the seizure of property, blankets and manufactory were taken away, which subsequently disappeared somewhere.

In with. Kalmyk of the Borisoglebsky district, the alienation of kulak property was carried out by a policeman with the help of 2 dispossessed hooligans serving forced labor at the village council. Things were taken from the kulaks and middle peasants at home and on the street, bribes were levied for leaving property, and so on.

NOTE: At the same time, it should be noted that the presence of mass demonstrations is very significant for the CES. According to incomplete information, there were 22 of them for 25 days of February. According to the 15 mass demonstrations of participants, there are up to 13 thousand people. Of the 22 speeches, in 7 cases the speakers used physical violence against party activists. By the number of participants in performances, the region today ranks first.

At the same time, it should be noted that the party line is distorted in the direction of defending the kulaks. Individual workers of the grass-roots Soviet party apparatus, connected with the kulaks, protest against repressions, shelter the kulak and kulak property.

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With the general positive attitude of the poor-middle peasant masses to the activities of the Soviet power in the countryside and active participation in their implementation on the basis of distortions in some areas, there is an increase in dissatisfaction among the masses.

middle peasants and poor peasants, which in some places turns into anti-collective farm anti-sowing and other mass actions provoked by kulak-counter-revolutionary elements. The success of these provocative attacks by the kulak and the "counter-terrorist" is largely due to the insufficiency of mass explanatory work, which is established from a number of liquidated mass actions in a number of areas.

BEGINNING SOU OGPU

EVDOKIMOV APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 129-131. Script. Typescript.

\* Published without Eikhe's telegram and Syrtsov's note (see note 74).

No. 225

MESSAGE S.F. REDENSA G.G. YAGODA BY DIRECT WIRE FROM TIFLIS WITH  
TRANSPORTATION OF THE CC TO MEMBERS AND  
CANDIDATES TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

AND TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CCC

March 11, 1930

No. 20748/s

MOST SECRET

On behalf of Comrade Stalin sent you for your information a note by Comrade Redens by direct wire from Tiflis dated 11.3.30.

APPENDIX: copy. No\_on 2 sheets.

Pom. Secretary of the Central Committee (Signature)

Owls. secret

Moscow, OGPU - comrade. BERRY

As a result of the insufficient coverage of a huge number of newly created collective farms, the excesses made, intra-kolkhoz shortcomings and the general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak forces, \* mass anti-collective farm demonstrations that take on a political coloring intensified \*, Kakheta and a number of districts of the Tiflis district, some villages of the Sevan district and all Turkic regions of Armenia. In these areas there is a rapid disintegration of collective farms, accompanied in a number of cases by the defeat of the Village Soviets, the beating and expulsion of party members and soviet activists. The demonstrations that have taken place so far have been liquidated by peaceful means and persuasion, and only in rare cases by a demonstration and an insignificant military force, the initiators and direct participants in the rout and violence, with a few exceptions, have not been arrested, in some cases, when trying to arrest, one had to run into the general resistance of the entire village As a result of which the planned arrests were canceled, all this was interpreted by the population as a sign of the weakness of the authorities and contributed to even greater insolence of those who acted under the influence of anti-Soviet forces, the following demands were put forward \*: 1) Release all those arrested. 2) Remove party members and Komsomol members. 3) Remove and remove part of the local

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co-workers. 4) Allow free trade. 5) Allow the delivery of goods from abroad. 6) Reduce the cost of goods. 7) Cancel insurance and state loans. 8) Extradite all informers; and 9) Return those who were expelled and give property to the dispossessed. A particularly tense situation was created in the Turkic regions. In the Vedibasar district of the Erivan district, up to 250 people went to the mountains together with their families, of which up to 150 were armed. The departed led a wide agitation in the surrounding villages and recruited supporters. To eliminate the uprising, which had taken on a broad character, it was necessary to send a military group of up to 30 bayonets. Subsequent negotiations did not yield results, therefore, \*March 11, operational actions will begin\*. In the rest of the Türkic regions of Armenia, as well as in individual border Türkic villages of Georgia, there is a "strong migration movement—flight to Turkey". In Georgia and Armenia, and especially in Azerbaijan, a group of kulaks have gone underground and are hiding with weapons; at their expense, the existing gangs have significantly replenished. In connection with the general situation in the countryside, the gangs in Azerbaijan switched to active operations, as a result of which \* military groups had to be sent to the Ganja district, Karabakh and Nakhkrai for the operation \*. The situation is serious. If decisive measures are not taken, then by spring we may have serious complications that could result in armed uprisings. Through the GPU, we have "taken all possible measures": 1) The GPU apparatus has been strengthened in the localities for all districts, Plenipotentiaries have been selected and sent, and the entire Chekist reserve has been used. 2) Operational groups were organized under the district departments of the GPU. 3) Detachments of Communards have been created in the most affected areas. 4) The police are attached to the organs of the GPU and are used entirely for operational work. 5) The Red Army personnel, delayed by demobilization, was used to strengthen the protection of the borders. 6) From 3 to 8 of the 24 regiments of the GPU troops, operational groups were formed, in Azerbaijan numbering 130 people, and Georgia - 100 people. 300 bayonets were allocated to Armenia at the expense of the frontier units. We consider it absolutely necessary: 1) To confiscate the initiators of the demonstrations, the instigators and the direct participants in the rout and beatings, the agitators-walkers and malicious kulaks, without stopping at the decisive suppression of resistance. 2) In order to ensure the planned operations to eliminate active bandit groups and anti-Soviet actions, transfer to the disposal of the GPU 1000 bayonets, with the appropriate number of command personnel, equipment and technical means. 3) Allocate 30 light machine guns, 500 rifles, 500 pcs. grenades and 300,000 pcs. cartridge. We ask for urgent instructions. Please acquaint STALIN and SERGO with the contents of the note.

Previous ZAK GPU REDENS

Beginning SOW BERIA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 146. L. 74-77. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains handwritten notes by G. Yagoda: "T. Stalin. G. Yagoda. 11.III.30" and "The OGPU ordered the transfer of 630 bayonets and the issuance of 500 rifles, 500 grenades and cartridges. G. Yagoda.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.



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No. 226

INDICATIONS OF ENGINEER I.N. STRIZHOVA  
ON THE "VARATIVENESS" OF THE ENGLISH COMPANY  
"VICKERS", DIRECTED TO THE OGPU I.V. STALIN (75)

March 13, 1930

After the nationalization of the oil industry in the USSR, benzin became the main oil export product, which gave the greatest benefits. It became clear that it was necessary to increase the production of gasoline by all means. One of these methods was cracking. In America, it was already widespread, but in our country this method was hushed up. The first wrecking act of the leaders and specialists of the oil refinery business in the USSR \*in relation to cracking was to hush up the importance of cracking and resist its introduction into the USSR\*. Cracking plants had to be ordered as early as 1923, but they were ordered only in 1925, and in such a way that they have not yet begun to work well. The second sabotage act in the field of cracking was the ordering of these first units from the wrong systems and from the wrong firms.

It was necessary to order cracking units from one of the few American systems that have been tested in practice, have come into wide use and have proved to be profitable. Among these I include: HOLMES-MANLY, 2) CROSS, 3) DABBS, 4) GOLF, 5) JENKINS, 6) ICEM and 7) ELLIS.

ŸThe installations had to be ordered by American firms. Instead, in 1925, Azneft ordered 2 installations and Grozneft 1 installation - to the English company VIKKERS and also VIKKERS systems. The order was placed by A.P. SEREBROVSKY during his journey from America through England back to the USSR. This order was made on the advice of engineer A.I. MANCHO and GINNIS. Until that time, VICKERS cracking had not been tested anywhere on an industrial scale. Factory Vickers crackers were nowhere to be found. It was clear that such cracking could not be ordered \*. And yet it was booked. At its core, Vickers cracking was a stolen, altered, and corrupted CROSS method. The deviations introduced by VICKERS into the CROSS process were the reason why VICKERS cracking could not work well. However, VICKERS did not want to return to the original method of CROSS, because then CROSS would have sued VICKERS. In London in 1925 the order was given in principle. Then the long procedure of working out the details of the order began. It took place in Moscow, Baku and Grozny. For this purpose Dr. LOMAX and engineers came to the USSR from VICKERS. I.I. ELIN, A.A. SHIBINSKY, V.S. POLLYAK, I.N. AKKERMANN, Yu.K. MAKSIMOVICH, G.I. Eminov, G.S., SURABEKOV, M.N. ROST MYAN and A.N. SAKHANOV. The leading role was played by I.I. ELIN, A.A. SHIBINSKY and G.P. EMINOV. Communication with VICKERS was maintained by A.I. MANCHO and V.S. POLLAK. I.N. also went to London. AKKERMANN.

Ÿ The Vickers firm was known in Russia even in pre-revolutionary times as a firm that mainly supported itself on bribes\*. Solid industrial firms did not deal with it. She was mainly engaged in deliveries to the treasury, and she obtained these state orders for bribes, and by fulfilling these orders, she supplied all kinds of shit, paying bribes

Receivers. Obviously, this company thought that, despite the revolution that had taken place, the treasury, state officials and bribe takers remained in the USSR,

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engineers. VICKERS continued his former policy, and he managed not only to foist unsuitable cracking on the Soviet oil industry, but also to receive a number of other orders, some of which were not at all in his specialty. He took on everything. He undertook to supply American-type rotary drilling rigs, but they also turned out to be unusable. \* In the activities of VICKERS in relation to the oil industry of the USSR, one can see the desire not only to earn money, but also to damage \*. If even before England considered Russia its primordial enemy, after the revolution the hatred of the British ruling circles towards the USSR increased. VICKERS, by supplying unusable equipment, was a tool in the hands of others. Behind VICKERS stood Sir DETERDING and the Anglo-Persian Oil Society, in which the English government participated.

As a result, VICKERS cracking did not go to the USSR. Both our Soviet engineers and the British engineers sent by VICKERS suffered for a long time with this matter.

But about the work of English engineers, we will say this:

Why didn't VICKERS send a cracker specialist to the USSR?

After all, if real cracking specialists were sent, they would not suffer so much, but would immediately resolve the issue.

Meanwhile, ordinary ordinary engineers were sent, who had never seen cracking. And Dr. LOMAX himself could not be considered a cracking specialist. He did not work on cracking and did not build cracking plants, but only took an English patent for someone else's system according to stolen drawings. LOMAX stayed with VICKERS for a short time. Seeing that with this cracking he got into a big mess, he preferred to get away from VICKERS and from this dirty business. In his place, VICKERS invited MOORE, who understood cracking even less than LOMAX, so that A.I. MANCHO. As time went. Cracking did not improve. There were several fires and explosions. The English engineers were at a loss. They were assisted by our engineers and gave advice on what corrections should be introduced into the VICKERS cracking. These corrections gradually brought VICKERS cracking closer to American CROSS cracking. So several years passed. Cracked gasoline began to be included in regular annual programs, though in small quantities. But in fact this did not happen. Only in the current year one of the VICKERS installations in Baku began to work, but not at full capacity. \*Thus, no less than 4 years of time were lost with cracking\*. If, instead of VICKERS, CROSS or DABBS or HOLMES-MANLY had been ordered in 1924 or early 1925, he would have started working from the beginning of 1926 and for all the elapsed time would have given us many millions of rubles of currency. And if American cracking had been ordered even earlier, then cracked gasoline would have managed to capture the high prices for gasoline, reaching up to 2 rubles 50 kopecks.

Despite the fact that VICKERS cracking in Baku and Grozny does not

It was possible to get it right, the defenders of this method still continued to come out in the USSR, and one should be surprised that even in 1928 and at the beginning of 1929 the specialists of the People's Commissariat of Trade insisted and demanded in the most energetic way that new installations be again ordered to VICKERS. Evidently, VICKERS found a way into Narkomtorg\*.

I believe that VICKERS can never be trusted for anything. The best thing is to never have anything to do with him.

- The third sabotage act in the field of cracking was the wrong formulation of the question and the wrong choice of material for cracking\*. On

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question: what to crack? our specialists, urged on by VICKERS, gave the answer: fuel oil. This decision was given by I.I. ELIN, EMINOV, SHI BINSKY, POLLYAK, MAKSIMOVICH, SAKHANOV, and O.G. KOPELYANSKY, and they especially praised this decision. Meanwhile, it was a wrong and harmful decision.

Cracking fuel oil is a very difficult task. And suddenly we, not knowing how to crack, immediately take on the most difficult cracking. During cracking, fuel oil gives a lot of coke, which settles in a fine form on the inner walls of the reaction chamber and other parts of the cracking unit and interferes with the further course of the process. Cracking fuel oil, the installation cannot have a long cycle of continuous operation. It has to be stopped to clean the coke, and cleaning the coke is a difficult, dirty, and inconvenient job. For cleaning, it is necessary to artificially cool the equipment, and after cleaning, heat it up again, and this leads to extra fuel consumption. Cracking coke is a bad material. It cannot be compared with ashless straight-run petroleum coke. Cracked coke hardly finds a market for itself, and, moreover, at a very cheap price. In America, it is predominantly gas oil or a broad fraction with distillate that lies between gasoline and tar, rather than fuel oil, that is cracked. True, fuel oil is also cracked here and there, but the amount of cracked fuel oil in comparison with the amount of cracked gas oil is negligible. And we had to take not fuel oil as a material for cracking, but a wide fraction of distillates.

• The fourth sabotage act in the field of cracking was the decision to simultaneously produce good fuel oil along with gasoline. It was a tricky decision. One thing: either gasoline or fuel oil \*.

The authors of this solution were the same persons who were named, and they especially praised this solution, saying that it saves us from the inconvenient paraffin oil that hardens at high temperature, giving instead of it gasoline and good non-hardening oil.

True, by cracking paraffinic fuel oil, it is possible to direct the process in such a way that cracked gasoline will be obtained and the remainder will be non-solidifying fuel oil. But in this case, the percentage of gasoline yield will be small (instead of 50-60% - only 25-35%), and fuel oil will be clogged with coke, which in a fine, suspended state will float in fuel oil and greatly reduce its quality.

Why do we crack? In order to get more gasoline. And since this is so, we must go in this process to the maximum extent possible. It is necessary to obtain the maximum yield of gasoline. And this is incompatible with the production of good fuel oil in the residue. You have to give up on fuel oil in cracking.

Fuel oil is obtained in other (cheap) ways. Cracking to get good fuel oil is nonsense. Cracking, with its enormous pressure, with its very high temperature, with its expensive equipment, dangerous work, and risk of fires and explosions, cannot be made a means of obtaining good fuel oil. Its goal is to obtain the maximum amount of good gasoline. You can't chase two birds with one stone here. At the DABBSA cracker, it is possible to crack the product to the end and obtain only gasoline, gas, and coke. There will be no oil left. Cracking gas oil, you can get 50% good gasoline and 20% good fuel oil. But to set ourselves the task of cracking paraffinic fuel oil into non-solidifying fuel oil is to hide the problem of cracking. Namely, the problem of cracking was posed by the pests listed above.

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\*The fifth sabotage act in the field of cracking was the delay in further orders for cracking (after the first three ordered in 1925 to VICKERS)\*.

What are the three small installations ordered by VICKERS? Compared to our capabilities and our need for gasoline for export, this is a drop in the ocean. Three units were ordered in 1925. It was necessary to order 10 in 1926, 50 in 1927, 100 in 1928, etc. That's when we would have gasoline and would have hundreds of millions of rubles in hard currency. But the lack of knowledge, the indecisiveness of the oil trusts, the blindness of people, the inability to foresee the developing economic processes and the sabotage policy of the leaders of the oil refinery business of the USSR were the cause of an unacceptable delay in orders. Until the end of 1928, not a single order was made. The question of new orders was repeatedly raised. But the above-mentioned specialists said: "How can we order new installations? We do not know what systems? We have to wait for the results of the commissioning of the VICKERS installations." So we waited 4 years. So we still do not have a single first-class cracker. Ordered in a small number of installations at the end of 1928 and in 1929, the JENKINS cracker is good and widely tested in practice in America, but HOLMES-MANLY and CROSS are technically somewhat higher. The cracking WINKLER-KOCH ordered by SAKHANOV in the second half of 1929 is unknown to me. I have never seen WINKLER-KOCH crackers anywhere in America and have not read anything about them in the literature. Maybe he's good? But how can one order cracking that has not been widely tested in practice and has not entered into life. Don't know. Indeed, along with this, there are 7 cracking systems in America that have become widely used and work profitably.

It was necessary to order HOLMES-MANLY, or CROSS, or ELLIS, or DABBS, and I put DABBS a little lower than the first two. In the first place I put HOLMES-MANLY.

First-class American cracking should have been ordered a long time ago, and cracking installations should have been started long ago at metallurgical and machine-building plants of the USSR according to its model. This last issue was also heavily delayed in execution.

\* Cracking should give us not just gasoline, but anti-knock gasoline. This problem has also been wiped out by our pests\*. Any

Cracked gasoline has higher anti-knock properties than conventional gasoline, but its anti-knock properties are different for different cracking systems. The higher the cracking temperature and the lower the pressure, the more anti-knock gasoline is obtained. The most anti-destructive gasoline is obtained by vapor phase cracking, i.e. at a very high temperature and very low pressure. It was necessary to order 1 vapor phase cracker for every 3 liquid or vapor-liquid crackers. By mixing these gasolines, we would have such anti-knock gasolines that would beat in Zap. Europe gasolines of all our competitors.

In addition to the anti-knock gasoline needed by the military department, vapor phase cracking could produce benzene and toluene.

In yet another respect, the above-mentioned pests in the field of cracking have damaged - this is in the matter of choosing a place for cracking. They began to install such in mining areas, i.e. in Baku and Grozneft, and \*should have been put closer to sales. For the export of gasoline, it was necessary to install cracking on the Black Sea coast, and for the domestic market - first of all in Moscow\*. However, Grozneft under the influence of A.A. SHIBINSKY, Yu.K. MAXIMO

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HIVA, I.I. ELINA and A.N. SAKHANOV is still doing cracking in Grozny. This is an unjustified harmful decision.

All the wreckers of the oil refinery objected to the cracking plant in Moscow. Meanwhile, Moscow is the ideal point for cracking. Of all the cities of the USSR, it has the maximum consumption of gasoline, which will increase very strongly in the near future, and antiknock gasoline will be required. For the military department and especially for the Directorate] of the Military [no] - Air Forces, Moscow as a point for the production of antiknock gasoline and toluene would be the most acceptable. Headspace cracking produces a lot of gas and requires a market for this gas. In this respect, Moscow is also the most convenient point, because it needs cheap good gas most of all. The Moscow working population was forced to pay 3 rubles. 15 kop. for 1000 kb. feet of bad gas made from coal. This is also one of the outrageous circumstances\*. American bourgeois pay for rich gas from 50 kopecks. up to 2 rub. for 1000 kb. f. In the general campaign for lowering prices in the USSR, it is not clear why Moscow gas was left aside. And this is against the backdrop of large coal deposits near Moscow. But if the coal industry of the USSR and the MCC was not able to provide Moscow with cheap high-calorie gas, this task should be taken over by the "oil and gas industry" by prospecting for oil and gas at anticlines as close to Moscow as the OKA anticline. TsNA, etc., as well as by building a large oil refinery in Moscow with conventional cracking and vapor phase cracking. In terms of calories, cracked gas is three times richer than coal gas and does not contain such unnecessary or harmful impurities as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, sulfur, etc.

It is easier to build cracking in Moscow than in Baku or Grozny, and it will cost less. The proximity of machine-building plants and scientific and technical institutions is a great advantage. Cracking will be in the "eye", and it will probably be unrelentingly monitored.

So, now in the cracking business, you have to start over, that is, from the one with

what should have been started in 1923.

Prof. I. Strizhov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 336. L. 3-12. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 227

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

«ABOUT UKRAINE AND BELARUS»

March 15, 1930

No. 120, p. 72/34 - About Ukraine and Belarus.

According to the available data, there is reason to assume that in the event of serious kulak-peasant uprisings in the right-bank Ukraine and Belarus, especially in connection with the upcoming eviction of Polish-kulak counter-revolutionary and espionage elements from the border regions, the Polish government may go for intervention. To avoid all this

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The Central Committee considers it necessary to issue the following directives to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Central Committee of Byelorussia, as well as to the corresponding bodies of the OGPU:

- 1) to carry out the directive of the Central Committee of March 10 on combating distortions of the party line in the countryside with all determination, especially in the border regions of Ukraine and Belarus;
- 2) to focus both in the sense of political work and in the sense of military-Chekist training on the fact that no speeches of an anti-Soviet nature were allowed in the border districts of Ukraine and Belarus;
- 3) to transfer to the border districts within a week a sufficient number of experienced party workers at the expense of other districts to help local organizations;
- 4) to strengthen in the border districts quantitatively and qualitatively within a week the operational composition and maneuvering military groups of the OGPU at the expense of other reserves of the OGPU;
- 5) to prepare the operation of arrest and eviction of the kulak-Polish counter-revolutionary elements with all care and carry out as soon as possible;
- 6) to carry out the operation of evicting the kulak-Polish elements in the most organized manner and without noise;

7) the main task: to prevent any kind of mass action in the border districts;

8) to acquaint with the text of this directive as top secret only the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and the Bureau of the Central Committee of Belarus and the PGPU of Balitsky and Rappoport.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 154a. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on March 11, 1930.

\* f In the text there is a typewritten note about the distribution: "T. Yagoda.

No. 228

NOTE G.G. BERRIES AND E.G. EVDOKIMOVA

I.V. TO STALIN ON POLITICAL MOODS IN SIBERIA

IN CONNECTION WITH COLLECTIVIZATION AND DISSEMINATION

March 20, 1930

OWL. SECRET

On the basis of materials received recently from the OGPU PP for Siberia, we consider it necessary to pay attention to the following main points: The incessant perversions cause serious fluctuations in the mood of the middle and poor peasant masses, which creates favorable ground for the development of the kulak k.r. agitation and to spread kulak influence on a part of the middle peasants and even the poor. As a result, mass demonstrations led by the kulak k.r. and growing into gangs, movement.

It should be noted that in a number of districts (Achinsk, Kansk, Slavgorod district, etc.) mass excesses and gross distortions were not only the result of misunderstanding and distortion of the directives of higher organ

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nizations - grassroots apparatuses, but were largely the result of incorrect directives taught by district organizations (RIKs of the District Committee) and authorized district organizations.

Along with this, a large number of directives sent out by the District Committees suffered from vagueness and lack of specificity; almost all directives did not link dispossession with collectivization.

Here are a number of facts illustrating the gross mistakes of the leadership.

Characteristic is the following excerpt from the report of Yakimova, an authorized representative of the Slavgorod District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (inspector of the Okrtorg Department):

"The work to confiscate meat from the kulaks has been deployed and is going full steam ahead. Now we have turned it around in such a way that even the soul rejoices, we are cracking down on the kulaks in accordance with all the rules of modern politics, taking from the kulaks not only cattle, meat, implements, but also seeds, food and other property. We leave them in what the mother gave birth.

Krutinsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Kansk Okrug. gave this directive:

"All property is subject to confiscation, leaving the necessary clothing and utensils, excluding valuable utensils."

A similar directive was issued in the same district by the Kansk District Commission and in the Krasnoyarsk District by the Krasnoyarsk District Commission. The latter made only such restrictions: "It is forbidden to take away the last shirt and the last piece of bread."

As a mass phenomenon in most areas continues to be noted:

1) brutal coercion of the poor and middle peasants to join the collective farms. accompanied by threats, arrests, taxation on an individual basis with x. tax, deprivation of electoral rights and "dispossession" of the poor and middle peasants who refuse to collectivize and especially oppose collective farms (Barnaul, Krasnoyarsk, Biysk, Omsk, Rubtsovsky and other districts):

In the Charyshsky district of the Rubtsovsky district. For refusing to join the collective farms, 132 middle-peasant farms were "encircled" and sold out. (At present, the sold property has been returned, and the perpetrators have been brought to justice.)

Upol. Berechinsky District Administration of the Omsk Region (A member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks personally imposed an individual tax on 41 middle peasants for refusing to join the collective farm, and only when they agreed to join the collective was the tax lifted.

In with. Lugovsky, Talminsky district, Barnaul district. The chairman of the village council arrested 3 middle peasants because the latter refused to join the commune and socialize their implements and seeds.

In with. Lushnikovo, Barnaul region Verevkin, the secretary of the VKP(b) cell, and members of the commune Glebov, Pavlov, Onufriev, and others "drew" the peasants into the collective farm, declaring: wall and shot or will be transferred to the kulaks and sent to Narym.

In with. Yarsky, Tomsk region cell secretary The All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks arrested two poor peasants for speaking out at a general meeting against the commune and speaking out in favor of organizing agricultural production. artels.

In with. N. Elovka, Barnaul region. The chairman of the newly organized collective farm, Zyuzin, and the chairman of the village soviet, mobilized the peasants who had not joined the collective farm and forced them to work for the collective farm. In the same place, Zyuzin, together with Upol. Rika Avdonin arrested several middle peasants for refusing to join the collective farm; A 15-year-old boy and a 70-year-old low-powered middle peasant who was in custody without food for 4 days were arrested for not returning the semfond. (Guilty arrested.)



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2) Expansion of the contingent of farms subject to dispossession at the expense of the farms of the dispossessed of all categories, including at the expense of the poor and middle peasants; at the expense of all the "former" (small merchants, owners of handicraft factories who hired a seasonal laborer, etc.), now also the poor and middle peasants, dispossession for failure to comply with the state. duties and household tasks, etc.

In with. Romanovsky N. Siberian district. from the low-powered middle peasants of Arambitsky, the council confiscated all property, including all food, tea utensils and bedding, on the basis that for 3 years (4 years ago) Arambitsky had a handicraft cheese factory. Arambitsky was asked to leave the house at 24:00, his wife was refused to take a pillow for the child. (The guilty are put on trial.)

In with. Geddak, Omsk region the middle peasant was dispossessed "for having married three times."

In the Sukhobuzinsky district, the expropriation of property from a low-powered middle peasant Marina was planned because her son, a Red Army soldier of the ODon armored train, "did not pay alimony" (the expropriation was suspended).

3) mockery of the dispossessed (in a number of cases, this number also includes Soviet elements of the village), confiscation of all the property of the dispossessed to the smallest detail, depriving the families of the dispossessed of the necessary minimum of food and clothing, not to mention the minimum of household equipment and seeds . Bullying, looting and physical violence during dispossession.

In with. Deep Kamensky district. the secretary of the cell, while taking inventory of the property of the kulaks, threw a one-year-old child into the snow.

In with. Poratny Shipunovsky district, Rubtsovsky district. During the inventory of the kulak's property, the householder was stripped down to his underwear and subjected to mockery. In his underwear, the fist jumped out into the street, where 40 peasants had gathered.

In with. Dubrovino, Minusinsk region dispossession is carried out under the slogan: "Take your pants, leave the button on your kulak." Team of 6 people. dispossession took place. Going to the kulak, stripped him naked and subjected him to mockery. Among the property confiscated from the kulak, sourdough with dough was delivered to the s / s.

In almost all districts of Siberia, a large number of facts have been registered when, during dispossession, kulak property is plundered and stolen.

is acquired.

Some owls. workers, in particular communists, buy confiscated property for speculative purposes.

In a number of cases, groups of the poor, in the presence of district workers, passed a resolution on the distribution of kulak clothing among the poor.

In with. Cheldak, Omsk region (under the leadership of a non-partisan policeman

Grinev, (the son of a kulak), the following operation was performed: 43 kulaks were called to the S/S. In another room, a queue of poor peasants and farm laborers was built, and each in turn of the poor peasant and the kulak was called into the room and forced to mutually exchange fur coats and boots. The militiaman used threats and physical violence against the stubborn kulaks. The same policeman organized a similar dressing up in the street for the kulak youth.

In many cases, dispossession of kulaks is carried out without connection with work on collectivization. as an end in itself.

The most affected districts in terms of curvature and kinks are, according to data from

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Omsk, Biysk, Achinsk env. By sampling data on the most gross distortions and excesses in the course of collectivization, sowing campaigns and dekulakization in Siberia, 309 settlements were taken into account that were heavily affected. In addition, there are a number of districts (not included in this figure), where all settlements are covered by bends and curvature (Novoselovsky district of the Krasnoyarsk district, N. Maryinsky district of the Tomsk district, Alekseevskii district of the Slavgorod district and a number of others). In addition, there are hundreds of cases of curvature that are not specifically taken into account in local materials.

The weakness of explanatory work around the ongoing events should be noted as a general phenomenon for most districts and settlements of Sibkrai.

It is necessary to note the growth of resettlement, which partially captured even the poor.

The exit from the collective farms of the peasants, who joined them under pressure, is intensifying. According to incomplete data, over 2,000 farms were discharged from the collective farms in 10-15/3/13 across Siberia. Together with the data for the first 2 five-day days of March, the number of exits from collective farms is 9394.

#### Anti-Soviet manifestations

Despite the widespread operational work by the OGPU bodies to seize k.r. elements of the village (according to data on 13/III, 8,117 active workers were arrested in the Territory, 14 organizations with 470 members and 350 groupings with 2,779 members were liquidated), incessant excesses and distortions in the work of grassroots owls. parties, organizations, the absence of more or less satisfactory mass political work, in connection with measures for collectivization and dispossession of kulaks, create fertile ground for the development of kulak activity and for the spread of kulak influence on a part of the middle peasants and even the poor.

Serious attention should be paid to the growth in the number of mass protests, which has begun in mid-February, mainly arising from perversions and poor political preparation during collectivization and dispossession. Recently, there have been more frequent speeches in connection with the

the laziness of the kulaks.

During the month of January, 7 mass demonstrations were registered throughout the region; in February, according to incomplete data, there were 17 performances; for the first five days of March, according to incomplete data, 7 performances. For the second five-day period of March - 11. for the 3rd - 22 speeches, 9 of them on the basis of the eviction of the kulaks.

The development of a number of mass actions into actions of an insurrectionary character and the formation of some of the protesters into active gangs deserves serious attention.

A number of gangs organized and led by the kulak k.r. active, includes the middle peasants and even the poor, provoked by the kulaks to action, in connection with the perversions and excesses during collectivization and dispossession (along with this, the leaders of the gangs, the movement is also used forcible mobilization of the middle peasants).

(Performances in the Muromtsevsky district of the Baraba district; Mukhor-Shimbir district and in the area of the Tunkinskaya border commandant's office of Buryat-Mongolia; in the K-oshagach district of Oiratia, the Uchpristan district of the Bysk district).

On 1/Sh s.g. there were 21 active gangs in the region with a total of 473 members. On 15/Sh. - 28 gangs (of which 3 are liquidated) with a total number of participants 2992 (of which 1442 people were liquidated).

Thus, an increase in 15 days of March by 7 bands with 2519 members.

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There is an increase in political moments in the actions of gangster-kulak formations, moving from individual raids, terrorist attacks and robberies to open gang uprisings, with the capture of settlements, the destruction of the Soviet power in them, the organization of peasant gatherings with a call to join a broad insurrectionary movement under kulak slogans.

Eviction of the kulaks

The eviction of the kulaks of the 2nd category in the region is proceeding extremely poorly. According to the data for 15/30, 10,302 farms were evicted from the 30,000 farms planned by the region, which is 34.3%. In addition, there is additional information from the districts about 8986 farms prepared for shipment, which, together with those sent, will amount to 64.3%. Thus, the eviction plan will be significantly underfulfilled until the spring thaw. At the same time, there is an extreme weakness in the preparations for the eviction of the kulaks in the 3rd category. From many RECs, until very recently, no information was received on the degree of provision with food, seeds, and equipment for farms subject to eviction. In a number of okrugs the question of employing resettled people for one job or another has not been worked out definitively.

With the delay in the eviction and the presence in the region of up to 8,000 dispossessed, who fled from their places of residence, a further increase in banditry by spring is inevitable, which cannot but affect the sowing campaign.

All of the above speaks of the need to take a number of measures on the part of the regional organizations to quickly and decisively eliminate the existing serious shortcomings in the work of local organizations.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU G. Yagoda  
BEGINNING. SOU OGPU Evdokimov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 147. L. 117-123. Script. Typescript.

No. 229

TELEGRAM OF THE FIRST SECRETARY OF TATOBKOM  
VKP(b) M.O. RAZUMOV TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT PEASANT SPEECH

March 22, 1930

SECRET

In recent days, in a number of both Russian and Tatar volosts of Arsky, Mamadyshsky, Chistopolsky, Buinsky cantons, an unusually high activity of the kulaks has been noted, striving to provocatively use the latest directives of the party to combat excesses and the work being carried out in connection with this for the collapse collective farms. The agitation of the kulaks leads in a number of cases to the collapse of the collective farms and the withdrawal of the poor and middle peasants from the collective farms. ^Preparation for spring sowing in these villages is suspended. In twelve volosts of the Arsky canton, the anti-collective farm movement captured one hundred collectivized villages, and twenty-five clearly counter-revolutionary demands were put forward: the dissolution of collective farms, the return of tractor deposits from seeds, the cessation of work with the poor, the abolition of dekulakization and the eviction of kulaks, the restoration of all dispossessed, the abolition of the prohibition of slaughter, the removal of the poor from kulak houses, the closure of Soviet schools, the arrests of teachers, the opening of religious schools. In some cases, additional demands are made for the return of churches and mosques. Akti were beaten in four villages

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whists, forcibly dismantled the socialized seeds, in two villages they are forced to sign out from the party and the Komsomol. In many cases, the kulaks frustrate explanatory work to combat excesses. Kulak troikas appeared in several villages instead of village councils. The movement is led by fists\*. A movement analogous to the Arsky canton is also observed in certain points of the Mamadyshsky canton. In the Buinsky canton, after an explanation had been given, the collective farmers in many cases withdrew their applications for leaving the collective farm. We place our main stake on carrying out mass explanatory work, for this we mobilize all suitable party forces in the city, with the exception of those necessary to eliminate the industrial breakthrough, and send them to the countryside. Over the past two days, three hundred people have been sent. Two operational groups of about a hundred people were sent to the Arsky canton to seize the kulaks-leaders in some points. \* We ask you to allow the partial seizure and expulsion now of kulaks of the second category, at least within 1000 of the whole of Tataria. Signed by the secretary of the Tatobkom RAZUMOV \* On March 22, 1930, the head of the secret department of the GPU of the Tatar Republic SHARF handed over.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 146. L. 124-125. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text contains handwritten notes: "A copy was sent to Comrade Yagoda on 23/11.30"; "T. Razumov

reported by Stalin that the OGPU should accept and evict 1000 (see cipher dated 23/III)."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 230

REFERENCE G.G. BERRIES AND E.G. EVDOKIMOVA  
ON THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" SPEECH IN  
THE DIDOYEVSKIY SECTION  
OF THE ANDIAN DISTRICT OF DAGESTAN

April 4, 1930

The Didoevsky section of the Andean district is the most difficult, accessible and backward region, with a closed subsistence economy. This region in the past was the base of the uprisings of Said Bek Shamil and Gotsinsky.

On the basis of the most outrageous excesses, bare administration, the desire to "force" collective farm construction, tractorization, etc. (grain procurements were also carried out) — mass unrest began in this region on March 11, provoked and led by kr Sharia elements. Those who spoke organized a detachment, dispersed the local organs of Soviet power, created a "Sharia council" and a "Sharia court." \*At the head of the speech is the former commander of the red partisans - Vali Doygaev. The number of armed people at first was up to 100 people; according to the latest information, the number of armed men allegedly increased to 500\*. Unrest swept almost all the villages of the Didoevsky section.

\* The head of the movement, Vali Doygaev, on behalf of the rebels presented Okris to the regiment with the following demands;

- 1) Cancel collectivization.
- 2) Return waqf 1 lands.
- 3) Stop the persecution of the clergy.

Vakuf (ar.) - in Muslim countries, property (primarily land), tax-free and inalienable, provided as a gift or by will by a religious or charitable institution. - Comp.

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Basically, Doigaev complained about the outrages of the local authorities and demanded their change  
\*.

To the proposal to disband the gang, Vali Doigaev replied: "I took the leadership intentionally, since angry, dark and stupid Didoyites can do a lot of trouble."

The Didoevsky site belongs to the Tsumadinsky district (the center is the village of Dumala). The Didoevites who spoke indicate that there are no representatives of them (Didoevites) in the region, and the complaints of the Didoevites are mainly reduced to the Tsumadinsky authorities, which they demanded to be held accountable.

It should be noted that \* for the entire last period of excesses

in the Didoevsky district was not.

The speakers intercepted by ambushes all the mountain passes leading to the Didoevsky sector \*.

The area of action is isolated by military units and partisan detachments, which occupied mountain passes and roads leading to Georgia and the northeastern part of Dagestan.

The Bureau of the Dagkom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in its decision of March 28 of this year. fixed:

"1) Immediately send a special investigation commission to investigate all the perversions, excesses and crimes committed by individual workers in the Tsumadinsky district and bring them to justice, holding a trial on the spot with the participation of the poor.

2) Suggest that the Dagsoyuz immediately send an instructor to organize a cooperative in Didoy and take urgent measures to transfer manufactured goods and bread to supply the workers.

\*Even at the very beginning of the events, one of the demands of those who spoke was to join Georgia. As can be seen from the attached telegrams, on April 2, a delegation of Didoevites\* appeared at the Transcaucasian military barrier (Kodorsky Pass - Georgia), declaring on behalf of the population their desire to join Georgia as part of 40 villages.

It should be taken into account that the Didoevsky site has a number of economic ties with Georgia (pasture issue).

\*We consider it necessary to resolve the issue of the Didoevsky sector without the intervention of armed forces\*, if the terms of surrender are met by the Didoevites.

\*\* It is quite obvious that the Dagestan government will not be able to resolve the issue peacefully with the attitude of the Didoevites towards them (sending a delegation to Georgia).

We would consider it necessary to send an urgent dispatch from the center of a special, commission on the Soviet line, or to authorize someone from the Rostov SKK \*\*.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA  
BEGINNING. SOU OGPU EVDOKIMOV

APRF. F, 3. Op. 30. D. 147. L. 15-17. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains handwritten notes: "For Comrade Stalin"; "From Comrade Berries".

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

»\*—» Underlined in the margins with two lines.

DOCUMENTATION

No. 231

CIPPHROTELEGRAM FROM MAKHACHKALA A.I. MURAVIEV  
and D.E. Korkmasova I.V. STALIN

April 7, 1930

No. 4/s

MOST SECRET

For a month, in the Didoevsky region, the GPU authorities conducted negotiations with the rebels of this region. All conditions relating to the elimination of shortcomings admitted by the party organs, the local Soviet authorities, the involvement of those responsible for abuses, excesses, were accepted by the Dagestan government. The district is provided with manufactured goods and bread within the limits of the need. \*On April 5, the leaders of the rebels refused any negotiations with the Daghestan government, declaring Gazavat, on the same date they went on the offensive against our detachments. Two small detachments, consisting of GPU workers, red partisans, are surrounded by insurgents\*. Mullahs, kulaks, tribal leaders of mountainous Dagestan, in connection with the offensive of the rebels, led a frantic agitation for a general action. We have mobilized all forces to fight the rebels, who are poorly armed, but \* our forces may not be sufficient to eliminate the uprising \*. Launching an offensive from the side of Dagestan, at the same time, in order to ensure the rear from the side of Georgia, \* the rebels sent a delegation to Tiflis to negotiate the accession of Didoy to Georgia \*, as a result of which the GPU authorities delayed the liquidation of the uprising. A further delay in the liquidation of the Didoev uprising will lead to a spread to other regions, and may disrupt the spring season, since a group ebb began to flow into the mountains among the mountaineer workers in the fields.

\*Please give a directive to the military department, the GPU to take measures to eliminate the uprising in the Didoevsky region as soon as possible\*.

SECRETARY OK MURAVIEV  
CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL'S COMMISSION KORKMASOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 147. L. 49, 50. Original. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 232

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DIDOEVSKY DISTRICT"

Ju April 1930

N ° 123, p. 46 - About the Didoevsky district (comrades Stalin, Yagoda).

a) Reject the proposal of the Dagobkom on the Didoyevsky district, considering it more expedient to gradually eliminate unrest by isolating the area from the outside world and decomposing it from within.

b) Instruct Comrade Yagoda to give instructions through the OGPU on the basis of the exchange of opinions that took place (to demand the extradition of ringleaders, to confirm to the population before

voluntary entry into collective farms, freedom of religion, etc.).

APRF. f. 3. Op. 30. D. 147. L. 49. Copy. Typescript.

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No. 233

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE VERIFICATION

I.N. STRIZHOVA

April 25, 1930

N ° 124, item 56 - On the testimony of Strizhov.

To instruct a commission composed of representatives of the RKI of the USSR, the OGPU and the People's Commissariat of Military Commissariat of Commissars to verify the correctness of Strizhov's statement and about countermeasures on our part.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 336. L. 30. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by the decision of the Politburo of 20.4.30.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Yagoda, Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov.

No. 234

MESSAGE I.P. PAVLUNOVSKY

I.V. TO STALIN ON THE VERIFICATION OF THE CORRECTNESS OF INFORMATION

I.N. STRIZHOVA

May 30, 1930

MOST SECRET

In pursuance of the decision of the PB, the Commission, under my chairmanship, carried out an inspection of the Tuapse port in connection with the testimony of the arrested Strizhov.

1. On April 12, 1930, Strizhov testified that "on the instructions of the British, the Tuapse port was specially prepared by a wrecking organization as a base for the British fleet in the Black Sea in case of intervention in 1928 to deploy large landing operations on the Caucasian coast."

For the operations of the British fleet against the USSR in the Black Sea, the British, of course, need to have strongholds, at least in the form of temporary bases. For these purposes, the British can use the ports of Tuapse, Batum, Poti and Novorossiysk.



Talk about intervention in emigre circles has been going on all the time and is still going on. From this side, the testimony of the arrested Strizhov is probable, that in 1925 the White Guards, and possibly the British intelligence, were given the task of wrecking the port of Tuapse.

This is all the more likely because Strizhov in the past was a major shareholder of Nobel, chairman of the Kadet party and mayor in Grozny.

2. Tuapse port and until 1927, i.e. Prior to the construction of the Grozny-Tuapse oil pipeline, it had a depth at the berths of 22-24 feet, while at the entrance to the port, at a distance of 1/2 kilometer from the berth, the port had a depth of 34-36 feet. Even until 1927, such a depth of the port allowed light English ships (destroyers, light cruisers) to approach the berth itself and to stop at the entrance to the port in the roadstead for large English ships of the line, i.e. and until 1927 Tu

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Apse could be used by the British as an operational base on the Black Sea.

From 1927 to the present, the Tuapse port, in connection with the construction of the Grozny-Tuapse oil pipeline, has received significant development: large-scale dredging has been carried out, the first stage of an oil refinery has been built to process 1.3 million tons of oil, the number of berths has been increased, a power plant was built and other works were carried out to improve and equip the port.

Of course, such a development of the Tuapse port increased its role and importance as a possible operational base for both our navy and foreign navies - English, French and Italian.

yansky.

3. However, it must be emphasized that I did not find any special works not related to the development of the commercial activities of the port, but intended specifically for interventionists, in the port.

Strizhov shows that "the ports were deepened to 36 feet, which was necessary for large English ships, but was not necessary for oil tankers." During the examination, this indication is not confirmed. The measurement of the depths at the berths carried out by us together with the port showed that by now the port has been deepened at the berths from 22-24 feet. up to 29-34 feet, in the roadstead and at the entrance to the port from 34-36 feet. up to 36-37 feet. Is this depth necessary for commercial purposes? During our visit to Tuapse on May 13-14, a foreign steamer with a draft of 30 feet, with an overload of up to 32 feet, was standing at the pier under a flood of oil. Such a draft of a steamer requires a depth of 32-33 feet. The port at 4 berths is deepened to 34 feet. Therefore, the maximum that can be said about the depths is that four berths have been made one foot deeper than is required for commercial purposes at the present time. Is it possible to consider that this foot has a special purpose for interventionists? It is difficult to say, because the depth of 32-33 feet is sufficient for powerful English ships of the line (dreadnoughts) to approach the berth.

\*Thus, the port of Tuapse currently really provides

the possibility of entering it by powerful warships. But all the first-class commercial ports of Europe and our ports—Leningrad, Odessa, Novorossiysk\*—are in the same approximate depth position.

Number of berths. Until 1927 the port of Tuapse had 9 berths. Currently, it has 13 berths, of which 6 are adapted for oil loading. For the export of the projected 2.3 million tons of oil products, 4 oil berths would be enough. Thus, the two berths seem to be overbuilt. But during our visit to Tuapse on May 13-15, five oil-loading berths were occupied by oil tankers and one quarter-loader stood in the roadstead\*.

As for the location of 6 oil berths, which can be approached by ships of the line, these berths in the port are located in such a way that they extremely hamper the maneuvering of the navy. Large warships can only approach two oil berths. The approach of large warships to the remaining four berths is unlikely, since they would have to be pulled out by tugboats from the berths to the roadstead, which is absolutely unacceptable in a combat situation. Therefore, to assume that these berths were specially built for the approach of large English warships, as Strizhov shows, seems unlikely.

4. Strizhov testified: "Tuapse was supplied with cars, trucks, tractors, which the troops needed." "We have prepared in Tuapse significant

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stocks of high-quality iron, tires, electric welding machines, stocks of fodder, food supplies, which should have been required by the landing force.

The survey found that at present in Tuapse there are 4 tractors and 5 five-ton trucks. At the height of the work on the construction of the port, there were 24 tractors, five-ton cars - 28. Forage stocks at the time of construction reached 10-15 wagons. There were no special food supplies.

\*I have come to the conclusion that cars, tractors, fodder, etc. were necessary for the construction of the port, and their number does not give grounds to conclude that in Tuapse, during the construction of the oil pipeline and the port, special reserves were specially accumulated for interventionists.

5. I did not find concrete platforms for the installation of large guns \*.

6. As for the area for airplanes, in 1929 a platform with a size of 600x300 meters was actually built, which could be used for landing airplanes.

7. On April 12, 1930, Strizhov testified that the construction of oil refineries in Tuapse and Batum was sabotage aimed at creating bases for the British navy. But if these same plants were built in Poti and Novorossiysk, then, according to Strizhov, this would not be wrecking.

This is sheer nonsense. Ports of Novorossiysk and Poti in terms of use

their interventionists are no different from Tuapse and Batum.

8. According to Strizhov's testimony, Tuapse was being prepared by pests as a base for "landing large military detachments", for "operations deep into the Caucasus and to the North."

Commission with the participation of com. troops of Comrade Belov, it was revealed that Tuapse, as a base for the development of operations on Krasnodar and Armavir, is of little use, since the offensive paths in a strip of about 70 kilometers pass through a mountain range with inaccessible, forested slopes. Under these conditions, an enemy offensive from the direction of Tuapse can be delayed for a long time even by small detachments.

9. \*What is the sabotage in the Tuapse port:

114 oil tanks with a capacity of up to 300,000 tons are not camouflaged and are located in such a way that direct shots even from small ships - destroyers and submarines - can freely shoot and set fire to all the tanks.

As a result, I come to the conclusion that sabotage in the Tuapse port consists mainly in the location of tanks at a close distance from the coast and, moreover, without any disguise.

As for the development and equipment of the port, I cannot draw the conclusion that the port of Tuapse has been specially adapted by pests as a base for large English ships and for landing from Tuapse deep into the Caucasus.

On my return from Tuapse, in the presence of Comrade Prokofiev, I interrogated Strizhov and Akkerman\*.

Strizhov showed that "our main c.-r. work consisted in the fact that we prepared a port for the interventionists, which was not needed for the economy of the USSR. "From the point of view of the narrow military, I, not being competent in military matters, cannot judge whether the port of Tuapse was prepared in detail for landing and other military operations."

Akkerman testified: "I knew from Strizhov, Pokrovsky and Rodnensky that at the end of the year 28 (autumn) an intervention by the British was planned, and it was planned to capture Tuapse and turn it into a base. Therefore, according to Strizhov's instructions, I had to complete the construction of the plant by this date, since the invaders' fleet would need oil products."

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"Assignments for the preparation of the Tuapse region for the installation of heavy artillery and the arrangement of concrete platforms for it, shooting maps, fixing certain lines for firing, etc. I did not receive, and nothing in this respect was undertaken or done by me.

#### OFFERS

1. Instruct the NKVMor and the Supreme Council of National Economy to work out the issue of the construction site of the second stage of the oil refinery, the transfer of part of the tanks already built to a safe place and the organization of the defense of Tuapse.

Pavlunovskiy

P.S. Comrade Shorskov has a dissenting opinion on certain questions, which I enclose here.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 336. L. 46-52. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "To members of the PB. No. 3".

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* Published without Shorskov's note.

No. 235

CRITIQUE V.R. MENZHINSKY  
NOTES I.P. PAVLUNOVSKY AND  
THE PROPOSAL IN CONNECTION WITH I.V. STALIN

June 8, 1930

No. 24581/s

MOST SECRET

TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC. t.t. Andreev, Bauman, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kosior St., Kuibyshev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Petrovsky, Rudzutak, Rykov, Stalin, Syrtsov, Tomsky, Chubar

t.t. Ordzhonikidze, Menzhinsky, Pavlunovsky.

Criticism of Comrade Pavlunovsky's memorandum on the Tuapse buildings is sent out. To the opinion of T.T. Menzhinsky and Prokofiev, apparently, a representative of the Military Department on the commission of Comrade Pavlunovsky joined. The question should have been discussed in the Politburo.

I. Stalin

Top secret

After reviewing the memorandum of comrade. Pavlunovsky about the work entrusted to him as a member of the Politburo commission on the work on the Tuapse construction, it should be noted that \* the large amount of factual material given in the note does not always correctly reflect the actual state of affairs \*, moreover, it is accompanied mainly by personal incorrect facts - judgments. All this makes the memorandum of comrade. Pavlunovsky was not the result of the work of the commission, but his dissenting opinion put forward against the point of view of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the OGPU.

In confirmation of this, one should dwell on the following points in the Report of comrade. Pavlunovsky: 1. Perversions were allowed in the question of the depth of the port. \*The actual depth of the port at the berths is now 34 feet and at the entrance to the port is 37 feet. For commercial shipping,

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exactly only 28 feet, and not 32, as the note states \* (for the period from December 16, 28 to November 10, 29, out of 104 ships of domestic and foreign origin, the maximum draft of foreign ships was 27! / 2 foot.). As for the stay of a foreign ship in the port of Tuapse with a draft of 30 feet, mentioned in the memorandum of comrade. Pavlunovsky, this fact is not true. According to the official certificate of the Lloyd's register, the draft of the steamer "Lumineta", about which Comrade. Pavlunovskiy is equal to 25 feet, and therefore, the conclusion about the need to deepen the port over 30 feet for commercial purposes is unconvincing.

2. In paragraph 3 it is said that \*no special work for the intervention has been carried out, and below in the memorandum it is indicated that, nevertheless, a platform for airplanes has been built\*. The very fact of building an airfield is of considerable importance in terms of preparation, and especially in Tuapse as a military port.

3. \* Most of the tractors and trucks were taken away not after the completion of construction, as the memorandum says, but after the start of the investigation in Grozny, which is not the same thing \*.

4. There is absolutely accurate information that since 1927 cargoes of a very strange nature have been sent to Tuapse, which lie there to this day. According to official information from Soyuzneft, these items are not needed for Tuapse construction.

5. The memorandum says nothing about the inspection of the Yar Mez plant, \* which is a typical front-line workshop \* and not needed for Tuapse construction.

6. Tov. PAVLUNOVSKY considers STRIZHOV's testimony that if an oil refinery had been built in Novorossiysk, and not in Tuapse, it would not have been sabotage aimed at creating a base for the British navy as sheer nonsense. Never in his testimony did STRIZHOV say anything of the kind regarding Novorossiysk. STRIZHOV in his testimony of April 13 of this year, to which Comrade. PAVLUNOVSKY, says that the refinery should have been built not in Novorossiysk itself, but 25-30 versts from it on the other side of the Arkhotsky pass, which would be a natural defense against possible shelling by ship artillery.

The cited few lines torn out from the testimony of STRIZHOV received personally by Comrade. PAVLUNOVSKY, cannot but instill distrust in Strizhov's testimony in this form, despite the fact that they are a development and confirmation of his initial testimony.

Quite strange is the fact that the memorandum does not express exactly the opinion of comrade. MUKLEVICH and the command of the Black Sea Fleet, saying that Tuapse at present can be the most favorable base for operational operations of a foreign fleet \*.

If we add to all this the wrong postscript Comrade. PAVLUNOVSKY that SHORSKOV has a dissenting opinion on certain issues and that the commission did not meet to discuss the conclusions of its work, then it will become quite clear that the memorandum of comrade. PAVLUNOVSKY is not a commission document, but rather his personal opinion\*.

CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU MENZHINSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 336. L. 60-63. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 236

NOTE G.G. BERRIES AND YA.K. Olsky I.V. STALIN,

K.E. VOROSHILOV, S. ORJONIKIDZE ON  
THE ARREST OF N.M. SHISHMAREVA

July 16, 1930

Top secret

In Leningrad, our body arrested the head. the general department of the secret part of  
"Vossudprom", a member of the CPSU (b) since 1919 N. M. SHISHMAREV. on charges of spying  
for England.

The investigation established that, along \* Shishmarev was handed over to the British  
with other top secret documents, one copy of the "Conclusions of the commission of the inspector of the  
RCT comrade. BLIZNICHENKO on the survey of "Sudotrest" with the application of the "Plan of  
Specialization of the Plant". In the conclusions relating to the end of 1929, along with a detailed analysis of  
the state of "Sudotrest", there are precise indications necessary for the implementation of the programs  
outlined by the government both in the field of commercial and military shipbuilding, rationalization  
measures, partial re-equipment of factories trust, capital and other investments, etc. The "Plan of  
Specialization" specifies exactly at which factories of what type military ships (armored ships, submarines,  
destroyers, minesweepers, gliders, etc.) should be built.

\*Based on the indicated data, the British headquarters is able to determine with approximate  
accuracy the program of the Voenved for military shipbuilding in the current five-year plan\*.

Deputy before the OGPU  
Yagoda Nach. KRO OGPU Olsky

APRF. F.Z.Op. 58. D. 240. L. 94. Original. Typescript.

\* On the sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "To members of the PB."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 237

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"About a bargaining chip" (76)

August 25, 1930

No. 5, p. 30/39 - On a bargaining chip (PB dated 5.VIII.ZO, project No. 3, p. 8/17) (comrades Rudzutak, Mikoyan, Bryukhanov, Kalinin, Menzhinsky).

b) Instruct the OGPU to step up measures to combat speculators and concealers of small change, including in Soviet-cooperative institutions.

RGASGI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 16. Original. Typescript.

The decision was adopted at a meeting of the Politburo on 20.8.30.

There is a typewritten note in the text about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Menzhinsky - b." -

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No. 238

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON INCREASING THE NUMBER OF STAFF OF THE OGPU (77)

August 25, 1930

No. 5, paragraph 31/40. - Question of the OGPU (PB dated 10.8.30, pr. No. 4, p. 21\32). (vol. Postyshev, Rogov, Janson)

a) Accept the proposal of the commission (see annex).

b) To entrust the issue of the currency estimate to be considered by commissions consisting of t.t. Rudzutak, Messing and Bryukhanov.

APPENDIX to

clause 31 \ 40-rs (o.p.) pr. PB No.

5

QUESTION OF THE OGPU

1. To increase the contingent of employees of the OGPU from October 1, 1930 by 3165 employees.
2. To increase from 1.X.30 the number of internal troops of the OGPU by 3500 people, the border guard of the OGPU by 2500 people and by 3000 horses.
3. Approve the estimate of the OGPU for the organs for 30/31 in the amount of 88,014,000 rubles.
4. In case of insufficiency of credit for food to prisoners and allowances for convicts, to propose to the OGPU, upon submission of reports in the 2nd half of 30/31, to enter with a presentation to allocate an additional loan from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
5. In the event of the formation of arrears in the payment of pensions, such should be included in the estimate of 31/32 years.

6. Determine the reserve for the fight against the kulaks at 250 people.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 9. L. 16, 20. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten notation about the mailing: "The extracts were sent to: comrade Rudzutak, comrade Bryukhanov, comrade Menzhinsky."

No. 239

NOTE V.R. MENZHINSKY AND A.L. MOLOCHONIKOVA

I.V. TO STALIN ON THE ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (78)

August 29, 1930

OWL. SECRET

The OGPU uncovered a number of espionage and sabotage groups organized on the territory of the USSR by the British Intelligence Service.

The beginning of the creation of such groups dates back to 1926, when the Metropolitan-Vickers firm received a number of orders in the Soviet Union and established its general representative office in Leningrad.

Having significant installation work in the USSR, the Metropolitan-Vickers firm maintains its technical personnel in the Union. This is used:

1. "Intelligence Service" to send its agents to us for the purpose of political, military espionage and organization of sabotage.
2. The Commission for Russian Trade, which exists under the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the purpose of economic espionage.

We have identified and arrested a number of agents recruited for the needs of the Intelligence Service, and a number of agents working for the Metropolitan Vickers and the mentioned commission under the Ministry of Trade and Industry.

DOCUMENTS \_251

The saboteur groups have so far been established by the corollary as follows:

1. In Leningrad, at the 5th state power plant "Red October" and at the Volkhov power plant. This saboteur group included: the chief engineer of the station SVIRSKY V.V., Head. installation of turbines NEANDER M.F. and foreman PALEK I.V. The group was headed by engineer NEANDER.
2. The second saboteur group is installed in the Grozneft trust. This saboteur group included engineers BONDARENKO I.K., KHANBEKOV and ADAMOVICH, headed by engineer BONDARENKO.

The task of the saboteur groups was: AT THE MOMENT OF OPENING MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE USSR TO BLOW UP A NUMBER OF LARGE REGIONAL POWER PLANTS AND THIS FOR A LONG TIME TO PARALYZE THE ACTIVITY OF OUR FACTORIES, INDUSTRY AND FACTORIES.